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How do intellectual innovations in policy fields occur under authoritarian China? In this study, I 
answer this question through a political-sociological investigation of the academic policy debates of 
the People’s Republic of China about its ethnic minority policy (a.k.a. “minzu policy”) in the Post-
Mao period. Building off existing literature, I propose a theory of academic policy debates. This 
theory is predicated upon the political-institutional context of a policy subsystem and the internal 
dynamics of the knowledge community. My central argument can be summarized as follows: 
academic policy debates in Post-Mao China vary along two dimensions – the level of academic 
politicization and the theoretical heterogeneity; consequently, a debate on a given topic is a function 
of a) the level of conflict within the policy subsystem and b) the level of fragmentation within the 
knowledge community. To demonstrate this theory, I trace the changes in the conflict of policy 
subsystem, the fragmentation in the knowledge community, and the character of academic policy 
debates regarding China’s ethnic minority policy from 1979 to 2017. As I show, during this period, 
academic debates about minzu policy went from moderate-to-intense debate within the minzu 
studies paradigm to a heightened inter-paradigm debate – as the conflict among policy elites and 
fragmentation within the knowledge community increased – only to become somewhat moderated 
following the direct intervention of the party leadership to unify policy discourse. This study makes 
three main contributions: 1) it offers the first systematic study of the dynamics in academic 
knowledge production behind China’s multiethnic governance since 1979; 2) it provides a political-
sociological account of the academic policy debates in Post-Mao based on a diachronic analysis of 
the minzu debate, thus advancing our theoretical knowledge about the political-sociological 
conditions for intellectual innovations in contemporary PRC’s policy field; and finally, 3) it suggests 
insights for understanding intellectual innovations in policy fields under authoritarian regimes more 
broadly.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
“Marxist-Leninist ethnology and capitalist ethnology are fundamentally at odds with one 
another, completely incompatible like water and fire; only by thoroughly critiquing the 
reactionary thoughts of the bourgeoise ethnology can we establish a new theoretical system for 
China’s ethnology […] Let us bury the bourgeoise ethnology without any reservation and 
establish China’s Marxist-Leninist ethnology with our wisdom and hands, [and] offer our service 
to the socialist construction and the communism in the not-so-distant future!”  
– Huang Chaozhong, 19581 
 
“Of course, it is beyond reproach to critique the idealist or reactionary theories of the western 
ethnology. However, labeling ethnology in the West entirely as reactionary without exception, 
putting a bourgeoise hat on it, or even declaring it to be a ‘forbidden topic’ is completely 
mistaken. […] The historical materialism of Marxism only provided us the perspective, 
approach, and theory to study human societies; but historical materialism cannot substitute the 
entire social science. […] We should carry out thorough and in-depth investigations, further 
deepen our understanding of the new issues that emerged for different ethnicities in the process 
of ‘Four Modernizations’ and offer scientific bases for the party and state in making plans and 
policies for the minorities.” 
 – Li Youyi, 19802 
 
                                                      
1 Huang, Chaozhong. 1958, “The Reactionary and Anti-Scientific Character of Bourgeoise Ethnology”, Theory and 
Practice, No. 8, pp16-18.  
2 Li, Youyi. 1980, “Review and Future Prospect of China’s Ethnology”, Ethno-National Studies, No. 1, pp48-59.  
 2 
1.1 Overview 
1.1.1 Familiar Strangers: Academics of the People’s Republic 
To a casual observer, academic discourse in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may look like 
a chimera: whereas in some quarter one finds the kind of serious scholarship as one would expect 
from a community of professional researchers anywhere in the world, in other places one finds the 
same group of people enthusiastically offering advices to the government or engaging in seemingly 
non-academic, political slogan chanting. Moreover, most scholars seem to be perfectly capable of 
traversing back and forth between these two realms with little effort. In fact, PRC academics – 
scientists, social scientists, philosophers, etc. – openly espouse the notion that their professional 
endeavor should and does perform a function beyond the pursuit of knowledge itself. The quotes at 
the beginning of this chapter offer us a glimpse: Huang Chaozhong, director of Guangdong Institute 
of Nationality was advocating for a reform of ethnology along Marxist-Leninist lines (C. 朝中 
Huang 黄 1958) whereas Li Youyi, researchers at CASS Institute of Nationality was defending the 
western (“bourgeoise”) ethnology (Y. 有义 Li 李 1980). Both pieces (despite being kept apart by 
more than two turbulent decades), however, were premising their arguments on an unequivocal 
position that scientific research should serve the political objective of the state, be it “communism” 
or “Four Modernizations”. Robert Cox’s exclamation that “[t]heory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (Cox 1981, 128), so it seems, is not just a call for attention but the basic principle 
upon which PRC scholars pursue their career as professional academics. In what language one’s 
commitment to political service is articulated – as the above examples show – is likely contingent 
upon the specific social and political conditions. But it is an undisputable fact that scholars in China 
do not refrain from but actively align their research with the political agenda of the state, often 
openly committing to produce knowledge for the state (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004a). The 
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persistent intertwining between academia and state even in Post-Mao period where political control 
over research has been substantially reduced makes it clear that scholars’ manifested interests to 
serve the state is not just a performance put up to please the censor. Rather, it seems more likely that 
most of them have internalized – not the Roxian insight that came about only in 1981 – the famous 
thesis put forward by the former paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao 
Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung). Speaking at the Counter-Japanese Military and Political University (Ch: 
kangri junshi zhegnzhi daxue) in Yan’an in 1937, Mao argued that:  
 
“Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the 
laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of 
these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important […] 
But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide 
action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into 
practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance.”3  
 
For PRC scholars, therefore, producing knowledge that can guide practice to change the world is 
the ultimate end of scholarly pursuit. However, the concern with the “practicality” of knowledge 
does not exclude theoretical inquiry. On the contrary, as the above-cited speech demonstrates, 
theory is understood as part of the dialectical movement where theory as grasping the objective laws 
of the world is generated from practice and is then applied back into practice so to achieve the 
expected change; in this process the correct theories are validated and wrong ones discovered and 
discarded. In the contemporary context, this means not just any practical knowledge, but practical 
                                                      
3 Mao, Zedong. [1937] 2014, “On Practice: On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and 
Doing”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong]: Vol. I, pp295-310.   
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knowledge for the Chinese state. Over the decades since the founding of PRC, generations of 
academics in China have passionately engaged in debates on a variety of topics with the aim of 
letting their knowledge better serve their country. One recent example, already extensively 
documented and studied in the English-language literature, is the debate revolving around the 
Chinese International Relations (IR) Theory, alternatively also known as the so-called “Chinese 
School of IR” (Callahan 2008; Qin 2009, 2010; Ren 2010; F. Zhang 2012; Kristensen and Nielsen 
2013; Noesselt 2015). As analyses of the debate have suggested, what puzzles (or troubles) many 
outside observers is not that PRC scholars have a different IR theory or theories from the ones 
taught in the West per se (e.g. realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism) but that many of those 
scholars advertise their theory-building endeavor – implicitly or explicitly – as a service to the 
Chinese state, e.g. by offering both a counter-weight against the perceived hegemony of “western IR 
theories” (Y. Zhang and Kristensen 2017) or the “scientific” guidance for the Chinese foreign 
policy-making (Xuetong Yan 2011). As one commentator put it, “[t]he Chinese School [of IR] 
Movement represents the most recent expression of Sino-centrism and has played an indispensable 
role in the continuity of the Sino-centric tradition” (Lu 2018, 11).  
It is against the backdrop of this “peculiar” character of the PRC academia that I situate the 
topic of the present study. PRC academics are, one could say, “familiar strangers” to their 
counterparts in western universities, think-tanks, or other professional research institutions. They are 
“familiar” because one can point to a number of similarities between academics in PRC and 
elsewhere: they conduct research following recognizably disciplinary traditions, publish and 
exchange their findings with peers, organize and attend professional conferences and workshops, 
and fulfill other duties such as teaching, mentoring, and administration. At the same time, they are 
unmistakably “strangers” because as a community of professional researchers they display an firm 
belief that scientific knowledge should first and foremost serve their country, even in moments 
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when their faith in the government or regime might be shattered (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004a). 
For those who are interested in contemporary China, particularly the relationship between 
knowledge and governance, these “familiar strangers” and their professional activities are an 
important topic of study. This dissertation focuses on one such group: the PRC ethnic minority 
studies community (or the PRC minzu studies community, as I shall explain later). Specifically, this 
is a study about how the political-sociological conditions – i.e. conflict in the policy environment 
and fragmentation in the knowledge community – shape the debates among scholars of ethnic 
minority in Post-Mao China. By examining how these conditions influence the way academic policy 
debates are carried out, I attempt to shed light on an important issue that relatively fewer political 
scientists have touched upon: intellectual innovations in contemporary China’s policy field. Before 
elaborating further on the significance of this study, I first summarize the basic rationale and main 
arguments below.   
 
1.1.2 Intellectual Innovation in Policy Fields and Academic Policy Debates 
The fundamental puzzle that drives this research is: how do intellectual innovations in policy 
fields occur under authoritarian China? Like every ruler, autocrats face challenges to their 
government from time to time. Crime, corruptions, market fluctuations, energy shortage, ecological 
crises, ethnic conflicts – for those in power, changes in the domestic or international circumstances 
produce new problems constantly. To cope with them, modern states – regardless of how its 
political institution is organized – usually support a corps of scientific and technical experts who 
would busy themselves with studying the problems and proposing policy innovations when 
confronted with a new problem. But the mere presence of a knowledge community is no guarantee 
to intellectual innovations in policy fields. To know when and how innovations occur, one needs to 
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look into the process of policy knowledge production. In this study, I approach this question by 
zooming in on one key aspect of the latter process: the academic policy debate.  
The central research question of this study is: how do we explain the character of academic 
policy debates in Post-Mao China? In the broader literature on scientific knowledge production, 
sociologists of science tend to look at such a question through the prism of scientific development 
and focus primarily on the internal dynamics of knowledge community. Scholars of science and 
technology policy, in contrast, highlight the role of the state in guiding professional scientific 
activities. Still others – e.g. political scientists who focus on authoritarian regimes – concern 
themselves with how the autocratic government engages in day-to-day censorship and control over 
the production and circulation of scientific knowledge, seeking to understand the constant 
negotiation of boundary between politics and science. Relatively fewer attention have been given to 
the question of intellectual innovation in policy fields under a complex relationship between 
intellectuals and the state such as the one in contemporary PRC. Despite a recent surge of interests 
in various forms of learning practices of authoritarian regimes from Asia to Middle East and Latin 
America, we still know relatively little about how academic policy debates – and by extension, 
intellectual innovation in policy fields – occur under authoritarian regimes (for an exception see 
Kristensen and Nielsen 2013).  
In this study, I examine the logic of intellectual innovation in policy fields under authoritarian 
China through a political-sociological investigation of the academic debates on China’s minzu policy 
(Ch: minzu zhengce) in the Post-Mao period4. As I shall argue below, the character of academic policy 
                                                      
4 The precise meaning of the Chinese word minzu is itself a topic of much debate. Depending on the context, the word 
could mean ethnicity, nationality, ethnic minority, ethnic, national, or different combinations of them. Throughout this 
dissertation, I use the expression minzu policy, a direct transliteration of the Chinese phrase minzu plus the common 
English translation for zhengce, as a translation for the compound phrase minzu zhengce. I do so also for a number of other 
compound phrases which contain the word minzu in order to avoid issues with fixing it to any single concepts in English. 
For example, minzu yanjiu and minzu wenti are rendered, respectively, as minzu studies and minzu questions. One alternative 
rendering for minzu which is occasionally used in this dissertation is “ethno-nationality” (and, when applicable, its 
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debates has important implications for intellectual innovations. Building off the literature on 
comparative public policy, science and technology studies, and sociology of science, I propose a 
theory for explaining how academic policy debates react to the political-sociological conditions in 
Post-Mao China. This theory involves two steps: first, I argue that the character of an academic 
policy debate can be analytically broken down and measured along two dimensions: a) the degree of 
theoretical heterogeneity and b) the degree of academic politicization. Combining these two 
dimensions generates four mutually distinguishable types of debates: 
(1) Intra-paradigm Professional Debate 
(2) Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
(3) Inter-paradigm Professional Debate 
(4) Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
Second, I argue that each of the two dimensions is in turned shaped by a structural feature of the 
political-sociological environment in which the academics operate. Specifically, the degree of 
academic politicization of the debate is shaped by the degree of conflict within a given policy 
subsystem whereas the degree of theoretical heterogeneity of the debate is shaped by the degree of 
fragmentation within the knowledge community most intimately related to this policy area. 
Together, these two political-sociological conditions shape the character of academic policy debates 
within this community, and by extension, the potential of this community to generate intellectual 
innovations in policy fields. Accordingly, my main argument can be stated as: (DV) the character of 
an academic policy debate is a function of (IV1) the level of conflict in the policy subsystem and 
(IV2) the level of fragmentation in the knowledge community closely related to this policy area.  
                                                      
adjective form “ethno-national”). For a review about the debate over the meanings of minzu, see chapter 3, section 3.3.: 
“Discourse about Minzu Policy in PRC”.  
 8 
As the table below demonstrates, a higher level of conflict in the policy subsystem causes an 
academic policy debate to become more politically-oriented than professionally-oriented, whereas a 
higher level of fragmentation in the knowledge community causes an academic policy debate to 
become more inter-paradigmatic than intra-paradigmatic. Independent variations of the two 
explanatory variables produce the four of academic policy debates discussed above through exerting 
their influence on the two aspects of a debate separately. In sum, by describing different types of 
debates and linking them with the character of policy subsystem and knowledge community, my 
theory explains variation in the character of academic policy debates in Post-Mao China.  






Academic Policy Debate 
(DV) 
(1) Low conflict Low fragmentation Intra-paradigm Professional Debate 
(2) Low conflict High fragmentation Inter-paradigm Professional Debate 
(3) High conflict Low fragmentation Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
(4) High conflict High fragmentation Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
 
To demonstrate this theory, I examine the evolution of policy debates by the PRC academics on 
ethnic minority studies from 1979 to 2017. In doing so, this study brings our aforementioned 
“familiar strangers”, i.e. social scientific intellectuals in authoritarian China, under the spotlight. Why 
is it important to study the activities of social scientists in authoritarian regimes from a theoretical 
point of view? How does a study centered on social scientific academics contribute to our 
knowledge about broader topics in comparative politics and policy? In the rest of this chapter, I shall 
discuss the significance of this study in relation to the broader theoretical literatures on intellectual 
innovations in contemporary China’s policy fields, authoritarian consultation, epistemic community, 
and politics of science. In the course of doing so I will explain how an inquiry of the relationship 
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between the social scientific community and the authoritarian state may contribute to each of them. 
Finally, I offer an overview of the structure of this dissertation. 
 
1.2 Significance 
1.2.1 Knowledge Production and Intellectual-State Relations in Contemporary China 
Studying academic policy debates in China has the potential to make a number of contributions. 
Most immediately, it contributes to our knowledge about knowledge production and intellectual-
state relations in contemporary China. First of all, academic policy debates reflect various features of 
the knowledge production by policy experts in the country, offering important insights on the way in 
which a given policy topic is approached by the national scientific community. Examining policy 
debates in academic venues enables us to study the policy focus of the academic community, the 
different theories and approaches that the academic elites employ to analyze policy matters, the 
range of opinions and perspectives held by the scientific community in the country at a given time, 
as well as the possible structural and/or institutional characteristics of the scientific knowledge 
production process (Elliott 2015; Irvine 2017). This allows us to understand the manners in which a 
policy topic is approached by the professional researchers. At the same time, due to the public 
accessibility of academic discussion to the public, as well as many scholars’ active efforts to shape 
public opinions (Cheek 2006), studying academic debates offers us clues about the potential policy 
and political attitudes of the wider society. This is particular so because ideas and opinions in 
academic policy debates often carries the recognition as the institutionally-sanctioned “scientific” 
opinions, and often serve as the basis and/or points of reference for wider discussion of policy 
issues in the media or – increasingly – by the public via online social media. As such, it offers us 
clues about how the societal discussion about a particular policy could unfold.  
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Secondly, academic policy debates are an important component of the elite policy discourse and 
acts as a window into the innovative aspect of policy-making of the Chinese government. Policy 
discourse covers not only the debates among academics but also policy discussions, deliberations, 
and debate carried out through the internal channels of the government and party. Academic venues 
are less easily accessible to the general public than the media but more accessible than internal 
government discussions. Importantly, even academic venues are regulated not only by professional 
norms and institutionalized standards, but also by policy, political, and ideological interests of the 
regime (Taylor 2011; Noakes 2014; Holbig 2014). The regime allows innovative policy debates to be 
carried out inside academic and professional venues, especially when decision makers have not yet 
reached consensus, elite interests clash, or different proposals compete for endorsement by the 
political leadership (Downs 2004, 2; Gilley and Holbig 2009; Lynch 2015). Occasionally, officials 
engage directly the scholarly discussion by authoring articles in academic journals. Therefore, 
academic policy debates offer one the opportunity to peek into the deliberative aspect of 
contemporary Chinese policy-making. While the discourse has no direct bearing on decision 
decisions, it reveals the range of ideas that the government is willing to entertain, discuss, compare, 
or even emulate. 
Finally, scholarly venues in Post-Mao China are neither a completely autonomous sphere of 
intellectual exchange nor a mere outlet for “politically correct” ideas of the regime. As such, changes 
in the parameter of academic policy debates reflect the changing intellectual-state relationship in 
China. Since the restoration of social sciences in 1980s, disciplines were revived, and departments 
were reestablished. Journals gradually resumed publications. Scholars also began to convene 
conferences, workshops, and other professional gatherings. The granted autonomy of social 
scientific research played important roles in China’s economic and social reform under the Post-Mao 
leadership (Halpern 1988; Hsu 1988; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). At the same time, political 
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control over the intellectuals has also been restructured. Different from the overt political 
intervention in research and teaching from 1950s to 1970s, academic censorship during the Post-
Mao era are subtler, in many cases more indirect, fluid, and context-specific. In addition to direct 
censorship, the government also exerts influence through research funding allocation, job 
appointment, editorial process, and administrative discipline, and so on (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007a; 
Holbig 2014). As a result, one could expect that academic discourse in China has become partially 
autonomous, operating within the shifting parameters set by the regime but maintaining a limited 
space for debates, disagreement, and even dissent at the same time. Therefore, it is both useful and 
important to study the factors that shape academic policy debates, particularly in light of the shifting, 
multifaceted state-society relations in Post-Mao China. 
In sum, studying PRC academic policy debates can help us to understand how a particular policy 
topic is understood and debated within the professional circle and the relatively more politically 
active segment of the society. Because of the intimate connection between politics and academia, it 
also provides insights on the innovative thinking among policy elites and offers clues for predicting 
possible direction(s) of the policy development. Lastly, it also sheds light on the evolving 
intellectual-state relationship in a transitional, post-socialist country such as the People’s Republic of 
China. 
 
1.2.2 Authoritarian Consultation and Regime Resilience 
Beyond its contribution to the field of contemporary PRC studies, studying academic policy 
debates also speaks broadly to the literature of authoritarian politics, particularly the role of social 
scientific intellectuals. As an occupational designation, “social scientists” refer to those who work as 
teachers, professors, researchers, or independent scholars in the fields that are commonly accepted 
as belonging to the social sciences, such as anthropology, economics, ethnology, geography, history, 
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linguistics, political science, sociology, and so on. The defining feature of social scientists is their area 
of specialization. Because of such specialization, they supposedly possess the professional skills to 
examine, analyze, and explain complex social phenomena.  
As professional knowledge workers, they can and do perform a variety of different social and 
political functions in the contemporary world. In the context of mass politics, social scientists could 
influence the society as public intellectuals, speaking with the authority of science as well as the 
symbols of objectivity and neutrality which science carries (Gattone 2006). In the context of modern 
governance, social scientists could provide knowledge to practitioners as advisors or consultants, 
either directly to the policymakers or through indirect channels such as research institutions, NGOs, 
or media (O’Connor 2001). In some cases, social scientists could take initiative as political advocates 
for policy and/or institutional reform, using social capital that comes from their prestige as experts 
and public intellectuals (Pielke, Jr. 2007). In still other cases, social scientists are induced or 
compelled to work for the political authority while seeking to either expanding its influence with the 
state’s support or preserving its autonomy by withdrawing themselves (Z. Wang 2008; Moore 2008).  
The implication of social scientists’ ability to engage in politics has been under-examined in the 
context of authoritarian regimes. An institutionally autonomous and critically-minded social 
scientific community constitutes a potential threat to an autocracy. Instead of directly partaking in a 
physical assault, they could challenge the legitimacy of the regime with counter discourse, disqualify 
its policy with professional knowledge, or even organize public oppositions with their moral 
leadership (Moore 2008; Cheek 2004). In his 1987 presidential address to the American Political 
Science Association, Samuel Huntington went as far as to argue that “political science […] is not just 
an intellectual discipline; it is also a moral one” (Huntington 1988). In his view, “the creation of a 
republic and the development of democracy also called forth political science and political scientists” 
 13 
(Huntington 1988). In other words, it should be in the interests of political scientists to promote 
democratization.  
It remains an open question if political scientists – and social scientists in general – should 
participate in politics in the way Huntington envisioned (i.e. engender political reform), or whether 
they have the interests or capacity to do so at all (Noakes 2014; He 2016). But there is ample 
evidence that most autocrats guard against their intellectual class, particularly those in the social 
sciences. In the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China up until the 1980s, 
government authorities exerted extensive control over the scientific community through political 
control, administrative appointment (nomenklatura), and research management (Kneen 1984; Hao 
2003; Hayhoe 1996). In Latin America, during the 1960s and 1970s, military governments in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Chile undertook a variety of measures to repress academic freedom and autonomy in 
universities, including dismissal and early retirements of academic staff without due process, 
expulsion of students from the university, and in some cases, even from the country on the basis of 
subversive actions (De Figueiredo-Cowen 2002).  
Today in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, governments not only censor 
the news media but also interfered in journalism education, favoring “media research that promotes 
the politically established goals of national development and national unity and discouraged from 
developing programs critical of the principles, struggle, values, and national traditions of Arab 
society”(Amin 2002). Moreover, the authority there also cultivates a “censorial political culture”, 
pressing universities and media to practice self-censorship on themselves (Mazawi 2003). Most 
recently, the Turkish government under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has ordered thousands of 
scholars either fired or suspended, a number of universities to shut down, forcing many to flee the 
country (Keller, Mykhyalyshyn, and Timur 2016; England 2017). According to one report, in the 
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first week of 2017 alone, 631 researchers and professors lost their jobs due to government imposed 
dismissals (Weise 2017).  
In addition to active control and monitoring, authoritarian governments also co-opt their social 
scientists by recruiting them in the service of the regime. Scientific “freedom” is sometimes used by 
the authority as an instrument of positive incentives and granted in exchange for loyalty and 
subservience (Solingen 1993). The Communist authorities in former Soviet Central Asia, for 
example, repressed critical social sciences but encouraged “empirical research” which could be 
exploited for solving practical problems and social engineering (Amsler 2007). Soon after the violent 
crackdown on the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989, the Chinese political leadership realized that 
the benefit of a relatively autonomous research community outweighed its risk. Subsequently, it 
chose to grant greater academic freedom to a wide range of disciplines with the caveat of promoting 
policy relevant research and excluding radical political views (C. Cao 2004; Sleeboom-Faulkner 
2007b). Wide acceptance of this a gesture by intellectuals is attested by the fact that the majority of 
social scientists continued to work for the post-Mao authoritarian regime (X. Gu 1998), even though 
the private sector did see an evident inflow of people with professional intellectual background 
(Mok 1998; Hao 2003). Later studies show that many have chosen to do so under the assumption 
that, by cooperating with the establishment they would have a chance to help improve the social 
conditions of the country with their knowledge and mend the rift in the state-society relations (X. 
Gu 1998).  
Despite their important political role, however, scholars have received relatively less attention to 
the social scientists in authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the field of International Relations (IR) 
have seen a vibrant literature on the politics of knowledge in international politics (Cooper and 
Packard 1998; Guzzini 2012; Neumann and Sending 2010; Klein 2003; Chowdhry and Nair 2002; 
Doty 1996; Anand 2007; da Silva 2007; Hansen 2006), especially following the “constructivist turn” 
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of the field (Wendt 1992; Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). While one may find 
monographic accounts of intellectual history in specific countries or comparative studies of scientific 
& technology policy in the developing world (Gaillard 1997; E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004a; Altbach 
2003), relatively few have focused specifically on the relationship between the social scientific 
community and the political environment in which they operate. Even less have attempted a 
systematic study of their political influence under authoritarian regime (Solingen 1994).  
From an institutional point of view, the defining feature of an authoritarian regime lies in the 
fact that the rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections (Gandhi 2008). Without 
having to go through a competitive struggle for popular votes, the authoritarian rulers are not held 
accountable by the general public to serve their interests. Keeping the political participation of the 
public at bay is not only a means for exercising power with less constraints, but also an essential 
undertaking to safeguard the regime and its rulers from mass uprising. In the world of authoritarian 
regimes, rulers often go to great length to suppress the public from broadening the scope of political 
participation, even at the risks of empowering those who could pose a threat to the rulers in turn, 
e.g. militaries (Svolik 2012).   
In addition to the risk of keeping a powerful repressive force, however, there is another 
downside to the arrangement. Removal or absence of institutionalized representation of the public 
in the political process takes away an important commutation channel between the authority and the 
public, thereby undermining the ability of the ruler to learn about the thinking of the ruled. As a 
result, the rulers are often inadequately informed of not only the public interests, but also the 
accumulating social grievances and the potential of anti-regime uprisings (Kuran 1995). The 
authoritarian institutions that supposedly help to sustain and strengthen the autocrats’ rule, 
ironically, also become their “information cage”, rendering them vulnerable to social revolution due 
to the lack of knowledge about the latent discontent and the likelihood of a political crisis (Kuran 
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1995). A number of notable precedence have demonstrated how such knowledge/power paradox 
could work against the authoritarian regimes, destabilizing it or even leading to regime collapse 
(Kuran 1991; Weyland 2012).  
To mitigate this problem, rulers could introduce information-gathering mechanisms so to update 
themselves with the public concerns. In Communist Bulgaria, the party leadership set up the 
Information-Sociological Center of the Central Committee in order to track citizens’ complaints in 
order to adjust governance and address popular discontent (Dimitrov 2014). A similar setup was also 
present in the People’s Republic of China till today, in the form of the Letters and Visits Offices 
(Ch: xinfangban) (Dimitrov 2013, 2015).  
Another option is to formally invite public input on government decision making. During the 
last decade, China scholars have discovered a variety of government-led consultative practices, 
ranging from local deliberative polling and controlled elections (Fishkin et al. 2010; He and 
Thøgersen 2010), to public and expert consultation in policymaking (Almén 2016; Xiaojun Yan 
2011), to NGOs taking part in local policymaking (Mertha 2008), and to self-mobilization of the 
public and media to set policy agendas. These phenomena provide interesting material for exploring 
questions of authoritarian accountability, adaptive capacity, and regime stability. The long-term 
implication of these measures on regime stability remains unclear. While some suggested 
destabilizing and/or democratizing effect on the regime, others predicted a reinforcement of the 
authoritarian rule through improved governance (He and Warren 2011).  
Importantly, research on authoritarian consultative/deliberation has yet to appreciate the role of 
social scientific intellectuals. With a few exceptions, studies usually sidelined the social and political 
functions that social scientists have played under these new developments. As noted earlier, social 
scientists are only capable of talking about specialized topics to their academic peers but are in a 
unique position to provide elaborated arguments and professional insights on public matters as 
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public intellectuals. They could inform and guide the public opinion with their expert knowledge 
and authoritative status. Given the appropriate platform, they could either serve as policy advisors or 
engage in politics as advocates themselves. Their capacity to do so is a result of their unique status as 
the institutionally endorsed knowledge authority. In other words, the discussion about consultative 
authoritarianism omits an important group of actors with capacity to influence politics.  
With the regards to studies on knowledge actors in contemporary China, to date the literature 
tends to focus on one of the following two themes: intellectual freedom and knowledge-production 
capacity. On the one hand, the political radicalism during the Mao-era had not only led to a series of 
attack on intellectuals, but also created a general unfriendly if not hostile environment for intellectual 
activities in general. Because of the tense relationship between the state and the professional 
community thus resulted, one of the main attempts by the post-Mao leadership was to appease the 
intellectuals and enlist their help for the “Four Modernization”. Against this backdrop, a prominent 
theme of the post-Mao scholarship on China is the disruption of intellectual activity during the Mao 
era, and the restoration/expansion of intellectual freedom under the reforming regime (Hayhoe 
1996; E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004a; Andreas 2009).   
On the other hand, the last three decades also saw a growing body of scholarship on 
professional research communities, particularly government and civilian think-tanks (Zhu 2009b). 
The importance of economic think tanks in top-level policy-making was already acknowledged by 
observers during the early years of the reform (Halpern 1988; Naughton 2002). Subsequent studies 
further expanded the scope to include national security (Shambaugh 1987), foreign policy (Glaser 
and Saunders 2002; Shambaugh 2002; Abb 2015), public security (Tanner 2002), and military (Gill 
and Mulvenon 2002). While initially dominated by western scholars, the field began to see 
contributions from domestic ones in recent years (Zhu and Xue 2007; Zhu 2009b, 2011), especially 
after the Chinese government made “think-tank development with Chinese characteristics” (Ch: 
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zhoneguo tese xinxing zhiku) a major target in their development plan.5 With but a very few exceptions, 
however, studies on think tank focus predominantly on their organizational features and knowledge 
output capacity.  There remains ample room for broadening our understanding about how 
intellectual innovation in policy fields operates.   
Relatedly, an equally underexplored theme is the “degree” of openness in authoritarian 
consultation/deliberation. While we may have a tentative answer as to the rationale of these 
practices (why does an autocrat consult the people?) (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2015; Meng, Pan, and Yang 
2014) and its mechanism (how does an autocrat consult the people?) (Fishkin et al. 2010; Xiaojun 
Yan 2011; Dimitrov 2015; Y. Wu and Wang 2012; Truex 2014), we still do not know the degree of 
consultative authoritarianism (how much does an autocrat engage the people in consultation?). One 
prominent thesis of this literature holds that autocratic rulers introduce administrative-level reform 
such as policy consultation in order to improve their governance and minimize the risk of a regime 
change (He and Warren 2011). In other words, consultation is meant to help reinforce regime 
stability by forestalling a revolution. If so, one should reasonably ask just to what extent would the 
autocratic rulers allow the societal actors to exercise their freedom of expression and intellectual 
autonomy, so to harness the necessary knowledge without raising the prospect of a revolution?   
After all, there are well known reasons for authoritarian governments to limit the freedom of 
speech and thought of intellectuals, and social scientists in particular. Open space for critical 
discussion of social and political issues could nurture the political awareness of the citizenry, 
cultivating demand for accountability, transparency, and participation. A critically-minded social 
scientific community could spearhead the counter hegemonic discourse against the regime. On the 
flip side, if an autocrat is interested in obtaining accurate knowledge of societal interests, this 
                                                      
5 “Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of New Think-Tanks with Chinese Characteristics” (“关于加强中国特
色新型智库建设的意见”), Xinhua Net (“新华网”), http://www.xinhuanet.com//zgjx/2015-
01/21/c_133934292.htm, accessed May 4th 2018.   
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objective would be compromised if the social scientists are unable to freely exercise their talents, 
especially if there is no guarantee of safety for expressing themselves.  
Scholars have only begun to examine the boundaries or parameter of political discussion under 
consultative authoritarianism, focusing primarily on public discourse in media (King, Pan, and 
Roberts 2013; Lorentzen 2014). A study of the intellectual autonomy of professional social scientists 
remains lacking at the moment (He 2016), despite evidence of intense political debates among elites, 
such as scholars, cadres, and policy makers (Gilley and Holbig 2009). An inquiry into political 
discussion of social scientists can be particular useful for grasping the institutional evolution: if 
socials scientific intellectuals are allowed to engage in substantive critical discussion, it is not 
inconceivable that the government become compelled to gradually transition from a simple 
“information-gathering” listener to a participating interlocutor.  
Furthermore, study the involvement of social scientists in policy process leads us to examine the 
social-cognitive process of authoritarian governance. As professional intellectuals, social scientists 
not only perform the role as researcher and producer of technical knowledge, but also take part in 
public discourse on political matters as well as policy process through various institutional and non-
institutional venues such as legislature, policy meetings, and mass media (Huntington 1988). These 
activities may operate well within the boundary of consultative authoritarianism as long as they do 
not amount to organized political opposition (He and Warren 2011). Through this process, however, 
the substantive involvement of intellectuals would likely open up the regime’s policy process even 
more in the sense that the officials would need to come up with policy justification for a wider and 
more diverse audience in their communications. Imagine as the interaction between the authoritarian 
state and the intellectuals deepens, the autocrats and the unelected officials would engage routinely 
with the society on policy matters to communicate mutual concerns and develop solutions. In this 
probable scenario, intellectuals – social scientists in particular – would play a central role. An inquiry 
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of the relation between social scientific intellectuals and the state would therefore be much beneficial 
to the study of authoritarian politics in terms of the development of consultative practices.  
 
1.2.3 Epistemic Communities and Power of Knowledge 
Outside the field of authoritarian politics, this study also speaks to the literature on the influence 
of knowledge communities in national and transnational governance. Organized around the theme 
of experts’ role in policy making, the epistemic community literature is explicitly concerned with – 
but not exclusive to – the policy influence of scientific figures (Haas 1992). On the empirical side, 
these studies were motivated by the increasingly routinized appearance and important functions that 
the experts play in the domestic and international policy process. On the theoretical side, the idea 
was facilitated by and a response to the constructivist turn in political science that emphasize the 
need to examine the social-cognitive dimensions of politics, including the impacts of knowledge, 
identities, norms, and ideology (Ruggie 1998).  
The main distinction between an epistemic community approach to policy-making and other 
approaches lies not so much in the specific types of actors that the former focuses on as in the type 
of policy influence which they wield and the mechanism in which such influence operates. As Adler 
and Haas suggested, “[e]pistemic communities are less a ‘new’ international actor or unit of analysis 
than they are a vehicle for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of 
collective interpretation and choice”. An epistemic community operates not through political 
pressure, but through persuasion based on their expert knowledge (Haas 1992). A group of scientists 
could employ tactics that bear little on their professional background. But only persuasion with 
expert knowledge, rational thinking, and impartial judgment define an epistemic community at work. 
More specifically, it is the shared scientific principles, professional knowledge, and policy-relevant 
expertise that define an epistemic community and enable it to realize its agency and exercise its 
 21 
persuasive power. The causal logic is grounded in the fact that contemporary governance involves 
situations where decision-makers constantly face uncertainties that call for specialized knowledge. As 
a result, experts that possess an authoritative claim to such knowledge should reasonably be 
expected to play a role.  
By putting “expertise” at the center, the epistemic community framework does not merely 
introduce a new type of actor in policy process, but provides a new conceptual tool to study the 
cognitive, epistemic aspect of policy-making that other approaches fail to capture (Adler and Haas 
1992, 368). In the two decades following the 1992 Special Issue in International Organization that first 
popularized the concept, a great number of studies has taken advantage of the insight and power of 
this framework, and produced fruitful evidence that validated its relevance (Cross 2013; Finnemore 
and Sikkink 2001; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). At the same time, these studies fall short 
on a number of aspects, two of which are worth highlighting in light of the present study.  
First, the role of epistemic communities under non-democratic settings has received relatively 
little attention. While significant number of studies has examined the circumstances under which 
epistemic communities are more effective at causing policy change, the attention has been largely 
confined to factors internal to an implicitly pluralist policy process common in democratic 
governments. In reviewing the literature, Cross listed five main categories of contextual factors that 
may impact the effectiveness of epistemic communities, including: (a) scope condition, e.g. whether 
the issue of interest is surrounded by uncertainty, (b) political opportunity structure, e.g. whether 
experts have access to top decision-makers, (c) phase in the policy process, e.g. intervention occurs 
at the initial or later stage, (d) coalition building, e.g. whether the community possess high 
professionalism and status, and (e) policy field coherence, e.g. whether quantitative data rather than 
subjective qualitative data exists for the issue of interest (Cross 2013). The summary is based on 
what Cross considered as the “second-wave” of literature and suggests rather impressive advance in 
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the research program. But it is also apparent that very few have attempted to move beyond the 
geographical and political confines that offered the original inspiration and sought to advance the 
applicability of the framework and our knowledge about the dynamics in knowledge-politics relation 
in non-democratic settings.  
Comparing with democratic regimes, policy process under authoritarian ones has been generally 
understudied, partially due to the regime’s institutional lack of transparency and its untypically 
hostile attitude towards outside inquiries. The commonly held notion that autocrats exercise power 
without external consultation perhaps also adds to the reservation of scholars to save their time and 
efforts from these “risky” cases. Yet in recent decades, studies have shown that epistemic 
communities not only exist in autocracies but like their counterparts in democracies, could also 
influence policy decisions given the right circumstance (Zhu 2009b, 2009a; Naughton 2002; Glaser 
and Saunders 2002; Greenhalgh 2008). What should further boost the interest in a dialogue with the 
authoritarian politics literature is the recent trend in the institutional development of authoritarian 
regimes (such as China) where the governments actively adopt consultative practices in public 
policy-making (He and Warren 2011; Teets 2013; Truex 2016, 2; Malesky, Stromseth, and 
Gueorguiev 2017). As argued earlier, a systemic account of the role of social scientist in authoritarian 
policy process remains lacking, and epistemic community could be especially helpful in theorizing 
their policy influence, given the conceptual and theoretical groundwork that existing studies already 
laid.   
Secondly, as critics have rightfully pointed out, few studies of epistemic communities have 
looked into their internal dynamics, or examine the formation of one in relation to the external 
political and institutional environment (Cross 2013). Working from the assumption that the main 
obstacle undermining the influence of epistemic communities is to be found externally (e.g. political 
opportunity structure, scope condition of the policy issue), studies in much of the literature have 
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omitted the fact that not all epistemic communities are equally organized and structured. Factors 
such as the level of professionalism, the degree of commitment to shared normative beliefs, or the 
level of consensus on basic criteria of scientific validity could affect the internal cohesion of an 
epistemic community, and thereby its ability to exercise persuasive power as a collective agent. 
Additionally, the political and institutional context in which one operates could have consequential 
implications in this respect. This suggests another area where a study of scientist-state relation in a 
contemporary autocracy could contribute to. As mentioned earlier, ample evidence shows that an 
authoritarian government would invest in cultivating a scientific community loyal to its own political 
objectives, while oppressing or weakening the formation of an independent epistemic center (Kneen 
1984; Amsler 2007; L. Cheng and So 1983; Mazawi 2003).  
Taking into account how an epistemic community develops and evolves in an environment like 
such would greatly contribute to our knowledge about the process of epidemic community 
formation and impacts of external political and institutional context in this process. A study of the 
political influence of the social scientific community in authoritarian policy process, therefore, could 
not only advance our understanding of epistemic communities under authoritarianism, but also 
enrich our theoretical knowledge about their internal dynamics, formation, and relation with the 
domestic environment.  
 
1.2.4 Politics of Science in Modern Autocracy 
Last but not least, looking more broadly, a study of authoritarian social scientist-state relation 
could also speak to the critical discourse regarding the sociological and political character of science 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991; Said 1979; Giddens 1990). As well explored in the sociology of 
knowledge literature, science is at its core an organized human activity seeking to produce 
authoritative knowledge on a variety of subjects; as such, it cannot and does not escape the 
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imperfections from which all human activities suffer, despite what the positive symbol of rigor, 
neutrality, and objectivity that science often represents.  
Importantly, science does not progress according to the Popperian ideal of strict falsificationism, 
where scientists actively attempt to disprove existing theories and abandon any disapproved ones 
(Popper 1962). Rather, scientists tend to maintain their approval of certain theories and criteria of 
research as long as it is the prevailing norm within the community to endorse those as “facts” and 
“valid scientific procedure” (Kuhn 1970). In cases of sustained disagreement, scientists could also 
pursue parallel research agenda that share little common epistemological or even ontological 
grounds with one another (Lakatos 1980). Thus, what is known as scientific fact and research criteria 
to the wider society could be often found heavily contested within the scientific circle, where the 
pursuit of scientific progress inevitably encounter various non-research related factors, such as 
personality, leadership, culture, institutions, funding, etc. (Wagner 2001).  
Furthermore, studies have shown how external environment drives the production and 
dissemination of particular type of knowledge. In particular, the political and institutional context of 
a state often plays an influential role in deciding what is to be accepted as valid, authoritative, and 
scientific “knowledge”. Weir and Skocpol’s study (1985) on the different attitudes toward Keynesian 
economics across Sweden, Britain, and the United States following the outbreak of the Great 
Depression is a case in point. Kevles’s study shows both how racial anxieties were at the very core of 
the eugenic movement across the Anglo-American world during the early half of the twentieth 
century, and how such legacy affects the research on human genetics today (Kevles 1986). In the 
realm of foreign policy, Ido Oren’s book shows how the portrayal of Germany and Russia changed 
in the mainstream discourse of American political science in response to major conflicts involving 
these countries and the US (Oren 2003).    
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At the same time, once obtained an authoritative status, knowledge could in turn wield powerful 
influence over the behavior of the state, both in its domestic and foreign practices. The above-
mentioned study by Kevles demonstrates that eugenic science facilitated the passage of sterilization 
laws and provide justification for the Holocaust (Kevles 1986). O’Connor’ study documents how a 
“poverty knowledge” produced by a network of liberal social scientists formed the dominant lens 
for understanding the issue of poverty and laid the foundation for designing social programs in the 
US (O’Connor 2001). Latham’s work shows how modernization theory became the dominant 
ideology of the US government during the Cold War and facilitated a number of major foreign 
policy initiatives during the Kennedy Era (Latham 2000). Lastly, Greenhalgh’s study on China’s 
“One-Child Policy” suggests that a group of scientists from the National Defense sector played key 
roles in promoting the extremist population control policy through their dominance in the research 
circle and access to top decision-makers (Greenhalgh 2008). In other words, an interactive, mutually-
reinforcing relationship exists between science and the state. 
With a limited number of exceptions, however, the majority of the studies on the politics of 
science focus their attention on the practice of the “West” (Lam 2011; Mullaney 2011; Greenhalgh 
2008; Amsler 2007). This is particularly true with regards to the postcolonialism literature, which has 
been leading the studies on the politics of knowledge production with a systematic, often totalizing 
critique of the ideological biases embedded in the discourse about the “Non-West” produced by the 
“West”. Said’s seminal work on the western representation of people and society from the Middle 
East, Orientalism, is a good example (Said 1979). Yet the insight of postcolonial critique is by no 
means confined to just those contexts, even though the “West” represents the geographical origin of 
modern sciences and the center of epistemic power in the modern world. As some of the recent 
studies show, countries and societies of the “Non-West” have their distinct history and dynamics of 
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knowledge-power relation, which are not only interesting empirical novelties on their own, but – 
importantly – also a potential opportunity to advance our theories of politics of knowledge.  
Particularly, we should ask: how would the institutions, culture, and history of an authoritarian 
state affect the knowledge production by its national scientific community, and how could the 
dominant form of knowledge in turn enable and/or constrain the behavior of the government? Can 
we observe a similar type of epistemic violence between the authoritarian state and its population, as 
those argued with regards to the relationship between the “West” and “Non-West”? How is the 
social process in which the interaction between the authoritarian state and the scientific community 
takes place, and what are the social, political, and policy implications? These questions are 
particularly relevant in the context of aforementioned discussion on the persisting authoritarian 
regimes. To what extent, one might also ask, do the social scientific intellectuals contribute to the 
ideological domination of the state, thereby helping to consolidate its legitimacy, and how does the 
regime maintain the vitality of the research community so to exploit their intellectual products 
without compromising its ideological hegemony?  
 
1.3 Structure 
This dissertation consists of nine chapters in total, which can be organized thematically into four 
blocks. Chapter 1 to 3 overview the dissertation, present the conceptual and theoretical framework, 
and offer an empirical background of the topic. Chapter 4 to 7 present the primary empirical 
evidence of this study based on a diachronic analysis research design consisting of four different 
cases from the Post-Mao China’s minzu debate. Chapter 8 supplements the diachronic analysis in 
the preceding four chapters with two additional, self-standing tests to assess the challenge of 
alternative explanations. Finally, chapter 9 concludes the dissertation. The content of each chapter 
(excluding the present one) is detailed below.  
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Chapter 2 develops a theory of academic policy debates in Post-Mao China and presents my 
research design. The character of an academic policy debate is conceptualized as constituted by two 
distinct aspects: 1) the level of academic politicization and 2) the level of theoretical homogeneity. 
Each of the two bears implications for the innovative potential of a debate. Based on this 
conceptualization, I develop an explanatory theory of academic policy debates by linking the above 
two features with the political-sociological environment in which a given debate is situated. 
Specifically, I argue that the degree of conflict within the policy subsystem (IV1) and the degree of 
fragmentation of the knowledge community (IV2) shape the character of a given academic policy 
debate (DV) through exerting their impact on, respectively, academic politicization and theoretical 
homogeneity of the debate. This theory produces four ideal-typical scenarios. Accordingly, I present 
and explain my research design, which is based on the logic of a single unit, diachronic analysis of 
debates about minzu policy in Post-Mao China. In the last section, I introduce my data source and 
discuss my research operationalization. 
Chapter 3 presents the empirical background of the topic under investigation in this study. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the general political environment of 
Post-Mao China in terms of its intellectual-state relations and the general sociological trend in the 
knowledge community in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. This should prepare the reader 
for the more case-specific background introduction to follow. Then in the second part, I present the 
general contour of minzu policy evolution, knowledge community development concerning ethnic 
minority studies, and the academic discourse revolving around ethnic affairs in the Post-Mao period. 
In addition, the last section also serves to provide some further clarifications concerning the 
conceptual and terminological issues regarding the term “minzu” which is central to this study. 
From chapter 4 to chapter 7, I examine four distinct periods within the time range from 1979 to 
2017. As it will be explained in chapter 2, this study follows a single unit, diachronic analysis research 
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design whereby each case is a temporally bounded cluster of phenomena, represented in my study by 
a distinct period of academic policy debates in Post-Mao China. Therefore, each period represents a 
case of a particular configuration of academic debates on minzu policy, understood to be shaped by 
the above-mentioned two independent variables, i.e. the degree of conflict within the policy 
subsystem and the degree of fragmentation within the knowledge community. They represent 
different scenarios as described in the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, where I shall 
provide further information on each of the four “cases” with particular emphasis on how they link 
to my theory. To facilitate the comparison across different cases, the four chapters all follow the 
same structure. Each begins with an introductory “chapter overview” summarizing and highlighting 
the main arguments made in this chapter, followed by a similar tripartite narrative: a first section on 
the political environment represented by the conflict within the minzu policy subsystem, a second 
section on the sociological environment represented by the fragmentation within the knowledge 
community on minzu policy and ethnic affairs in general, and a final section on the impact of the 
political-sociological environment on the character of the academic policy debate above minzu 
during this period.   
Chapter 4 focuses on the period from 1979 to 1989. This is the period of policy and knowledge 
community restoration. Under the reformist leadership Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, the 
academic policy discourse featured a moderate debate on the nature of ethnic relations in the 
People’s Republic within the larger consensus that the party’s minzu policy should be dutifully 
carried out in order to fulfill the promise of promoting inter-ethnic equality and co-prosperity.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the period from 1989 to 2003. This period corresponds to Jiang Zemin’s 
two terms as the first post-Deng paramount leader of PRC. Despite a number of political crises 
within and outside China, we see by and large consensus among policy elites regarding ethnic 
minority affairs. On the other hand, the knowledge community became increasingly diversified, with 
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more specialized research and pluralistic disciplinary contribution. As a result, the scholar discourse 
began to feature more intense debate about the design of minzu policy.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the period from 2003 to 2013. This is the period of Hu Jintao’s two terms. 
The steadily worsening ethnic tensions, catapulted to become national political crises by two widely-
publicized riots during Hu’s second term, i.e. the 2008 Lhasa Riot (“3-14 Incident”) and the 2009 
Urumqi Riot (“7-5 Incident”), plus a highly pluralistic if not fragmented knowledge community, 
enabled an unprecedented debate among scholars of a variety of background over the future 
direction of China’s minzu policy. During this debate, we saw scholars challenging PRC’s minzu 
policy from a systematic standpoint for the first time. The exchange between reform advocates and 
their critics – which occurred right before the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping – 
was highly politicized, leading many to anticipate a possible major reform under the incoming new 
leadership.  
Lastly, chapter 7 focuses on the period from 2013 to 2017. This period covers the first three 
years of the Xi Jinping administration, i.e. from Xi’s taking office until the point when this 
dissertation is being written. The new leadership did not launch a systematic reform. However, it 
sent out signals which legitimate a wide range of policy adjustments and innovations through a 
number of central meetings. Importantly, it also made efforts to reduce intra-elite division by way of 
a major restructuration of the State Council (central government of PRC). While the new leadership 
managed to bridge somewhat the policy conflict through meetings and government reform, 
divisions within the knowledge community remained. This caused the academic policy discourse to 
return to an intense yet contained debate, with more focus turning to studying specific adjustments 
of minzu policy in the near future.  
Chapter 8 examines two alternative explanations. As it will be also discussed in chapter 2, the 
diachronic analysis alone – embodied by chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 – does not rule out other competing 
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explanations. In this chapter, I carry out a two-fold test in order to assess their potential of 
challenging my theory. Specifically, the chapter looks at two likely influential factors: the occurrence 
of ethnic violence in China and the ethnic identification of the authors in the debate. Different from 
earlier chapters, I employ a quantitative approach to design the test. I use an original dataset of 
nearly 200 academic journal articles as well as the existing one (“Ethnic Violence in China” by Cao 
et al. 2018). The tests performed suggest that neither above candidate has any observable impact on 
the character of the academic policy debate. Therefore, the result from earlier chapters holds.   
Finally, chapter 9 concludes the dissertation and discusses its implication for future research on 




Chapter 2 Theory and Research Design 
 
This chapter proceeds in four steps. In the first step (section 2.1), I define the central concepts 
of this study – i.e. “academic policy debate”, “policy subsystem”, and “knowledge community” – 
and explain how I analytically approach them. I argue that the character of a debate could be 
analyzed from the two separate perspectives: the level of theoretical heterogeneity and the level of 
academic politicization. Based on this conceptualization, in the second step (section 2.2) I present 
my theory for explaining academic policy debates in Post-Mao China. Drawing from the scholarship 
on comparative public policy, science and technology studies, and sociology of science, I argue that 
two distinct political-/sociological-conditions shape the character of an academic policy debate: (a) 
the conflict in the policy subsystem and (b) the fragmentation in the knowledge community. Each of 
them influences one aspect of the character of a debate as defined above. Accordingly, I present the 
hypotheses to be tested in this study. In the third step (section 2.3), I present and defend my 
research design regarding the unit of analysis, case selection, generalizability, and the logic of 
inference, before explaining in detail how my empirical evidence is organized through chapters 4 to 
8 so to demonstrate my theory. Finally, in the fourth step (section 2.4) I discuss the 
operationalization of the main variables in my theory, the primary and secondary source used for 
this study, as well as ethical considerations regarding the use of interview data.  
 
2.1 Conceptualization 
2.1.1 “Academic Policy Debate” 
As the site of and drivers for intellectual innovations in policy fields, academic policy debates 
can be analytically broken down and measured along two dimensions in terms of its capacity to 
foster intellectual innovations. The first dimension is the degree of “theoretical heterogeneity”, 
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which tells us about to what extent the participants of an academic debate share the same basic 
theoretical assumptions and conceptual vocabulary. To explain this concept, I borrow the notion of 
research programmes from Imre Lakatos (1980). I prefer Lakatos’s theory of research programmes 
over Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigm because of the former’s wider acceptance among political 
scientists in assessing the state of their discipline (Elman and Elman 2003; Jackson 2010). 
Accordingly, a debate of low theoretical heterogeneity is understood here as one between those who 
agree on those fundamental theoretical questions that define a research programme. Such a debate 
can be productive, i.e. contributing to the improvement of the explanatory power of the system of 
theories at the core of the research programme, since sharing the same basic theoretical assumptions 
and conceptual vocabulary creates greater analytical compatibility and allows people to exchange 
their knowledge and debate with each other more easily (Weible 2008, 626). However, it can also 
constrain people from going beyond the research programme which defines the concepts, questions, 
theories, and interpretive frameworks of their discussion. In contrast, a debate of high theoretical 
heterogeneity describes one between a group of people who do not agree on the fundamental 
theoretical questions that sit at the core of a research programme. It could be a debate between an 
established research programme and another emerging programme or established one. Similarly, the 
mere fact of high theoretical heterogeneity does not render the debate necessarily fruitless or 
productive. Such a debate can highlight the ineffectiveness of one research programme by showing 
its incapability to explain new phenomena or account for anomalies. But it may or may not lead to 
the development of new and better theories. While debates of both high and low theoretical 
heterogeneity have their productive or unproductive moments, a pluralistic community of scholars 
bears more chances for innovation than a monistic one. Similar to a market, “rivalry in an 
intellectual field” is a crucial structural ingredient for intellectual creativity (Collins 1987). Intellectual 
pluralism, demonstrated by the high theoretical heterogeneity of the debate, incentivizes scholars’ 
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innovative efforts with greater opportunities to locate a market position to channel their creative 
energy. Therefore, the degree of theoretical heterogeneity of a debate is an important measure of the 
ability of a knowledge community as a whole to foster intellectual innovation – in policy fields and 
elsewhere. As Collins (1998, 80) put it, “conflicts are the lifeblood of the intellectual world”.  
However, theoretical heterogeneity captures only the internal dynamics of a knowledge 
community. In today’s societies, knowledge communities rarely if ever work in isolation from the 
political environment in which they find themselves (Brown 2015). In both democratic and 
authoritarian countries, academics often work closely with the public authorities in designing policies 
and institutions. For scholars who work under an authoritarian regime, their works often carry 
political connotations due to the intimate relationship between the state and the scientific 
community (Solingen 1993). PRC academics’ embrace of the practical-political function of theories, 
as the preceding section shows, is an example of how such a relationship is understood and 
internalized in cultural-specific terms. However, even for an authoritarian regime, the extent to 
which arguments made in an academic policy debate align with clear political positions is not a 
constant but a variable. I refer to this character of an academic policy debate as the degree of 
“academic politicization”. A high politicized debate is where the arguments are explicitly made to 
advance or undermine a government policy, political program, or ideology, etc. In this scenario, 
scholars are acting less as disinterested technical experts but more as invested political advocates 
(Pielke, Jr. 2007). Whether it was voluntary or compelled, exploiting one’s intellectual position for 
advancing specific political cause usually comes at the expenses of maintaining one’s open-
mindedness and looking for all possible opportunities within the intellectual field with one’s creative 
energy. A highly politicized debate is unlikely to be flexible enough to generate much intellectual 
innovation. But a moderately politicized debate, where scholars understand the political implications 
of their professional activities and output yet manage to maintain a separation between academic 
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research and political advocacy, can be conducive to innovation. After all, concern with politics of 
the day always constitutes an important source of inspiration for social scientists – if not for 
scientists in general. Thus, the degree of academic politicization provides another measure of the 
ability of a knowledge community to generate intellectual innovation in policy fields. 
Table 2 – Types of Academic Policy Debates 
 Low academic politicization High academic politicization 
Low theoretical heterogeneity (1) Intra-paradigm Professional Debate (2) Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
High theoretical heterogeneity (3) Inter-paradigm Professional Debate (4) Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
 
Combining these two dimensions gives us a useful typology of academic policy debates (see the 
table above). Based on my two-dimensional formula, we can identify four different types of 
academic policy debates: (1) an Intra-paradigm Professional Debate, (2) an Intra-paradigm Political 
Debate, (3) an Inter-paradigm Professional Debate, and (4) an Inter-paradigm Political Debate. 
Besides clarifying different dimensions of qualities that matter to intellectual innovations in policy 
fields, conceptualizing academic policy debates as such also allows us to further investigate what 
factors could shape these two dimensions of a debate and consequently, design an empirical strategy 
to examine if and how those factors affect the quality of a debate.  
 
2.1.2 “Policy Subsystem” 
To explain the characters of an academic policy debate, I argue that one should refer to the 
political and sociological conditions in which a debate is situated. Specifically, each of the two 
dimensions of an academic policy debate is shaped by a different factor: a) the conflict in the policy 
subsystem drives the academic politicization; b) the fragmentation in the knowledge community 
drives the theoretical homogeneity. What exactly do I mean by the “conflict in the policy 
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subsystem” and the “fragmentation in the knowledge community”? How exactly do the two 
explanatory variables vary?  
Inspired by Weible (2008, 621), I understand policy subsystems as “semiautonomous decision-
making networks of policy participants that focus on a particular policy issue usually within a 
geographic boundary”. Importantly for this study, however, a policy subsystem is composed of 
competing policy coalitions whose members are mainly government bureaucracies, party 
organizations, state-owned enterprises, military, and other apparatus of the state. Depending on the 
level of conflict among competing policy coalitions within the subsystem, a policy subsystem can be 
either “collaborative” or “adversarial”, each of which bears different implications for the activities of 
experts involved in the policy debates. Readers familiar with the comparative policy literature would 
have noticed the differences between the above usage of the term “policy subsystem” and the 
classical definition of “policy subsystem” used in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
literature. Specifically, there are three important distinctions between the two, which are central to 
the operationalization of this concept to my study. Below I discuss each of them in detail.  
First of all, in this study “policy subsystem” centers around policy-making elites who work in the 
state-sector and excludes mostly professional academics whose occupation is located outside of the 
state. The ACF frameworks – from the original one proposed by Sabatier (1987) to its later versions 
such as those reviewed by Sabatier and Weible (2007) – all consider scientific and technical experts 
to be members of the policy coalitions. It was based on this formulation that the ACF proceeds to 
examine how policy-oriented learning based on scientific knowledge is facilitated or hindered by 
various environmental factors and how, in turn, policy change is fostered or obstructed by belief 
change through learning. For the present study, not distinguishing conceptually the political conflict 
between competing coalitions of state actors in a policy subsystem and the sociological 
fragmentation within the non-state, professional knowledge community is unsatisfactory, since it 
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collapses the two aspects into one, i.e. inter-coalitional conflict, and as such, cannot analytically 
differentiate the independent effect from either aspect. To understand the character of an academic 
policy debate, as I argued, one should consider separately how external, political conflict incentivizes 
academic politicization while at the same time, how internal, sociological fragmentation promotes 
theoretical heterogeneity. Thus, it is required by my theory to reformulate the concept of “policy 
subsystem” around policy-making elites in the state sector so to allow for a separate analysis of the 
effect of knowledge community’s fragmentation on academic policy debates.  
Secondly, following this redefinition, the implication of subsystem-type is reconsidered in this 
study. The formulation of the effect of subsystem-type by Weible (2008, 626–28) also includes 
predictions about other aspects regarding the use of expert-based information, which vary according 
to the level of conflict in a policy subsystem. One that concerns my theory in particular is the 
implication of inter-coalitional conflict for “analytic compatibility”. For Weible, the level of analytic 
compatibility among debating experts is directly and negatively affected by the level of conflict. I 
disagree with this proposition based on the preceding discussion that “analytic compatibility” is 
better seen as a direct effect of the fragmentation in the knowledge community itself. 
Understandably, policy-making elites in a high-conflict policy subsystem could be encouraged to 
exploit the existing fragmentation in the knowledge community when they recruit academics to the 
policy debate. They may extend invitations – either tacit or not – to scholars who do not share the 
mainstream theoretical and methodological approaches in the existing knowledge community to 
advocate for the political positions of those elites. In this way, the intra-coalitional conflict in the 
policy subsystem may indirectly contribute to a decrease of analytic compatibility in the policy 
debate. But even so, the conflict is at most a facilitating factor to this outcome, rather than the direct 
cause. Indeed, the incorporation of the fragmentation of knowledge community as an explanatory 
variable in my theory is a response to the lack of attention to this condition in the Weible’s original 
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formulation. It is my expectation that my theory would be able to capture the effect of this missing 
factor and better account for the changes in the character of the academic policy debate.  
Thirdly, regarding the spectrum of variation, I adopt a simplified version of the classificatory 
scheme of “policy subsystem”. In Weible’s original formulation, there are three ideal-types: a unitary 
subsystem, a collaborative subsystem, and an adversarial subsystem. They are different from one 
another in a number of aspects, but the most important distinction lies in the degree of inter-
coalitional conflict within a given subsystem. A unitary one means the subsystem is dominated by a 
single coalition that faces no rivalry. A collaborative one is where two or more cooperative coalitions 
coexist yet the inter-coalitional conflict is at intermediate levels. Finally, an adversarial one is where 
competitive coalitions coexist in an environment of high conflict. Each type possess distinct internal 
characters and produces different effect on various aspects of a policy process, such as knowledge 
utilization (Weible 2008), belief convergence (Weible and Sabatier 2009), or translating crises into 
policy change (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). For the present study I choose to simplify this 
categorization into only two types: a collaborative subsystem featuring low intra-coalition conflict 
versus an adversarial subsystem featuring high intra-coalition conflict. The simplification is made 
based on two considerations: first of all, as far as the impact of a policy subsystem on experts’ 
behavior is concerned, the variation of this effect across the three types is by and large linear: the 
higher conflict there is, the more experts act as principal allies/opponents rather than auxiliary ones 
and the more experts only promote learning in a closed circle (i.e. within the affiliated coalition). In 
other words, higher conflict leads to greater academic politicization. Conversely, when the conflict is 
milder, experts tend to become marginalized within the policy coalition as the political value of their 
information decreases. Therefore, it does not sacrifice much my analytical leverage if I simplify the 
typology into a dichotomy. In the second place, as far as the empirical scope of the present study is 
concerned, i.e. PRC minzu policy debate from 1979 to 2017 (I will discuss this topic in greater detail 
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below), the concept of a unitary subsystem is irrelevant, since only two kinds of policy subsystem – 
collaborative and adversarial – can be observed. Thus, it would not make much sense for me to 
consider this third theoretical possibility as my empirical scope could not match up to a tripartite 
typology. However, by making this choice I do not imply that a unitary policy subsystem does not 
exist in Post-Mao China: it certainly might. At the same time, it is my assumption that such a 
scenario is quite rare given the widely shared observation that policy-process in Post-Mao China is 
“fragmented” or “pluralistic”, i.e. in most if not all policy areas there exist and persist negotiations 
and contestations between different government and/or party agencies, between different levels of 
governments, and between state and non-state actors (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Mertha 2009; 
Han, Swedlow, and Unger 2014; X. Huang 2015; Yichong 2017; C. Zhang 2017). This means that 
my simplification does not come at the price of greatly reducing the relevance of my theory for 
understanding politics of academic policy debate in Post-Mao China, broadly speaking. 
 
2.1.3 “Knowledge Community” 
For the definition of the second explanatory variable, i.e. “fragmentation in the knowledge 
community”, I draw my inspiration from the epistemic community literature. Following (Haas 1992, 
3), I understand knowledge community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue-area”. But similar to – and indeed, corresponding to – my above adaptation of 
the concept of “policy subsystem”, I also modify the concept of “epistemic community” into a 
similar yet more restricted notion of “knowledge community” in two ways.  
Firstly, in contrast to the expansive notion of epistemic community (Haas 1992) and in 
opposition to my elite-centered conceptualization of policy subsystem, my definition of knowledge 
community excludes mostly policy-making elites who work in the state-sector but instead centers 
 39 
around professional academics whose occupation is located outside of the state. The qualifier 
“mostly” attached to the conceptual exclusion in my definition of the knowledge community – as 
well as the one in my definition of the policy subsystem – should be understood as a practical 
compromise. That is to say, for me, a knowledge community is understood to be primarily consisting 
of professional academics whereas a policy subsystem primarily consists of policy-making elites. The 
two concepts are redefined as such so to become by and large mutually exclusive because I intend to 
assess the independent effect of each on the character of an academic policy debate. At the same 
time, I also recognize that in reality, one person’s occupation could transgress the boundary between 
the state and non-state sectors. As it is known to scholars on China and other countries, a university 
professor could be a key participant in the government’s policy research activities, while a 
government’s policy staff could be an occasional yet important contributor to an academic journal. 
Nevertheless, there is no convincing reason thus far for blurring the two concepts or collapsing 
them into one – at least not in contemporary China. In the next chapter (chapter 3), I will discuss in 
greater detail the changing intellectual-state relations since the founding of PRC. In particularly, I 
will argue that in the Post-Mao period we have witnessed the emergence of a less rigid but more 
dynamic, not hierarchical but interactive and reciprocal relationship between the research 
community and the government (section 3.1.1). In other words, while interaction continues and 
transgression occurs, the two realms remain independent from one and another. As such, my 
redefinition is empirically well grounded.  
A second distinction between a knowledge community and its relative in the epistemic 
community literature lies in how the implication of the internal dynamics is understood. In her 
review of the literature, Cross (2013) makes a strong case for looking into the internal dynamics of 
epistemic communities so to better understand their behavior. She proposes that “the process of 
professionalization itself is one way in which internal cohesion is established” and suggests how one 
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could measure the variation in the degree of professionalization and by extension, the internal 
cohesion of an epistemic community. Inspired by her discussion, I distinguish two types of 
knowledge community depending on this quality: a “uniform” one versus a “fragmented” one. Their 
distinction lies in whether and to what extent there is a uniform set of standards for selection and 
training members of the community, how frequent the members meet to discuss issues of common 
concern, to what extent members share a uniform set of professional norm and culture (Cross 2013) 
– in other words, the sociological characteristics of the community. A uniform knowledge 
community means that its members possess higher uniformity with regards to the standards for 
selection and training, meet more frequently, and share more professional norm and culture. A 
fragmented one means that these aforementioned qualities are either or missing. However, I diverge 
from her focus with regards to the implication of a knowledge community’s internal cohesion – or 
conversely, internal fragmentation. Whereas Cross is interested in the policy influence of experts – 
hence her assumption of a positive association between an internal cohesive epistemic community 
and a greater potential for its policy influence, my interest lies in the innovative potential of a policy 
debate. For an academic policy debate to be conducive to intellectual innovation, a highly cohesive 
community – uniform selection and training standards, professional norms, and common culture – 
could be in fact counterproductive. Higher internal cohesion usually implies stronger professional 
discipline, which might translate into more systematic and self-consistent knowledge production by 
the members of this community. Importantly as it might be for securing policy influence of the 
experts, it is not the concern of the present study. Rather, I am interested in whether the sociological 
cohesion or fragmentation might influence the theoretical heterogeneity of an academic policy 
debate produced by a knowledge community, which either promotes or limits the debate’s 
innovative capacity. Thus, in the discussion below, I consider only the potential positive correlation 
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between a knowledge community’s sociological fragmentation and a debate’s theoretical 
heterogeneity.   
 
2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Explaining Academic Policy Debates in Post-Mao China 
In this section I develop a political-sociological theory of academic policy debates in Post-Mao 
China. I propose that a proper explanatory framework of the character of academic policy debates 
should be grounded in the causal connection between the external political-sociological environment 
and the two attributes of a debate. Specifically, I argue that on the one hand, the conflict within the 
policy subsystem (hereafter “external conflict”) drives the academic politicization; on the other hand, 
the fragmentation within the knowledge community (hereafter “internal fragmentation”) drives the 
theoretical homogeneity. As academics in PRC conduct their policy debates, the innovative potential 
of the debate, understood as a product of theoretical homogeneity and academic politicization, is to 
be understood as shaped by the combined effect of “external conflict” and “internal fragmentation”. 
Based on the conceptualization laid out in the previous section, I elaborate on these two causal 
mechanisms below.    
First of all, the degree of internal fragmentation of a given knowledge community is a strong 
determinant of the degree of theoretical homogeneity of the debate generated by this community. As 
discussed above, fragmentation describes how a knowledge community is sociologically organized. 
A community of low fragmentation means that its members are much alike with one another in 
terms of their professional trainings, concerns, norms, and culture. This similarity grants them the 
possibility to engage in discussion of greater theoretical compatibility (lesser theoretical 
heterogeneity). In contrast, a community of high fragmentation means that its members come from 
diverse background and are likely to bring to the table different research traditions, approaches, and 
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evaluative standards due to the kind of trainings they received. They may also come with different 
sets of professional concerns, norms, and culture. Under such a condition, the debate is more likely 
to feature a high level of theoretical heterogeneity. The process of cultivating a particular knowledge 
community usually takes time. Thus, both fragmentation and de-fragmentation are unlikely to be 
altered in a sudden fashion unless due to an exogenous shock, e.g. a purge of intellectuals. 
Consequently, it is safe to assume that the internal fragmentation of a knowledge communities 
usually remains relatively stable in a short period of time, such as five to ten years. In sum, other 
things being equal, an internally fragmented community is better capacitated to generate a 
theoretically heterogeneous debate than internally uniform ones, thus holding better chance for 
intellectual innovation.  
Secondly, the degree of external conflict in the policy environment that a knowledge community 
faces is a strong determinant of the academic politicization of its debate. As historians of science and 
sociologists of knowledge have long observed, knowledge production has never been completely 
independent from politics. Modern states in particular have always attempted to control, direct, or at 
least influence the development of scientific community and the production of scientific knowledge 
to their own interests (Kneen 1984; Solingen 1994; Boswell 2009). Science, on the other hand, also 
constantly seeks out benefactors for its own survival and development. Especially in authoritarian 
countries, scholars often unwillingly or willingly orient their research to the interests of those who 
sponsor them, which in most case is the state (Hirsch 2005; Amsler 2007; Greenhalgh 2008). After 
all, experts are the same fallible human beings as everyone else, and are not immune to bias, desire, 
ambition, and habits. Science, thus, shared a much more intimate history with state and corporations 
than what popular account of science would admit. In the context of modern governance, such 
close relationship is especially the case. As Haas (1992, 11)emphasized, “[t]hat scientists working 
within the bureaucracy have a common faith in the scientific method does not guarantee their 
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solidarity, nor does it make them immune to pressures from the institutions in which they work or 
from political temptation”. Similarly, scholars of comparative policy analysis also argued that 
scientists could be coopted by policy coalitions into their political advocates, thereby abandoning 
their supposedly “neutral” position and commitment to objectivity (Sabatier 1987). Later studies 
further specified how the utilization of scientific knowledge could be affected by the political 
dynamics within a policy subsystem (Ingram, Schneider, and deLeon 2007; Weible 2008). As their 
argument goes, experts could be mobilized to play different functions (principal or auxiliary allies for 
a particular policy coalition), depending on the level of conflict in a given policy subsystem (Weible, 
Pattison, and Sabatier 2010). The more polarized a policy subsystem is, i.e. the more difficult that the 
competing coalition within a given policy subsystem can reconcile their differences with regards to 
their preferences, the more likely that the knowledge community will be co-opted into political 
advocates for particularistic preferences of the competing policy coalitions.   
To sum up the discussion thus far: 1) the potential of an academic policy debate to foster 
intellectual innovation in policy fields depends on two aspects: “theoretical heterogeneity” and 
“academic politicization”; 2) the “theoretical heterogeneity” of the debate is a function of the 
“internal fragmentation” of the knowledge community, whereas the “academic politicization” is a 
function of the “external conflict” faced by the knowledge community; 3) therefore, the potential of 
an academic policy debate to foster intellectual innovation in policy fields is a function of the 
combination of the “internal fragmentation” of the knowledge community and the “external 
conflict” faced by the knowledge community. Accordingly, to understand and explain why at a 
particular time a given debate displays certain features, e.g. being an inter-paradigm professional 
debate or an intra-paradigm politicized debate, one needs to look into both the level of political 
conflict characterizing the policy environment in which experts operate as well as the level of 
sociological fragmentation characterizing the professional environment inside the knowledge 
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community. The figure below visualizes the causal relationship between the various concepts 
discussed so far.  
Figure 1 – Causal Logic: “external conflict” and “internal fragmentation” 
 
2.2.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the preceding discussion, the main hypothesis derived from my theory can be 
formulated as follows: as the conflict in the policy subsystem and the fragmentation in the 
knowledge community vary, we should expect corresponding variation in the character of the 
academic policy debate, i.e. the level of academic politicization and the level of theoretical 
heterogeneity. Table 3 (see below) expands table 2 in section 2.1.2 by incorporating the external, 
political-sociological conditions and depicts the full sets of ideal-typical causal patterns hypothesized 
by the theory. Below I elaborate on each of these four sub-hypotheses.  
H1: When the conflict in the policy subsystem is low (“collaborative”) and the fragmentation in the knowledge 
community is also low (“uniform”), the academic policy debate is likely to remain intra-paradigm and professionally-
oriented.  
Character of academic policy debate 
Level of conflict in  
policy subsystem 
(“external conflict”) 
Level of fragmentation in 
knowledge community 
(“internal fragmentation”) 
Level of academic 
politicization 
Level of theoretical 
heterogeneity 
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This is the scenario in the upper-left cell (A.1). It is defined by a low level of conflict within the 
policy subsystem – a collaborative policy subsystem – and a low level of fragmentation within the 
knowledge community – a uniform knowledge community. Together they enable people to engage in 
relatively less politicized discussions, but which are most likely to feature a high degree of theoretical 
homogeneity. As a result, the debate tends to be confined within the horizon defined by the 
predominant research programme and carried out by participants using the same or similar 
theoretical and conceptual language. While the potential for intellectual innovation is not 
constrained due to political tension, it is held back by the lack of intellectual rivalry that challenges 
the theoretical assumptions of the predominant research programme.  
Table 3 – Four Outcomes of Academic Policy Debate 
 
Low conflict in the policy subsystem 
“collaborative” 
(A) 
High conflict in the policy subsystem 
“adversarial” 
(B) 




(A.1) Intra-paradigm Professional Debate 
- Low academic politicization 
- Low theoretical heterogeneity 
(B.1) Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
- High academic politicization 
- Low theoretical heterogeneity 




(A.2) Inter-paradigm Professional Debate 
- Low academic politicization 
- High theoretical heterogeneity 
(B.2) Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
- High academic politicization 
- High theoretical heterogeneity 
 
H2: When the conflict in the policy subsystem is low (“collaborative”) and the fragmentation in the knowledge 
community is high (“fragmented”), the academic policy debate is likely to become inter-paradigm while still 
professionally-oriented.  
This is the scenario in the lower-left cell (A.2). It is defined by a collaborative policy subsystem and 
a high level of fragmentation within the knowledge community – a fragmented knowledge community. 
Here, the political environment remains relatively neutral towards knowledge production, i.e. the 
academics are not pressed to take side with regard to policy matters. But due to the fragmentation of 
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the knowledge community, those who engage in the debate may come with a variety of research 
traditions and disciplinary background. The pluralistic nature of the community increases the 
chances where people can challenge each other on deeper, theoretical levels. This is the closest to an 
ideal situation for intellectual innovation, as the academics are relatively less influenced by either 
external political influence or lack of alternative theoretical approaches within the knowledge 
community.    
H3: When the conflict in the policy subsystem is high (“adversarial”) and the fragmentation in the knowledge 
community is low (“uniform”), the academic policy debate is likely to be intra-paradigm yet politically-oriented.  
This is the scenario in the upper-right cell (B.1). It is defined by a high level of conflict within 
the policy subsystem – an adversarial policy subsystem – and a uniform knowledge community. The 
heightened tension between opposing policy factions drives political elites to recruit experts in their 
service, using whatever means available at their disposal. Political incentives, economic incentives, or 
a combination of both might be employed depending on the specific institutional-legal context of 
the country. However, the general lack of protection of civil liberty and rule of law in authoritarian 
regimes could only facilitate the political influence on academic discourse. As a result, debate tends 
to take on greater political character. On the other hand, a knowledge community whose members 
work within the same dominant research programme – thus sharing the same or similar theoretical 
approaches – does not offer much structural cleavage for the political elites to exploit. Therefore, 
while the debate would take on a political character, it likely continues to proceed within a parameter 
defined by the existing theoretical ideas.  
H4: When the conflict in the policy subsystem is high (“adversarial”) and the fragmentation in the knowledge 
community is also high (“fragmented”), the academic policy debate is likely to become inter-paradigm and politically-
oriented.  
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This is the scenario in the lower-right cell (B.2). It is defined by an adversarial policy subsystem 
and a fragmented knowledge community. The policy subsystem is divided between different coalitions 
competing for more influence over the policy process. Similar to the situation in B.1, the political 
elites would try to recruit experts in their services. The knowledge community, on the other hand, is 
fragmented due to the variety of theoretical and methodological traditions embraced by scholars. As 
such, debates within the community enjoy a high degree of theoretical heterogeneity. Yet the 
political tension that finds its way into the knowledge community would pressure academics to 
express themselves along partisan lines, i.e. advocating a particular policy idea, policy position, or 
articulating preference for a particular policy direction, rather than engaging each other in a 
professionally-oriented fashion. Under the structural incentive of both the policy subsystem and the 
knowledge community, scholars are motivated to align with those policy coalitions whose position is 
perceived closer to theirs and attempt to advocate for their shared policy ideas against their policy 
opponents. The academic policy debate thus becomes a venue for political debate, where people 
attack each other’s policy position and the underlying beliefs. Intellectual innovation in policy fields 
is least expected from this situation due to the likely political “hijacking” of the academic debate.  
 
2.3 Research Design 
2.3.1 Unit of Analysis, Case Selection, Generalizability, and Inferential Logic 
To demonstrate this theory, I employ a single unit, diachronic research design using evidence 
from the evolution of academic debates on China’s minzu policy within PRC from 1979 to 2017. 
Following Gerring (2004, 342), I define my research as following a case study design, understood as 
“an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. 
Specifically, I chose to employ a “case study I” research design, in which the covariation is to be 
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observed and examined within a single unit along the temporal dimension, instead of (also) along the 
spatial dimension. Hence it is a single-unit, diachronic analysis.  
The “unit of analysis” is “PRC’s minzu debate from 1979 to 2017”, which has three independent 
components (variables): 1) the conflict within the policy subsystem on minzu policy (“external 
conflict”), 2) the knowledge community that partakes in the discussion on minzu policy (“internal 
fragmentation”), and 3) the character of the academic policy debate which emanates from the 
knowledge community and which revolves around minzu policy (“debate”). This unit of analysis is 
“a spatially bounded phenomenon” that exists for a period of time, allowing researcher to observe at 
different points in time different constellation of the above three components which covary and 
which are causally connected with one another. Specifically, I argue that the character of the debate 
– understood as a composite of its qualities along two dimensions, i.e. “academic politicization” and 
“theoretical heterogeneity” – is a function of the degree of external conflict and the degree of 
internal fragmentation.  
The covariation of the above three components along the temporal dimension within the single 
unit of “PRC’s minzu debate from 1979 to 2017” produces distinct “cases”, each of which is 
understood as a specific constellation of external conflict, internal fragmentation, and debate 
observable at a particular point in time. In other words, unlike case study II & III which break down 
the primary unit of analysis – in this case, the PRC’s minzu debate – and which would involve a 
change in the level of analysis, the present study preserves the primary unit of analysis and makes no 
change to the level of analysis (Gerring 2004, 344). The PRC’s minzu debate is not broken down 
spatially into different “sub-units/sub-debates”; rather, it is observed at different points in time 
between 1979 and 2017 to generate a series of “cases” of the same unit/debate. Below I shall discuss 
the rationale for choosing the primary unit to be temporally bounded between 1979 and 2017 and 
how it is observed at four discrete points, which gives me four different cases.  
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Taking a step back, the “population” from which the primary unit of analysis of the present 
study is chosen is “academic policy debates in Post-Mao China”. My theory does not attempt to 
explain all the different academic policy debates in all authoritarian regimes. Instead, it is intended to 
only explain academic policy debates in one authoritarian country – i.e. China – during a particular 
period – i.e. the Post-Mao period. This does not, however, prevent my study from shedding light on 
how we might understand academic policy debates in other authoritarian regimes (within different, 
other temporal scopes as motivated by the specific interests). But the main objective of the study is 
to 1) offer a detailed account of a particular phenomenon “PRC’s minzu debate from 1979 to 2017” 
and to 2) produce some knowledge about “academic policy debates in Post-Mao China” in general. 
The key distinction between the two is that the primary unit of analysis, “PRC’s minzu debate from 
1979 to 2017”, is my “formal unit” which this case study is dedicated to and which will be 
intensively studied in this study, whereas other academic policy debates in Post-Mao China are 
implicit “informal units” or “adjacent units” that are related to my discussion only in a peripheral 
way (Gerring 2004, 344). “Academic policy debates in other authoritarian regimes” are still further 
“informal/adjacent units” that should be understood as even less related to my theory. 
Comparability between them and my primary unit still exists, given the nature of case study. My 
theory might or might not hold for those informal units, but it is not the intention of the present 
study to prove one way or the other.  
Therefore, the demonstration of my theory should require that I present evidence that 
sufficiently supports the causal logic in the specific unit under examination while refuting other 
alternative explanations at conflict with my account. To that end, I select four cases from my 
primary unit of analysis based on different times of observation. Through an in-depth examination 
of each one, I show that the four cases match the four hypotheses derived from my theory. 
Moreover, because the four cases were generated from the same unit, the congruence between the 
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expectation of my theory and the observed covariation of factors across the four cases offers 
positive evidence to the theory. This part of my analysis is presented mainly in chapter 4 to 7.  
This operation alone does not rule out potentially unaccounted factors, however. In particular, 
two factors might challenge my theory and explain the variations in the character of academic policy 
debates without interfering with the explanatory variables. The first one is external: the intensity of 
ethnic violence in the country. The second one is internal: the ethnic identity of the debate 
participants. China experienced a dramatic period of economic growth and social development from 
the 1979 on, as a result of the government’s resolute implementation of economic – and to a limited 
degree, political – reform. These efforts altered the economic as well as political trajectory of China, 
allowing it to be resilient, adaptive, yet nonetheless authoritarian until today (Nathan 2003; He and 
Warren 2011). This process was accompanied by a continuous stream of ethnic conflicts, particularly 
in western border regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet (Bovingdon 2010; Yeh 2013). If academics act 
as rational agents seeking to maximize their impact on the policy discourse, it is reasonable for us to 
expect that they would be incentivized to publish more politically-oriented policy pieces following 
heightened ethnic violence. Granted, it is analytically difficult to assess whether ethnic conflict drives 
the academic politicization of academic policy debates independent of intra-elite policy conflict, as 
the latter is also a potential recipient of the impact of ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, if one finds that 
political-oriented policy debates follow more closely moments of heightened ethnic violence rather 
than structural conflicts among policy-making elites, then my theory could be missing the most 
significant explanatory factor but looking at something of secondary importance. Conversely, if one 
finds that the debates show no association with heightened ethnic violence, then my theory is not 
weakened by this potential alternative explanation.  
Similarly, given the theme of the debate, it is reasonable to assume that scholars are not only 
motivated by the perceived political tension among elites and the market position within the 
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intellectual field fostered by theoretical heterogeneity, but also by their own personal background, 
particularly ethnic identification. Since the debate directly concerns policies for ethnic minorities in 
China, one could imagine that scholars with ethnic minority background, i.e. non-Han scholars, are 
particularly motivated to participate in the debate. It is also reasonable to further hypothesize that 
given their position, they are more likely to defend accommodating cultural diversity and oppose 
integrationist policies. Similarly, one may also expect that Han scholars are on average more inclined 
to prefer integrationist policies over accommodationist ones.  
These two factors constitute two potential alternative explanations – “violence” and “ethnicity” 
– yet which cannot be directly confirmed or disapproved by the single unit, diachronic research 
design as described above. To address them, an additional step of check has to be performed. In 
chapter 8, I carry out two additional tests in order to assess to what extent my theory can stand 
against the above two challenges. The first test juxtaposes the occurrence of ethnic violence with 
academic debate over minzu policy in order to assess whether ethnic conflict has a direct impact on 
the intensity of policy-oriented debate and by extension, academic politicization. The second test 
measures the effect of a list of demographic indicators of academics – e.g. ethnic identification, 
gender, age, institutional affiliation, area of specialization – on whether one challenges the existing 
minzu policy. This test helps to assess whether other internal factors of the knowledge community 
are more responsible for voicing political opinion. The rest of this chapter focuses on the 
operationalization of the research design employed for the primary analysis of this study, i.e. the 
diachronic analysis of PRC minzu debate. For the two additional tests described here, its specific 
research design and operationalization will be discussed in chapter 8.  
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2.3.2 A Diachronic Analysis of PRC Minzu Debate from 1979 to 2017 
What is the rationale for choosing PRC’s minzu debate from 1979 to 2017 as the primary unit of 
analysis for this study? Minzu policy has been at the center of conflicting bureaucratic interests as 
well as clashing elite factions at the top echelon of the Chinese political system. At the same time, a 
number of scholar communities have been closely associated with the policy since its initial 
formulation in the 1950s. Many of these communities had been and continue to be involved on its 
implementation, adaptation, and adjustment. Most importantly, the period after 1979 saw a number 
of important changes to both the minzu policy subsystem – in terms of the level of conflict between 
competing policy coalitions – and the minzu knowledge community – in terms of the level of 
fragmentation among the professional experts. As a result, the minzu policy in China serves as a 
good candidate to test the explanatory power of the political-sociological conditions for the 
character of the minzu debate.  
Table 4 – PRC Minzu Debate, 1979-2017 
 
Low conflict in the policy subsystem 
“collaborative” 
(A) 
High conflict in the policy subsystem 
“adversarial” 
(B) 




(A.1) Reaffirming Minzu Policy, 
1979-1989 
Intra-paradigm Professional Debate 
- Low academic politicization 
- Low theoretical heterogeneity 
(B.1) Questioning Ethnic 
Consciousness, 1989-2003 
Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
- High academic politicization 
- Low theoretical heterogeneity 




(A.2) Securitizing National 
Identification, 2013-2017   
Inter-paradigm Professional Debate 
- Low academic politicization 
- High theoretical heterogeneity 
(B.2) Denaturalizing Ethnic 
Identification, 2003-2013 
Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
- High academic politicization 
- High theoretical heterogeneity 
 
In addition, debate over minzu policy – and China’s minzu policy in general – are comparatively 
less-studied in the existing literature, especially in political science. Works in anthropological and 
historical traditions, with a few notable exceptions (Mullaney 2011; Powers 2017), do not engage 
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much with the knowledge production of elites concerning minzu policy. As such, the choice also 
makes an empirical contribution to the literature on China. Based on the evolution of the PRC 
minzu debate over the approximately four decades since 1979, one can identify four distinct phases, 
which largely correspond to the four cells in the above table. Thus, PRC minzu policy debate from 
1979 to 2017 offer us four distinct cases to evaluate the explanatory power of the above theory on 
the character of academic policy debates. Below I briefly summarize the argument of each case. 
These four cases are elaborated in greater detail individually later from chapter 4 to 7. 
 
2.3.3 Case I – Reaffirming Minzu Policy, 1979-1989 
The first case is minzu policy debate from 1979 to 1989 (chapter 4), which I labelled as 
“reaffirming minzu policy”. The policy subsystem saw a low level of conflict and is considered as 
collaborative. During this time, the CCP leadership worked to reverse and correct many of the 
extreme polices from the Cultural Revolution period. With regards to minzu policy, efforts of 
rectification involved reaffirming the government’s commitment to regional ethnic autonomy, 
interethnic equality, and preferential treatment for ethnic minorities in areas such as education, 
language, cultural practices, and family planning. Under the influence of the short-lived party 
secretary Hu Yaobang, the party leadership also approved measures to increase the representation of 
ethnic minority in regional administrations of Xinjiang and Tibet. There were disagreements as to 
how far the local autonomy should be emphasized. By and large, however, the leadership agreed on 
a more accommodationist policy platform and generally share a less hostile attitude towards the 
ethnic minority population.  
The scholarly community, on the other hand, was generally uniform. It was just recovering from 
the disruption it suffered during the Cultural Revolution. The most closely related knowledge 
community to minzu policy is what I refer to as the Chinese Marxist Ethnology or minzu studies. 
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This field was the product of a merger of several social science disciplines during the earlier years of 
the PRC, when the government imposed a top-down design on national scientific organizations 
based on the Soviet experience. Because of the relative vulnerable state of the scholar community 
vis-à-vis the state, Chinese Marxist ethnologists during this period concentrated their effort on 
reviving their professional community through restoring departments and research units at schools 
or research institutes, relaunching academic journals, and reestablishing national and regional 
associations. Consequently, the knowledge community on minzu policy was relatively more uniform 
compared with later times.  
As we shall see, during this time the debate on minzu policy displayed low degree of academic 
politicization and low degree of theoretical heterogeneity, which I label as an intra-paradigm 
professional debate. The discussion revolved largely around reaffirming the official minzu policy 
of the party-state and, along those lines, debating the meaning of ethnic (in)equality in the context of 
better implementing minzu policy to amend ethnic relations from the previous political turmoil. This 
period fits largely the scenario of A.1. 
 
2.3.4 Case II – Questioning Ethnic Consciousness, 1989-2003 
The second case is minzu policy debate from 1989 to 2003 (chapter 5), which I labelled as 
“questioning ethnic consciousness”. The policy subsystem during this time saw rather high level of 
conflict and is considered to be adversarial. Two events at the end of the 1980s deepened the split 
within the party leadership, which was already developing since the early 1980s. Internationally, the 
downfall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union alarmed the 
Chinese leaders of the centrifugal potential of localized ethnic identities and the vulnerability of their 
multiculturalist institutional design. Domestically, the ethnic unrest in Tibet from 1987 to 1988 and 
the mass democratic demonstration across the country in 1989 led many leaders to view Deng’s 
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liberalization policy as a prelude to an eventual overthrow of the CCP’s rule by various dissenting 
forces in the society. Against this background, some within the leadership began advocating for a 
more integrationist approach towards the ethnic minorities, particularly for those residing in the 
border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet. The growing rift within the leadership and the 
bureaucracy manifested itself in the 2001 amendments of Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy as well 
as the declining rate of enactment of autonomous regulations (Ch: zizhi tiaoli) at the local level since 
the mid-1990s. As the central government launched its Great Western Development Strategy (Ch: 
xibu da kaifa zhanlue) under Jiang Zemin, the influx of Han-Chinese labors and capital from Han-
dominated regions aggravated the tension between the minzu policy establishment and the 
developmental agencies.  
The knowledge community during this time showed some tendency of fragmentation but 
remained largely uniform. Specifically, the scholar community on minzu policy began to develop in 
number of different directions due to the general revival of social sciences and the tendency of 
specialization. Sociology, anthropology, and ethnology all have connections with the field of minzu 
studies in PRC. As these disciplines grew, they began to reevaluate minzu studies from an 
increasingly critical standpoint. Motivated by an interest to promote their own discipline against 
others in the competition for research resources, social scientists from the above disciplines actively 
debated about the nature and mission of minzu studies in contemporary China. As a result, the 
knowledge community of minzu policy became more fragmented.  
Under the combined influence of these factors, the academic debate on minzu policy displayed 
higher politicization than the previous period but remained theoretically homogenous, which I label 
as an intra-paradigm political debate. One representative development was the debate over the 
concept, “ethnic consciousness,” which led to the division of the community between those who 
advocate for controlling ethnic consciousness – of the minorities in particular – in the name of 
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social stability and national unity, and those who defend ethnic consciousness as a natural and 
harmless component of any ethnic identification. Over the years this debate gradually intensified to 
go beyond purely theoretical discussion and began questioning the orientation of minzu policy. 
Different opinions soon started coalescing along the “integration vs. accommodation”-axis. This 
period largely fits the cell B.1.   
 
2.3.5 Case III – Denaturalizing Ethnic Identification, 2003-2013 
The third case is minzu policy debate from 2003-2013 (chapter 6), which I term as 
“denaturalizing ethnic identification”. The policy subsystem saw high level of conflict and is 
properly considered as adversarial. As the developmental efforts by the central government in 
border regions continued to marginalize local population and endanger indigenous communities’ 
way of life, interethnic frictions increased and discontent among the minority population 
accumulated. In response, the governments in both Xinjiang and Tibet gradually shifted their focus 
from preserving indigenous culture to suppressing local ethnic identity, emphasizing cultural 
assimilation, and tightening social control. During the second term of Hu Jintao, two high-profile 
incidents took the leadership and the entire country by surprise. The 2008 riots in Lhasa (a.k.a. “3-14 
incident”) and 2009 riots in Urumqi (a.k.a. “7-5 incident”) shocked the national and regional 
leadership, who responded initially by forceful repression of the unrest, upgraded security measures, 
and renewed efforts to invest in local infrastructure and economy. Over the next few years, 
however, the government progressively gave more priority to social stability and displayed a declined 
interest to buy ethnic minorities’ political loyalty with economic benefits. As a result, local 
governments in Xinjiang and Tibet adopted many practices which were inconsistent – if not in direct 
conflict with – the principles laid out in the national laws on ethnic minorities affairs. Example of 
those deviant practices include increasingly replacing minority language with mandarin Chinese in 
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education, stricter restriction against practices of religious belief, and stricter control of movement 
of citizens with minority background both within the country and across national borders. The 
tensions between these repressive policies and the official line manifested in the frequent personnel 
changes in officials posts closely related to ethnic minority affairs and the slight yet observable 
inconsistencies in different officials’ interpretation of the state’s minzu policy.  
On the scholars’ side, the knowledge community became decisively fragmented. As the 
research agenda of different disciplines expand into more areas and overlap, studies on ethnic 
minorities were no longer monopolized by either the minzu studies community or the historically 
related and thematically adjacent disciplines such as sociology or anthropology. Importantly, political 
science and legal studies became increasingly involved, and particularly in discussions on minzu 
policy design and implementation. At the same time, the push by younger generation of ethnologists 
to focus the attention of the discipline on culture and history also contributed to a general less 
engagement with the research on ethnic minorities from the policy perspective. As a result, the 
knowledge community became even more fragmented than the previous period.  
The tension in policy subsystem and the fragmentation of knowledge community led to an 
inter-paradigm political debate, featuring high level of academic politicization and theoretical 
heterogeneity among the participants. Building off the earlier debate, a number of prominent 
scholars – sociologists, political scientists, and legal scholars – faulted at the existing policy for 
sending China down a similar path of disintegration as the former Soviet Union. They openly 
advocated for a major policy reorientation, even arguing for a complete abolishment of the ethnic 
regional autonomy, while defenders of the existing policy counterattacked with moralized languages 
reminiscent of the ideological campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. This period approximates 
the scenario represented by cell B.2.  
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2.3.6 Case IV – Securitizing National Identification, 2013-2017 
The fourth case is minzu policy debate from 2014 to 2017 (chapter 7), which I term as 
“securitizing national identification”. The policy subsystem during this period returned to a 
collaborative state. The new leadership under Xi Jinping sought to provide a new policy discourse 
which can accommodate the securitization of minzu policy in Xinjiang and Tibet without altering 
the basic language of the state’s minzu policy as reinstituted at the beginning of the Post-Mao era. 
While the security policy in border regions does not carry the title of minzu policy, in the regional 
context of Xinjiang and Tibet it is designed in such a way that it affects primarily the lives of the 
ethnic minorities, particularly Uyghurs and Tibetans. These policies are carried out by security 
agencies under the leadership of the respective regional leadership, while their bureaucratic superiors 
at the central level face criticisms from the minzu policy establishment, most notably the State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) and State Administration on Religious Affairs (SARA). To 
resolve these tensions, Xi Jinping convened a number of state-level meetings to unify policy 
discourse immediately after taking office and carried out a major restructuration of the State Council 
in order to reduce bureaucratic conflict and improve intra-elite policy coordination. The latter move 
significantly diminished the influence of both SEAC and SARA, through putting the former under 
the leadership of the party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) and letting the latter be 
entirely absorbed by UFWD. As a result, the policy subsystem became less divided as compared 
with the previous period.  
On the other hand, the scholarly community on minzu policy remained fragmented. Ethno-
national political studies as a dedicated research program that adopts a political science approach to 
ethnic minority affairs grew more mature and salient. Under the initiative of creating “think tanks 
with Chinese characteristics,” the government also actively cultivated explicitly policy-oriented 
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knowledge communities that serve their interests. For example, in this period, we saw the creation 
of “Xinjiang Think Tank” and “Tibet Think Tank”.  
The increased fragmentation of the knowledge community under a more collaborative policy 
environment led the academic debate on minzu policy to a state of inter-paradigm professional 
debate, where the critics of the reform proposals from previous period continued to express their 
discontent towards those proposals but had to give in on many specific policy adjustments due to 
their legitimation by the central leadership. Increasingly we see scholars simply paying lip-service to 
the rejection of the reform proposals while continuing advancing policy changes on various practical 
aspects. As such, this period fits the scenario in cell A.2.  
 
2.4 Operationalization 
As explained above, this study deals with two independent variables: (IV1) the level of conflict 
within the policy subsystem and (IV2) the level of fragmentation within the knowledge community. 
The dependent variable: (DV) the character of an academic policy debate is understood as a 
composite of two dimensions, respectively, (DV1) the level of academic politicization and (DV2) the 
level of theoretical heterogeneity. Below I present the operationalization for each of them.  
 
2.4.1 Conflict in the Policy Subsystem 
As discussed, in this study I distinguish two types of policy subsystems depending on the level of 
conflict within it: a collaborative subsystem where the inter-coalitional conflict is low and an 
adversarial subsystem where the inter-coalitional conflict is high. Following the classificatory scheme 
of policy subsystems by Weible (2008), I understand the differences between the two types as 
follows. Whereas in collaborative subsystem, one would expect to observe relatively “cooperative 
coalitions with intermediate inter-coalition belief compatibility and high inter and intra-coalition 
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coordination,” in adversarial subsystem there would be “competitive coalitions with low 
intercoalition belief compatibility and high intra-coalition and low inter-coalition coordination” 
(Weible 2008, 621–22). Policy images among different coalitions tend to reconciled in collaborative 
subsystems but debated in adversarial ones (Weible 2008, 622). Authority to carry out policy is 
decentralized and sometimes fragmented across policy subsystems under collaborative subsystems, 
where different coalitions share access to authority. But in adversarial ones, authority is centralized 
or fragmented within the policy subsystem where different coalitions compete for access to 
authority (Weible 2008, 623). In terms of venues, coalitions are expected to use a variety of venues, 
including ones based on consensus-based institutions in collaborative subsystems but in adversarial 
ones seek to influence decisions in any amiable venues (Weible 2008, 624). Finally, policies tend to 
be voluntary, win–win, and flexible in means in collaborative subsystems but coercive, win–lose, and 
prescriptive in means in adversarial ones policy designs (Weible 2008, 625).  
To capture the variation and identify the subsystem type for this study, I choose to focus on the 
congruency of policy image as the main indicator for the level of conflict within the policy 
subsystem. Specifically, I look at whether and to what extent is the policy image being contested 
within the official policy discourse, by cross-examining policy documents that are made publicly 
available by the Chinese governments. When the policy image displays inconsistencies across 
different government/party agencies – either at the same administrative level or across different 
ones – I assume that there is a high level of conflict within the policy subsystem, because competing 
policy coalitions are attempting to signal their different preferences openly to each other and to the 
public. When the policy image appears consistent across different parts of the government/party 
organizations, I assume that there is a low level of conflict within the policy subsystem, because 
competing coalitions feel no need to express their differences openly to coordinate actions among 
allies and exert pressure on their opponents. This choice is made on the basis of information 
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availability under a highly opaque authoritarian regime such as the contemporary PRC. Over the 
decades a good number of official compilations of government and party documents have been 
published, which contain valuable information on what the political elites have been thinking with 
regards to minzu policy and how they express their thinking at various times and in different 
occasions. These constitute my primary source for assessing the inter-coalitional conflict within the 
minzu policy subsystem in Post-Mao China. Specifically, I have made extensive use of the following 
collections of official documents:  
1) Selected Works on Tibet Work (1949-2005),6 published by CCP Central Committee Party 
Literature Publishing House, September 2005;  
2) Selected Works on Xinjiang Work (1949-2010),7 published by CCP Central Committee Party 
Literature Publishing House, September 2010; 
3) Selected Works on Minzu Work (2003-2009),8 published by CCP Central Committee Party 
Literature Publishing House, September 2010; 
4) Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Vol.1, Vol.2, & Vol. 3,9 published by CCP Central Committee 
Party Literature Publishing House, September 2016; 
5) Selected Works of Xi Jinping on Socialist Political Development,10 published by CCP Central 
Committee Party Literature Publishing House, August 2017. 
 
                                                      
6 Original Chinese title: 《西藏工作文献选编（一九四九——二○○五年）》 
7 Original Chinese title: 《新疆工作文献选编（一九四九———二〇一〇年）》 
8 Original Chinese title: 《民族工作文献选编（二○○三———二○○九年）》 
9 Original Chinese title: 《胡锦涛文选（第一卷）》, 《胡锦涛文选（第二卷）》, 《胡锦涛文选（第三卷）》 
10 Original Chinese title: 《习近平关于社会主义政治建设论述摘编》 
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2.4.2 Fragmentation in the Knowledge Community 
Two types of knowledge communities with regard to the level of their internal fragmentation are 
considered in my theory: a uniform knowledge community featuring low internal fragmentation and 
a fragmented knowledge community featuring high internal fragmentation one. Drawing on Cross 
(2013, 150), the level of fragmentation can be evaluated along a number of aspects, including 1) 
selection and training, 2) meeting frequency and quality, 3) shared professional norms, and 4) 
common culture. To assess the level of fragmentation for this study, I choose to focus primarily on 
the first criterion, i.e. selection and training, and the last criteria, i.e. common culture. To capture 
how consistent or inconsistent the selection and training for the minzu knowledge community is 
during a particular period, I looked at the development of research programs within the community 
to identify possible divergence or convergence of research interests and training orientation. To 
capture to what extent members within the minzu knowledge community share a common culture, 
understood as “the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community” 
(Cross 2013, 150), I look at the way in which academics from various sub-fields identify themselves 
vis-à-vis the broader community of expertise on minzu in their writings. When members of the 
community promote research programs that share the same or similar broader theoretical 
assumptions and profess their identification or affinity with a common scholarly tradition, I assume 
that the knowledge community is relatively uniform. When members of the community promote 
research programs based on different if not conflicting theoretical assumptions and evoke 
symbolism indicating different scholarly traditions, I assume that the knowledge community is 
relatively fragmented.  
This choice is made on the basis that the development of knowledge community on minzu 
policy, like that on many other policy topics in China, did not fit nicely into any specific disciplinary 
tradition. Or rather, because of the particular history of the People’s Republic of China during which 
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the state heavily intervened in the development of scientific communities, a knowledge community 
on policy in China do not operate like a single academic discipline but oftentimes involve a dozen of 
different disciplines and subfields with various different profiles and traditions. As a result, it is more 
important to pay attention to how experts with different disciplinary background identify (or not 
identify) with one another through endorsing a particular, policy-related common identity (“minzu 
studies”, “minzu theory”, or “minzu policy studies”) and whether they build or promote research 
programs that  celebrate this common identity or challenge it.  
To enable analysis on the common culture and research programs of the knowledge community 
on minzu policy, I used a variety of primary and secondary sources. My primary sources are briefings 
on professional activities which were written by PRC academics themselves and published by 
academic journals in China. Using China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) as the main 
data source for Chinese journal articles, I analyzed more than a dozen of them published between 
1952 to 2018. My secondary sources are scholarly publications that examine the history of minzu 
policy-related disciplines. One particularly important source is Wang Jianmin and his coauthors’ two 
volumes on the history of Chinese ethnology, which I list below. The value of these two books was 
confirmed by a number of scholars with whom I had contact, ranging from my interviewees in 
China to professional colleagues in the US.   
1) The History of Ethnology in China: Part I (1903-1949),11 by Wang Jianmin, published by Yunnan 
Education Publishing House, September 1997;  
2) The History of Ethnology in China: Part II (1950-1997),12 by Wang Jianmin, Zhang Haiyang, and 
Hu Hongbao, published by Yunnan Education Publishing House, May 1998; 
 
                                                      
11 Original Chinese title: 《中国民族学史: 上卷 (1903-1949)》 
12 Original Chinese title: 《中国民族学史: 下卷 (1950-1997)》 
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2.4.3 Academic Politicization and Theoretical Heterogeneity of Academic Policy Debate 
To evaluate the character of an academic policy debate, I focus on two specific indicators: (a) the 
level of academic politicization and (b) the level of theoretical heterogeneity of the debate. As 
previously discussed, these two dimensions summarize the character of an academic policy debate 
and suggest important implication for the capacity of the debate to foster intellectual innovation in 
the policy fields. The first dimension, academic politicization, is defined as the extent that arguments 
in a debate are made to explicitly advance or undermine a political position, be it government policy, 
political program, ideology, etc. The second dimension, theoretical heterogeneity, is defined as the 
extent that participants in the debate employ different theories and methods in understanding and 
explaining a given sociopolitical phenomena. Variations on these two dimensions produce four 
different types of debates.  
To evaluate how an academic policy debate performs on those two indicators, I carry out an in-
depth discourse analysis of the academic discussion on minzu policy within the entire time period. 
This operation is conducted mainly with Chinese academic journal articles as the primary source. 
For this study, I used a large number of Chinese academic journals for sourcing articles, which I 
accessed through the CNKI, the largest online database for academic publications in mainland 
China. No less than 200 journal articles from 1979 to 2017 were analyzed in-depth for assessing the 
character of the minzu debate. Below listed are journals that I have referenced the most:  
1) China’s Ethnic Groups13 
2) Ethno-National Studies14 
3) Guangxi Ethnic Studies15 
                                                      
13 Original Chinese title: 《中国民族》 
14 Original Chinese title: 《民族研究》 
15 Original Chinese title: 《广西民族研究》 
 65 
4) Guizhou Ethnic Studies16 
5) Heilongjiang National Series17 
6) Inner Mongolia Social Sciences18 
7) Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)19 
8) Journal of Hubei University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Sciences)20 
9) Journal of Minzu University of China (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)21 
10) Journal of Northwest Minorities University (Philosophy and Social Science)22 
11) Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences)23 
12) Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities24 
13) Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social Science)25 
14) Journal of Xinjiang University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)26 
15) Journal of Yunnan Minzu University (Social Sciences)27 
16) Minzu Tribune28 
17) Northwestern Journal of Ethnology29 
18) Qinghai Journal of Ethnology30 
                                                      
16 Original Chinese title: 《贵州民族研究》 
17 Original Chinese title: 《黑龙江民族丛刊》 
18 Original Chinese title: 《内蒙古社会科学(文史哲版)》 
19 Original Chinese title: 《广西民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
20 Original Chinese title: 《湖北民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
21 Original Chinese title: 《中央民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
22 Original Chinese title: 《西北民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
23 Original Chinese title: 《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
24 Original Chinese title: 《中南民族大学学报》 
25 Original Chinese title: 《西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)》 
26 Original Chinese title: 《新疆大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
27 Original Chinese title: 《云南民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 
28 Original Chinese title: 《民族论坛》 
29 Original Chinese title:《西北民族研究》 
30 Original Chinese title: 《青海民族研究》 
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19) Social Sciences in Xinjiang31 
20) Thinking32 
 
2.4.4 Use of Interviews and Ethical Considerations 
To complement the above document research, I carried out over 50 interviews across the 
country over an 18-month fieldwork in China from July 2014 till December 2015. A list of 
interviews conducted during my fieldwork can be found at the end of this dissertation, under 
“Appendix B”. My interviewees consist of academics, educators, officials, and journalists. They are 
found across the country, including Beijing, Kunming (Yunnan Province), Urumqi (Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region), Yunmin County (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), Yanji (Jilin 
Province), Hunchun (Jilin Province), Xining (Qinghai Province), Tongren County (Qinghai 
Province), and Lanzhou (Gansu Province). Most of my interviewees are academics who work in 
either universities, colleges, or research institutes. I chose to focus on this particular group because 
as members of the knowledge community on minzu policy, they have direct experience of carrying 
out research under the influence of both the broader political and policy environment as well as the 
internal dynamics of their professional community. While I also use other material for the study of 
this community as previously stated, interviewing scholars who reside in different places and work 
within a variety of different institutional context allows me to reduce the bias of relying on a few 
historians’ account and learn about things left out, overlooked, or differently represented in 
publications available to the public.  
To protect my informants, I do not disclose any identifying information in this dissertation and 
have taken measures to anonymize all the fieldnotes taken about those interviews. I have the utmost 
                                                      
31 Original Chinese title: 《新疆社会科学》 
32 Original Chinese title: 《思想战线》 
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respect and appreciation for those who generously spent their time and shared their knowledge with 
me for this research. I cannot stress enough how valuable their contribution is and how grateful I 
am for it. Granted, it might be safe to disclose the names of some people that have helped me. But it 
is never entirely certain that the political circumstance will not change for the worse. Afraid that 
even a brief line paying credit to a person could put him or her in unforeseeable danger, I made the 
difficult decision not to identify anyone that I interviewed.  
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Chapter 3 Background 
 
3.1 Politics and Knowledge in Post-Mao China 
3.1.1 Political Environment for Knowledge Communities in Post-Mao China 
In the broader sense, epistemic community in the forms of “network of professional with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992) has always existed in China. Even 
during the Mao era, there were technocratic officials and government-affiliated research units that 
functioned effectively as knowledge-based actors to the decision makers. Though during the 
turbulent years of radical political movements, e.g. Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, many 
if most of them were marginalized to the extent of insignificant to policy process (Chan 2001).  
Although this study does not concern itself with them, recognizing their existence during the 
pre-Reform era is nonetheless necessary. This not only serves to do justice to the concept of 
“epistemic community,” but to also dispels the implicit assumption reflected in the extant 
scholarship that only in pluralistic societies could knowledge-based actors exert policy influence. Or, 
to put it differently, what necessitates a study of epistemic community in today’s China is not the 
emergence of something which never existed before, but the transformation of various social, 
economic, and political institutions, and the state-society relation in general under reform. These 
transformations have led to changes both in the composition of knowledge community as well as 
how it relates to the government and policy-making process.  
The evolution of epistemic community since 1980s is marked by, first of all, the rise of relatively 
autonomous research communities operating “externally” to the officialdom on the one hand, and 
the continuation if not the expansion of government control on the other hand. Public intellectual 
sphere was restored under Deng and was decisively expanded in comparison with the pre-reform 
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era. Universities are allowed to reestablish previously disbanded disciplines, rehabilitate scholars and 
resume interrupted research activities, even restore their ties with oversea peers and professional 
communities (L. Cheng and So 1983; Bonnin and Chevrier 1991; Hayhoe 1996). As the reform 
proceeded, the government also allow civilian/private research organizations to be set up, provided 
they could find a government agency as their “supervisor”.  
However, the government remains unquestionably powerful in setting the agenda for research 
activities and determine the boundary of discussion among intellectuals, using both positive (e.g. 
allocate research fund) and negative (e.g. practice censorship) incentives (E. X. Gu and Goldman 
2004a). Nonetheless, the Chinese government under the reform-leadership shows strong interests to 
promote the professionalization and specialization of research community. In this process, many 
intellectuals also became gradually reconciled to cooperating with the regime in exchange for a space 
for one’s own career, supplying the officials with their intellectual products and assisting with 
decision-making (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004a).  
The result is not simply more “freedom” on the part of academics and intelligentsia in general, 
but the emergence of a wide variety of knowledge-based actors with varying degree of autonomy. 
Today, government research units (e.g. NDRC Macroeconomic Research Institute, NDRC Energy 
Research Institute), semi-official think-tanks (e.g. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations), civilian think-tanks (e.g. Unirule Institute of 
Economics, Friends of the Nature), as well as universities and colleges (e.g. Peking University, 
Fudan University) all operate as potential knowledge source for policymakers (Zhu and Xue 2007). 
Some receive research assignments from the government and are financially dependent upon 
research funds from the state; others, such as universities and civilian think tanks, operate according 
to a different logic. Institutional and financial independence allowed these research organizations to 
pursue their own interests and sometimes even publish opinions that deviate from what the 
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authority prefer. At the same time, they may nonetheless choose to work on topics of interests to 
the government, as the latter remains the most resourceful and generous research sponsor. In sum, 
an increasingly diversified knowledge community gradually emerged, with different combination of 
agencies and structural constraints vis-à-vis the state for each type of player (Zhu and Xue 2007).  
This process led to a less rigid but more dynamic, not hierarchical but interactive and reciprocal 
relationship between the research community and the government. In an oversimplified fashion, one 
may say that such a relationship is based less on the “political logic” of hierarchical control but more 
on the “economic logic” of supply and demand, to borrow Solingen’s terminology (Solingen 1993). 
Government wants policy-relevant knowledge and ideological control over intellectual sphere, 
whereas the researchers want intellectual freedom for research, and social and financial resource for 
career advancement. The meeting point is thus the tacit agreement to avoid political confrontation 
while maintaining the steady exchange between practical knowledge and political loyalty on the one 
hand, and resource for research and professional development on the other hand (Solingen 1993).   
For the government, who remains the ultimate political authority and primary financial sponsor 
for research activities, it could thus exploit the expertise of a professionalized corps of natural and 
social scientists, engineers, legal experts, and many others through political and economic incentives 
without limiting so much their vitality and creativity with a centrally-planned, command system. As 
the literature on authoritarian consultation/deliberation argued, what sustains the continuing relative 
autonomy of the research communities in today’s China is primarily the functionally motivated 
effort of the regime to cope with concrete challenges in everyday governance (He and Warren 2011, 
269).     
Equally important while parallel to the above development is the broadening of venues for 
policy debate, to which epistemic communities in post-Mao China increasingly have access to. As 
scholars have observed, policy debates in contemporary China increasingly spill over from internal, 
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closed-door meetings to a more diverse set of platforms, including semi-public government work-
conferences, public hearings, academic conference, even open debate in academic journals and news 
& social media (Gilley and Holbig 2009; Zhu 2009b; Stern and O’Brien 2012; Hassid and Repnikova 
2015). One should, of course, avoid taking these new and seemingly more transparent forms of 
discussion at their face-value, i.e. treating them as evidence that the regime has permitted all 
members of the society to freely monitor and participate in the political process of decision-making. 
Clear limits exist with regard to different venues (Shirk 2011; Stockmann 2013). In fact, with the 
advancement of information technology, proliferation of internet users, and popularization of 
mobile devices, the techniques of surveillance, censorship, and information control of the Chinese 
government are becoming increasingly sophisticated and permeating (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013, 
2014, 2017).   
Nonetheless, there are signs that public discussions about political matters are more tolerated by 
the regime, if not all the time and everywhere. Presently, when the authority prepares to seriously 
considerate a major policy, experts are routinely called upon to conduct studies, organize debate, and 
offer advices and suggestions regarding different possible alternatives directly targeting specific 
policy topics. Incidentally, the fact that some topics are confined to the semi-public discussion 
among experts such as officials, scholars, and researchers shows precisely the eminence of 
“epistemic community” over “public opinion” in todays’ Chinese policy-making.  
The expanded intellectual autonomy of research communities, the emergence of reciprocal 
relationship between the government and the experts, and the diversification of venues for policy 
engagement with a more sympathetic government characterize the structural and institutional 
environment under which knowledge communities operate in post-Mao China. What implications 
can we draw from these developments? One immediate inference is that the intellectual landscape of 
the knowledge community is approaching a more crowded, more animated and vibrant 
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“marketplace of ideas”. Existing literature on contemporary on Chinese society largely confirmed 
this point. As Edward Gu and Merle Goldman observed in their coedited volume on intellectual-
state relations in post-Mao China, “by the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first, China’s intellectuals had opened up a public space and filled it with a variety of ideas 
and vigorous debates”(E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004b, 13). On the other hand, this widened 
intellectual sphere does not guarantee the rational civic engagement necessary for truly realizing 
communicative rationality and deliberative democracy. Behind the authority’s efforts to promote 
professionalization and specialization lies the incentive to exploit the knowledge community for its 
own instrumental needs. With the government being the most important sponsor for scientific 
research, the knowledge community is incentivized to align research agenda with the interests of the 
authority. In spite of the general tendency in post-Mao political development where scholars and 
researchers are granted greater space for their activities, there remain hurdles preventing them from 
becoming a knowledge/rationality-based political actor on their own (Weible and Sabatier 2009).  
Knowledge production of the epistemic communities interacts with policy-making through 
various forms of institutional and non-institutional engagement with the authority. The sustaining 
factor is the Chinese governments’ active efforts to exploit talents outside the officialdom. On the 
one hand, national and regional governments, as well as different bureaucratic sectors have been 
investing heavily in cultivating their “external brain,” through allocating funds for policy-oriented 
research and setting up specialized institutions. On the other hand, it has become a routine today for 
the government to request input from the expert community before considering major policy 
changes, and study carefully their suggestions and advice before announcing their decisions.  
As a result, not only are prominent academics routinely invited to give their opinions at high-
level government “work conferences” (Ch: gongzuo huiyi), but also are scholars from governmental 
and civilian research institutions incentivized – in some cases, obligated – to produce policy analysis 
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or recommendations and submit them to the government through the “internal reference” (Ch: 
neican) system. In the latter case, when a high official annotates the written opinion of a scholars with 
his/her comments (Ch: pishi), the document becomes an official document containing the direct 
instructions from the leadership (Tsai 2015). The author whose submission was annotated with 
official comments would also be considered as having made a great achievement and are often 
awarded according to the administrative level from where the officials’ comment comes from. 
Lastly, officials also pay careful attention to the academic policy debates within the wider knowledge 
community, and at times even participate in their official capacity in the debate to voice their 
interests and support.  
In sum, the Chinese government today is routinely and actively interacting with the knowledge 
community at multiple levels: inviting them to policy-making as well as promoting their 
professionalization in domains of policy relevance. 
 
3.1.2 Mao’s Anti-Intellectual Politics and Uneven Knowledge Development in Post-Mao China 
As one can see, despite continuing present constraints, the political environment of post-Mao 
China features more political opportunities for knowledge actors than the pre-Reform era. 
Nonetheless, the structural environment as described above only tells half the story. Below I delve 
into the internal dynamics of the epistemic community. What gives epistemic communities the 
power to be an influential actor in modern governance is not only the external condition, i.e. 
increasingly complex tasks compel the government to seek help from the experts, but also the very 
fact that experts are – in modern societies – produced and organized in such a way that they possess 
authoritative knowledge on certain topics and could act on behalf of their collective commitment to 
those shared knowledge claim and associated normative beliefs. Thus, another key foundation of 
their power – apart from the structurally-generated opportunities in modern states – is the 
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constitution of scientific community themselves as professionally-organized knowledge-producing 
institutions.  
To realize this, simply having a group of scientists with similar background and common 
interests is not enough. One also needs strictly enforced entry criteria and internal discipline, shared 
normative beliefs and commitments to a common social and politics enterprise.33 These elements are 
important because they constitute the very structure, norms, and principles which enable the 
coordination within and the mobilization of the group for a common cause. If there are no clearly 
defined boundaries, no rigorous standard of qualification, and no shared fundamental values, there is 
no “community” to speak of, but a random collection of professionals who happen to be in the 
same business.  
In today’s China, authority’s support for the development of scientific/technical expertise, the 
relative autonomy of the research community, and their increased contact with the government 
opened up more possibilities for knowledge actors to intervene in policy-making. Some recent 
studies even show that, at times, experts are capable of effecting policy change against prevailing 
bureaucratic and local interest (Han, Swedlow, and Unger 2014; Lv 2015). But few studies have 
investigated these developments rigorously from the perspective of epistemic community approach. 
Specifically, the following questions are relatively unexamined: how exactly an epistemic community 
is organized, why some epistemic communities are better developed, established, and well-organized 
than others, and how some became capable of exerting policy influence while others cannot. While a 
good number of studies have investigated how various external conditions enabled the intervention 
of epistemic communities, the “inside story” has received relatively fewer attention. Sufficiently 
                                                      
33 See Cross (2013, 150), Cross argued that ‘internal cohesion’ to be a particular important factor in affecting epistemic 
communities’ policy influence. She also suggested the following four as potential indicators for assessing the ‘internal 
cohesiveness’, including 1) selection and training; (2) meeting frequency and quality; (3) shared professional norms; and 
(4) common culture. Together they either enhance or weaken the professionalism of an epistemic community, and in 
doing so, affecting the degree of its internal cohesion.  
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internal uniformity of a given epistemic community is usually assumed, taken for granted, or simply 
treated as invariable and independent from politics, thus leaving the actual internal dynamics of 
different epistemic communities overlooked (Cross 2013).   
This often-neglected factor is key to understand the varying influence of epistemic communities 
under similar environment. Although ideally an epistemic community consists of people sharing 
normative and causal beliefs, as well as a common set of criteria of validity and policy enterprises, 
not in every case exists a group with the same level of internal cohesiveness in terms of those 
commitments. How cohesive an epistemic community is could affect how effective it could be in 
exerting influence on the policymaking process. When the members are loosely organized, or have 
strong disagreements regarding their fundamental beliefs, it could weaken the bargaining position of 
this epistemic community vis-à-vis the policy apparatus, or – in case of polarized environment – 
being even co-opted by opposing policy coalitions into political advocacy rather than rational 
collaboration, deliberation, and professional policy consultation (Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier 
2010). On the other hand, an epistemic community’s ability of influencing policy makers could be 
strengthened when its members are united behind a similar set of commitments, as their message is 
backed by the collective beliefs of the authoritative knowledge producers.  
It goes without saying, of course, that singling out internal cohesion here is by no means to 
suggest that external environment is unimportant. Issues such as scope condition, political 
opportunity structure, phase in policy process (when intervention occurs) have been extensively 
demonstrated by scholars (Cross 2013, 144). Rather, the intention here is to highlight a factor which 
is crucial to the constitution of an epistemic community and furthermore, particularly consequential 
to one’s policy influence when external conditions are similar across time or different issue-areas.  
The question of internal cohesion also points to an important distinction among different 
epistemic communities in post-Mao China. As already noted, it is common for sharply opposing 
 76 
policy opinions to exist within the broader knowledge communities, which came as a result of the 
post-Mao market reform, liberalization, and increased intellectual autonomy. Understandably, it is 
usually difficult to locate a highly internally cohesive epistemic community on a particular policy 
issue, in which the majority of its members could commit to the same cause and are capable of 
conveying a unanimous message to the policy makers. But in addition to the general tendency of 
pluralization of intellectual positions, there are also differences with regard to the internal cohesion 
across different epistemic communities.  
To be more precise, there are significant gaps in terms of how well the community of experts 
around a particular issue or policy topic has developed, to what extent is has obtained a sufficient 
degree of professionalism, how effective it could mobilize its member to rally around a common 
cause, and so on. The analytical value of cross-epistemic-community difference regarding its internal 
cohesion is further highlighted in today’s context, given that the broad structural condition is similar 
for all, i.e. communities of different expertise and thematic focus all have to work with an adaptive, 
sometimes accommodating but nonetheless authoritarian government. Against such a background, 
how cohesive an epistemic community become particularly significant in deciding how strong its 
policy influence can be.  
Where does the gap between different epistemic communities come from? In the case of China, 
a key factor lies in the politics of Mao era, or more precisely, the series of anti-intellectual political 
campaigns initiated by the PRC government under its first paramount leader Mao Zedong. Among 
them the most relevant one is the targeted dissolution of social science at the beginning of PRC 
period. Beginning in the 1950s, almost all major social scientific disciplines were forcefully 
dismantled by the Communist authority in its top-down-imposed nationwide educational reform, 
formally known as the Adjustment of Colleges and Departments (Ch: gaodeng yuanxiao yuanxi 
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tiaozheng). Higher education and research institutions were systematically reorganized in order to 
produce talents that fit the government’s plan of accelerated industrialization.  
This policy borrowed heavily from the Soviet practice, particularly in areas such as disciplinary 
division, curriculum, and textbooks. Social sciences suffered significantly more than their 
counterparts in natural sciences and engineering, mainly due to the conflict between their ambiguous 
ideological orientations and the Communist orthodoxy. Fei Xiaotong, a student of Malinowski at 
London School of Economics and then the leading sociologist and anthropologist in the country, 
took great personal risk when he petitioned personally to Mao for sparing sociology from the 
reform, i.e. disbanding of the discipline. Against Fei’s request, Mao reportedly answered that the 
discipline of sociology must be wiped out completely, leaving nothing left (Song 2010).   
Although the post-Cultural Revolution Chinese government heeded the restoration of those 
earlier-dismantled disciplines, the interlude was more than just a temporary interruption of scholars’ 
work. Numerous studies, as well as memoirs and novels based on the event show that it was both a 
professional and personal catastrophe for scholars, researchers, their friends and families, and 
intellectuals in general. Many scholars of the old generation, once at the forefront of research and 
teaching in China, were prosecuted, tortured, exiled, executed, or forced to commit suicide because 
of their allegedly “counter-revolutionary” (Ch: fan geming) acts or stances (Y. Wang 2004; Y. Xie 
2001). Pan Guangdan, a leading sociologist and eugenicists at the time and a former student at 
Dartmouth College and Columbia University, was repeatedly tortured by the Red Guards before 
dying in a dysfunctional hospital in Beijing in 1967. Huang Guozhang, professor of geography at a 
number of different schools in early PRC period and a former student of Yale and University of 
Chicago, committed suicide along with his wife in 1966 due to the tremendous pressure suffered 
from the prosecution against their family.  
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Those managed to survive the political turmoil, on the other hand, were either too old to resume 
their work as researcher and teacher, or simply too afraid to pick up their job again, after seeing so 
many of his/her colleagues perished at the hands of the same regime. Communication with the 
international colleagues were also severely disrupted almost to the point of “academic autarky,” if 
not for some contact with the Soviet academia. As a result of more than two decades of brutal 
suppression, the Chinese social scientific community saw their roots almost entirely destroyed. The 
condition of Chinese social science had effectively regressed to almost its pre-PRC state on the eve 
before Deng’s reform, if not worse.  
Different fates during the Mao era led to very different internal dynamics of epistemic 
communities which manage to reestablish themselves in the post-Mao era. As one can reasonably 
infer, those epistemic communities that survived the political onslaught in more or less one piece 
would have a much higher internal cohesion due to its less-interrupted operation, continued-
engagement in the policy field, and better-maintained professionalism. As a result, they would have a 
greater chance of influencing policymaking with its “knowledge” and “ideas”. Given how severe the 
damage was for many knowledge communities, the differences in one’s Mao-era legacy amount to 
an institutional advantage that other epistemic communities could not easily compete or catch up – 
in the short term. In sum, in the post-Mao political arena, although many scholars and researchers 
have taken advantage of the relatively loosened political environment to rebuild disciplines and 
research programs, and to resume research and teaching, the damaged to the knowledge community 
is not easily reversible. Libraries and labs can be rebuilt within months. A professional knowledge 
base of a society may take years or decades to be re-cultivated, if not more.  
Therefore, it is a practical challenge for an epistemic community in post-Mao China to organize 
themselves, and by extension, to become effective in knowledge production and intellectual 
innovation in policy fields. In certain ways, this uneven development is further exacerbated by the 
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relatively relaxed political environment of the post-Mao era. As discussed, the expanded autonomy 
of research communities at the present time foster diversity of academic interests, professional 
orientations, and political perspectives. In the long term, should the Chinese government continue 
to broaden the scope of public political engagement, the openness could contribute to the 
improvement of professional knowledge community in general. In the short term, however, with 
many subjects and disciplines either recovering from years of nonexistence or trying to expand 
themselves to catch up with international colleagues, the state of their internal cohesion is 
simultaneously being promoted by the efforts of some to rebuild and reconsolidate their community 
and undermined by the attempts of others to challenge the old academic orthodoxy and 
administrative conventions.  
The effect is sustained and further amplified by the rapid market reform and economic liberation 
under Deng, which not only created strong incentive for many to leave academia for private 
business, but also pushed individual scholars, academic department, and even entire organizations to 
pursue money-making rather than serious research (Hayhoe 1996, 116–17). As a result, to arrive at a 
level of internal cohesion sufficient for knowledge production, an epistemic community would need 
to overcome both the sociological trauma from Mao’s legacy and the centrifugal force under market 
economy that attracts talents away from the academia.  
 
3.2 Politics, Experts, and Knowledge of Minzu in Post-Mao China 
3.2.1 Minzu Policy and Politics of Ethnicity 
China’s Minzu policy refers to the sum of laws, government regulations, polices, and institutions 
that are designed and implemented by the state to manage relations among various ethnic groups 
inside the People’s Republic of China. A 1999 Government White Paper states that “ethnic equality 
(Ch: minzu pingdeng) and ethnic solidarity (Ch: minzu tuanjie) as the basic principle and foundational 
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policy for solving the minzu question (Ch: minzu wenti) are clearly defined in the Chinese 
Constitution and relevant laws […] The Chinese government adopted special policies and measures 
in order to effectively realize and guarantee the right to equality among all ethnic groups in social life 
and government activities as prescribed by the Constitution and laws” (SCIO 1999).  
Specifically, minzu policy aims at ensuring and fulfilling the rights and interests of the country’s 
ethnic minorities, known in Chinese as shaoshu minzu.34 This is so because among the 56 officially 
recognized ethnic groups in China, Han constitutes the absolute majority. The sixth and the latest 
national population census (2010) reported that out of the 1.33 billion people in China, 1.22 billion 
(91.6%) were Han. In other words, the rest 55 ethnic groups make up less than 9% of the total 
population.35 China’s minzu policy does not usually cover issues concerning foreign citizens,36 as 
there are separate agencies in charge of foreigners’ affair and immigration.  
Due to the particular legacy of the nationalist movements of China in the 20th century and the 
socialist revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the minzu policy of PRC took on a 
character resembling both the imperial system from the pre-20th century China and the Soviet 
Union’s nationality policy of the 20th century. The basic premise of PRC’s minzu policy is that China 
has become a multinational state (Ch: duominzu de guojia) before the modern time and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. Different ethno-national communities (Ch: minzu) have existed in 
“China;” as a result of their historical entanglement, all of them should be considered as constitutive 
parts of the unified “Chinese nation” (Ch: zhonghua minzu), a national category which sits above 
                                                      
34 Literally, “minority nationalities” or “minority ethnicities”.  
35 “Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China,” National Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm, accessed February 1st 2018.  
36 There are exceptions to this rule: the Chinese government treats certain types of non-Chinese citizens as “oversea 
Chinese compatriots” and has made specific policies for individuals of such background. For example, according to 
“Opinions on Properly Receiving Oversea Tibetan Compatriots” (original Chinese title: 关于接待国外藏胞工作的意
见) issued by the Central United Front Work Department in May 1980, Tibetans residing abroad without foreign 
citizenship are to be treated as “oversea Tibetan compatriots” whereas those who have obtained foreign citizenship but 
want to visit family and friends or to settle in China are to be treated as “foreign citizen of Chinese descent”. This policy 
was clearly made in consultation with China’s specific minzu policy regarding Tibet.  
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other, “constituting” ethno-national groups. Based on this premise, the PRC government sought to 
offer political recognition to various group in exchange for their political loyalty to a single, unified 
Chinese state and Chinese (supra-)nation. As CCP managed to take over almost the entirety of the 
former Qing Empire’s territory (with the exception of Outer Mongolia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Macau), it began to experiment with ethnicity-based regional autonomous governments in areas with 
significant non-Han population so to exert, maintain, or strengthen the party’s control over those 
territories while countering against any potential separatist tendencies.  
This policy became formalized after the official founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. Soon after the its establishment, a new Central People’s Government launched a nationwide 
“Ethnic Classification” (Ch: minzu shibie) project in 1953 in order to “scientifically” map the different 
ethno-national community within the PRC borders. During this process the government recruited a 
massive number of social scientists from various disciplines, such as ethnology, sociology, 
anthropology, linguistics, and history. These scholars and researchers are organized into several 
survey teams with different regional focus, which were then sent to various parts of the country to 
survey, study, and catalogue the ethnic-makeup of those regions. Due to the interruption of the 
project during successive political movements, e.g. the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural 
Revolution, the classification was not officially concluded until 1986. However, the majority of 
classification work had been completed around mid- to late-1950s. During this time, 50 plus ethnic 
groups were identified and given official recognition as a constituting ethno-nationality of the 
unified Chinese nation. Because of the significant discrepancy in terms of population size, all ethnic 
groups except for Han are considered as ethnic minority (Ch: shaoshu minzu) of the country.   
Based on this official ethno-taxonomy, the regime established a system of “ethnic regional 
autonomy” (Ch: minzu quyu zizhi) across the country. Central to this system is the local administrative 
institution known as the “regional autonomous government” (Ch: quyu zizhi zhengfu), which 
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distinguishes itself from an autonomous government in a federation (such as the United States) or a 
confederation (such as the former Soviet Union). From 1940s to early 2000s, the regime established 
and maintained around 150 ethnic autonomous regions at three different administrative levels: five 
provincial-level Ethnic Autonomous Regions (Ch: minzu zizhiqu), about 30 prefectural-level Ethnic 
Autonomous Prefectures (Ch: minzu zizhizhou), and about 120 county-level Ethnic Autonomous 
Counties (Ch: minzu zizhixian).37  
An autonomous area can have up to four titular groups, which are supposedly selected from the 
most representative ethnic groups of the area, which are not always – in fact rarely – the most 
populous ones. All autonomous areas share certain institutional features and enjoy a number of 
regionally-confined privileges, such as special quota for titular minority groups in the local 
government and legislature, rights to use the language of the minority groups in official documents 
and public signs within the area, and rights to enact laws deviating from superordinate laws, e.g. 
autonomous decrees (Ch: zizhi tiaoli) and special decrees (Ch: danxing tiaoli). In addition, many 
national laws, regulations, and policies contain provisions which specify exceptions, exemptions, or 
special considerations regarding ethnic minorities, including both those residing inside their own 
autonomous areas and those living elsewhere in the country. Well-knowns examples of such special 
provisions include exemption from the strict “one-child-rule” in China’s family planning, bonus 
points and special quota during college admission, and the reduced legal responsibility for minority 
perpetrators in criminal justice known as the “two fewers, one leniency” principle.38  
                                                      
37 The number of Ethnic Autonomous Counties changed over time, as some earlier established ones were later on 
merged with other units, revoked, or lost its autonomous status when it was upgraded, whereas some were not 
reconstituted as autonomous areas until very late. In addition to the above listed three levels of autonomous 
governments, there are also over 1,000 Ethnic Townships (Ch: minzuxiang) in China. These are township-level 
administrative units where a sizeable ethnic minority community resides, but which do not have the status of an 
autonomous area and thus do not enjoy the rights and benefits as prescribed by laws for the former category.  
38 Document No. 5 [1984] of the Central Committee of the CPC (Original Chinese title: 中发〔1984〕第 5 号文件): 
“With regards to criminals with ethnic minority background, [we] should always ‘arrest fewer and execute fewer,’ and 
should be as lenient as possible in treating [them in legal procedures]” (“对少数民族的犯罪分子要坚持‘少捕少杀’, 
在处理上要尽量从宽”).  
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State-led ethnic classification, ethnic regional autonomy, and preferential policies for ethnic 
minorities together constitute the main pillars of mainland China’s minzu policy (Leibold 2013, 6). 
While the state ethnic classification and the system of ethnic regional autonomy remain by and large 
stable since the 1980s (with a few autonomous units being added and a few others revoked), 
preferential policies are being constantly adjusted and/or changed by both the central and local 
governments to adapt to new conditions and to cope with new challenges. For example, since the 
introduction of bilingual education in ethnic minority regions, many schools from kindergarten- to 
high school-level in those areas have been tasked with greater emphasis on strengthening students’ 
mandarin proficiency. In Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, bilingual education reform has been 
increasingly marginalizing minority languages – if taught at all – while demanding almost all of 
science and humanities subjects, such as math, physics, chemistry, geography, history, to be taught in 
mandarin Chinese. For another example, recent years also saw the gradual adjustment to the bonus-
point system for ethnic minority text-takers in the national college entrance examination (Ch: 
gaokao), with several provincial governments taking steps to reduce the cover of the system or 
eliminate it altogether.   
The experience of ethnic regional autonomy helps to shed light on the centrally designed and 
coordinated minzu policy has been resisted at the implementation phase. Shortly before the 
conclusion of the civil war, the Communist authority began experimenting with ethnicity-based 
regional autonomous government in the north (Lin 2011). The first regional autonomous 
administration created at the provincial level was the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 
established in 1947 (Bulag 2010). It was then followed by four other provincial-level autonomous 
region (ARs), as well as autonomous prefectures (APs) and autonomous counties/banners (ACs or 
ABs) which spread across the country. While every autonomous unit is designated to one or two 
titular ethnic groups – who are recognized as the most important constituting elements to the 
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administrative unit and whose status are recognized in local laws – there can exists also smaller 
autonomous units within a larger one, thus dividing an autonomous unit designed for a specific 
group into several smaller ones for others. For example, while Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) was constituted in 1955 as the provincial level administrative unit for the Turkic-speaking 
Muslim minority Uyghur, who was the unquestionable majority in the region, XUAR also contains 
five autonomous prefectures as well as six autonomous counties within its jurisdiction. These 
smaller units are designed to other groups such as Hui, Mongolian, Kazakh, Xibo, Tajik, and 
Kyrgyz. In this way, the autonomy of an autonomous unit sits uneasily with its own constituting 
units which are also “autonomous” by law.   
The idea of the regional autonomy system originated in the Republican era. The Chinese 
Communist leadership, influenced by the theory and practice of the Soviet Union, initially ran a 
platform based on the principle of self-determination (Lin 2011; Liu 2003). This was done to 
counter its domestic political and military opponent KMT, which under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-
shek) ran an assimilationist platform. At this time, CCP policy not only recognized minority’s 
entitlement to self-rule, but also offered them the rights to secede from China and form their own 
independent country as a part of greater supranational confederacy with the then young Soviet 
Chinese Republic based in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. Soon after the breakout of the war with Japan, 
the Communist leadership realized the danger of the same principle being exploited by the Japanese 
to carve up the country, so to separate the traditional peripheral non-Han regions and set up puppet 
regimes to their advantage. As a result, CCP changed their stance and refrained from its earlier 
commitment, now insisting that while all minority groups have the right to govern themselves, it is 
best to exercise such power within the context of a unified China (Bulag 2010). To maintain 
consistency with their earlier position, the CCP opted for a watered-down version of its earlier 
proposal: instead of having the right to secede and become independent, the minorities now would 
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have the right to exercise self-rule under “autonomous government” within a unified China. The 
first experimental regional administration based on such principle was established in Yuhai County 
in 1936, under the title “Shan-Gan-Ning Yuhai County Hui Autonomous Government” (Ch: 
shanngannng yuhaixian huimin zizhi zhengfu) (Lin 2011). 
In the post-civil-war China, the autonomy system was instituted as the basis for implementing 
ethnic policy, an umbrella term for a variety of preferential policies and institutional arrangements 
designed to ensure that the ethnic minorities of the People’s Republic would receive better treatment 
so long as they show political loyalty (Kaup 2000). The policies aim to protect and promote their 
own language, culture, and religious faith, and foster socioeconomic development of those 
communities. The autonomy system is centerpiece of China’s ethnic policy, for it not only forms the 
administrative foundation for separating “conventional areas” from “minority areas” and enable the 
latter to enjoy group-based benefits in a more manageable manner, but also symbolizes the 
commitment of the CCP to respect ethnic minority, to recognize the socioeconomic inequality 
between Han and the non-Han people, and to right the historical wrong through political 
empowerment and preferential treatment. However, this noble cause, repeatedly emphasized in 
official documents, encountered continuous obstacle and resistance in actual practice since the 
beginning of the PRC (Leibold 2013). At the center of this struggle is the conflicting objective of 
maintaining national unity under a centralized system versus allowing the non-Han ethnic minorities 
in the vast borderlands the power to exercise self-rule. The vertical partition of larger autonomous 
units into smaller ones, as the above paragraph shows, represents one example of the contradiction 
in the institutional design, resulted from conflicting political objectives.  
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the central government began a nationwide 
rectification campaign, which reversed many of the disastrous policies implemented during the 
previous decade (Bovingdon 2010). Although the administrative structure of ethnic regional 
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autonomy by and large survived through the political turmoil and social upheavals in the 60’s and 
70’s, ethnic policy, particularly those specifically designed to protect the minorities’ culture, language, 
religious faith, were regularly ignored if not openly violated (Dillon 1999; Bovingdon 2010; Kaup 
2000; Norbu 2001). Seizing the opportunity of the leadership reshuffle and the new climate of 
rectification and political pragmatism, some elites in the top leadership began pushing for greater 
institutionalization of the regional autonomy system and other minority-related preferential policies.  
Not all their efforts succeeded. On the one hand, many minority cadres who were purged 
previously are rehabilitated. The local government received instructions emphasizing once again the 
need to be culturally sensitive and responsive (Kaup 2000). A number of regional Production and 
Construction Corp (Ch: shengchan jianshe bingtuan), a type of quasi military-economic organization 
established and stationed in minority regions of China for both national defense, internal stability, 
and economic development purposes, were disbanded. Most significantly, two important legal 
statutes were passed which strongly reaffirm the commitment of the Chinese government to protect 
and promote the rights of its domestic minorities to enjoy equality and development: the 1982 
Chinese Constitution and the PRC Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy (LERA, Ch: minzu quyu 
zizhifa). The latter document was particularly important as it emphasized the right and the need for 
autonomous units to exercise the legislative power and design localized policies tailored to the need 
of the minority communities, through enacting autonomous regulation (Ch: zizhi tiaoli) and special 
decrees (Ch: danxing tiaoli).  
On the other hand, those who remain skeptical of allowing minority greater autonomy, and see 
social stability and national security as the overriding political priority vehemently pushed back the 
above efforts. A policy of dramatically increasing the ratio of minority cadre in the local 
governments of minority regions by sending Han cadres back to inland China, which received the 
endorsement of the Party Secretary Hu Yaobang, was discarded soon after the initial adoption 
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(Bovingdon 2010). This policy would have created a large minority cadre force in Xinjiang and 
Tibet. In addition, while most of the Production and Construction Corps were disbanded, only one 
was immediately resurrected and survived until this day, the Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps (XJPCC). Under the pressure of former Xinjiang Chief, founder of the XJPCC, and longtime 
hardline politician-military official Wang Zhen, Deng authorized the reestablishment of XJPCC in 
1981 and assigned Wang Zhen’s trusted colleague, Wang Enmao, as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (Bovingdon 2010). Lastly, although LERA stipulates that all 
autonomous unit have in theory the right to create autonomous regulations and specific decrees, in 
practice the legislative efforts have made only moderate progress since LERA came into effect and, 
at the provincial level, almost no progress at all.  
The significance of autonomous regulation for an autonomous region of any level is twofold: on 
a symbolic level, it is an acknowledgement of an agreement between the central government and 
regional autonomous government to commit themselves to the principle of regional autonomy for 
national minorities; on a substantive and practical level, it would be an official interpretation of the 
division of power between the central government and an autonomous region, upon which the 
“regional autonomy” of this level is to be operationalized. While more than half of the autonomous 
units (including all five ARs, and many APs and ACs) were established before 1960s, the process of 
making autonomous regulation did not begin until after the Cultural Revolution. 
Starting from 1985 (LERA came into effect in October 1984), autonomous prefectures and 
autonomous counties across the country began drafting their autonomous regulations. By the end of 
1994 – a decade after LERA, 87 units (56%) have had their autonomous regulation approved by the 
upper authority. However, the rate, which already began to decline after 1989, never picked up again 
after 1992. In the five years after LERA’s enactment (1985-1989), 56 autonomous regulations were 
approved. But in the next decade (1990-1999), only 43 went through. The record went further down 
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in the 2000s. In the first five years of the 21st century, none passed. Only in 2006, two autonomous 
regulations from, respectively, Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County in Sichuan and Weichang 
Manchu Autonomous County in Hebei received approval. Since then the record has been kept at 
zero. 
If we break down the record by administrative level, then it is clear that: 1) the process of 
enacting autonomous regulations has by and large stalled in the mid-1990s, and 2) the higher an 
autonomous unit is in the administrative hierarchy, the harder it would be able to receive approval 
from its upper authority regarding the autonomous regulation after the 1990.  
At the county level – the lower level an autonomous government can be created – the peak (14 
approvals) came in 1988 and 1989, followed by gradual decline to zero in 1999, only to see another 
two new approvals (the latest two as mentioned above) in 2006. The ones did not receive approval 
concentrate in western China, particularly Gansu, Qinghai, Yunnan, Chongqing, and Xinjiang. 
At the prefecture level, the peak (8 approvals) came in 1987 followed by a gradual decline to zero 
in 1993. Since then there was not a single new approved autonomous regulation. The five remaining 
autonomous prefectures that failed to obtained approval for their regulation all sit in Xinjiang.  
Finally, at the provincial level, none of the five autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia) has enacted their autonomous regulation, even though they were 
among the earliest autonomous units created by the PRC government. To this day, the approval rate 
for autonomous regulation at the county level is 63% (76 out of 120), 83% at the prefecture level (25 
out of 30), and 0% at the provincial level (0 out of 5).  
If we compare the progress by province, out of 20 provincial-level administrative units in PRC 
that either are autonomous regions themselves or contain autonomous prefectures or counties or 
both, more than half (11) have managed to have autonomous regulations for all the autonomous 
units it contains approved. Most of these provinces are found on eastern China, such as 
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Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. The lowest approval rates are found in 
western China. Ningxia, Chongqing, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Ch: xizang) all have 0% approval rate. 
Within this group, Xinjiang stands out as an extreme case: aside from being a provincial-level 
autonomous region, Xinjiang also contains five autonomous prefectures and six autonomous 
counties representing seven distinct ethnic minority group: Hui, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Monglian, Tajik, 
Uyghur, and Xibo. Yet none of the eleven autonomous governments (including XUAR) has to-date 
enacted its autonomous regulation.  
Figure 2 – Approved autonomous regulations for all 
autonomous areas (by year) 
Figure 3 – Approved autonomous regulation for autonomous 
counties only (by year) 
 
Figure 4 – Approved autonomous regulation for 
autonomous prefectures only (by year) 
 
















































Figure 6 – To-be approved autonomous regulations (by province) 
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Could we conclude that the stalled legislative process for autonomous regulations, particularly in 
the northwest, is one fallout of the intense intra-elite struggle between the accommodationist 
approach and the oppressive approach? For what we have thus far, it seems that the oppressive 
approach is more prominently featured in the northwest, represented primarily by the elites in 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. To look for additional evidence for this proposition, I use 
Chinese scholarly discourse as an approximation for elite interests in this topic. Using academic 
journal database on CNKI as my data source, I did a simple auto-keyword search with two criteria: 
the title of the article must contain the phrase “autonomous regulation” (Ch: zizhi tiaoli), while the 
subject of the article needs to contain one of the five autonomous regions in China.  
Figure 8 – Approval rate of autonomous regulations (by province) 
 
The result shows a similar pattern with the progress of legislation. Guangxi Zhang Autonomous 
Region, where 12 out of 13 autonomous governments have obtained approval for their regulation 
(92%), is featured in 10 articles. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where 3 out of 4 autonomous 
governments have obtained approval (75%), is featured in 4 articles. Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region and Tibet Autonomous Region, which have no sub-provincial autonomous governments 

































respectively in 4 and 1 articles. Lastly, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which has 1 provincial 
and 11 sub-provincial autonomous governments, none of which have obtained any approval for the 
regulation, is featured in zero article. 
In fact, scholars based in China openly acknowledged the lack of institutionalization of 
autonomous government at the provincial level. According to Pan Hongxiang (H. 红祥 Pan 潘 
2009), Ningxia started drafting its autonomous regulation in 1980, and have made 16 versions of 
drafts by 2001. Among them, the 15th and 16th draft made it to the Party Committee of the 
Autonomous Region; yet neither were submitted to the National People’s Congress and State 
Council. Inner Mongolia started similarly in 1980 and drafted 22 versions by 1994. Only the 17th 
draft was sent to the center, but it failed to obtain approval. Guangxi started as early as 1957, one 
year before the founding of the Autonomous Region, but made little progress even after reaching 
draft 19 versions by 1994. The regional government submitted the 13th and 18th draft to the center 
but were rejected in both occasions. Xizang/Tibet made 16 versions of draft by 2006 but has made 
no attempt as of yet to submit a draft to the center. Finally, Xinjiang did not make one single draft 
since the establishment of XUAR. All in all, as Pan commented, the legislative work on autonomous 
regulation for the five autonomous regions are in complete “stagnation”.  
 
3.2.2 Chinese Marxist Ethnology and Knowledge Community on Minzu 
To understand Chinese scholarly community on minzu policy, one important reference point is 
a special field of studies known as the Chinese Marxist Ethnology/minzu studies. Both words come 
from the Chinese term minzu yanjiu. Neither is an imperfect translation because of the ambiguous 
meaning of minzu in the Chinese context. Whereas minzuxue means ethnology, a discipline centered 
on the study of culture, minzu yanjiu is a discipline that focuses almost exclusively on ethnic 
minorities (Ch: shaoshu minzu) in China and does not confine itself to the topic of culture. One 
 94 
option alternative is simply abducting the term minzu to form a compound phrase “minzu studies” 
or using the expression “ethno-national” as a replacement for minzu and call the field “ethno-
national studies”.39 An alternative is to highlight the field’s root in ethnological sciences while 
acknowledge the political influence in its subsequent transformation (as I explain below), which 
leads to the term “Chinese Marxist Ethnology”. In this study, the “two and half” terms (“ethno-
national/minzu studies” and “Chinese Marxist Ethnology”) are used interchangeably.  
Chinese Marxist Ethnology or minzu studies as a field of study formed during the early years of 
the People’s Republic of China. While social sciences of the Republican China (1912-1949) included 
disciplines similar to those in European and American universities, the PRC government decided to 
radically change the disciplinary division in order to bring the intellectuals in line with the 
Communist Party’s political agenda. As a result of the systematic reform of higher education and 
research from 1952 onwards, known in official texts as the Adjustment of Colleges and 
Departments, most social scientific disciplines were discontinued and whose academic staffs either 
went to unemployment or received reassignment to posts elsewhere. Ethnology, anthropology, and 
sociology were among the discontinued ones. However, because the government needed expertise 
to assist with the practical task of governing a multiethnic country, a large number of ethnologists, 
sociologists, and anthologists were recruited by the government to continue research on the topic. 
Under the directive of the central government, many scholars from the above-mentioned 
disciplines were summoned to work at the Central Institute for Nationalities (Ch: zhongyang minzu 
xueyuan) in Beijing and its various regional branches across the country. These nationalities institutes 
(Ch: minzu yuanxiao) were set up as specialized centers for research on ethnic minorities in China and 
for training cadres of minority background. The Division of Research of the Central Institute for 
Nationalities (Ch: zhongyang minzu xueyuan yanjiubu), for example, received the majority of the most 
                                                      
39 See the section below, “Discourse about Minzu Policy in PRC,” for a detailed discussion about the term minzu.  
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prominent ethnologists and sociologists in China at the time, such as Pan Guangdan (Quentin Pan), 
Fei Xiaotong (Fei Hsiao-tung), Lin Yaohua, and Wu Zelin (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and 
Hu 胡 1998, 64). The organized scholar corps was then tasked with conducting research on non-
Han population across the country for the regime, starting with the Ethnic Classification (Ch: minzu 
shibie) in 1953, followed soon in 1956 by the Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History (Ch: 
shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha). These were not designed as academic research. Rather, they were 
conceived from the beginning as part of the larger political project of the new Chinese government 
to design policies and institutions for the diverse population with the assistance of modern science.  
During this time, although ethnology departments at universities were disbanded, the title of 
ethnology/minzuxue was preserved. However, under the government-directed research agenda, 
ethnology became no longer the study of culture, but the study of ethnic groups. More specifically, 
the reformed ethnology is a field about ethnic minorities in the People’s Republic of China. At the 
same time, the theoretical orientation of the field was redirected towards Marxist-Leninist doctrines 
propagated by the party and Soviet experts (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 88–
103). Accordingly, research emphasis shifted away from culture, which critics consider as 
“superstructure” and “reflective of bourgeois social sciences’ appetite for exoticism”, to the analysis 
of socioeconomic structure and historical development of the ethnic minority communities (Jianmin 
建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 183). As a result, ethnology became minzu studies, a 
field dedicated to the almost exclusive study of non-Han population of China, joined by experts with 
a diverse academic and professional (some government officials also participated as researchers) 
background, and guided strongly by political ideology. Object of inquiry includes everything related 
to the non-Han population of the country, such as culture, history, language, society, and economy. 
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It is also due to this legacy that the term Chinese Marxist Ethnology could stand in as a reasonable 
alternative name to the field.  
After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping began to restore 
academic social sciences. Ethnology, anthropology, and sociology were reestablished in universities 
and colleges. Scholars within Chinese Marxist Ethnology/minzu studies played important roles in 
the revival, as many of them remain identified with their formerly associated disciplines. But it soon 
became clear that it was almost impossible to separate minzu studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu) from 
ethnology (Ch: minzuxue), or to reconstitute ethnology without the legacy of the former. The 
integration of ethnological sciences (ethnology, anthropology, sociology) into the minzu policy-
making structure of the state has in effect created a new field of studies specific to the nation-
building project of the Chinese Communist Party. While the more senior cohort might remember 
the distinction between the “conventional” ethnological sciences and the Chinese Marxist 
ethnology/minzu studies, many – especially younger – scholars were trained in the latter tradition 
and saw ethnology as equivalent with the study of ethnic minorities. The intimate connection 
between ethnic minority studies and ethnic minority policy forged since the early years of the regime 
further convinced many that it would be useful to keep the existing focus of the field so to remain 
relevant to the government. In sum, a good number of scholars felt it was unnecessary to recreate 
another field with the same title of ethnology/minzuxue, while others were pushing for reestablishing 
ethnological sciences according to international/western standards.   
Since 1980s, the restored ethnology has been evolving in the shadow of the minzu studies 
legacy. There has been continuous debate over the nature of the discipline, reflecting the struggles 
between different traditions of research. These debates were not confined to only ethnologists, but 
often joined by scholars from closely related disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology. At the 
same time, because of the increased autonomy of researchers, the issue of ethnic minorities in China 
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increasingly attracted interests from different fields. For example, Fei Xiaotong was a key figure to 
the field of minzu studies, participated in both Ethnic Classification and Investigations of Ethnic 
Minorities’ Social History. Following the restoration of social sciences, he left the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science and founded the Institute of Sociology at Beijing University (PKU) in 1985, which 
later became the Institute of Sociology and Anthropology. At PKU, Fei sought to move away from 
the research tradition of minzu studies and to approach the topic of ethnicity through the lens of 
sociological theories. The leading journal of the Institute, Sociology of Ethnicity, is an example of 
such endeavor. Starting from the 1990s, many schools and research institutes also began to redefine 
itself in order to expand research scope and better connect with the international academic 
community. Given the close association between ethnology and cultural anthropology, many adopt 
both titles in such transitions. For example, in 1995 the Institute of Ethnology of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) rebranded itself as the Institute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology. In turn, many Chinese anthropologists were invited to work on topic of ethnic 
minorities, using theories unfamiliar to those in minzu studies. Since 2000s, Chinese political science 
began to take part in the academic discourse on ethnicity as well. Guan Kai, Professor at Minzu 
University of China (formerly Central Institute for Nationalities and then Central University for 
Nationalities), published the first Chinese textbook on theories of ethnic politics under the Chinese 
title zuqun zhengzhi in 2007 (Guan 关 2007). 
By and large, the scholarly community on China’s ethnic minorities in the Post-Mao era became 
more pluralistic. The Chinese Marxist Ethnologists, which played instrumental role in early PRC’s 
minzu policy-making and forged through a merger of several social scientific disciplines, remains an 
influential network in the revived ethnology. But inside and outside ethnology, dissenting voices to 
the idea of equating ethnology with minzu studies have taken hold. Importantly, ethnology no 
longer dominates the study of ethnic minorities. On the shoulders of Chinese Marxist Ethnological 
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scholarship, a new generation of scholars with diverse background are expanding the scope of 
research and enriching the scholarly discourse on ethnic minorities in China.  
 
3.2.3 Minzu Debate and Discourse of Ethnicity 
As discussed in the introduction, in contemporary China, “theory” – and by extension, 
“theoretical debates” – carries a somewhat different meaning from the way it is common 
understood in western academic context. Specifically, there is a strong emphasis on the “practicality” 
of theory, or the “dependence of theory on practice”, which as Mao elaborated in his 1937 speech 
means that “theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice”. There is a further 
epistemological implication of this conceptualization of theory, which is explained at length in this 
paragraph of the same speech:  
 
The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of 
changing the world […] This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of 
the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective reality 
is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to 
the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect 
rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it can achieve the 
objectives one has in mind (Mao [1937] 2014). 
 
In other words, the question “how do we know that our knowledge is valid” is not answered by 
the neopositivist principle of falsification, one of the most commonly held epistemological positions 
by political scientists today. To what extent does the above statement come close to alternative 
epistemologies embedded in other “philosophical-ontological commitments” – to use the term by 
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Patrick Jackson (2010) – is beyond the scope of the present study40. However, it suffices to say that 
operating under such a definition, a sufficiently large number of PRC academic writings do not 
concern themselves much with theoretical advancement through clear, rigorous, and transparent 
procedures of hypothesis-testing. Rather, theories are treated as guidance to devise practical 
solutions for specific social and political problems; their validity is determined primarily by how well 
they performed their practical function – which is almost always a contested subject. The discourse 
of minzu policy, the main theoretical debate that this study focuses on, follows precisely such a 
spirit. Much of the discussions revolve around the concept of minzu theory (Ch: minzu lilun, a.k.a. 
“ethno-national theory”), which is not to be understood merely as a theory that explains the socio-
political-historical phenomenon known as ethnicity or nationality (which it does claim to do), but 
also and more importantly, a system of ideas that guides and justifies the minzu policy-making of the 
PRC government. As it will become clearer, for many if not most PRC scholars, minzu theory is 
effectively both the philosophical doctrine behind the system of PRC minzu policies and at the same 
time, the intellectual product that results from experience of implementing those policies. In other 
words, the debate over minzu theory is the debate over minzu policy.  
With this qualification in mind, let us look at the Post-Mao minzu debates. Already in the 1990s, 
academics have begun discussing the design of China’s minzu policy, particularly in light of the 
rising social tensions in a number of minority regions and the dissolution of the former Soviet 
Union. A key theme to the 90’s debate in the academic circle regarding minzu policy was the 
concept of the minzu. A Chinese adaptation of the Japanese phrase written in kanji, minzoku, the 
usage of minzu in contemporary China is the source of not only terminological confusion, but also 
                                                      
40 Jackson considers four ideal-typical positions of “philosophical-ontological commitments”, which he terms as 
neopositivism (mind-world dualism + phenomenalism), critical realism (mind-world dualism + transfactualism), 
analyticism (mind–world monism + phenomenalism), and reflexivity (mind–world monism + transfactualism). Each of 
them bears distinct epistemological and methodological implications.  
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political controversy. The single word is used both to refer to “nation” or “nationality”, the cultural-
political entity that forms the basis of a modern nation-state, and to “ethnic groups” or “ethnicity”, 
the sub-national collective identity based on assumed common kinship, ancestry, and culture. 
According to the official discourse, the Chinese nation (Ch: zhonghua minzu) is defined as a 
conglomeration of as many as fifty-six ethnic groups, out of which fifty-five are considered ethnic 
minorities. The same line would read, in Chinese, as the Chinese minzu has fifty-six minzu, in which 
fifty-five belong to minority minzu. Critics argue that the term gives the minority the “wrong 
aspiration” that they deserve more preferential treatment from the state, less they should have their 
own independent state; while the defenders warn about the ideological confusion that replacing this 
term may incur (S. 胜君 Xie 谢 2012; Hao 郝, Zhang 张, and Ma 马 2014).  
To understand the reason behind the terminological inconsistency, one needs to go back to the 
legacy of ethnic politics in modern China, in particular, the early minzu policy of CCP. As discussed 
in the previous section, the Communists once adopted a strong pluralistic stance on the issue as a 
counter policy to its domestic rivalry, the KMT. It was in this context that the CCP adopted the 
term minzu in its official discourse on ethnic relations, which saw major ethnic/national groups (e.g. 
Uyghurs, Tibetans, Manchus, Mongolians, etc.) having equal rights as Han to pursue political 
independence.  Although they later refrained from supporting the right to secession of the national 
minorities, the terminology of minzu lives on in the official lexicon on minzu policy of the 
Communist regime. Furthermore, it forms the conceptual basis for the nationwide ethnic 
classification conducted by the PRC government, which started in the early-1950s and concluded by 
the early-1980s. Under the influence of the Soviet ethnic/nationality policy, the PRC government-
led ethnic classification campaign recruited hundreds of academics across the social scientific 
disciplines to help identify and classify the “peoples of China”, and produced the official 
ethnotaxonomy, which then serves as the basis for implementing ethnic regional autonomy and 
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other related ethnic policies. As a result, minzu, a term that could not effectively distinguish the two 
very important but different concepts, “nation” and “ethnicity”, serves as the very core conceptual 
vocabulary of ethnicity and nationhood in contemporary PRC to this day.  
In the post-Mao era, Chinese academics were concerned about the political ramification of 
continuing using minzu not only because of the external environment, i.e. the breakup of the Soviet 
Union along ethno-national boundaries; the restoration of anthropology and sociology in the 1980s, 
and of their connection with the international academic community also facilitated the reflection and 
debate, through allowing theories and concepts from western anthropological sciences to be 
(re)introduced back in mainland China. Throughout the 1990s, proposals were made to replace 
minzu with zuqun (roughly equivalent to “ethnic-group”)41 when ethnicity is being referred to, and 
keep minzu only for occasions where “nation” or “nationality” is concerned. Alternatively, minzu can 
be preserved only for referring to sub-national collectives, i.e. ethnic groups, whereas guozu 
(sometimes translate to “state-nation”)42 will be used to refer to “nation”.  
Because of the political significance and policy relevance of this term, the debate should be seen 
as much about academics collectively rethinking the conceptual tools for studying, understanding, 
and articulating ethnicity and ethnic relations, as about the minzu policy of the People’s Republic of 
China43. In fact, officials openly acknowledged such connection. In effect, the debate opened up a 
space for alternative approach for discussing ethnicity in China and had allowed terms such as zuqun 
and guozu to be used and debated. Although in official discourse, minzu remains the only one in use 
for denoting both nation and ethnic groups. However, at the end of 1990’s, the ministerial agency in 
charge of ethnic affairs under the State Council, State Nationality Affairs Commission changed its 
                                                      
41 Original Chinese term: 族群. 
42 Original Chinese term: 国族. 
43 As Wang Dongming recounts, a major debate over the concepts had occurred every ten years since the founding of 
the PRC. See Wang Dongming, “Summary of the Debate over the Concepts of ‘Minzu’ and ‘Zuqun’” (关于“民族”与
“族群”概念之争的综述) (D. 东明 Wang 王 2005).  
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official English title to “State Ethnic Affairs Commission” (SEAC), suggesting that the leadership 
has agreed to take some steps towards de-emphasizing the connotation of “nation”.  
As we move into the 21st century, not only do we see the continuation of this debate with a 
generation of scholars, but also an escalation of its intensity. What makes this debate particularly 
interesting to researchers, however, is that not only did the debate openly challenged the official 
minzu policy of the government, but it also did so in an unprecedentedly public fashion. As 
introduced at the beginning of this essay, despite the increased transparency of policymaking in 
today’s China, the authority remains carefully monitoring and censoring the political discourse. 
Sensitive topics such as ethnic relations rarely see negative reporting in the media or even critical 
academic research. Yet from 2011 and 2014, an open minzu policy caught observers from both 
China and abroad by surprise. Given the political environment in today’s China and the long internal 
struggle over the direction of minzu policy among top PRC elites, we have enough reason to assume 
that the debate was more than just an intellectual exercise among the academics. In fact, most 
observers agree that the debate, whose participants were primarily academics, reflects serious intra-
elite disagreement on the policy topic.  
In a way, the debate was more than just an innocent policy deliberation among interested parties; 
rather, it may have been part of the deliberative attempt of the revisionist elites to seek legitimation 
for repressive policy approach towards the ethnic minorities. As the previous discussion has shown, 
the implementation of minzu policy – in particular the institutionalization of ethnic regional 
autonomy – has been seriously hindered in the post-Mao era. The contrast between the embrace of 
cultural pluralism and reaffirmation of commitment to interethnic equality and ethnic regional 
autonomy in the official tone on the one hand, and the lack of progress in implementing the basic 
requirements on the other, coupled by rising social tensions and increasing government spending on 
stability maintenance in minority regions, strongly suggest the possibility that a serious divergence 
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between policy on the paper and the actual practice on the ground. Given this backdrop, the most 
pressing issue for those who dislike and possibly have resisted the existing policy is to find a way to 
justify their action. The academic policy debate is the ideal, politically safer venue for conveying their 




Chapter 4 Reaffirming Minzu Policy, 1979-1989 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The immediate post-Mao years is marked a high degree of agreement among top leaders on the 
need to halt the coercive assimilationist policy towards ethnic minorities during the Cultural 
Revolution. With the support from senior cadres such as Ulanhu and Deng Xiaoping, a newly 
elected general secretary Hu Yaobang sought to promote substantial autonomy for ethnic minorities 
through greater institutionalized pluralism in political, economic, and cultural domains. Importantly, 
the leadership sent out a uniform signal about their agreement on correcting earlier policy and 
offering more accommodation to the minorities.  
This collaborative policy environment is joined by a relatively uniform knowledge community, 
characterized by the predominance of Chinese Marxist Ethnology, a.k.a. minzu studies. Following 
the abolishment of sociology, anthropology, and ethnology, a new field that focused exclusively on 
the research of ethnic minority population of PRC was created under the title minzu studies (Ch: 
minzu yanjiu) in the late 1950s, before it was also discontinued in the early 60’s. Throughout 1980s, as 
scholars of ethnicity in China mobilized to revive their respective disciplinary traditions, the 
merger/late-comer minzu studies was the first to come back to life. The knowledge community of 
ethnic affairs that re-emerged during this period displayed a strong commitment to define its 
mission and research agenda in Marxist-Leninist worldviews, and to promote professionalization of 
ethnological research in China.  
As a result, the academic debate on minzu policy revolved around core conceptual issues, such 
as the meaning of ethnic (in)equality. While sharp divisions persisted, the discussion remain largely 
professionally-oriented and confined within the Marxist-Leninist theoretical vocabulary.   
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4.2 Collaborative Policy Subsystem 
4.2.1 Ideological Reorientation and Organizational Restoration 
Following an intense power struggle after the death of Mao Zedong, a formerly demoted Deng 
Xiaoping regained control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the help of a number of 
party elders. The new leadership under Deng, which had purged most of the radical leftist elements, 
began to reverse many of the policies of the Cultural Revolution era. In the area of minzu policy, a 
key signal of change was the decision of the leadership to stop treating the “minzu question” as a 
matter of class. In December 1978, at the CCP’s Third Plenum (3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP 
Central Committee), the party leadership decided that “class struggle” was no longer central to the 
Party’s minzu policy (M. E. Clarke 2011, 73). This marked an important departure from the guiding 
doctrine since the 1960s. Under this earlier doctrine, one’s ethnic identification is the product of 
“backward” social conditions and an obstruction to the building of socialism. Moreover, it was 
believed that once China reached the stage of communism, ethnic identity would simply fade away 
as the social condition of its existence, i.e. capitalism, ceases to exist. Under the influence of this 
idea, many accommodationist policies towards ethnic minorities which were designed by the 
government in the 1950s were severely undermined, distorted, and in some cases, outright rejected. 
The dire consequence of it for the ethnic minority population of PRC has been shown and discussed 
by a number of works, with different geographical and thematic focus. Judging from the existing 
evidence, it is fair to say that by the end of the 1970s, ethnic tensions have reached an alarming level 
in a number of regions within the county, particularly the northern, western, and northwestern 
border regions. The post-Mao leadership was aware of this and prepared to address it as part of the 
rectification campaign. Under the leadership of a rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping and later on his 
protégé Hu Yaobang, the party leadership undertook a number of steps towards a systematic 
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adjustment of its minzu policy in order to improve ethnic relations and restructure a sustainable 
system of multiethnic governance.   
The determination of the top leadership to reverse minzu policy from the Cultural Revolution 
period was evident in the continuous streams of statements and speeches on minzu policy from 
various outlets associated with the center. One example was the highlighted emphasis on the 
leadership’s strong opposition against the so-called “Han Chauvinism” (Ch: dahanzu zhuyi, literally 
“great Han nationalism”). CCP’s stance towards Han Chauvinism had long been articulated prior to 
the founding of the PRC in 1949 and continuously emphasized throughout the first decade of the 
People’s Republic. Importantly, discussion of Han Chauvinism was also always accompanied with 
another concept, “local (parochial) nationalism” (Ch: difang minzu zhuyi) in a classical dialectical 
fashion: the former refers to the prioritizing Han over other ethnicities whereas the latter refers to 
the opposite logic, i.e. prioritizing non-Han ethnicities over other Han or others. Both were 
considered as dangerous tendencies which is counterproductive to ethnic solidarity of the country 
and which the party-government apparatus at all level must guard against and actively prevent. Since 
the Chinese expression for both terms contain the phrase minzu zhuyi (“nationalism”), the two are 
often referred to together as the “Two Nationalisms”. In the context of immediate post-Cultural 
Revolution, the leadership highlighted the need to fight against in particular the practice and even 
the mentality of Han Chauvinism because of the recognition that it would be very difficult to regain 
the trust of ethnic minorities without such an attitude.  
The central leadership’s determination was likely the product of a wider support in the top ranks 
of the party. Political rectification had led to the rehabilitation of many senior cadres who not only 
had long-time working experience in ethnic affairs but also held a more sympathetic attitude towards 
minorities. Many of them, once rehabilitated, took an active role in reinforcing the message of the 
center and pressuring the bureaucracy to adjust their practices with regards to minzu policy. The 
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Mongolian cadre Ulanhu, arguably one of the most experienced officials in minzu work and then the 
head of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), authored an article in CCP’s principal 
ideological journal in March 1980 where he openly denounced the policies and practices regarding 
ethnic minorities during the Cultural Revolution as reactionary coercive assimilation (Ch: tonghua). 
He also called for several immediate changes to minzu policy, including strengthening ethnic 
regional autonomy, more public expenditure on minority areas, and increased training of minority 
scientific and technical cadres and skilled workers (Mackerras 2003, 25).  
On July 15th of the same year, a People’s Daily article penned under the name of specially invited 
commentator openly criticized the doctrine of treating “minzu question” as a matter of class.44 Titled 
“Commentary on the So-Called ‘Nature of Minzu Question is Class Question’,” the article argued 
that “during the Ten Years of Turmoil (Ch: shinian dongluan, a.k.a. Cultural Revolution), Lin Biao and 
the Gang of Four used the argument of ‘the nature of the national question is class question’ as the 
theoretical basis for them to promote extreme leftist lines and carry out feudal fascist dictatorship in 
ethnic areas”. While it does not reject the argument altogether, as it was once used by Mao too, the 
article suggested it was necessary to “clarify the original meaning of this statement” because an 
incorrect apprehension and adoption has negatively interfered with the party’s minzu policy. The 
author behind this anonymous piece was revealed to be Huang Zhu, also a senior party official on 
ethnic and religious policy and the secretary of PRC’s first UFWD director Li Weihan. According to 
an interview with Huang more than two decades later, the People’s Daily article went through 
several rounds of review at the CCP Central Secretariat to ensure the message was appropriate and 
                                                      
44 Original Chinese title:评所谓“民族问题的实质是阶级问题”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=64 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 24th, 2018. 
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in line with the top leadership  (Z. 铸 Huang 黄 2003). Upon publication, it immediately became an 
important piece in the new minzu policy discourse.  
This ideological reorientation is paralleled by a restoration of the party and state agencies for 
ethnic work. Many agencies in ethnic work were severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution. 
Part of Deng/Hu’s effort to reestablish a proper system of multiethnic governance was to restore 
agencies that could be entrusted with such responsibilities. Already in February 1979, the United 
Front Work Department (UFWD) submitted a report to the party leadership, titled “Petition of the 
UFWD of the CCP Central Committee Regarding Taking off the Hat of ‘Executing the Defeatist 
Line’ for All China’s United Front, Ethnic Affair, and Religious Affair Departments”.45 The report 
affirmed that the party’s ethnic and religious policy has been dutifully implemented, which had led to 
the development of ethnic areas and consolidated the unity and friendship among different 
ethnicities. Therefore, it argued that it was wrong and groundless to call the united front, ethnic 
affairs, and religious affair department as “executing defeatist line and revisionist line”. In July of the 
same year, the second meeting of the 5th NPC decided to reinstate the National People’s Congress’ 
Ethnic Affairs Committee (NPC-EAC), which was first established in 1954 at the first meeting of 
the 1st NPC but suspended during the 4th NPC due to the Cultural Revolution.46 The restored NPC-
EAC was headed first by the senior Tibetan official Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, who headed the 
Tibetan delegation to Beijing for the 1951 peace negotiation and signed the “17-Point Agreement” 
on behalf of the Tibetan government. During the few years when the committee was absent, an 
minzu policy research group (Ch: minzu zhengce yanjiuzu) was established under the NPC Standing 
                                                      
45 Original Chinese title: 中共中央统战部关于地方民族主义分子摘帽问题的请示. The full-text of the document 
can be viewed via http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66704/4495684.html (CCP News) or 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=17 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 24th, 2018.  
46 The official website of the National People’s Congress’s Ethnic Affair Committee (NPCEAC) can be accessed via 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/minzu/node_1503.htm, accessed June 24th, 2018.  
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Committee on June 1st, 1975 and was headed by the senior Mongolian cadre Ulanhu, who also was 
the Vice Chairperson of the NPC Standing Committee at the time.47 Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme had 
served on a series of important political positions of the PRC government, including the Chairman 
of the People’s Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). He stayed on the restored 
NPCEAC as its chairman for three consecutive NPC, until 1993. On the other hand, Yang Jingren 
became the first chairman (1978-1986) of the restored State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the State 
Council. After the Tibet Work Symposium, Hu Yaobang continued to push for minzu policy reform 
on different fronts, while also supporting his colleagues. Hu became first the Chairman of the CCP 
in June 1981 and was promoted to the party’s General Secretary a year later. Monthly before his 
promotion, in May 1982, Hu gave a speech at the All-China United Front Work Conference (Ch: 
quanguo tongzhan gongzuo huiyi) (Y. 耀邦 Hu 胡 1982). In his speech, Hu stated that he deliberatively 
chose not to discuss too much the issue of minzu but recommended that the cadres seek out the 
opinion of Ulanhu and Yang Jingren, both of whom had long time experience in ethnic minority 
affairs and were heading the recently restored party and state agencies in ethnic work.  
 
4.2.2 Tibet Work Symposium and Hu Yaobang’s New Minzu Policy 
Under Hu Yaobang, the new leadership began implementing a more gradualist approach 
towards the issue of integration and assimilation of ethnic minorities (M. E. Clarke 2011, 73). A key 
moment signifying the substantive change to minzu policy came at Hu Yaobang’s articulation of his 
Tibet policy. In March 1980, the First Tibet Work Symposium was convened in Beijing. At the 
meeting, the then Secretary-General of the CPC Central Secretariat Hu Yaobang offered a 
systematic critique of the party’s policy in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution. The content of this 
                                                      
47 See, also, NPCEAC website, “history of the committee,” http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/minzu/node_1509.htm, 
accessed June 24th, 2018.  
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meeting was summarized in the “Summary of the Tibet Work Symposium,”48 which was then 
circulated among the party committees of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, 
military districts, ministries of the state council, and most other key party organs and government 
agencies. The document made a clear statement about improving the living condition of the Tibetan 
population as the long-term policy objective:  
 
“[…] at the present and in the long run from now on, the central mission and goal of our effort 
in the region [Tibet Autonomous Region] shall be: to center on the Tibetan cadres and Tibetan 
people, to strengthen the unity of cadres and people from all nationalities […] let Tibet become 
prosper, developed, and rich.”  
 
The key to the realization of this objective, states the document, is to “further liberate our 
thinking, implement the policy, follow closely the reality, thoroughly critique the ‘extreme leftist line’ 
of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four”. Under this heading, the document went on to argue for several 
specific tasks geared towards the political empowerment and cultural accommodation of the 
indigenous population, including 1) actively training party cadres with Tibetan and other minority 
background and making Tibetan cadres the majority in both party and government apparatuses 
above the county-level within TAR; 2) promoting Tibetan culture and language, respective local 
culture and customs, and making both Tibetan and Chinese languages mandatory for all party and 
government apparatus in TAR; in addition, Han cadres should learn Tibetan while Tibetan cadres 
should learn Chinese; 3) giving adequate quota for Tibetan and other ethnic minorities in all types of 
employment, promotion, military recruitment, and school admissions; different branches of the 
                                                      
48 Original Chinese title: “中共中央关于转发《西藏工作座谈会纪要》的通知”. The full-text of the article can be 
viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=64 
(Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 24th, 2018.  
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public sector should make an effort to absorb Tibetans into their work force so to cultivate 
intellectuals and working class from ethnic minority background. In addition, the document also 
states that the authority should unite the religious masses (Ch: xinjiao qunzhong, i.e. people who are 
religious) by preserving and repairing monasteries, carry through the rectification for those wrongly 
charged during the Cultural Revolution, and maintain a welcome towards oversea Tibetans (PLRC 
and TARPC 2005, 309–10). 
Importantly, the leadership justified its policy change with an explicit admission of its prior 
mistakes, even though those were attributed to the then deceased Lin Biao and the arrested “Gang 
of Four”. In the short message “CCP Central Committee’s Notice on Forwarding the Summary of 
the Tibet Work Symposium”49 which was attached before the above document, it is stated that 
“because of the severe harm done to the Party’s minzu policy, economic policy, religious policy, 
united front policy, cadre policy and others by the extreme leftist line of Lin Biao and the Gang of 
Four, the people of Tibet suffered misfortunes like people in other parts of the country”. It then 
goes on to say that “the center sends its kind sympathy and regard to the compatriots of all 
ethnicities in Tibet”. Even in this short message, the author made sure to reinforce the already 
articulated rejection of the “class-approach” to minzu questions by the leadership: “in today’s China 
where all ethnicities have completed their socialist reform, the relationship between different 
ethnicities is one of relationship among working people. Therefore, the so-called expression that ‘the 
nature of the minzu question is a class question’ is wrong”. In addition, the document also explicitly 
states that the Tibetan local administration has the right to refuse central policies should those be 
unfitting for Tibet.  
                                                      
49 Original Chinese title: 西藏工作座谈会纪要. The full-text of the article can be viewed online via 
http://www.china.com.cn/cpc/2011-04/12/content_22343375.htm, accessed June 24th, 2018. 
 112 
Given its obvious radical break from the previous policy, it would have been quite difficult for 
this proposal to receive the top elites’ full endorsement in the absence of a united leadership on this 
matter. Some elements of Hu’s proposal appear to have come from initiatives of the regional 
leadership. For example, the bilingual requirement for both Han and Tibetan cadres in TAR was 
already articulated in an earlier directive from the Propaganda Department of the TAR Party 
Committee. Dated January 31st, 1980, this directive explicitly states that:  
 
“Tibet [TAR] is an ethnic autonomous region where Tibetan constitutes the titular group (Ch: 
zhuti), which accounts for about 90% of the region’s population […] That Han cadres and 
personnel working in Tibet should study the written and spoken language of the Tibetan people 
is not only compliance with the party’s minzu policy and required for ensuring equal rights 
among ethnicities and strengthening ethnic solidarity, but also an indispensable prerequisite for 
convenience of administration and contacts with the masses.” (PLRC and TARPC 2005, 315) 
 
The directive specifically asks that in three years, a good number of (non-Tibetan) comrades 
should have a basic grasp of spoken Tibetan and be able to have conversation with Tibetan 
comrades, while also a good number of (non-Tibetan) comrades should know enough written 
Tibetan to read newspapers and government documents in Tibetan (PLRC and TARPC 2005, 317). 
This directive was first forwarded on behalf of the TAR Party Committee to party and government 
organs within the region in February 1980. Following the First Tibet Work Symposium and Hu’s 
confirmation of the idea at the top level, the same directive was forwarded again – this time in the 
name of the CCP Central Committee – to the entire country. According to the comments attached 
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to this center-issued document,50 dated April 16th, all other ethnic minority areas should refer to this 
directive and implement similar language policies as the one in TAR, i.e. Han cadres must study the 
written and spoken language of the indigenous ethnic minority. From this, it could be argued that 
the TAR leadership was in full agreement with Hu’s new policy direction. At the central level, 
studies of elite factionalism argue that by early 1980 Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his control in 
both the Politburo Standing Committee and the State Council – thus giving him control over both 
political and economic reforms (J. Huang 2000, 373–79). If we agree with this analysis, then it is safe 
to assume that by this point, i.e. early 1980, the CCP leadership had rallied behind Hu Yaobang’s 
minzu policy reform in Tibet.  
Immediate subsequent development by and large confirmed this inference. Soon after the First 
Tibet Work Symposium, in May 1980, Hu visited the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and chaired 
an Enlarged Meeting of the TAR Party Committee. At this meeting, Hu gave the famous speech 
which was subsequently summarized as the “Hu-Six-Point” (Ch: huliutiao). In this speech, Hu took 
the idea in the speech at the Tibet Work Symposium even further and proposed a reform program 
which was not only comprehensive but radical breaking from the previous Tibet policy. Particularly, 
the sixth and last of this program demanded that Han cadres should give up their positions to 
Tibetan cadres (TARPC Policy Research Center 2007, 15–32). Hu allegedly argued that in TAR the 
Tibetan cadres should make up 80% of the total, letting Han take the rest 20%.  
Despite resistance, the center was determined to push through Hu’s new Tibet policy. Two 
months after Hu’s Tibet trip, in July, SEAC director Yang Jingren authored an article in the party’s 
principal ideological journal Red Flag (Ch: hongqi zazhi), in which he echoed both the First Tibet 
                                                      
50 Original Chinese title: “中共中央批转西藏自治区党委关于汉族干部、职工学习藏语文的意见的通知”. The 
full-text of the article can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/c709226e-1f32-4aa2-b9ff-
21fa97e178c3/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 
24th, 2018.  
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Work Symposium and Hu’s speech during his visit. Titled “Resolutely Implement the Center’s 
Instruction and Perform Well on the Tibet Work,”51 Yang’s article states that the cadres must 
“resolutely implement the policy of ethnic regional autonomy and explicitly equate the concept of 
ethnic regional autonomy with the right to self-government” (Ch: zizhuquan). Reinforcing Hu’s 
speech, Yang suggested nine points: 1) the regional administration in Tibet must be composed of 
mainly Tibetan cadres; 2) the first administrative language in Tibet must be Tibetan; 3) 
administration in Tibet must follow regional features; 4) autonomous regions could enact special 
decrees (Ch: danxing tiaoli) in accordance with its own conditions; 5) autonomous regions should 
enjoy greater financial privilege than other provincial units; 6) autonomous regions should be 
entitled to a large share from the local resources, such as minerals, forest, grassland, etc.; 7) 
autonomous regions should have the right to engage in border trade when possible; 8) autonomous 
regions must develop science, culture, and education of their own ethnicities; 9) autonomous regions 
could be exempted from central policies, provided that a permission or report is filed (State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission 国家民族事务委员会 and Central Party Literature Research Center 中共中央
文献研究室 1990, 63–78). In effect, Yang’s piece elaborated and further specified the 
implementation of Hu’s new minzu policy for Tibet.  
Former UFWD director Li Weihan also actively endorsed Hu’s policy. A year after Hu’s visit to 
Tibet, in May 1981, a commemoration of the 30-anneriversay of the “Liberation of Tibet” was 
convened in Beijing. A recently rehabilitated Li Weihan gave a speech entitled “Path of Tibetan 
National Liberation” (SEAC and PLRC 1990, 87–108).52 In his brief review of the modern history of 
                                                      
51 Original Chinese title: “坚决贯彻中央指示，做好西藏工作”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=64 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 24th, 2018.  
52 Original Chinese title: “西藏民族解放的道路”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=64 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 24th, 2018.  
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Tibet, Li made no mentions of the 1959 Lhasa uprising and the subsequent flight of 14th Dalai Lama 
to India. Instead, he emphasized the disruption to minzu policy during the Ten Years of Turmoil, 
which was again attributed to Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. He further pointed out that the 
disruption persisted even after the Third Plenum, which had apparently not completely overturned 
the previous policy practices in Tibet. The speech argues explicitly that socioeconomic development 
is the key task in Tibet. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need to respect local conditions and carry 
out properly regional autonomy, letting the ethnic minorities truly enjoy self-government, through in 
particular the “ethnicization of party cadres”. Clearly attempting to signal the willingness of the 
central government for a possible reconciliation, the speech concludes by saying that “we cannot but 
think of the Dalai Lama and the oversea Tibetan compatriots, who live far away in foreign lands, 
away from their home and the people, this is unbearable for all those who have a patriotic heart. We 
are very sympathetic to this condition of theirs […] the door of the motherland will be always open 
to anyone with a sincere heart towards her”. Thus, while in line with Hu’s speech and the article by 
Yang Jingren, Li’s piece further covered the necessary adjustment in foreign policy under the new 
direction for minzu policy in Tibet.  
 
4.2.3 Consolidating Minzu Policy in Both Periphery and Center 
In the ethnically diverse southwestern province of Yunnan, Hu Yaobang’s new approach to 
minzu policy was well received. The “Summary of Briefing of Yunnan Ethnic Work,”53 forwarded 
by the CCP General Office on July 6th of 1981, confirmed the provincial leadership’s agreement with 
the center (SEAC and PLRC 1990, 85–86). The “Summary” stated: “in Yunnan as in the rest of the 
                                                      
53 Original Chinese title: 云南民族工作汇报会纪要. A portion of the text is included in the volume under the title “the 
Party’s General Policy for Ethnic Work” [党对民族工作的总方针] and can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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country, the Party’s minzu policy and ethnic work gradually suffered serious interference from the 
‘left-leaning’ mistakes since the end of the 1950s […] only after the Party’s Third Plenum did the 
‘left’-leaning mistakes receive critique from the root”. It defines “left-leaning” mistakes as “omit or 
even deny the characteristics of the various nationalities, fail to diligently implement or even distort 
or resist the Party’s minzu policy, in particularly, the policy of ethnic regional autonomy, [as a result] 
affecting the intimate connection between the Party and the masses of various ethnic minorities”. It 
also reaffirmed the critique against the idea that “the nature of the minzu question is class question”.  
However, the new minzu policy encountered some complications in Inner Mongolia (IMAR) 
and Xinjiang (XUAR). Starting from 1978, a number of former Mongol officials who had survived 
the purge of the Cultural Revolution returned to control some of the key areas of the party and 
government in IMAR. However, the trend of “re-ethnizing” the regional government did not last 
very long. In September 1981, a student demonstration broke out following a directive issued earlier 
by the central leadership the month before. Titled “Summary of the Central Secretariat’s Discussion 
on Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,”54 the central directive was released under the heading 
“Document No. 28 of the Central Committee” (hereafter Document No. 28) and circulated to 
IMAR in early August. The document basically argued that since the Third Plenum, “ethnic relations 
have been well handled, the restoration of production has been quick, living conditions of the 
masses have seen some improvements, and all ethnicities have been content”. To what extent this 
description was correct was questionable, but according to some analyses, what was found 
particularly problematic by ethnic Mongolians in the region was the contradictory statement (absent 
in the publicly available version) that “the plan not to introduce migration into Inner Mongolia from 
                                                      
54 Original Chinese title: “中央书记处讨论内蒙古自治区工作纪要”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/485e635c-9aa9-4fdf-a377-df16e49309ff/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=166 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018. But this version is declared as not 
the complete version, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66699/4495333.html. An unverified full version 
can be viewed via https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/935, accessed June 29th, 2018. 
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now on is correct; however, but in terms of the natural population flow from other provinces into 
Inner Mongolia, the IMAR should not adopt a policy of ‘blocking’”. Many interpreted this as the 
center’s indifference towards the inflow of non-Mongolian population into the region and the 
subsequent “dilution” of the region’s “ethnic character”.55  
It is important to note that the decisions in Document No. 28 was taken collectively by the top 
leadership at a meeting of the Central Secretariat, led by Hu Yaobang and joined by reform-minded 
leaders such as Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Ulanhu, and Yang Jingren. Thus, the decision was endorsed 
collectively by the top leadership and not with the absence of any key members. However, when the 
news of the Document No. 28 reached the schools in autonomous region in August, ethnic 
Mongolian students were immediately alerted by its implications and began questioning the intention 
of the policy as stated in the document and demanded the IMAR Party Committee for an 
explanation. According to one account published in the dissident journal Beijing Spring (Ch: beijing zhi 
chun), the student demonstration in IMAR lasted from early-September to mid-November of 1981. 
In the end, they even managed to send a six-member delegation to Beijing to formally petition to the 
central authority for reversing this policy.56 No violent confrontation occurred between the 
protestors and the authority throughout the entire episode. But despite students’ success to maintain 
a peaceful protest and the generally tolerant attitude of the officials to the students’ actions, the 
government did no change to the policy in Document No. 28. After the demonstration was settled 
in November, however, the student leaders were reportedly punished and more than two hundred 
high-ranking Mongol officials were sacked or demoted for being sympathetic to the student 
demands (Bulag 2004, 108).  
                                                      
55 http://beijingspring.com/bj2/2000/240/2003820193847.htm  
56 http://beijingspring.com/bj2/2000/240/2003820193847.htm  
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The case of Xinjiang was further different from that of Inner Mongolia. Due to the persisting 
ethnic tension already in the 1980s and the authority’s concerns for border security, the push for a 
more conciliatory minzu policy has met with resistance from the local cadres. Nevertheless, the 
regional leadership by and large followed the center’s line and made efforts to improve inter-ethnic 
relations through socioeconomic development and relaxation of control over cultural and religious 
life, as well as to maintain and strengthen the party’s control in key’s area of the regional 
administration. Hu Yaobang’s May 1980 visit to Tibet spurred expectations among the ethnic 
minorities in Xinjiang that his six-point reform program would be also extended to Xinjiang, in 
particular, the implementation of substantial local autonomy by the minorities and the transfer of 
Han officials away from Xinjiang (M. E. Clarke 2011, 77). In several southern Xinjiang cities, the 
desire for change led to into demonstrations of local minorities, even violent clashes between the 
protestors and the local authorities which resulted in social disturbances and in some cases, 
causalities. This seemingly threatening development prompted the central leadership to dispatch the 
senior cadre Wang Zhen to Xinjiang in October 1980 and to urge the Xinjiang authority to maintain 
stability and strengthen “ethnic solidarity” (M. E. Clarke 2011, 77). Despite the added emphasis on 
stability, however, the Xinjiang regional government continued to implement measures to revival 
ethnic minorities’ cultural and religious practices, including reinstating the Xinjiang Islamic 
Association in June 1980 as well as introducing Arabic script for Uyghur and other Turkic speaking 
minorities to replace the Latinized script used since 1958 (M. E. Clarke 2011, 78).  
Rhetorically, a slight difference in terms of the emphasis of Xinjiang’s minzu policy can be 
discerned from reading the policy document of this time. The July 1981 “Summary of CCP Central 
Secretariat’s Discussion on Xinjiang Work,” for instance, makes relatively fewer references to the 
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catchphrases as seen in other accommodationist policy decisions around the same time.57 Instead, it 
emphasizes that the key in Xinjiang is to promote good ethnic relations and strengthen unity among 
different ethnic groups. In particular, it argues that neither the minority cadres nor the Han cadres 
alone can accomplish the task in Xinjiang; instead, the minority cadres cannot be left alone to work 
on the governance and development of Xinjiang without the participation of the Han cadres. The 
strong emphasis on the necessity of Han cadres stands in clear contrast to the strong pro-autonomy 
rhetoric in Hu’s Tibet policy, which explicitly advised the removal of Han cadres from the region. 
This does not represent a complete refusal of the general direction of Post-Mao leadership’s minzu 
policy. But the idea that Xinjiang required a somewhat different approach was already endorsed by 
the top leaders back then. Deng Xiaoping, for example, acknowledged the necessity of prioritizing 
stability and cultivating politically loyal minority cadres in the region during his 1981 visit to 
Xinjiang.58 Still, in the same speech, Deng reportedly also acknowledged that in Xinjiang the party 
must remain vigilant and guard against both Han Chauvinism and local (parochial) nationalism. The 
continuing emphasis on the “Two Nationalisms” shows that the practice of Post-Mao minzu policy 
in Xinjiang had to navigate between pressures of two increasingly conflicting demands, namely, 
accommodating ethno-cultural diversity and maintaining political unity and social stability. As I shall 
below, development in Xinjiang during the 1980s by and large supported such an inference.  
In October 1981, Wang Enmao, former XUAR party secretary and then party secretary of Jilin 
Province, returned to Xinjiang to serve as the first secretary of XUAR Party Committee and first 
political commissar of the Urumqi Military Region (M. E. Clarke 2011, 79). Upon appointment 
                                                      
57 Original Chinese title: 中央书记处讨论新疆工作问题的纪要. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018. 
58 Original Chinese title: 新疆稳定是大局，选拔干部是关键. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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Wang immediately began reconsolidating party control at all levels in the region. To ensure stability, 
Wang made a clear distinction between legal and illegal religious activities (McMillen 1984). At the 
same time, Wang Enmao affirmed and carried on the party’s general conciliatory approach to 
cultural and religious practices of ethnic minorities, as implemented under the previous Xinjiang 
chief Wang Feng (M. E. Clarke 2011, 81). However, Wang Enmao made one important alteration to 
his predecessor’s policy: the reconstitution of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in June 
1982. Originally created in 1954 as the Production and Construction Corps of the Xinjiang Military 
District of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, this regional paramilitary organization was 
demobilized in 1975. Following the appeal of both Wang Enmao and Wang Zhen, the central 
leadership agreed to reinstitute it under the new title “Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps” 
(XJPCC). On the other hand, Wang Enmao appealed for taking advantage of the historical 
connection between Xinjiang and the Muslim Central Asia by introducing foreign investment into 
Xinjiang so to develop the “Great Islamic Circle” (M. E. Clarke 2011, 82–83; Christoffersen 1993). 
As Michael Clarke argues, the dynamics in Xinjiang during this initial period of Deng’s reform came 
as the result of the contradiction between the prerogatives of the central leadership and the 
imperatives of the regional authorities (M. E. Clarke 2011, 74).  
Overall speaking, in the years immediately after the Cultural Revolution, the senior officials of 
the party generally agreed on a more accommodationist approach to minzu policy and shared a less 
hostile attitude towards the ethnic minority population than in the previous decade. While Inner 
Mongolia and Xinjiang experienced a certain degree of setback in pursuing the above approach and 
had subsequently adjusted their regional policy instrument, no major split between the regional and 
the central leadership appeared to exist with regard to the general direction of the minzu policy. In 
fact, the crackdown on Mongolian students and cadres in the aftermath of demonstration against 
Document No. 28 led senior leaders, particularly Ulanhu, to see legal measures as a better guarantee 
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for ethnic minorities’ autonomy than political directives of the party. The drafting and subsequent 
enactment of the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy (LERA), which codifies the protection of the 
minority rights and further specifies the implementation of the regional autonomy for ethnic 
minorities, can be seen as a positive outcome from the complications in the above two regions 
(Bulag 2004, 108).  
 
4.3 Uniform Knowledge Community 
4.3.1 From Ethnology to Minzu Studies 
Similar to party organs and government agencies, the social science community was also in a 
process of institutional restoration and organizational revival during this period. To fully grasp the 
trajectory of the knowledge community on minzu policy in the post-Mao era, it is useful to briefly 
review the vicissitudes of the academic and research institutions in PRC between 1950s and 1970s.  
From 1949 to 1952, the PRC central government issued a number of directives on restructuring 
the education and research institutions of China. The process heavily borrowed the experience and 
template of the Soviet Union. After the “Adjustment of Universities and Departments” (Ch: gaodeng 
yuanxiao yuanxi tiaozheng, hereafter “Adjustment”), the differences between various schools of 
Chinese ethnology were significantly reduced. Those who remain in ethnological research became 
absorbed into a new unified discipline guided by an orthodox theoretical approach: Ethno-National 
Studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu), or, as to follow Wang Jianmin’s definition, “Chinese Marxist Ethnology”. 
Whereas in early 20th century, ethnology (Ch: minzuxue) and physical anthropology (Ch: tizhi renleixue) 
were moving closer towards one another to form an integrated discipline, with the former becoming 
renamed as cultural anthropology, the Adjustment interrupted this process and reversed this 
tendency by separating the two again into entirely different categories. Instead of integration, 
physical anthropology was categorized as a sub-field under biology and renamed simply as 
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“anthropology” (Ch: renleixue). Thus, whereas ethnology remained within the social sciences, physical 
anthropology/anthropology in China became part of the science program (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, 
Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 67–69).  
According to Wang et al., there are four major consequences of the Adjustment. First was the 
complete reorientation of the scientific community’s theoretical approach. Scholars from different 
schools became subsumed into the same state ethnological science and were asked to adopt 
Marxism-Leninism as their primary theoretical tool and guiding philosophy. This “conversion” not 
only occurred to the young scholars who were under training at the time, but also to many 
established, senior scholars who had genuine desire to work for the PRC regime and demonstrate 
their political loyalty (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 70).  
Along with the theoretical reorientation, the ethnology community also came under stricter state 
intervention in research agenda. In 1956, Ethnic Minority Language Institute (Ch: shaoshu minzu yuyan 
yanjiusuo) was established as a part of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS). In the same year, the 
CCP Central Propaganda Department and the CAS Philosophy and Social Science Division (Ch: 
zhexue shehui kexue bu) organized meetings on a 12-year research planning on topics including 
domestic national questions, ethnic minority history, ethnology, ethnic minority languages. Many 
scholars participated in these meeting, including more than thirty from the Central Institute for 
Nationalities (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 72). In the final product, titled 
“1956-1967 Philosophy and Social Science Planning Outline of the State Council Science Planning 
Commission,”59 the mission of ethnology was defined as: to study ethnic minorities’ ethnic 
                                                      
59 The original Chinese title of the document is “国务院科学规划委员会 1956-1967 年哲学社会科学规划纲要”. The 
coordinating and leading agency, State Council Science Planning Commission (Ch: guowuyuan kexue guihua weiyuanhui 国家
科学规划委员会) was established on March 14th, 1956 and was mainly responsible for drafting the 12-year (1956-1967) 
natural and social science planning. For more information, see 
http://www.most.gov.cn/kjfz/kjzg60dsj/200909/t20090914_72857.htm (Ministry of Science and Technology, PRC)  
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identification, the evolution of their societal character, characteristics of their cultural life, and 
religions among ethnic minorities. As a result, the research focus of ethnologists became oriented 
towards the governments’ need for knowledge about ethnic minority communities across the 
country. Research no longer followed merely the academic interests of the scholars, but significantly 
more the practical need of the government’s ethnic work.  
Thirdly, while earlier ethnology had no particular preference for either Han or non-Han 
communities in China, the reformed discipline had overwhelmingly focused on ethnic minority 
areas. This is reflected in the earlier division of focus within the Central Institute for Nationalities. 
During its initial years, the institute hosted a library and five regional offices. All of the regional 
offices were apparently targeting places with a high concentration of non-Han population. These 
five regional offices are Northwest Office (led by Feng Jiasheng), Northeast and Inner Mongolia 
Office (led by Weng Dujian), Southwest Office (led by Jian Bozan), Tibetan Office (led by Lin 
Yaohua), and Central-East and -South Office (led by Pan Guangdan) (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, 
Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 74).60 China proper, or Inner China, received no dedicated research staff 
– not to mention a separate division – at the institute.   
Fourthly, the focus of their research transitioned from a the rather singular topic of culture to 
everything about ethnic groups. Whereas pre-PRC ethnology – like its counterpart in Europe and 
North America, sometimes under the title of cultural anthropology – has been mainly concerned 
with the study of the culture, the new reformed ethnology became preoccupied with understanding 
ethnic groups as a product of historical development of human society (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, 
                                                      




%A6%E9%99%A2, accessed June 28th, 2018.   
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Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 75). This was largely a result of the aforementioned theoretical 
reorientation to Marxism-Leninism and empirical focus on ethnic minorities. Marxism-Leninism 
held a teleological view of human society development. Coupled with an exclusive focus on the 
minorities, these two factors encouraged the (predominately Han) scholars to view ethnic minorities 
as backward relative to Han and a living proof of the earlier stage of social evolution in Marxism-
Leninist theory. As such, the job of studying ethnic minorities was to study the socioeconomic 
conditions of those communities, i.e. “productive forces” and “relations of production,” rather than 
culture, i.e. “superstructure” which should be epiphenomenal to the formers.   
The reorientation was not uncontested. Chinese ethnologists, anthropologists, and sociologists 
have been cultivating their respective disciplines for decades before the Communist Party came to 
power in the mid-20th century (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王 1997). While the Communist authority 
pushed its reform those disciplines with political authority and administrative muscle – first by 
abolishing sociology, anthropology, and ethnology in universities and colleges and then by 
consolidating scholars into new research units in the framework of Ethno-National studies (Ch: 
minzu yanjiu) – the scholars also sought to shape their community towards their vision. In a famous 
article cowritten by Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua in 1956, titled “Several Tasks for Ethnology 
Demanded by Current Ethnic Work,”61 the two prominent scholars explicitly contested the above 
tendency as a result of the “Adjustment”. They argued that ethnology should not be exclusively 
about ethnic minorities, but about Han as well. They also argued for a practice-oriented, experience-
grounded approach to the definition of ethnology, stating that “the nature and scope of the 
discipline would gradually become clear in the development of research activities […] we think that 
we should not set the parameters and draw up the boundaries at the beginning” (Fei 費 and Lin 林 
                                                      
61 Original Chinese title: “当前民族工作提給民族学的几个任务”  
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1956, 17). In fact, Lin Yaohua even took the article to the All-Soviet Ethnography Conference of the 
Soviet Union in May of the year, where he presented it under the title “Research Questions Raised 
for Ethnologists by the New China in Solving Problems in Ethnic Work” (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, 
Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 97; H. 鸿保 Hu 胡 2004, 1).  
However, as the involvement of Chinese ethnologists in the government’s minzu policy 
deepened, the influence of the government’s preference became more and more reflected in the 
professional activities of the scholars. In 1954, the government launched a nationwide ethnic 
classification (Ch: minzu shibie) following the first national census. Then in 1956, the government 
launched the Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History (Ch: shaoshu minzu shhui lishi diaocha). 
Academics across disciplines were heavily involved in both projects, which were funded by the state 
and coordinated between the central and different regions across the country to allow a systematic 
production of knowledge about the social, economic, historical, as well as cultural features of various 
ethnic minority communities of China. Since the main interest behind these projects were political 
rather than academic, the researchers must learn to adapt to the need of the government, who 
wanted the knowledge for policy-making above everything else. The Anti-Rightist Campaign (Ch: 
fanyou yundong), which lasted from 1957 to 1959, further pushed the scholars to accept the leadership 
of the party-state in their professional lives. Those who voiced disagreement received not only 
criticism, but in many cases also other forms of punishments. As Liang Huaxin, a Guangxi-based 
party official of Zhuang nationality wrote with a proud – if somewhat ironic – tone in 1960:  
 
“After the Anti-Rightist Rectification Campaign during the first half of 1958, especially after 
various reactionary opinions of the bourgeois ethnology were thoroughly critiqued, the majority 
of our comrades in the survey team [for Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History] had 
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come to the realization that, upholding the party’s political leadership is the fundamental key to 
good work” (Liang 梁 1960, 13)  
 
The integration of ethnological science into the party-state’s minzu policymaking was also 
reflected in the academic output of the ethnology community. Ethno-National Studies (Ch: minzu 
yanjiu), the flagship journal of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Ethnology (the 
predecessor to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology), 
published a total of 135 articles between 1958 and 1959. Through a quick break-down of the 
thematic focus of these articles, we can see clearly how politics had invaded the internal discourse 
within the academic community at that time. Of the nine categories, #1 and #2 are explicitly 
concerned with the state-level politics. But the other categories also featuring a substantial number 
of articles that are discussion about the implementation of the party-state’s minzu policy rather than 
professional ethnological research.  
Table 5 – Articles in Ethno-National Studies by Theme, 1958-195962 
 Theme # of Articles Percentage 
#1 “Celebration of 10-Year Anniversary of PRC’s Founding” 13 9.6% 
#2 “General Line, Great Leap Forward, People’s Commune” 24 17.8% 
#3 “Politics”  7 5.2% 
#4 “Economy” 5 3.7% 
#5 “Cultural Education” 16 11.9% 
#6 “Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History”  45 33.3% 
#7 Translated Essays 8 5.9% 
#8 Book Reviews 1 0.7% 
#9 “Updates on Academic Activity” 16 11.9% 
 Total # 135 100% 
 
Another indication of this tendency can be observed in the first issue of the journal. Ethno-
national Studies was launched in September 1958 as a monthly journal for ethnological studies by 
                                                      
62 Source: Ethno-National Studies (“民族研究 1958—1959 年总目录 [Combined Catalog of Ethno-National Studies, 
1958-1959]” 1959) 
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the Institute of Ethnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. In the very first issue, the editors 
published an essay explaining the orientation of the journal. But immediately after the issue was 
released, the editorial team received political criticisms directly from the Central Nationalities Affairs 
Committee (Ch: zhongyang minzu shiwu weiyuanhui), for failing to take it as the journal’s top priority to 
“publicize and explain the innovative development to nationality theory in Marxism-Leninism by 
Chairman Mao with regards to solving China’s national question, publicize the party’s nationality 
policy, publicize the glorious achievements of the party in ethnic work” (Journal Editors 本刊编辑
部 1959). In the context of the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-1959), the editing team did not dare to 
dismiss the reaction from the Nationalities Affairs Committee. In the two months after the first 
issue – from October to December 1958 – the Institute of Ethnology reportedly organized a series 
of internal political campaigns targeting the above-mentioned essay, including 18 “Criticism 
Meeting” (Ch: pipan hui), which saw the participation of over 200 people, received 122 pieces of 
comments, and produced 417 “big-character posters” (Ch: dazi bao) (Lv 吕 1959). In 1960, Ethno-
national Studies was suspended after less than two years of its launching.  
Starting from 1963, party and government agencies in united front, minzu policy, and religious 
policy became involved in a new political campaign targeting “Defeatist and Revisionist Lines”.63 
Ethno-national/minzu questions (Ch: minzu wenti) were to be treated as class questions. As a result, 
ethnological studies came under heavy attack. Fearing to be seen as continuing a bourgeois 
ethnological research, scholars gradually refrained from using the term “ethnology”. Instead, ethno-
national studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu) or ethno-national question studies (Ch: minzu wenti yanjiu) became 
the substitute (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 221). The term “ethnology” was 
not revived again until after the Cultural Revolution.  
                                                      
63 Original Chinese term: 投降主义修整主义路线.  
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4.3.2 Rebuilding the Chinese Ethnology 
The process of restoring ethnology and other social sciences started soon after the Third 
Plenum. From late April to early May 1979, All-China Ethno-National Studies Work Conference64 
was convened in Kunming, Yunnan Province and led by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS). At the conference, it was decided that ethnology (Ch: minzuxue) should be listed as an 
independent discipline within the broader category of ethno-national studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu). 
Chinese Ethno-National Studies Association (CENSA)65 was also established as an umbrella 
professional association for scholars and researchers in this area. At the same conference, a group of 
scholars mainly from the Institute of Ethnology of CASS were entrusted with the task of setting up 
a dedicated professional association for ethnology, which was initially named as the Chinese 
Ethnological Research Association (CERA).66 The first meeting of the CERA was convened a year 
later, which announced the establishment of the association as well as its status as a member of the 
CENSA, the umbrella association with the term “Ethno-National Studies” in its title. (Jianmin 建民 
Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 313–15) 
The restored of ethnology and other social sciences bore certain imprint of the pre-Cultural 
Revolution. While scholars were enthusiastic about the restoration of social sciences, many of them 
did not agree on a common definition of their respective discipline. This is particularly the case with 
the ethnological sciences, where the disagreement was in large part rooted in the earlier integration 
of the discipline into minzu policy agencies of the state, and its subsequent transformation into an 
ethnic minority-oriented comprehensive social and historical research program under the title of 
                                                      
64 Original Chinese title: 全国民族研究工作会议. 
65 Original Chinese title: 中国民族研究学会. 
66 Original Chinese title: 中国民族学研究会. 
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ethno-national studies. Tibetologist and CASS research fellow Li Youyi pointed out frankly that “the 
concept of ethnology is not very clear among ethnological researchers in China. Many prefer the 
term ‘ethno-national studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu)’ instead of ‘ethnology (Ch: minzuxue)’” (Y. 有义 Li 李 
1980, 54).  
For some scholars, ethnology equals ethno-national studies. Renowned sociologist and 
anthropologist Lin Yaohua, for example, argued that “ethnology is […] a field of studies that takes 
ethno-national community (Ch: minzu gongtongti) as its object of research […] The research method 
of ethnology is mainly field research, plus using various textual and historical materials to study 
different ethno-national communities of different developmental stages around the world” (Lin 林 
and Jin 金 1980, 53). Some emphasized that the ethnological science in socialist China had been and 
should continue to be Marxist ethnology. The focus of ethnology should be the patters of the origin, 
development, as well as dissolution of ethno-national community (T. 廷贵 Li 李 and Wang 王 1980, 
57). Along this line, they also prefer to maintain the interdisciplinary nature of ethno-national studies 
for ethnology as well, thereby making ethnology essentially everything concerning ethno-national 
communities. Zhang Yongguo, for instance, considers such broad scope a necessary principle for 
the Chinese ethnological science because:  
 
“Ours is a Marxist ethnology, [it] must not follow the example of the bourgeois ethnology, 
focusing narrowly on human culture, national culture, or the social institutions of earlier human 
societies; [it] must also not follow the example of the Soviet ethnography, focusing narrowly on 
the life style, material culture, spiritual culture of various ethno-national communities or the 
history of ancient societies. China’s ethnology must study comprehensively the entire 
developmental process of ethno-national communities, especially problems with regards to the 
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process in which various ethno-national communities in China form socialist ethno-national 
communities (Ch: shehui zhuyi minzu).” (Zhang 張 1980, 68) 
 
On the other hand, some believe that ethnology should be defined as different from the ethno-
national studies. Li Youyi is one example. For him, ethnology has been an important component to 
the studies of ethno-national groups in China. However, its unique focus and method warrants the 
establishment of a separate academic discipline. He notes that there were five components within 
the broad category of ethno-national studies, each of which is somewhat separate from the others. 
These are: theory of the ethno-national question (Ch: minzu wenti lilun), language of ethno-national 
groups, history of ethno-national groups, ethnology, and ethno-national groups around the world 
(Ch: shijie minzu). Among them, Li believes that only ethnology deserves an independent discipline of 
its own.  
 
“The remaining four aspects have a certain degree of independence, but they are sub-divisions 
of other disciplines with a special focus on ethno-national groups. For example, theory of the 
ethno-national question is a branch of Marxism-Leninist theory, or a branch of ethnology; 
language of ethno-national groups is a branch of language studies, it is a sub-division of language 
studies on the language of ethno-national groups; history of ethno-national groups is a branch of 
history, it is a sub-division of history on the topic of ethno-national groups. Ethnology, however, 
is an independent discipline, no other can replace it” (Y. 有义 Li 李 1980, 56).  
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The disagreement was reflected also in the title of the association of ethnologists. From 1980 to 
1991, the association went from Chinese Ethnological Research Association67 to Chinese Ethno-
National Groups Association68 in 1984 to Chinese Ethnology Association69 in 1991 (Jianmin 建民 
Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 316). While the titles are very similar with one another in 
Chinese – with but the alteration of one or two characters each time – each bears a quite different 
connotation. Despite the disagreement, it was nonetheless widely shared that ethnology and ethno-
national studies represent important research programs to the design of China’s minzu policy (Y. 有
义 Li 李 1980, 56–59; Lin 林 and Jin 金 1980, 55–70; Zhang 張 1980, 68).   
In practice, ethnology and ethno-national studies were often intertwined with one another 
during their restoration. Department of Ethnology were introduced at nationality institutes across 
the country. As a result, in the revived discipline of ethnology, it was the tradition of Chinese 
Marxist Ethnology – which operated under the name of ethno-national studies or minzu yanjiu – that 
dominated the knowledge community in the initial years following the revival.  
From the perspective of disciplinary development, this outcome can be evaluated from two 
sides. On the one hand, the legacy of state intervention in social science research and organization 
left a strong and lasting imprint on the character of ethnological science in China, which caused it to 
become a different discipline from its earlier and contemporary international counterparts, but one 
heavily focused the study of ethnic minority groups within historical and contemporary China. On 
the other hand, because of this legacy, during the initial years of disciplinary revival, while scholars 
and researchers had different ideas about what a proper ethnological science should be, there was a 
general consensus on the importance of reviving and cultivating a professional academic community 
                                                      
67 Original Chinese title: 中国民族学研究会. 
68 Original Chinese title: 中国民族学会. 
69 Original Chinese title: 中国民族学学会. 
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of ethnological researchers based on the history of not only pre-PRC scholarship but also and more 
importantly, the large-scale social science studies led by the PRC in forms of Ethnic Classification 
and Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History. As a result, scholars and researchers within 
the broad ethnological science community share a common vision for a social science discipline 
under which they would carry out their professional activities. They also general share the same 
theoretical lexicon and research orientations. As such, it is reasonable to argue that during this time, 
the knowledge community on minzu policy – represented by mostly the ethnological science 
community – is by and large internally coherent.  
 
4.4 Intra-paradigm Professional Debate 
4.4.1 “De facto Interethnic Inequality” 
Within this context, the scholarly discourse on minzu policy demonstrated a high degree of 
common commitment to understanding the nature of interethnic relations from the shared 
theoretical framework of Marxism-Leninism. A key debate among scholars during this time revolved 
around the question of “de facto interethnic inequality”.70 While there was clearly a debate between 
those who advocate the application of this concept to describe and understand the socioeconomic 
condition of ethnic minorities, others contested its meaning, its fitness with the Chinese context, as 
well as the desirability of using it in public discourse. The debate over “de facto interethnic 
inequality” offers a good example of a moderate policy debate among scholars under a collaborative 
policy environment and within a coherent professional knowledge community.  
The discussion began as early as 1979. Jin Xiangzhen in his article “A Tentative Discussion of 
the Nature of Ethno-National Question during Socialist Period,” published December 1979, asked 
                                                      
70 Original Chinese term: 民族间事实上的不平等.  
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the following question in the opening: “in China, especially after the socialist reform of the 
ownership of means of production is complete, what is the nature of the ethno-national question 
(Ch: minzu wenti)? Is it a question of class? Or is it about something else?” Arguing that “nature of 
the ethno-national question” changes according to the “nature of the revolution” (Ch: geming de 
xingzhi), Jin proposed that since China had become a de facto socialist country under the proletarian 
dictatorship, class contradiction was no longer the main contradiction. Ethno-national question, 
accordingly, should also stop being about class struggles. Instead, the more prominent issue had 
become developing the economy and culture of ethnic minority areas so to gradually eliminate the 
de facto economic and cultural inequality among ethnicities in the country (X. 相镇 Jin 金 1979, 23–
24). Jin carefully directed his blame only Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, for stalled development in 
ethnic minority areas. To remedy their impact, Jin called upon cadres to promote the “Four 
Modernizations” (Ch: sige xiandaihua) for ethnic minorities in order to reduce and eventually 
eliminate de facto interethnic inequality. Noted that for Jin, the inequality here refers to any kind of 
cross-ethnic inequality, beyond simply those between Han and non-Han people.  
Jin’s argument was echoed by a number of scholars, particularly after the First Tibet Work 
Symposium in March 1980. In the context of Hu Yaobang’s new Tibet policy, many joined the 
discussion, further elaborating the concept of “de facto interethnic inequality” and proposing 
practical solutions. Liu Xianzhao and Wei Shiming, for example, used Zhou Enlai’s 1957 Qingdao 
speech71 to justify the need to address de facto inter-ethnic inequality: “reading the speech after 
twenty years, we think ever more deeply that it offers profoundly practical guidance to China’s 
ethnic work in the current phase”. They consider eliminating de facto inter-ethnic inequality as the 
fundamental task of “China’s ethno-national question during the socialist period” and “a serious 
                                                      
71 Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the 1957 Qingdao Symposium on Ethnic Work, titled “A Few Questions regarding Our 
Country’s Minzu Policy” (“关于我国民族政策的几个问题”). See chapter 2 for a discussion of this speech.   
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mission for China’s ethnic work during the new era” (X. 先照 Liu 刘 and Wei 韦 1980, 7). Citing 
Lenin and Stalin’s writings as their theoretical reference, Liu and Wei defined de facto inter-ethnic 
inequality as the lack of development for the ethnic minorities in political, economic, and cultural 
aspects, despite and beyond the affirmation of ethnic equality in legal terms. They also critiqued the 
idea that focus narrowly on legal equality while overlooking those substantive inequalities.  
Like Liu and Wei, Shi Yang also used Zhou Enlai’s speech as justification for the question, while 
citing Lenin and Stalin to make his theoretical point. Shi made a distinction between eliminating 
inequality and ethnic assimilation (Ch: minzu tonghua), arguing that the latter would only happen only 
long after the realization of communism. Regarding the present task, Shi proposed to focus on the 
political empowerment of ethnic minorities. Blaming extreme leftism (Ch: jizuo) that was practiced 
and promoted by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four as the source for problems in ethnic minority 
areas, Shi argued that a key task for the government was the “ethnicization” (Ch: minzuhua) of the 
governments in autonomous regions. Only through “ethnicization,” argued Shi, would ethnic 
minorities be able to exercise their right to autonomy in an authentic sense:  
 
“To exercises the right to autonomy, [we] must implement ‘ethnicization.’ Without 
‘ethnicization,’ ethnic regional autonomy is nothing but empty talk. The right to ethnic 
autonomy (Ch: minzu zizhiquan) is the right to ethnic self-governance (Ch: minzu zhizhuquan); 
without the right to ethnic self-governance […] there is no ethnic equality.” (Shi 石 1980, 4) 
 
Along similar lines, Mao Aohai also argued that economic development should not be an end in 
itself, but merely means to achieve an important political end nonreducible to the former, namely, 
ethnic quality. Specifically, he argued that the carrying out “Four Modernizations” must not omit or 
override with the principle of ethnic equality. Instead, “Four Modernizations” would only create the 
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necessary material condition for addressing de facto interethnic inequality; furthermore, it must 
proceed carefully and strictly according to the principle of ethnic equality (Mao 茂 1980, 19–23). 
Wei Mingshan further raised the importance of ethnic equality by juxtaposing it with another 
foundational principle of CCP’s minzu policy, namely, ethnic solidarity (Ch: minzu tuanjie). As a 
concept, ethnic solidarity is often used when individuals or groups are asked to make sacrifices for a 
greater community, e.g. the Chinese nation, in the name of solidarity among ethnicities. For Wei, 
ethnic solidarity must be subordinate to the principle of ethnic equality. While Wei agreed that 
ethnic solidarity was important for the realization of “Four Modernizations,” he argued that “in 
China today where we have realized basically the political equality among various ethnicities, we 
should strengthen ethnic solidarity but what is more important is to gradually eliminate the de facto 
interethnic inequality” (Wei 韦 1981, 28).  
 
4.4.2 Disputing the Concept 
Different voices soon emerged. Writing for flag-ship journal of CASS Institute of Nationalities 
Ethno-National Studies, Yang Wenju challenged the concept of “de factor interethnic inequality” from 
both theoretical and practical points of view. On the other hand, Yang offered a different 
interpretation of the term – based on his novel reading of Stalin’s text – that redefined the “de facto 
inequality” as referring to only “differences in developmental stages” (Ch: shehui fazhan jieduan) in 
Marxist terms (W. 文炬 Yang 杨 1983, 3). To him, using the concept for anything beyond this 
parameter would be unfaithful to its originally intended meaning. On the other hand, Yang believed 
that differences in developmental stages has already be eliminated, given that China had gone 
through both democratic reform and socialist reform under the CCP. In contrast, gaps in 
socioeconomic development across ethnic groups remained and were impossible to be addressed 
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right away but would require efforts over the long term. As such, Yang argued – or rather, jumped 
to the argument – that one should simply stop labelling cross-ethnic gaps in socioeconomic 
development as “inequality”. He warned against the continuing usage of the term: either it would 
make people dismissive of real differences, or when it’s applied casually on any socioeconomic 
differences, people would begin to perceive inequality everywhere (W. 文炬 Yang 杨 1983, 6–7).  
Despite his not entirely sound logic, Yang’s attempt to dispute the concept attracted support 
from several scholars. Mu Mu, for stance, after recounting PRC’s achievements in improving the 
conditions of ethnic minorities, argued that there was no longer any de facto interethnic inequality in 
China. Specifically, Mu rejected that there remained inequality in economic and cultural development 
among ethnic groups. “Whether there is equality or inequality depends on whether [different groups] 
enjoy the same social status and rights, not differences in degree of development” (Mu 穆 1985, 
108). In other words, as long as everyone has the equal opportunity to development, “equality” is 
realized. Based on this definition, Mu called the idea of de facto interethnic inequality “inconsistent 
with the objective reality of inter-ethnic relations in our country, and therefore unpersuasive” (Mu 
穆 1985, 106). Wang Xunming from Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Sciences72 also shared 
Yang’s critique that completely eliminating differences in economic and cultural development was 
impossible, going as far as calling it an utopia (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 1985, 36). But for Wang, the 
criterion to assess the existence of real inequality was whether the working masses of the “backward 
nationalities” (Ch: luohou minzu) could fully enjoy the rights obtained through the “equalization of 
ethnic rights” like the working masses of the “advanced nationalities” (Ch: xianjin minzu) (Xunming 
勋铭 Wang 王 1985, 36).  
                                                      
72 Wang worked at the Institute of Scientific Socialism (Ch: kexue shehui zhuyi yanjiuyuan) of Inner Mongolia Academy of 
Social Sciences.  
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At the same time, many others also criticized Yang’s argument. Liu Shaochuan, for example, 
argued that eliminating de facto interethnic inequality involved necessarily also eliminating general 
socioeconomic differences between different ethnic groups. Calling Yang’s argument “stage theory” 
(Ch: jieduan lun), Liu disputed Yang’s reading of Lenin and Stalin’s texts. He spent 5 pages of his 7-
page article reinterpreting the passages by those two Marxist writers, before concluding that Yang 
had mishandled the concept and wrongly denied the possibility of eliminating socioeconomic gaps 
among different ethnic groups. In the end, Liu called upon the working class of the “advanced 
nationalities” to offer “comprehensive,” “flexible,” “long-term,” “proletarian,” “genuine,” 
“frequent,” and “sincere” assistance to the “backward nationalities” so to fully eradicate their 
“backwardness” (Ch: luohou xing) and eliminate de facto interethnic inequality (Shaochuan 绍川 Liu 
刘 1984, 12). Chen Jialing endorsed Liu Shaochuan’s critique and similarly disputed Yang’s 
interpretation of Lenin and Stalin’s text. While agreeing with Yang’s conceptual distinction between 
“stage differences” and “differences in economic and cultural development,” Chen saw both as part 
of the concept of “de facto inequality”. Before concluding, Chen professed confidence that the 
leadership under Zhao Ziyang and the newly enacted LERA would be able to facilitate this task 
(Jialing 嘉陵 Chen 陈 1984, 41, 66). A few years later, Chen published another critique against both 
Wang Xunming and Mu Mu (Jialing 嘉陵 Chen 陈 1987). Announcing that he would like to engage 
both authors in a comradely discussion (Ch: tongzhi shi de taolun), Chen challenged both Wang and 
Mu’s reading of the classical Marxist texts and argued that de facto interethnic inequality was indeed 
applicable in China today. This time Chen attempted to demonstrate the feasibility of eliminating 
such inequality by citing evidence from both the Soviet Union as well as Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture. Chen also suggested how one could measure inequality with general 
socioeconomic indicators by citing statistics from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (Jialing 
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嘉陵 Chen 陈 1987, 40–41). All in all, Chen’s second piece offered a systematic discussion about 
both the theoretical definition of “de facto interethnic inequality” and its operationalization for 
social scientific analyses.  
Aside from the two opposing camps, a number of other voices also appeared in the debate. Zhu 
Min, while admitted that there were indeed still inequalities among ethnic groups, preferred calling 
the phenomena “gaps in economic and cultural development” rather than “de facto interethnic 
inequality” (M. 民 Zhu 朱 1986, 25), for fears that the latter term might create frustration among 
cadres and the masses. Gu Zhaoji and Wang Chao agreed with Zhu Min that it was better to drop 
the term because it might hurt people’s “ethnic emotion” and be used to stir “ethnic hostility” (Gu 
顾 and Wang 王 1988, 11). Lacuo focused on the practical aspect of minzu policy, calling for more 
“opening-up policy” “assistance policy,” and legal support to facilitate the elimination of de facto 
interethnic inequality (Lacuo 拉措 1986). One novel argument came from Zheng Guanzhi, who 
brought up the issue of ethnic obligations (Ch: minzu yiwu) (Zheng 郑 1987). Agreeing with Yang 
Wenju’s redefinition of the term, Zheng argued that de facto interethnic equality had been realized 
since the founding of PRC. He then suggested that aside from upholding the principle of ethnic 
equality, it was equally important for everyone to fulfill their ethnic obligations, which include 1) 
upholding the system of ethnic regional autonomy and opposing all forms of splittism, 2) 
safeguarding the unity of the motherland and pursuing the unification of the motherland with 
Taiwan, 3) strengthening ethnic solidarity, and 4) upholding the Four Cardinal Principles (Ch: sixiang 
jiben yuanze) and Opening-up & Reform (Ch: gaige kaifang). A rebuttal to Zheng’s argument, targeting 
specifically his first claim, was provided later by Mao Aohai (Mao 茂 1989). 
The debate over “de facto interethnic inequality” has several features. Both its advocates and 
challengers have attempted to legitimize one’s argument or dispute the argument of the opponents 
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by referring to the same set of the Soviet Marxist literature, in particular, the discussion on 
nationality by Lenin and Stalin. No one in the debate has brought in any other theoretical 
frameworks aside from Marxism-Leninism. Much of the discussion revolved around or proceed 
through the attempts to (re)interpret the Soviet Marxist texts. Neither side rejected the concept 
altogether; they differed mostly with regards to how relevant it was for China or how useful it was 
for practical work. In the end, most participants of this debate shared a number of basic 
understandings: 1) there are socioeconomic gaps among ethnic groups in China, 2) these gaps are 
rooted in history and further exacerbated by the political turmoil during the Cultural Revolution 
(usually referred to indirectly as the sabotage by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four), 3) these gaps 
require active efforts and a long period of time to address, 4) the state had been working towards 
reducing the gaps and should be continuing doing so in the future. In terms of their argumentation 
style, most scholars chose to spend more ink on conceptual dispute than empirically grounded 
discussion. By and large, the debate over “de facto interethnic inequality” shows a scholarly 
discourse with relatively low theoretical heterogeneity and generally shared problem definition. 
Reviewing the debate already in 1985, Jin Binggao believed that the discussion was a positive 
phenomenon under the new domestic circumstances following the party’s Third Plenum. “Although 
there were a number of different, conflicting opinions […] [the debate] performed the positive 
function of unifying the community’s understanding […]” (B. 炳镐 Jin 金 1986, 39).  
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Chapter 5 Questioning Ethnic Consciousness, 1989-2003 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
From 1989 to 2003, the central leadership became increasingly divided over minzu policy due to 
political development both inside and outside China. Internationally, the downfall of communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union alarmed the Chinese leaders of the 
centrifugal potential of localized ethnic identities and the vulnerability of their multiculturalist 
institutional design. Domestically, the ethnic unrests in Xinjiang and Tibet throughout the late 1980s 
and early 1990s plus the nationwide mass democratic demonstrations in 1989 led many to consider 
Deng’s liberalization policy as a political failure. The push for shifting minzu policy back onto a 
more integrationist track reached a decisive milestone in 1996, when the party leadership Jiang 
Zemin issued the Document No. 7, thus drastically reducing the cultural and religious autonomy of 
the Turkic minorities in Xinjiang.   
During the same period, the scholar community on minzu policy began to develop in number of 
different directions due to the general revival of social sciences and the tendency of research 
specialization. Many increasingly evaluated minzu studies from a critical standpoint. Motivated by an 
interest to promote their own discipline against others in the competition for research resources, 
academics increasingly question the mission of minzu studies in contemporary China. Importantly, 
ethno-national politics gradually emerged as a distinct field of studies that combines approaches 
from both the Chinese Marxist ethnology and political science. As a result, the knowledge 
community of minzu policy became somewhat fragmented. 
Under the influence of the above two factors, the academic debate on minzu policy displayed 
more politicized disagreements than the previous period, featuring increasingly critical voice 
concerning China’s minzu policy. One representative development was the debate over the concept, 
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“ethnic consciousness,” which led to the division of the community between those who advocate 
for controlling ethnic consciousness – of the minorities in particular – in the name of social stability 
and national unity, and those who defend ethnic consciousness as a natural and harmless component 
of any ethnic identification. Over time, this debate went beyond purely theoretical discussion and 
began questioning the overall orientation of China’s minzu policy.  
 
5.2 Adversarial Policy Subsystem 
5.2.1 Balancing Soft- and Hard-line Approaches under Jiang 
Jiang Zemin became the CCP General Secretary in the aftermath of the 1989 pro-democracy 
student demonstration. He stayed in office for the next 13 years and presided over a period of 
sustained rapid economic and social development in contemporary China. Different from the 
previous one, this period saw evident increased ethnic tensions inside China. This led to a number 
of implications for the direction and content of PRC minzu policy. Especially in border regions such 
as Xinjiang and Tibet, the Chinese government’s approach to ethnic issues during this time became 
much less conciliatory than the previous decade. This turn, however, is facilitated by not only the 
shifting international and domestic conditions, but also the power reconfiguration within the top 
echelon of the Chinese Communist Party. With liberal leaders such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, 
Wan Li either marginalized or no longer around, as well as the consolidations of conservative leaders 
such as Li Peng and Chen Yun, the top leadership gradually returned to an integrationist position 
towards the millions of ethnic minorities in the country. Economic development and social stability 
soon became the top priority of the leadership. This opened up the possibility for regional 
governments to pursue more concrete and measurables objectives such as economic growth and 
social stability over the abstract ones such as promoting indigenous ethnic culture and protecting 
religious beliefs. In some cases, such preferences led authorities to pursue development and stability 
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at the expense of the ethnic minorities’ cultural, economic, or political autonomy. In particular, while 
a number of key bureaucratic sectors and the regional governments agreed on the importance of 
economic development, the increasingly security-driven approach in western China’s minority-dense 
regions challenged the minzu policy inherited from Hu Yaobang’s era. Despite discontent among 
minority cadres and intellectuals due to the center’s retreat from the accommodationist position, the 
Chinese government under Jiang Zemin gradually replaced the “development-accommodation” 
approach to ethnic affairs with a “development-stability” approach.  
A key trigger to the policy struggle came from Xinjiang. As partially discussed in the previous 
chapter, under Wang Enmao (1981-1985) and his immediate successor Song Hanliang (1985–1994), 
the XUAR government sought to consolidate the party’s control in the region while also boost the 
political loyalty of the ethnic minority population through accommodating their cultural and 
religious needs, specifically, the use of their native tongues and the practice of Islam. By the end of 
the 1980s, however, rising ethnic tension in Xinjiang increasingly called such an approach into 
question. Part of the cause for this development was the radicalization of Islamic believers facilitated 
by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during this period (1979-1989). The XUAR’s response to 
these unrest, throughout the late 1980s, was to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the region 
while continuing to accommodate the revival of the ethnic minorities’ cultural and religious practices 
(M. E. Clarke 2011, 78). As we have mentioned earlier, this did not mean lack of regulation; on the 
contrary, the XUAR only allowed ethnic minorities to engage in “lawful” religious activities within a 
framework of strengthened government control. In despite of the authority’s effort to strike a 
balance between accommodation and control, popular discontent with the government persisted. 
Out of the 18 organized protests in Xinjiang as documented by Gardner Bovingdon, nine occurred 
between 1980 and 1981, one in 1985, and the rest eight between 1988 and 1989 (Bovingdon 2010, 
177–80). The largest one of the second half part of the decade came in 1989: when students from 
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universities and colleges in Beijing occupied the Tiananmen Square in the national capital to protest 
against the rampant corruption and call for a systematic political reform of the country, 
approximately 3000 students from Xinjiang University marched to the Party headquarter in XUAR’s 
capital city Urumqi on May 19th. Although one initial trigger behind the protest was the publication 
of a controversial book Sexual Customs, which depicted Muslims going on the hajj to Mecca as 
engaging in sexual indulgence, the Urumqi protest also included calls for more cultural autonomy 
and support for fellow student protestors three thousands kilometer away in Beijing (Dreyer 2000, 
140–41).  
Externally, the Chinese authority felt the pressure from the dramatic change in geopolitical 
configuration as the Cold War came to a sudden end. Between 1989 and 1991, communist parties 
across Eastern Europe fell from power one after another. In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and 
was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In response, the CCP engaged in a 
systematic assessment of the causes for the failure of the socialist regimes in the Soviet bloc 
(Shambaugh 2008; PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 305). In particular, the Chinese leaders were anxious 
about the potential risk of their minzu policy, which bore much resemblance to the nationality policy 
of the Soviet Union. They were worried that China would follow a similar path.  
The rapidly changing international environment and rising ethnic tension within China did not 
trigger an immediate change to the minzu policy. The PRC Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy 
(LERA), crafted by the senior Mongolian cadre Ulanhu and supported by liberal leaders Hu 
Yaobang, was only enacted in 1984. By the early 1990, even after the standoff on the Tiananmen 
Square, the new party leadership did not go for an entirely different direction for their recently 
reinstituted minzu policy. But one can already sense the tension between the conciliatory approach 
preferred by the top leadership in early 1980s and the demand for increased repressive measures 
from the more restive area of the country, such as Xinjiang.  
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At the Sixth Plenum of the 13th Party Congress in March 1990, Jiang offered his first take on the 
country’s ethnic affairs after he was promoted to the CCP General Secretary only nine months ago. 
In his speech, titled “A Few Points on the Situation in and Opinions on Further Stabilizing Border 
Ethnic Regions,”73 Jiang tried to mediate the tension between the hardline and softline approach 
among the elites in response to the rising ethnic tensions in China. On the one hand, he affirmed 
that the correctness and effectiveness of the existing minzu policy and the development-oriented 
approach to ethnic tensions: “[e]specially since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, as the 
focus of the party and state shifted, ethnic region and ethnic minorities have made evidence 
progress, broadened and strengthened the basis of grand unity of all ethnicities” (PLRC and 
XUARPC 2010, 305). On the other hand, he also called attention to the problems in Xinjiang and 
blamed “ethnic splittists inside and outside China and other reactionary forces” who “have never 
stopped their sabotaging activities” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 305). Despite his admission of the 
threats posed by ethnic dissidents in Xinjiang, Jiang chose not to go beyond seeing the problem as 
only the work of a fraction of the people. He continued to emphasize the need to work with the 
indigenous population and trust the masses. “To do well on the work on border ethnic regions, and 
to maintain stability in the border situations,” so argues Jiang, “[we] must also resolutely unite and 
rely on people of all ethnicities, strengthen the unity between the military and the people, build 
together a stable and civilized border defense, and form a real wall of iron and bronze (Ch: tongqiang 
tiebi)” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 303).  
Jiang’s even-handed approach did not satisfy party elders who preferred a hardline-approach. 
Less than a month after the above meeting, Chen Yun wrote a personal letter to Jiang, urging him to 
pay more attention to Xinjiang’s stability. In the publicly available version of this letter, titled “Must 
                                                      
73 Original Chinese title: “关于进一步稳定边疆民族地区的几点情况和意见”. The full-text of the article can be 
viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 
(Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018. 
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Pay Great Attention to the Issue of Infiltration through Religion,”74 Chen wrote that he felt “deeply 
unsettled upon reading reports about the growing counter-revolutionary activities carried out under 
the cloak of religion under the new circumstances […]”. Linking the situation in Xinjiang with (his 
interpretation of) the rest of the world, Chen argued it has been a repeatedly-used tactics of the 
“foreign and domestic class enemies” to use religion to “compete with us for the hearts and minds 
of the masses, especially the youth” and that such tactics have effectively caused some communist 
parties to lose power in their countries (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 313). As a result, Chen strongly 
recommended the central leadership not to let religion become a new source of instability. To what 
extent did Chen’s letter influence Jiang’s thinking is unclear. However, the Baren County riots (Ch: 
baren xiang baoluan) that followed this letter, between April 5th and 6th, might have very well validated 
Chen’s message in front of Jiang and facilitated a change of mind for him. On April 24th, Jiang 
forwarded Chen’s letter to the entire Central Politburo Standing Committee as well as party elders 
such as Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, and Bo Yibo. In his attached comments to the letter, Jiang stated 
in an approving and determined tone that “the questions raised by Comrade Chen Yun are very 
important, and indeed deserve high attention and caution from party committees and governments 
at all levels, [we] must absolutely not be careless and let our guards down, [we] must adopt early 
effective measures, lest it leads to serious consequences” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 313).  
The increased frequency and intensity of minority-involved incidents in Xinjiang and the 
pressure from the elders compelled Jiang to make a personal visit to the region between August 22nd 
and September 1st, 1990. Jiang’s visit came after a long while since the party leaders’ last presence in 
this western borderland of PRC – seven years after the visit by Zhao Ziyang, then Premier of the 
State Council, and nine years after the visit of Deng Xiaoping, then the Chairman of the Central 
                                                      
74 Original Chinese title: “要高度重视利用宗教进行渗透的问题”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018. 
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Military Commission. During his trip, Jiang gave a number of speeches on behalf of the new party 
leadership. These speeches were then re-organized into a single document titled “Keep Pushing 
Forward the Socialist Construction and Reform Work in Xinjiang”.75 This text is important 
especially for a comparative analysis with texts produced under the same leadership but during its 
later years. From this text we can see that, despite the pressure from elders such as Chen Yun, 
Jiang’s Xinjiang policy continued to operate within the development-oriented framework, albeit with 
increased admission of the importance of stability. It might be said that Jiang was trying to remain 
somewhat neutral towards both the softline and the hardline approach at this point. Instead of 
giving in to some senior cadres’ demand for a more repressive approach towards the minorities, 
Jiang prioritized development and government assistance over security buildup, pitching the former 
as the key to solving the rising ethnic tensions in the region. For example, Jiang divided his 
comments into 8 sub-topics, which are arranged in the following order: 1) maintaining stability, 2) 
strengthening ethnic solidarity, 3) rural reform, 4) concentrating on developing economy, 5) opening 
up, 6) Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and troops stationing in Xinjiang, 7) 
strengthening the cadre building, and 8) strengthening party’s leadership.  
At the same time, he yielded certain grounds to the hardline approach, stating that “protecting 
the social and political stability of the country overrides everything” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 
317). Singling out Xinjiang, Jiang argued that stability in Xinjiang had even more “special 
implications”. In this particular region, maintaining social stability and developing economy are in a 
“dialectical unity” (Ch: bianzheng tongyi), which he elaborated as:  
 
                                                      
75 Original Chinese title: “把新疆社会主义建设和改革事业不断推向前进”. The full-text of the article can be viewed 
via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 4th, 2018. 
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“Without a stable political prerequisite, the economy could not be improved; without an 
improved economy, the stability could not be maintained. Thus, we say that stability overrides 
everything, this is why it matters.” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 318) 
 
Simply put, both must be treated as the equally top priority. Indeed, to show his agreement with 
increased emphasis on stability in the context of Xinjiang, Jiang brought up the Baren riots 
specifically and explicitly endorsed the XUAR’s response to the incident. But even here, Jiang 
carefully walked a fine line between endorsing certain repressive measures on the one hand and 
continuing the emphasis on development as the key policy instrument on the other hand:  
 
“Baren County Incident cannot be looked at separately from the international and domestic 
climate. Of course, you [presumably Xinjiang cadres at the meeting] should also diligently learn lessons 
from it. I endorse the several measures that you proposed to be implemented from now on. The 
key is to further improve economic work. Economic development is the basis for political 
stability and social stability. Of course, we must also be aware that, under the current international climate, 
even when we do well with the economy, [we] still cannot go to rest, [we] still must remain vigilant against the 
sabotage of hostile forces. We must keep our heads cool, no matter who comes to cause troubles, no 
matter from which ethnicities, [we] must deal with them according to the law and suppress their 
sabotage and prevent it at its earliest stage.” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 319)76 
 
Elsewhere in his speeches, however, Jiang also cited some passage from classical Marxist 
literature to counter-balance his endorsement of the repressive measures in Xinjiang, by emphasizing 
that he remained committed to the rejection of the “class-approach” to the ethno-national question 
                                                      
76 Italics added by author.  
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as decided in the intra-elite debate of the 1980s. He also paid lip service to the Law on Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy (LERA) as well as the underlying principle of respecting the autonomy of 
recognized ethnic minorities of China:  
 
“First of all, all nationalities […] are equal, including equal political rights, equal rights to 
economic development, [enjoying] equal status for their languages; [this] also includes respecting 
the religious belief, customs, and conventions of all nationalities […] Secondly, there are no 
superior or inferior among nationalities […] their differential maturing state and economic-
cultural developmental state are historically rooted […] Thirdly, national differences and national 
questions will continue to exist for a long time. First the class will be abolished, then the state 
will wither away, and the last will be the disappearance of the nation. This will be a prolonged 
historical process. Before the national disappears, it is mistaken to omit national differences and 
national characteristics […] Fourthly, the national question is part of the general social question; 
this was the case during the revolutionary period, it remains so during the construction period. It 
is the principal position of the Marxist nationality policy to realize the common prosperity and 
progress of all nationalities once the class oppression and national oppression are eliminated […] 
Fifthly, the institution of ethnic regional autonomy is the fundamental institution for solving 
China’s national question; the Law of Ethnic Regional Autonomy is a basic law codifying this 
institution in a legal form.” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 321–23) 
 
Importantly, even as Jiang acknowledge the seriousness of the threat to regional stability by 
“domestic and international hostile forces” (Ch: guoneiwai didui shili), he was careful not to paint the 
indigenous population of Xinjiang with a broad brush and risk alienating cadres who might prefer a 
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softer approach in minzu policy. Keeping in consistent with his tone at the Sixth Plenum earlier this 
year, Jiang emphasizes the need to separate the hostile forces from the masses:  
 
“[…] in the struggle against ethnic splittism, [we] must resolutely trust and rely on the cadres and 
masses of all ethnicities. A few splittists are found in one ethnicity is nothing surprising, which 
does little harm to the glorious contribution made by the people of this ethnicity for the 
motherland. Cadres of all ethnicities should educate and lead the masses of all ethnicities, 
including those from their own ethnicities, to join the struggle against ethnic splittism” (PLRC 
and XUARPC 2010, 323)  
 
This point is further echoed with another important expression which Jiang used in this 
document, which later on was summarized as the principle of “three inseparables” (Ch: san’ge 
libukai), now known as the signature-phrase of Jiang’s personal contribution to the party’s minzu 
policy discourse:77  
 
“[…] in the big family of our motherland, the relationship among all nationalities is that of an 
equal, united, mutually-helping socialist new inter-ethnic relations; Han people are inseparable 
from the ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities are inseparable from the Han people, various ethnic 
minorities are inseparable from one another either […] History has repeatedly demonstrated, 
when there is unity, there is progress and prosperity; when there is division, there is chaos and 
decay.” (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 321) 
 
                                                      
77 See, for example, “three inseparables” (“三个离不开”) 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%89%E4%B8%AA%E7%A6%BB%E4%B8%8D%E5%BC%80/3260627 
(Baidu Encyclopedia), accessed July 10th 2018. Italic added by author.  
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Similar to Hu Yaobang’s attempted intervention in minzu policy through his reform plan for 
Tibet and his personal visit to the region, Jiang Zemin’s speech on Xinjiang and visit also translated 
into broader adjustment to the state-level policy. The tension between the soft- and hard-line 
approach to managing ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and the new leadership’s attempt to balance 
between the two poles soon went beyond the autonomous region. Following the direction of Jiang’s 
response to Chen Yun’s letter in April 1990, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
jointly issued the “Notice on a Few Questions regarding Further Improving Religious Work”78 on 
February 5th, 1991. The document reflects a similar balancing act as one sees in Jiang’s speech during 
his Xinjiang trip, further giving one the impression that the party leadership was in fact caught 
between the two different directions of minzu policy. On the other hand, this document highlights 
the need to be cautious against the connection between religion and hostile forces in and outside 
China. After paying lip-service to affirm the correctness of the party’s religious policy, the document 
quickly turns into a cautious tone:  
 
“but [we] must also realize that, oversea hostile forces have been using religion as an important 
instrument to promote their ‘peaceful-evolution’ strategy, continuously engaging in infiltration 
and sabotage against China. Ethnic splittists also use religion to stir up trouble and cause chaos, 
attacking the party’s leadership and the socialist system and undermining the integrity of the 
motherland and ethnic solidarity.”  
 
                                                      
78 Original Chinese title: “中共中央、国务院关于进一步做好宗教工作若干问题的通知”. The full-text of the 
article can be viewed via http://www.sara.gov.cn/old/xxgk/zcfg/331716.htm (State Administration for Religious 
Affairs), accessed July 4th, 2018. See, also, Chen Yun’s letter to Jiang Zemin, “We Must Pay Great Attention to the Issue 
of Infiltration through Religion” (“要高度重视利用宗教进行渗透的问题”) 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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However, as if the authors weren’t entirely certain how far they should push the cautious 
message, the document quickly countered the above statement again with an accommodationist 
message:  
 
“at the same time [we] must also realize that, there remain plenty of problems in the 
implementation of the freedom of religious belief policy, in some places the citizens’ right to the 
freedom of religious belief was infringed upon, the rightful privileges of temples, monasteries, 
and churches were infringed upon, the normal activities of religious societies were interfered 
with, the prescribed return of religious property, temples, monasteries, or churches were 
unsolved for long periods of time.”  
 
By the time of the first Central Conference on Ethnic Work (Ch: zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi) in 
January 1992, it seems that this balanced tone has become the agreed-upon policy direction of the 
party leadership. Between January 14th to 18th 1992, officials from across the ministries, party organs, 
and the country were summoned to join the conference in Beijing, where Jiang Zemin gave the 
speech titled “Strengthen the Grand Unity of All Nationalities, Marching Forward Hand in Hand for 
Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.79 In it, Jiang emphasized that there are “objective 
laws governing the emergence, development, and withering away of nationality, class, and state” and 
that “national characteristic, national/ethnic differences will continue to exist for a long time” 
(PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 352). He made it clear that the leadership would not resurrect the 
“class-approach” to minzu issues; instead, it was reaffirmed that the party saw ethnic relations under 
                                                      
79 Original Chinese title: “加强各民族大团结，为建设有中国特色的社会主义携手前进”. The full-text of the 
article can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-
428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), 
accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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the condition of socialism as relations among working peoples, despite its complexity and difficulty 
for management. This recognition was made based on the assumption that the fundamental interests 
of all nationalities are the same, with only marginal differences with regard to distribution of 
economic benefits and lack of respect for cultural and religious differences. Accordingly, Jiang 
prioritized the task of ethnic work in the 1990s in the following order: 1) accelerate economic 
development in ethnic minority regions; 2) promote social development in areas such as education, 
healthcare, cultural; 3) promote economic reform in minority areas and linkages between them and 
the rest of the country; 4) fully implemented LERA; 5) promote ethnic solidarity and defend 
territorial integrity of the country. This development-prioritized approach was soon affirmed by 
Premier Li Peng, when he endorsed the westward “opening-up” strategy of Xinjiang in his speech 
“Making Border-regions in Xinjiang a Window for China’s Westwards Opening-Up” on September 
2nd of the same year.80 
 
5.2.2 “Document No. 7” and a Regressive Turn in Xinjiang Policy 
This balanced approach to minzu policy soon faced challenges in Xinjiang. Throughout the early 
1990s, protests and small-scale riots continued to occur in Xinjiang. Some of these activities took on 
Islamist-informed ideologies through neighboring countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
thereby prompting the Chinese government to reevaluate their minzu policy in Xinjiang. The 
sustained unrests and the continuing push for a hard-line approach by officials affiliated either with 
XUAR or the security sector eventually convinced the party leadership to make an important policy 
adjustment in the mid-1990s (Harbars 哈日巴拉 2008). On March 19th, 1996, members of the 
                                                      
80 Original Chinese title: “把新疆口岸建成我国向西开放的窗口”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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Central Politburo Standing Committee met in Beijing to discuss a new strategy for stability 
maintenance in Xinjiang. Following the meeting, the Central Committee issued the controversial 
“Summary of the Central Politburo Standing Committee Meeting on Maintaining Stability in 
Xinjiang,”81 also known as “Document No. 7 [1996] of the Central Committee,” or simply 
“Document No. 7” (Ch: qihao wenjian). Document No. 7 reoriented the party-government’s 
approach to ethnic relations in Xinjiang. According to scholars who had access to the full-text of the 
original official file, Document No. 7 begins with a radical re-definition of the nature of ethnic 
relations in the region:  
 
“Currently, the main threats posed to the stability in Xinjiang are national splittism and illegal 
religious activities […] Party committees and governments at all levels in Xinjiang must assume a 
high sense of political responsibility, righteously uphold the flag of ethnic solidarity and of 
protecting the dignity of law, unite cadres and masses of all nationalities to the maximum extent, 
take advantage of their trust to the maximum extent, so to isolate the national splittist and 
criminals, and maintain the stability of Xinjiang” (Harbars 哈日巴拉 2008, 6).  
 
To cope with such “threats,” Document No. 7 openly called for recruiting politically loyal Han 
cadres to come and work in Xinjiang in order to ensure the political and social stability in the region. 
It stated that the governments should “take feasible measures, train and assign a large number of Han 
cadres who love Xinjiang, capable of upholding the party’s basic line and basic strategy, correctly 
carrying out the party’s minzu policy and religious policy to work in Xinjiang”.82 In accordance with 
                                                      
81 Original Chinese title: “中央政治局常委会关于维护新疆稳定的会议纪要”. Alternative title in Chinese is “中发
〔1996〕7 号文件,” which means “Document No. 7 [1996] of the Central Committee”.    
82 See “Notice of CCP Central Committee’s Organization Department and Personnel Department on Questions 
regarding Selecting and Sending Cadres for Xinjiang” (“中共中央组织部人事部关于做好为新疆选派干部工作有关
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the Document No. 7, the CCP Central Committee’s Organization Department (Ch: zuzhi bu) and 
Personnel Department (Ch: renshi bu) announced in October of the same year that they would select 
2000 to 2500 cadres and technical personnel from inner China to work in Xinjiang during the “Fifth 
Five-Year Plan” period (1996—2000), starting with 200 people in the year of 1996 alone. Eight 
provinces and direct-controlled municipalities (Ch: zhixiashi, hereafter municipality) were named in 
the document which were asked to select and send cadres to various areas of Xinjiang as part of this 
national effort to bring “politically loyal Han cadres” to the region (see Table 3). Among those going 
to XUAR, party and government cadres would be asked to work there for five years, whereas 
technical personnel should work for no less than three years.  
Table 6 – Plan for Sending Cadres and Technical Personnel to Xinjiang, 199683 
Sending Areas Receiving Areas 
Jiangxi Province 
Kizilsu (Ch: kezilesu) Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture  
(Kyrgyz: وبالسى اپتونوم قىرعىز قىزىلسۇۇ ) 
Tianjin Municipality, Shandong Province  
Kashgar (Ch: kashi) Prefecture 
(Uyghur: ۋىاليىتى قەشقەر ) 
Beijing Municipality, Zhejiang Province 
Hotan (Ch: hetian) Prefecture  
(Uyghur: ۋىاليىتى خوتەن ) 
Shanghai Municipality, Henan Province 
Aksu (Ch: akesu) Prefecture  
(Uyghur: ۋىاليىتى ئاقسۇ ) 
Jiangsu Province  
Ili (Ch: yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 
(Kazakh: وبلىسى اۆتونومىيالى قازاق ىلە )  
 
The center’s decision to change of policy direction regarding Xinjiang produced a number of 
immediate consequences. Immediately following the issuance of Document No. 7, on March 27th, 
1996, the acting party secretary of XUAR Wang Lequan was formally promoted to head both the 
Autonomous Region’s Party Committee (as the party secretary) as well as the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps (as the first secretary). The previous XUAR party secretary and first 
                                                      
问题的通知”), available via China Court at https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/1996/10/id/26725.shtml, accessed 
July 4th, 2018. Italics added.  
83 Source: “Notice of CCP Central Committee’s Organization Department and Personnel Department on Questions 
regarding Selecting and Sending Cadres for Xinjiang,” available via ChinaCourt.org, a website overseen by the Supreme 
People’s Court, at https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/1996/10/id/26725.shtml (accessed July 4th, 2018) 
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secretary of the XJPCC, Song Hanliang, was removed from both positions after two years of 
“rehabilitation” since 1994. Immediately following Wang’s promotion, in May 1995, the XUAR 
government launched of a “Strike Hard” Campaign (Ch: yan’da) in the region, targeting specifically 
“splittism and illegal religious activities” (Becquelin 2004; Hierman 2007; Davis 2008). While the 
1996 “Strike Hard” Campaign was a nationwide operation coordinated between the Ministry of 
Public Security and local governments across the country, the specific target in Xinjiang clearly 
shows its connection with the Document No. 7 which, as we have seen, highlighted that “national 
splittism and illegal religious activities” are the main threats to stability in Xinjiang.  
Unfortunately, the heavy-handed approach led to even greater tension. The Ghulja incident in 
February 1997, which caused over one hundred causalities, including seven deaths, was believed to 
be the largest incident of ethnic violent since the Baren riots in 1990 (M. E. Clarke 2011, 134). 
Violent activities carried out by minority dissidents even went beyond Xinjiang. In March and May 
1997, three bombing incidents occurred in Beijing that were allegedly carried out by Uyghur dissents 
(M. E. Clarke 2011, 134). Aside from the pressure from the regional government under Wang 
Lequan, there might be also other factors at work. For example, some studies have suggested that 
the radicalization of ethnic minority dissidents in Xinjiang might have been very well the 
consequence of the XUAR’s own policy since the late 1980s, which encouraged the Xinjiang 
Muslims to develop links with fellow Muslims in Central Asia in the context of the PRC’s “Reform 
and Opening-Up” (M. E. Clarke 2011, 135–36). The “Great Islamic Circle” strategy as announced 
during the time when Wang Enmao was the regional leadership is one case in point (Christoffersen 
1993).  
The shifting of emphases in Xinjiang is confirmed in subsequent speeches by other state leaders. 
On September 7th, 1996, then Premier Li Peng gave a speech at a Briefing Conference in XUAR, 
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titled “Developing Nationality Economy is the Basis for Strengthening Ethnic Solidarity”.84 In his 
speech, maintaining stability assumed the top priority in the list of things being addressed, followed 
by economic development, XJPCC, and public finance. Li was explicit in his endorsement of the 
leadership’s decision in Document No. 7, stating that the decision was made only after “the center 
did careful research and listened to the opinions of comrades from Xinjiang as well as taking into 
account the current international and regional situation”. He also gave his approval of the way in 
which the XUAR officials had implemented the center’s decision and emphasized that it would be 
an important task for a relatively long time. Lastly, the new priority was treated as the main objective 
to which other efforts, e.g. developing economy and culture, should be subordinate:   
 
“Xinjiang should always put the strengthening of ethnic solidarity in a very important position. 
The stability of Xinjiang is determined by ethnic solidarity. To achieve ethnic solidarity, one 
needs good policy, one needs vigorously promoting economy, culture, education, technology, 
and other social causes in ethnic regions. The development of ethnic economy is the basis for 
strengthening ethnic solidarity.”  
 
Aside from its implication for security practices, Document No. 7 also reversed another key 
element of the minzu policy from the Hu Yaobang-era. Whereas Hu was committed to “ethnize” 
(Ch: minzuhua) autonomous regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet, partially by replacing Han cadres 
with ethnic minorities for posts in the public sector, the new policy as laid out in Document No. 7 – 
followed up soon by other specific policies – openly called for increased immigration of Han-
Chinese. Furthermore, different from the languages in early PRC minzu policy, where similar 
                                                      
84 Original Chinese Title: “发展民族经济是增强民族团结的基础”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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practices were justified on the grounds of knowledge transfer,85 Document No. 7 made it clear that 
the goal was to use Han – the only ethnic majority group – as an instrument to stabilize an 
autonomous region for minorities. It explicitly considered Han as the most political loyal and thus 
reliable people, capable of carrying out the will of the Communist state.  
At the Central Finance Leading Small Group meeting in late May 1997, Jiang gave full 
endorsement to renewed immigration of Han-labors to Xinjiang as well as organizing those 
migrating labors through the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XJPCC). Jiang’s speech, 
titled “Stationing Troop to Develop and Defend the Border Regions is the Center’s Strategic 
Decision to Govern the Country and Ensure Security,”86 touted the role of both Han-immigration 
and the XJPCC in stabilizing China’s borderlands. Based on “historical precedence” and “current 
international situation,” Jiang claimed that only with stationing troops in Xinjiang could the border 
regions of China be secured. Clearly taking pride in its potential for military purposes, he asked the 
XJPCC to work with peoples of Xinjiang to build up an “Great Iron Wall to safeguard the 
motherland’s northwest”.87 Soon after this speech, on October 10th, the CCP Central Committee and 
the State Council jointly issued the “Notice on Further Strengthening Works of Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps,”88 which explicitly defined XJPCC as a quasi-military entity (Ch: zhu junshi 
shiti) and granted it complete autonomy in its internal administration, justice, and law enforcement. 
In other words, the restored XJPCC was put on a trajectory of becoming both an integral 
                                                      
85 See, for example, Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the 1st Plenary Session of the 1st National People’s Congress, on September 
15th, 1954. The speech is included in Selected Works on Xinjiang Work (1949-2010) under the title “On Questions regarding 
Ethnic Regional Autonomy”. The original Chinese title is “关于民族区域自治问题”. The full-text of the speech can be 
viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745  
(Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
86 Original Chinese title: “实行屯垦戍边是中央治国安邦的战略性决策”. The full-text of the article can be viewed 
via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
87 Original Chinese term: “守卫祖国大西北的钢铁长城”. 
88 Original Chinese title: “关于进一步加强新疆生产建设兵团工作的通知”. The full-text of the article can be viewed 
via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018.  
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component of the XUAR and an autonomous military organization with significant degree of 
independence and power influence for the long term.  
In sum, by the end of Jiang Zemin’s first term (1989-1998), the competition between the soft- 
and hard-line approaches to ethnic affairs in Xinjiang largely ended with the triumph of the latter, 
evident by the issuance of Document No. 7 in 1996. Following the 15th Party Congress in 1997 and 
the 9th National People’s Congress in 1998, Jiang was re-elected as the President of China while Zhu 
Rongji replaced Li Peng as the Premier. Zhu also endorsed the Xinjiang policy as decided during 
Jiang’s first term. This can be seen from his highlighted acknowledgement of the role of the security-
related cadres and personnel in Xinjiang’s governance. In his March 1999 speech on development in 
Xinjiang, titled “To Develop Xinjiang’s Economy the Question of ‘One Black and One White’ Must 
be Properly Solved,”89 Zhu made sure to first give credits not to the local people of Xinjiang, but to 
the stationing troops and XJPCC for all the “achievements” in Xinjiang:   
 
“Xinjiang has made significant achievements in economic and social development […] this result 
is inseparable from the special function performed by the Xinjiang-stationing troops and the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. I believe there is no boundary to the future 
development of Xinjiang. 
 
Hu Jintao, who has been a member of the Central Politburo Standing Committee and the 
secretary of CCP Central Secretariat since 1992, was elected as the Vice President at the 9th National 
People’s Congress, thus becoming a potential successor to Jiang. Given the hardline approach which 
                                                      
89 Original Chinese title: “新疆经济发展要解决好“一黑一白”的问题”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/0d6f3106-46c6-4327-8ef0-428930790630/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=745 (Party 
Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed June 29th, 2018. “One Black and One White” refer 
to two main local products: “black” refers to crude oil, whereas “white” refers to cotton.  
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Hu Jintao adopted in repressing the ethnic protests in Tibet in late 1980s, the reconfiguration of the 
top elite circle at this point only further consolidated the center’s support for the new hardline policy 
for Xinjiang decided two years earlier. Within the Xinjiang, the regional authority – now with the full 
support from the central leadership – no longer sought to appeal to the indigenous ethnic minorities 
through cultural accommodations as they did in the 1980s; instead, they hoped to circumvent the 
issue of promoting autonomy and to achieve economic development and social stability directly 
through a heavily state-led investment program, i.e. “Great Western Development” (Ch: xibu 
dakaifa), as well as a reversed “ethnicization scheme” (in contrast the policy from the previous 
decade), i.e. colonizing the government and economy of the region with a full-force Han-
immigration and the reinvigorated quasi-military XJPCC.  
 
5.2.3 Shifts in Tibet Policy 
The turn of Xinjiang policy did not spread to other ethnic minority areas. Beijing’s Tibet policy 
during the 1990s, for example, followed a different path which was shaped likely by both domestic 
and international conditions. In 1978 the party leadership under Deng Xiaoping extended an 
invitation to the Tibetan Government in Exile based in Dharamsala, signaling a renewed interest on 
the Chinese side to rekindle dialogue with the exiled 14th Dalai Lama. Following meetings between 
Gyalo Thondup – elder brother and a personal representative of the Dalai Lama – and several high-
ranking CCP officials including Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Ulanhu (UFWD), and Yang Jingren 
(SEAC), four fact-finding missions made up of high-ranking Tibetan officials from the exiled 
government were sent to China to observe the situation of the greater Tibetan areas90 between 1979 
                                                      
90 Greater Tibet, also known as ethnographical Tibet, refers to the areas in which Tibetans traditionally inhabited. 
Traditionally it includes three culturally and linguistic distinct regions: Amdo, Kham, and Ü-Tsang. Today these three 
areas have been divided and re-organized into different administrative units of the People’s Republic of China. Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), commonly referred to as Tibet and known in Mandarin Chinese as Xi-Zang, contains only 
part of the traditional Ü-Tsang, whereas Amdo and Kham do not constitute provincial-level (Ch: sheng ji) administrative 
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and 1990.These fact-finding missions, each with five to seven members, were headed by, 
respectively, Juchen Thubten Namgyal in 1979 (August 5th – December 21st), Tenzin N. Tethong in 
1980 (May 1st – August 15th), the Dalai Lama’s sister Jestun Pema in 1982 (June 1st – October 3rd), 
and W. G. Kundeling in 1985 (June 16th – September 11th) (Norbu 2001, 325).  
In 1982, before the third fact-finding mission took off, a three-member delegation consisting of 
P. T. Takla, Juchen Thubten Namgyal, and Lodi G. Gyari were also sent to Beijing to meet with the 
Chinese officials for exploratory negotiation. While the first meeting bore no fruit, the same 
delegation was dispatched to China again in late 1984 for a second round of talks. In the end, neither 
the fact-finding missions nor the bilateral meetings produced any progress towards bridging the two 
sides toward any common ground. Instead, they only served to show the vast gap between their 
expectations. On the Chinese side, Deng Xiaoping was only willing to grant certain autonomy with 
regards to the practice of Tibetan language, culture, and religion. Giving full political autonomy to 
Tibet, e.g. through a federalist solution, was never part of Deng’s plan (Goldstein 2004, 201). On the 
Tibetan side, not only did the representatives always place top priority on Tibet’s full autonomy, they 
even stepped up their negotiating position at the second meeting where they demanded the creation 
of a “Greater Tibet” (Ch: dazangqu)91 – which include all the traditional Tibetan areas in the 
ethnographical sense and which would necessarily involve the re-drawing of administrative 
boundaries for several provincial-level units (Goldstein 2004, 202).  
While the meetings failed to convince the exiled Tibetans for a possible political reconciliation 
between the two sides, the Chinese government continued its reform strategy through the 1980s by 
promoting economic development in both Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and adjacent Tibetan 
                                                      
units themselves, but are broken into various prefectural-level (Ch: di ji) units inside provinces adjacent to TAR, 
including Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Most of them are constituted as Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (Ch: 
zangzu zizhi zhou).  
91 See footnote above.  
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areas, as well as allowing greater expression of indigenous ethnic culture. This strategy caused a great 
degree of anxiety in Dharamsala, as the exiled leadership feared that with Beijing’s aggressive 
developmental efforts and accommodationist policy, the negotiating position of the exiled 
government would only further deteriorate with time. In response, the exiled government launched 
an international campaign starting from mid- to late-1980s in order to garner support from other 
nations and the international community at large and to regain control at the negotiating table with 
Beijing (Goldstein 2004, 202–3).  
The international campaign had profound political consequence inside China. The speech given 
by the 14th Dalai Lama at U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus in 1987 led to immediate 
reactions among Tibetans inside China. Nationalistic monks from Drepung Monastery in Lhasa 
staged a political demonstration in support of Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama’s “Five 
Point Peace Plan”.92 The combined effect of the international campaign and the indigenous 
demonstrations triggered by it greatly shook Beijing’s confidence in its new minzu policy. Since the 
early 1980s, many Han cadres had been displeased with Hu Yaobang’s radical policy reform in Tibet, 
in particular, his call for “ethnizing” the autonomous region by replacing Han cadres with Tibetan 
ones. Now such discontent was further fueled by reports that thousands upon thousands of average 
Tibetans would dare to riot against the government despite all the “generous compromise” granted 
to them by the government (Goldstein 2004, 204). As the situation in Tibet deteriorated from 1987 
to 1989, the leadership increasingly felt that it had lost control over. The March 5th Lhasa 
demonstration in 1989 proved to be the last straw that broke the authority’s patience. Within days, 
the regional government under Hu Jintao declared a state of emergency in TAR and called in the 
military to crush the demonstration (Goldstein 2004, 206). The bloody confrontation in Lhasa 
                                                      
92 Full text of the 14th Dalai Lama’s address to the U.S. Congressional Human Right's Caucus, titled “Five Point Peace 
Plan” (September 21st, 1987), can be viewed via https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point-peace-plan. 
Accessed July 11th, 2018.  
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anticipated the repressive turn in Beijing’s Tibet policy in the years to come (Associated Press 1990). 
It also provided an opportunity for a young Hu Jintao, then party secretary of the TAR, to receive 
the recognition from Deng Xiaoping for his resolute repression of the demonstration and restoring 
of order, an act that paved the way for him to be promoted to the central leadership and later on, 
head of the CCP and the state.  
Believing that it was Hu Yaobang’s accommodationist policy that fueled the ethnic discontent 
and gave impetus to the demonstrations, the post-1989 party leadership under Jiang Zemin decided 
that the government must not allow too much freedom for the promotion of ethnic minority culture 
(Goldstein 2004, 207). Consequently, there had been a turn away from the accommodationist 
policies beginning from 1990. However, whereas in Xinjiang the issue of security “overrides 
everything” and has effectively become the dominant objective to which all other policies are 
subordinate, in TAR the regional government remained focused on using economic development 
and modernization to win over the loyalty of the indigenous population (Goldstein 2004, 207). Why 
did China’s Tibet policy not become a copy of its Xinjiang policy?  
Jiang’s 1992 speech on minzu policy might provide us with some clues. In the aforementioned at 
the Central Conference on Ethnic Work in 1992, Jiang devoted an entire paragraph outlining the 
leadership’s position regarding the Tibetan issue. In fact, Tibet not only received a dedicated 
discussion in Jiang’s speech, it was also the only autonomous region out of the five in total that was 
mentioned at all. In contrast, Xinjiang was not mentioned even once, despite Jiang’s obvious 
awareness of its situation and his explicit acknowledgement of the importance to fight splittism and 
defend ethnic solidarity in the same speech. Although decisions in the Document No. 7 had yet to 
be made at this point, minzu policy in Xinjiang – as the foregoing discussion has suggested – was 
already leaning more towards “maintaining ethnic solidarity” than “developing economy”. A closer 
look at the passage about Tibet in Jiang’s speech suggests that it might have been the Chinese 
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foreign policy consideration which prevented Beijing’s Tibet policy from following the similar path 
as its Xinjiang policy during this period. In other words, the special care and policy given to Tibet 
was very likely due to the government’s updated knowledge about the complexity and delicacy of the 
Tibetan issue following Dharamsala’s international campaign. 
 
“To safeguard the unity of the motherland, we must resolutely fight with a very small number of 
splittists. In the modern history of China, national splittist activities were always schemed by 
foreign aggressors […] Here I shall make a special emphasis about the situation of Tibet.93 […] a 
small number of splittists, ignoring history and reality, have never stopped their splittist activities 
against the motherland […] fabricated the so-called ‘Tibet Question’ and attempted to make the 
issue internationalized […] I want to restate my point here: should the Dalai Lama give up the 
claim for Tibet’s independence, stop the splittist activities against the motherland, we would still 
welcome him to return to the motherland […] the door of the central government is always 
open; aside from the question of Tibet’s independence, any other question is up for discussion.” 
 
In contrast to his comments on Xinjiang as seen previously, here Jiang appeared to be speaking 
on behalf of the Chinese government to a specific audience whom he would like to persuade and 
win over. This is likely because this “target audience” had shown its capacity to mobilize 
international pressure and domestic Tibetan population against the Chinese government. Thus, 
despite the harsh language employed to blame ethnic tensions on the 14th Dalai Lama and the exiled 
Tibetans, the tone of Jiang’s speech evidently softened in the end and revealed a willingness to 
engage with the exiled Tibetan leadership and possibly to also make certain compromises. If the goal 
                                                      
93 Here Jiang was talking about the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) specifically, referred to in Chinese simply as 
“xizang”. Same goes for the other “Tibet” that appear in this cited paragraph.  
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of China’s Tibet policy had to be coordinated with its foreign strategy towards the exiled Tibetan 
leadership, then it is reasonable that although Tibetans also organized anti-government 
demonstrations – similar to what Uyghurs did in Xinjiang – the Chinese government continued to 
refrain from fully embracing a repression-dominated strategy in the region.  
As other works have also argued, Beijing still hoped that the improvement in living-standard and 
general material conditions would be sufficient to win over the political loyalty of the Tibetans from 
their oversea competitor. Studies done by Jin Wei, professor at the Central Party School in Beijing, 
shows that the Chinese government engaged in a “Full Force Assistance to Tibet” (Ch: qiangli 
yuanzang) between 1985 and 2005 (Jin 靳 2010). Financial subsidy from the central government 
during this time amounted to 108.103 billion RMB (approximately 16 billion USD), accounting for 
92.66% of the TAR government revenue. These subsidies were used to fund a variety of 
government functions. As an illustration, at the Third Tibet Work Symposium in July 1994, the 
central leadership announced eight categories of its preferential policies for the autonomous region, 
covering areas such as public finance, investment, social welfare, enterprise reform, and so on. 17 
provinces and municipalities were recruited to provide assistance to Tibet, with another 17 central-
level state-owned enterprises (Jin 靳 2010). The magnitude of central-coordinated financial support 
for TAR is unmatched in PRC history for any other regions. By the end of the decade, the center 
had slightly shifted its minzu policy away from its direction under the previous leadership. By the 
time of the Second Central Conference on Ethnic Work in the fall of 1999, the tone of the 
leadership suggested a greater emphasis on ethnic solidarity and the integrity of the motherland.  
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5.3 Uniform Knowledge Community 
5.3.1 Chinese Ethnological Science: A Family Increasingly Divided 
Within the broader ethnological sciences, tensions between sociology, anthropology, and 
ethnology were revived along with the restoration of these discipline. Among ethnologists, 
increasing disagreement over the nature and orientation of the discipline, between those see 
ethnology equivalent to ethnic minorities studies (minzu studies) and those who prefer to see 
ethnology as closer to or same with cultural anthropology, which does not exclude the study of 
ethnic minorities’ culture but should not go beyond or stray from the focus on culture as the main 
object of inquiry (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 322). Behind this dispute was 
the disagreement over which broader social science categories ethnology should find itself in, history 
or social science.  
From September 14th to 19th 1995, Chinese Ethnology Association and Northeast Institute for 
Nationalities94 co-organized a conference in Dalian, entitled “How Should Chinese Ethnology 
Prepare for the 21st Century” (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 404). A major 
topic at the conference was the relationship between ethnology and anthropology. Renowned 
scholar Fei Xiaotong attempted to use his personal influence to mitigate the tension between the 
three. He personally met with representatives of different disciplines and proposed a “peaceful co-
existence” plan, summarized as “Three fields listed together, mutually intertwining, benefiting from 
each other, striving for further development”.95  
Despite Fei’s attempt, tensions continued to exist, and division remained deep. On October 28th, 
1994, Qiao Jian, a graduate from Cornell University, gave an influential speech at his inauguration as 
professor of anthropology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong titled “The Predicament and 
                                                      
94 Original Chinese term: “东北民族学院” 
95 Original quote in Chinese: “三科并列，互相交叉，各得其所，努力发展”  
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Prospect of Chinese Anthropology”. The speech made a number of piercing observations about the 
state of epistemic community in anthropological sciences in mainland China. He suggested that the 
lack of progress could be attributed to three main factors, which are: 1) lack of consensus and 
confusion regarding the boundary between ethnology and anthropology, 2) pressure from the 
government’s utilitarianism, and 3) the inadequacy of existing anthropological method for the study 
of China. Some scholars agreed with Qiao’s criticism. More people, however, disagreed with Qiao 
and attempted to set the records of Chinese ethnology/anthropology differently (Jiandong 建东 Li 
李 1995).  
Improved international connection facilitated dialogue with international peers but also 
encouraged more reflections over the definition of discipline (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, 
and Hu 胡 1998, 428–29). Wang et al. argued that this division had much to do with the sociology 
of the knowledge community, specifically, between those who were socialized into the profession 
during the state-led large-scale social survey projects such as the ethnic classification and the 
Investigations of Ethnic Minorities’ Social History, and those who were trained either in the pre-
PRC period by traditional scholars or those who received western trainings following the “Reform 
and Opening-Up” (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998, 430).  
Several important institutions in ethnic minority studies decided to rename themselves during 
this decade. For example, in 1992, Peking University’s Institute of Sociology was renamed to 
Institute of Sociology and Anthropology. In 1995, Minzu University’s Institute of Nationalities was 
renamed to Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. Finally, in 1997, CASS Institute of 
Nationalities’ Office of Ethnology was renamed to Office of Anthropology and Ethnology.  
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5.3.2 Emergence of Minzu Political Studies 
During this time, greater specialization led also to the fragmentation of the knowledge 
community. The revival of other social sciences, such as political science and policy studies, began to 
challenge the monopoly over knowledge on minzu policy by the minzu studies community. Beyond 
ethnic minorities studies, some scholars started to argue for a dedicated study of ethnic minority 
policy from either a political science perspective or a policy studies perspective. Xu Jieshun, for 
example, has been calling for it since early 1990s. Realizing the negative connotation of “policy” in 
PRC discourse, Xu carefully navigated the conceptual minefield by suggesting that the PRC’s minzu 
policy could be a subject of study for scholars (J. 杰舜 Xu 徐 1990). In 1993, Professor at PKU 
Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, Zhou Xing published his book Ethno-National Politics (Ch: 
minzu zhengzhixue). This was considered the first book in PRC that systematically discussed the basic 
principle of political science of minzu (Qing 青 2016).  
The government also became increasingly interested in broadening the analytical approach to 
ethnic issues. In 1996, Chinese Association for Minzu Policy Research96 (Ch: zhongguo minzu zhengce 
yanjiuhui) was established under the supervision of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC). As 
stated in its charter, the association specifically committed itself to the study of minzu policy as well 
as “high-level policy consultation and analysis for party committees and government agencies at all 
levels”.97 
                                                      
96 Original Chinese title: “中国民族政策研究会” 
97 For more information, see http://www.seac.gov.cn/art/2011/3/20/art_586_70.html, accessed July 1st 2018  
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Table 7 – Project on Xinjiang under Category of “Minzu Questions Studies”, 1991-200098 





PI’s institutional affiliation 




Xialipuhan Abudali Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Library 
2 Preservation, Inheritance, and Development of Uyghur 
Traditional Culture and the Socioeconomic 
Development of Xinjiang100 
2000-7-1 
 
Reyila Dawuti Xinjiang University, Department of Chinese 
Literature 
3 History of Minzu-Relations in Xinjiang101  1999-7-1 Miao Pusheng Xinjiang Academy of Sciences 
4 Comparative Study of Nomad People’s Traditional 
Culture in Xinjiang102  
1999-7-1 Meng Ke Xinjiang Normal University, Department of 
Chinese Literature 
5 Study of Sustainable Development of Grassland Region 
in Northern Xinjiang103  
1998-5-1 Cui Yanhu Xinjiang Normal University, Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology 
6 Study of Population, Resource, Environment, and 
Sustainable Development Strategy in Xinjiang104  
1998-5-1 Qin Fangming Xinjiang University, Department of Economic 
Management  
7 Study of Social Stability in Xinjiang105 1997-4-15 Shu Disheng CCP Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party 
School, Office of Minzu Theory  
8 Experience of the Party and Government in Managing 
Minzu and Religious Issues in Xinjiang since the 
Founding of PRC106  
1996-7-1 Li Ze Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of 
Minzu  
9 Distribution of Minzu Languages and Developmental 
Tendencies in Xinjiang107  
1996-7-1 Xie Xin Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Language 
Affair Commission, Editorial Team of 
Comprehensive Records of Xinjiang108 
                                                      
98 Source: National Social Science Foundation Project Database (http://fz.people.com.cn/skygb/sk/index.php/Index/index) 
99 Original Chinese title: “新疆哈萨克族文化转型研究” 
100 Original Chinese title: “维吾尔族传统文化的保存、传承、发展与新疆社会经济发展” 
101 Original Chinese title: “新疆民族关系史”  
102 Original Chinese title: “新疆游牧民族传统文化比较研究”  
103 Original Chinese title: “新疆北部草原地区可持续发展研究” 
104 Original Chinese title: “新疆人口、资源、环境及可持续发展战略研究”  
105 Original Chinese title: “新疆社会稳定问题研究” 
106 Original Chinese title: “建国以来新疆党和政府处理民族宗教问题的经验”  
107 Original Chinese title: “新疆民族语文分布状况与语言发展趋势”  
108 Original Chinese title: “自治区民族语言文字委员会<新疆通志>编辑部”  
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10 Study of the Current Situation of Cross-Border Minzu 
in Contemporary Xinjiang109  
1995-7-1 Gao Chaoming Xinjiang University, Department of Political 
Science 
11 Study of Approaches and Measures for Modernizing 
Pastoral Regions in Xinjiang110 
1994-7-1 Zhao Xiaoren Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Standing 
Committee of the People’s Congress, Agriculture 
and Animal Husbandry Commission 
12 Study of Reasons and Measures for the Lagging Behind 
of Individual, Private Economy in Xinjiang111  
1994-7-1 Li Shengyou Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s 
Government, Center for Economic Study 
13 Study of Measures for Managing Minzu-Relations 
under Market Economy’s System in Xinjiang112  
1993-5-27 Guo Zhengli Xinjiang University, Teaching and Research Office 
for Marxism-Leninism  
14 Study of Minzu-Relations in Xinjiang113  1992-10-25 Yin Zhuguang Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party 
Committee, Office of Policy Studies  
15 History of Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Feudal Struggles 
by People of All Minzu in Modern Xinjiang (1840-
1949114  
1992-10-25 Cai Jinsong Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of 
History  
16 History of Anti-Splittist Struggles in Modern Xinjiang115  1991-12-31 Ren Yifei  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of 
Ethnology 
17 Social Stability of Minority Minzu Rural Regions in 
Xinjiang116 
1991-12-31 Jiang Liyun Xinjiang University, Department of Political 
Science  
 
                                                      
109 Original Chinese title: “新疆当代跨国界民族现状研究” 
110 Original Chinese title: “新疆牧业地区现代化建设的途径与对策研究”  
111 Original Chinese title: “新疆个体、私有经济发展滞后的原因及对策研究”  
112 Original Chinese title: “在市场经济体制条件下新疆民族关系的对策研究”  
113 Original Chinese title: “新疆民族关系研究” 
114 Original Chinese title: “近代新疆各族人民反帝反封建斗争史(1840--1949 年)” 
115 Original Chinese title: “近代新疆反分裂斗争史” 
116 Original Chinese title: “新疆少数民族农村地区的社会稳定”  
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Figure 9 – Political Research on Ethno-National (Minzu) Questions, 1980-2002 
 
In the above figure, one can observe that a steady growth of both policy studies conducted in 
the field of ethnology and ethno-national question studies (Ch: minzu wenti yanjiu) and studies on 
ethno-nationality (Ch: minzu) in the field of political science since the beginning of the decade. The 
graph is based on the number of research projects funded by the National Social Science 
Foundation1 in each category. The fragmentation of the knowledge community can also be seen in 
the case of research on Xinjiang in the field of ethno-national question studies. As one can see from 
the table above, projects on Xinjiang under the category of “ethno-national questions studies” 
reflect a number of different disciplinary influence, suggesting diversifying tendency in research 
approach and focus. 
 
                                                      
1 National Social Science Foundation Project Database, http://fz.people.com.cn/skygb/sk/index.php/Index/index, 











# "policy" in ethnology & ethno-national(minzu) studies projects
# "ethno-nationality(minzu)" in political science projects
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5.4 Intra-paradigm Political Debate 
This period saw a growing interest in openly and critically talking about minzu policy. Whereas 
in the previous period few scholars were discussing the topic from a policy design’s point of view, 
more began to do so during this period, with particular emphasis on the principle that defines the 
ethno-national question (Ch: minzu wenti) in the Chinese context. Towards the end of this decade, 
some have even begun explicitly discussing the flaws regarding the design and implementation of the 
signature legislature on minzu policy from the last decade, the 1984 Law on Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy (LERA) (Luo 罗 and Xu 徐 1999). Such an open discussion was very likely the product 
of both a collaborative policy subsystem – which supported constructive dialogue among policy 
experts – and a moderately fragmented knowledge community – which enabled a broadening of 
analytical scope in the exchange of opinions. As a result, the period also saw the emergence of 
political science and legal approach in the studies of ethnic minority affairs. This is particularly 
evident in the discussion about the “right to autonomy” (Ch: zizhi quan) and “right to self-
determination” (Ch: zijue quan) in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR.   
With regards to the theoretical framework employed in the exchange, most scholars continued 
to refer to the Marxism-Leninism literature. Following the dissolution of USSR, Soviet writers 
became increasingly less featured. In contrast, scholars began to refer more to the speeches and 
writings of Chinese intellectuals and political leaders. For example, the late and the first PRC 
Premier Zhou Enlai frequently featured in scholars’ articles on minzu policy. In particular, Zhou’s 
1957 speech at the Qingdao Conference was often used by writers to advocate for a conciliatory, 
accommodationist approach to multiethnic governance in China. The term “ethnic solidarity” (Ch: 
minzu tuanjie), on the other hand, were frequently associated the discussion of an integrationist, if not 
somewhat hardline, repression-oriented approach.  
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With regards to their substantive focus, many scholars with background in political science or 
area studies contributed to the discussion on Chinese minzu policy with analyses of interethnic 
relations in the Soviet Union, East Europe, as well as other parts of the world. They brought in 
knowledge and perspectives different from that of the ethnologists, whose expertise was confined 
mostly if not exclusively to ethnic minorities within the borders of contemporary China and their 
history. While relatively few area experts made explicit comparison between China and other 
countries and regions, their participation in minzu policy discussion nonetheless introduced a 
comparative perspective, which facilitated a more critical appraisal of China’s minzu policy as a 
phenomenon not unique to China. Additionally, the period also saw increased number of studies on 
specific policy for ethnic minorities, e.g. education policy or economic policy, as well as more open 
discussion on topics related to “terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” in ethnic minority areas. Finally, 
during this period that we also witnessed the emergence of a critical discourse with a more explicit 
message about reforming the existing minzu policy so to adapt to the new “domestic and 
international circumstances”.  
 
5.4.1 The “Ethnic Consciousness” Debate 
Among the various scholarly discussions on minzu policy of this period, one particularly 
important one is the debate on “ethnic consciousness” (Ch: minzu yishi). Chinese scholars had 
already began discussing it since the 1980s. But it was not until the 1990s that the research 
community as a whole became evidently more interested in this topic, forming opposing opinion 
clusters along clearly articulated positions and disagreements (Wanying 万盈 Wang 王 1999, 38). A 
few academic meetings in the early 1990s, such as the Ethnic Relations Symposium2 in Harbin 
                                                      
2 Original Chinese title: “民族理论专题讨论会” 
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(1990.7.25-29) and the Young Researchers on Nationality Theory Symposium3 in Beijing (1990.12), 
all included the “ethnic consciousness” as a key topic in their program (Gegengaowa 葛根高娃 
1991). These early discussions followed the various ethnic protests and riots throughout the 1980s, 
such as those in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as discussed in the previous chapter. But it was after 
the rapid regime change in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union around the turn of 
the decade that a wider and more critical discussion about the potential danger of “ethnic 
consciousness” for political order emerged in China. From a genealogical perspective, it is important 
to note that at this point the term “ethnic consciousness” remained a vaguely-defined concept 
within the Chinese ethnological community, where the dominant theoretical framework – Marxism-
Leninism – offered only a few and vague discussion about this topic. Some attempted to define the 
term by referring to discussions of similar concepts in the orthodox Marxist literature, such as 
“social consciousness” or “common psychological makeup” (Min 敏 1991; Z. 志强 Yang 杨 1992). 
Other drew inspiration from sources beyond the above scope, borrowing ideas from early 20th 
century Chinese intellectuals Li Qichao and Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan) (R. 瑞 Li 李 and He 何 
1991) or Soviet ethnography and psychology (Xueli 学礼 Zhang 张 1991). Leading scholars of 
minzu studies explicitly warned the ethnologists to be extra careful when using the term and to 
caution against uncritical acceptance of other disciplines’ definition, or defining the term based on 
simple intuition from the everyday usage of the word (Naribilige 纳日碧力戈 1991, 43).  
One representative critical argument that emerged since the beginning of this decade was the 
notion that “ethnic consciousness” has a dual-function: either it could promote inter-ethnic 
solidarity and nationalist liberation or it could promote inter-ethnic antagonism and national 
disintegration, depending how the authority chooses to guide it (R. 瑞 Li 李 and He 何 1991, 5–6). 
                                                      
3 Original Chinese title: “青年民族理论工作者专题研讨会” 
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Without proper attention, so went the argument, “ethnic consciousness” could become parochial 
nationalism (Ch: xia’ai de minzu zhuyi) that destabilizes and society and threatens the unity of the 
country. Against this argument, Naribilige sought to de-sensitize the concept by considering it as a 
natural and necessary component of any ethnic community (Naribilige 纳日碧力戈 1990, 1991), 
thus undermining the logical basis for proposing any integrationist proposal towards the minorities 
from the idea of the intensification of “ethnic consciousness”. He defined the concept in the 
following way:  
 
“Ethnic consciousness belongs to one of the mechanisms of the human brain at a particular era; 
it is formed based on ethnic language and thinking (Ch: minzu yuyan siwei), and is the 
accumulative result of the comprehensive comprehension process (Ch: zonghe renzhi guocheng) of 
ethnic cultural differences and social statues of ethnic groups by members and the community of 
an ethnic group […] ethnic psychological quality (Ch: minzu xinli suzhi) or ethnic character (Ch: 
minzu xingge)” is the core of ethnic consciousness.” (Naribilige 纳日碧力戈 1991, 45) 
 
While ethnic consciousness is a neutral concept and a natural component of ethnicity, the way in 
which a particular ethnic consciousness is expressed at a given time could have positive or negative 
implications. In this way, Naribilige tried to divert the attention away from ethnic consciousness to 
specific forms and/or instances of “expression of ethnic consciousness,” which includes things that 
people have commonly found problematic, e.g. nationalism, national expansionism, national 
isolationism (Naribilige 纳日碧力戈 1991, 39–40).   
However, many scholars preferred to continue problematizing ethnic consciousness itself, 
echoing the “dual-function” argument that ethnic consciousness could contribute to solidarity and 
stability, as well as parochialism and separatism. It follows naturally that the government should 
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actively intervene in its development. For example, Lu Guangbin argued that the authority must 
provide guidance to ethnic consciousness through ideological education (Lu 逯 1991). Zhang Xueli 
argued that ethnic consciousness should gradually wither away and proposed to promote ethnic 
solidarity under the guidance of the “correct line” (Ch: zhengque luxian) in order to gradually weaken 
it (Xueli 学礼 Zhang 张 1991). Min Hao agreed with the potential danger of strong ethnic 
consciousness but recommended neither suppressing it nor encouraging it (Min 敏 1991). 
Trying to formulate a balanced proposal, historian Xiong Xiyuan from Yunnan University 
proposed a new concept called “motherland consciousness” (Ch: zuguo yishi). According to Xiong, 
“motherland consciousness” is different from ethnic consciousness, but more important. The 
present task for China is to ensure that the multiplicity of ethnic consciousnesses of various ethnic 
groups would align with the singular, unitary motherland consciousness of being “Chinese”. Xiong 
was particularly careful not to further reinforce the negative connotation of the concept, stating that 
“those two consciousness [“motherland consciousness” and “ethnic consciousness”] are not only 
non-conflictual, but in fact ought to be in harmony and complementarity (Xiong 熊 1992a, 16). In 
another article of him in the same year, Xiong took up the issue regarding the connection between 
ethnic consciousness and (ethno-)nationalism. Differentiating three pairs of concepts, i.e. a) “ethnic 
consciousness under western capitalism and bourgeois nationalism,” b) “ethnic consciousness and 
nationalism in colony, semi-colony, and vassal states,” and c) “ethnic consciousness in present China 
under the condition of socialism,” Xiong rejected the argument that ethnic consciousness would 
necessarily evolve into (parochial) nationalism. Even for problematic instances of ethnic tensions in 
today’s China, one must avoid exaggerating its significance and should see them as “incorrect 
thoughts among the people” (Ch: renmin neibu cuowu sixiang), so that the mistakes of politicizing 
everything during the “Cultural Revolution” would not be repeated (Xiong 熊 1992b, 21–22).  
 176 
Du Yonghao from Heilongjiang Institute of Nationalities took Xiong’s argument even further in 
his response to Xiong’s second article. Echoing Naribilige, Du argued that ethnic consciousness 
emerged along with the formation of ethno-national community and as such, was entirely a neutral 
concept and shouldn’t be judged as either good or bad. Nationalism, on the other hand, develops 
through cross-ethnic interaction and had performed a positive role in the bourgeois revolution. 
However, under socialism, “nationalism as a system of thought no longer exists any longer” because 
a socialist society has eliminated class-antagonism, a precondition for nationalism (Du 都 1992, 38). 
While one might observe residuals of nationalism survived the transition from the pre-socialist stage, 
those should not be seen as the product of ethnic consciousness. Along a similar direction, Sun Yi 
from CASS Institute of Nationalities further disputed the implications of ethnic consciousness, 
arguing that its intensifying tendency in the present period came as a result of the enduring 
interethnic inequality. However, the “social function” of such consciousness under the condition of 
socialism is mainly about preserve group survival and promote its development, without harming the 
interests of other groups (Yi 懿 Sun 孙 1992, 39–40).  
Wu Zhiqing from Central Institute for Nationalities sought to delineate the concept of ethnic 
consciousness by juxtaposing it with “common psychological makeup” (Ch: gongtong xinli tezheng), 
“ethnic self-awareness” (Ch: minzu ziwo yishi), “ethno-social-consciousness” (Ch: minzuxing shehuixing 
yishi), “class consciousness” (Ch: jieji yishi), and “nationalism”.4 Defining it as a particular type of 
                                                      
4 More specifically, for Wu Zhiqing, ethnic consciousness has several components: 1) sense of ethnic belonging (Ch: zuji 
yishi), a spiritual bond connecting members of the group, uniting everyone but posing no harm to others; 2) sense of 
ethnic origin (Ch: zuyuan yishi), a concept of pseudo-biological origin, also helping to connect and unit members of the 
group and posing no harm to others; 3) sense of ethnic language and script (Ch: minzu yuyan wenzi yishi) – language and 
script form the foundation and a basic aspect of ethno-national identification, and serve as the main medium of ethnic 
consciousness; 4) sense of ethnic territoriality (Ch: minzu diyu huanjing yishi), which may involve competition of space 
between different groups, a problem that would only be solved after class is eliminated; 5) sense of ethnic culture (Ch: 
minzu wenhua yishi), involving language, religion, belief, custom, ritual, clothing, etc.; 6) sense of ethnic survival and 
development (Ch: minzu shengcun fazhan yishi), core to the ethnic consciousness, manifesting as the idea to rightfully 
defend and realize interests and rights of ethnic survival and development.  
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social consciousness different and independent of particular class structure, Wu highlighted the 
inward-looking character of ethnic consciousness as opposed to the outward-looking character of 
nationalism. Based on this distinction, Wu concluded that ethnic consciousness only works to 
protect and promote the interests of an ethnic group whereas nationalism works to gain advantage 
for one group over others. The task under socialism is to eradicate nationalism and not to harm the 
masses’ ethnic consciousness. Agreeing with Du, Wu also believed that nationalism had no more 
positive role to play under socialism because class-division had been abolished and class-antagonism 
resolved (Z. 治清 Wu 吴 1993, 9–11).  
In response to these criticisms, Li Shuqin from Central Institute for Nationalities accepted that 
ethnic consciousness was developed historically as an “ethno-social-consciousness” (Ch: minzuxing 
shehuixing yishi) – a position that Wu Zhiqing shared – but maintained it had grown stronger under 
the present condition. As such, there are emerging trends that warrants attention and guidance (S. 淑
琴 Li 李 1994). Li reasoned that it was inevitable for ethnic consciousness to raise under socialism 
due to 1) the abolishment of class oppression and the subsequent greater space for different ethnic 
groups to pursue their way of life, 2) the intensified movement of people and interaction raising 
people’s awareness of each other and their group identity, 3) the elevation of educational level 
enabling better articulation of ethnic culture and identity, and 4) the strengthening of ethno-national 
consciousness around the world. However, Li pointed out that there were parochial elements in the 
“old” ethnic consciousness which focused narrowly on promoting the interest of particular ethnic 
groups at the expense of others and which remained in the Chinese society till the present day. 
Although she agreed with Wu that all forms of nationalism under socialism are reactionary, Li 
believed that those remaining parochial elements of ethnic consciousness could transform into 
nationalism or even ethnic splittism (Ch: minzu fenlie zhuyi) (S. 淑琴 Li 李 1994, 105). In other words, 
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Li refuted the above critiques and maintained the possibility for ethnic consciousness to develop 
into nationalism due to the residual parochial elements of the former.  
By this point, the exchanges between those who maintained an exclusively neutral or positive 
role of ethnic consciousness and those who emphasized its potential for inter-ethnic tensions and 
antagonism had more or less reached a stalemate. Both had spent significant if not the majority of 
their efforts in a “terminological warfare,” re-defining again and again the theoretical concepts while 
seeking to invalidate the reading of their opponents without discussing much about the policy. One 
exception and also an interesting contribution towards the mid-1990s came from Hao Shiyuan, then 
the vice director of the CASS Institute of Nationalities. Same with others, Hao admitted that ethnic 
consciousness was indeed on the rise. But he made an interesting observation about the 
unacknowledged assumption running through the previous debate: if the ethnic consciousness was 
intensifying because of the condition of socialism, it did not happen only to ethnic minorities, but 
should and did to Han as well. Due to greater inter-ethnic interaction, every ethnic group 
experienced enhanced consciousness of their group identity (Hao 郝 1995, 18). By extending the 
scope beyond minorities, Hao revealed and possibly, in a way, also challenged the underlying 
message of those who were critical of ethnic consciousness, i.e. the authority should be only 
watchful of the ethnic consciousness of minorities.  
 
5.4.2 From Theoretical Debate to Policy Critique 
A turning point came in 1995, when Gong Yonghui from Guangxi Institute of Nationalities5 
published his four-part essay-series on “Adjusting and Controlling Ethnic Consciousness” (Gong 龚 
1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d). The four essays are titled, respectively, “The Conceptual Issue of 
                                                      
5 Original Chinese title: “广西民族学院”  
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Ethnic Consciousness,”6 “Ethnic Consciousness and Ethnic Existence,”7 “Ethnic Consciousness 
and Ethno-National Question,”8 and “Ethnic Consciousness and Strategy for Adjustment and 
Control”.9 In these essays, Gong engaged in a systematic critical analysis of China’s minzu policy, its 
connection with the rising ethnic consciousness, as well as practical measures that the state could 
adopt to control it.  
Taking a quasi-constructivist approach, Gong argued that ethnic issues existed only as a result of 
ethnic consciousness. Specifically, when social issues, such as poverty, education, religious belief, 
social reform, come into contact with ethnic consciousness, they transform into ethnic issues (Gong 
龚 1995c, 20). In other words, ethnic consciousness makes other issues into ethnic issues: “since 
ethnic consciousness is the basis for conversion [of common social issues into] and generation of 
ethnic issues, then adjusting and controlling (Ch: tiaokong) ethnic consciousness should be one of the 
instruments for solving ethnic issues” (Gong 龚 1995c, 20). To demonstrate this claim, Gong first 
cited the examples of American Civil War and the Anti-Japanese War of China to show that “when 
ethnic consciousness receives proper adjust and control, ethnic issues could be properly resolved” 
(Gong 龚 1995c, 21). The case of the former Soviet Union was then cited for the claim that “when 
ethnic consciousness receives pernicious adjust and control, disastrous problems will fall upon the 
society” (Gong 龚 1995c, 21–22). 
In sum, ethnic consciousness must receive proper adjustment and control. This operation 
involves two aspects: one is to adjust and control the consciousness itself, the other is to adjust and 
control the society through ethnic consciousness. Gong calls for mobilizing the state apparatus (Ch: 
                                                      
6 Original Chinese title: “民族意识的概念问题” 
7 Original Chinese title: “民族意识与民族存在” 
8 Original Chinese title: “民族意识与民族问题” 
9 Original Chinese title: “民族意识与调控方略” 
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guojia jiqi) to engage in the establishment of a comprehensive adjust-and-control-system (Ch: tiaokong 
xitong) of ethnic consciousness and a seamless adjust-and-control-network (Ch: tiaokong wangluo). 
Specifically, he proposed that the state should not only enact laws and policies, but also build up 
adjust-and-control-system in economic relations, political institutions, and ideology to form such a 
network that directs the ethnic consciousness of the population (Gong 龚 1995d, 40). To reinforce 
his policy recommendation, in a 1996 article Gong argued that the Chinese government had engaged 
in adjustment and control of ethnic consciousness since the beginning of ethnic classification. This 
was done for the greater good of sorting out the chaotic ethnic identification and promote 
interethnic equality. By extension, Gong implied that adjusting and controlling ethnic consciousness 
had been the true legacy of China’s practice with ethnic affairs (Gong 龚 1996).10  
Gong Yonghui’s contribution to the debate was important because he not only broke away from 
other scholars’ habit of working within the Marxism-Leninism literature but also actively critiqued 
the Soviet experience, as well as articulating a distinct, independent theoretical discourse for China’s 
minzu policy. Gong’s theoretical departure from the rest of the ethnological community was already 
noted upon the publication of the above essays. Xu Jieshun, a senior scholar from Guangxi Institute 
of Nationalities, wrote that Gong’s essay are “quite novel, have theoretical implications for us in 
terms of understanding the dynamics in ethnic issues around the world, as well as improving our 
country’s ethnic work, and constitute a meaningful breakthrough in studies on ethnic consciousness 
by the minzu theory community after so many years” (J. 杰舜 Xu 徐 1995, 30).  
                                                      
10 Gong already rejected the relevance of Soviet Marxist literature to the discussion of ethnic consciousness in his first 
1995 article, writing that “the presumed theory in ethnic classification is the Stalinist model; however, if [China] had 
really followed that model, none of the ethnicities in China would have become [recognized as] ethnic” (Gong 龚 1995a, 
27). He argued that in practice China’s ethnic classification followed a flexible approach in which language and cultural-
psychological characters were given priority over common territory and common economic life. He also believed that 
this “breakthrough through practice” was not properly theorized by researchers.  
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Following the change in Xinjiang Policy in March 1996, scholars became more outspoken about 
the need for government intervention in ethnic consciousness so to maintain social stability. Qi 
Wenli from the XUAR Ethnic Affairs Committee wrote that the strengthening of ethnic 
consciousness had led to more fervent wish for political status and power which, if allowed to 
develop without “correct guidance,” could further cause several problematic mentalities, including 
“equalization of wealth” (Ch: junfu sixiang), “revenge” (Ch: baofu sixiang), “exclusion” (Ch: paichi 
sixiang), and “sheltering the wrongdoers” (Ch: bihu sixiang). To cope with these issues, Qi 
recommended using persuasion, education, and influencing public opinion to correct people’s 
thought; at the same time, he also raised the possibility of treating “hostile elements” as class 
enemies. Qi wrote, “in the socialist new era, although class struggle is no longer the main 
contradiction in the Chinese society […] class struggle will continue to exist in certain areas for the 
long term”. Specifically, for “the very few ethnic splittists either within China or having fled overseas 
who tried to sabotage interethnic relations,” Qi stated that their behavior must be “treated carefully 
and exposed resolutely” (Qi 齐 1996, 58–60).  
Using former Soviet Union as their case, Wang Weimin and Yi Xiaohong from Shanxi Normal 
University argued that ethnic consciousness played a fundamental role in triggering its dissolution 
and made a case for strengthening interethnic cohesion in China. In the first place, they drew from 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to explain why as ethnic consciousness gradually strengthened the 
intellectuals of a given ethnic group would raise more demands to protect and promote the their 
group interests (Weimin 为民 Wang 王 and Yi 扆 1996, 19). In the second place, they claimed that 
ethnic consciousness in the former Soviet Union had transformed into ethno-nationalism due to 
factors including its “mistaken” nationality policy, economic stagnation and inequality, Gorbachev’s 
 182 
policy of “Democratization” and “Openness,”11 and the facilitation of international anti-USSR force 
(Ch: guoji fansu shili) (Weimin 为民 Wang 王 and Yi 扆 1996, 20–21). Together, these conditions 
enabled the real culprit, ethnic consciousness, to cause the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
 
“In sum, behind the dissolution of the Soviet Union lay a number of complex factors, but 
ethnic separatism was its direct cause. The key crisis with regards to ethno-national question lies 
in the role of ethnic consciousness, in the transition from ethnic consciousness to nationalism. 
Even though such a transition was completed under specific historical conditions, […] it was by 
no means accidental. The lesson from the former Soviet Union tells us, as a multiethnic country, 
the key is to […] strengthen the centripetal force of ethnic minorities and the cohesiveness 
among ethnicities, only then can we ensure the stability, development, and prosperity of a 
multiethnic country” (Weimin 为民 Wang 王 and Yi 扆 1996, 21) 
 
Wang Xunming from Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Sciences also joined the debate. 
During the “de facto interethnic inequality” debate in the previous decade, Wang once wrote that it 
was incorrect to consider “ethnic equality” as the core of the proletarian outlook on ethno-
nationality (Ch: wuchan jieji minzuguan), calling such thinking causes people to “neglect the 
fundamental task of socialism and idolize the ethno-national question” (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 
1981, 44). Elsewhere he also argued that eliminating interethnic developmental gaps was inconsistent 
with the theories of Lenin and Stalin, calling the idea an utopia (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 1985, 36). 
In the present debate, Wang took issue with arguments defending the neutrality of ethnic 
                                                      
11 Here Wang and Yi did not refer to Perestroika, i.e. “restructuring,” but used the phrases minzhuhua which means 
democratization. The second word they used was gongkaixing which means “openness” and should refer to the word 
Glasnost. Thus, Wang and Yi were mainly concerned and critiquing Gorbachev’s political reform, instead of both political 
(Glasnost) and economic (Perestroika) reforms.  
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consciousness. For him, ethnic consciousness developed across different historical phase, gradually 
becoming more systematized and theoretically sophisticated. The highest theoretical formulation 
(Ch: zuigao lilun xingtai) of ethnic consciousness is “bourgeois nationalism” (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 
1997, 81). Under the condition of capitalism, ethnic consciousness facilitated the mobilization of the 
masses to struggle against the feudal oppression and establish independent nation-states. But under 
today’s world integration (Ch: shijie zhengtihua), economic internationalization (Ch: jingji guojihua), 
ethnic unification (Ch: minzu yitihua), and interethnic assimilation and merge (Ch: zuji jiejin ronghe), 
ethnic consciousness could no longer perform any positive historical role; instead:  
 
“The doctrine of ethnic consciousness artificially emphasizes ethnic particularities, insists on the 
ethnic development of every ethno-national group, preserves the permanent distinction among 
ethno-national groups, separates people of different ethnicities, covers and neglects class 
contradictions, and obstructs the progress of people of all ethnicities, therefore [it is] running 
against the general direction of human society’s development.” (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 1997, 
83)  
 
As such, for Wang, ethnic consciousness constituted a major threat to stability, development, 
interethnic solidarity, and peace around the world. Believing that the globalized capitalist system has 
facilitated the destruction of ethnic boundaries by turning peasants around the world into mobile 
proletarians and eroding the parochialism of each distinct ethnic group, Wang endorsed ethnic 
assimilation as the dominant trend in today’s world. As such, ethnic consciousness only causes 
trouble and obstruction to this process. Citing Lenin, Wang suggested the proletariat class should 
welcome ethnic assimilation, proclaiming that the decline of the doctrine of ethnic consciousness 
principle around the world is an irreversible trend (Xunming 勋铭 Wang 王 1997, 83–84).  
 184 
The most explicit critic of ethnic consciousness came again from Xinjiang. Yu Xinhui, who 
worked at the Party School in Aksu Prefecture of XUAR, linked the discussion of ethnic 
consciousness directly with the critique of ethnic splittism and local nationalism, yet interestingly, 
without the latter’s usual counterpart, i.e. Han Chauvinism. For Yu, the main trend in today’s China 
ought to be the strengthening of Chinese national consciousness and the weakening of particularistic 
ethnic consciousness of each individual ethnic group. “Individual ethnic consciousness,” as Yu 
wrote, “should gradually be integrated into the unified consciousness of the Chinese nation”. Those 
who deny or obstruct this trend, “promoting extreme parochial and reactionary local nationalism” 
and “attempting to separate Xinjiang from the arms of the motherland,” are practicing a regressive 
and reactionary act on ethnic consciousness (Yu 余 1998, 26).  
Under the renewed interrogation of the concept after 1996, those who sought to defend ethnic 
consciousness either continued to repeat the earlier arguments or conceded to their opponents’ 
positions. For example, You Tao from Guizhou Institute of Nationalities agreed with the 
observation that ethnic consciousness was on the rise but argued that such a trajectory posed no 
harm to the country. You wrote that “the intensification of ethnic consciousness […] mainly aims at 
reducing the interethnic developmental gaps and making a contribution to the revitalization of the 
Chinese nation, thus should be respected and understood, particularly by the majority ethnicity (Ch: 
da minzu)”(You 游 1996, 105–6). On the other hand, Wang Xi’en, researcher from the CASS 
Institute of Nationalities and one who was sympathetic toward ethnic consciousness,12 now agreed 
that ethnic consciousness did have certain parochialist tendencies which could be dangerous should 
                                                      
12 In his 1995 article “Ethnic Identification and Ethnic Consciousness,” Wang distinguished two types of ethnic 
identifications – which for him sit at the core of ethnic consciousness – a positive one and a negative one. Wang argued 
that the negative identification was problematic as it was built upon negative emotions such as humiliation and 
grievance. But he refrained from calling ethnic consciousness itself a double-edge sword or describing it as performing 
dual-function as many other scholars did (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 1995). 
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they be exploited by hostile forces seeking to undermine the national unity (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 
1998, 1–7). To cope with the duality of the ethnic consciousness – particularly its negative aspect of 
“parochialism and conservatism” – Wang proposed accelerating development for ethnic minorities, 
putting more emphasis on guiding the masses with the “correct ideas,” staying cautious against 
hostile forces in and outside the country, and promoting the rule of law to better manage interethnic 
relations (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 1998, 8–9).   
By the end of the 1990s, the “ethnic consciousness” debate seemed to have concluded with the 
victory of those critical of ethnic consciousness and expressed concern over its potential dangers for 
China. While most scholars already acknowledged the observation that ethnic consciousness was 
rising during the earlier phase of the debate, there was a sharp division between those who preferred 
a cautionary stand towards ethnic consciousness and those who defended the neutrality or positivity 
of ethnic consciousness. Following Gong Yonghui’s 1995 essay-series in which he openly called 
upon the authority to adjust and control ethnic consciousness, as well as the change in minzu policy 
for Xinjiang by Beijing through Document No. 7, the discourse on the topic became tilted towards 
one side, featuring increasingly critical voice against ethnic consciousness, while those who disagreed 
with the former offered few novel arguments. Towards the end of the decade, most scholars seemed 
to have resorted to accepting that ethnic consciousness could have negative implications, and that 
the authority should properly react to such a tendency with effective measures to control or guide it. 
From the debate, we can also see the decline of Soviet Marxist literature as the theoretical reference. 
In contrast, Chinese intellectuals from both earlier 20th century and from the present period were 
cited more frequently than the previous period. Other disciplines, such as psychology and area 
studies, also made more appearances in the discourse.  
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Chapter 6 Denaturalizing Ethnic Identification, 2003-2013 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
Under Hu Jintao’s administration, local governments in both Xinjiang and Tibet gradually 
shifted their focus from preserving indigenous culture to suppressing local ethnic identity, 
emphasizing cultural assimilation, and tightening social control. Moreover, two high-profile incidents 
during Hu’s second term took the country by surprise. The 2008 riots in Lhasa and the 2009 riots in 
Urumqi shocked the leadership, who responded initially by forceful repression of the unrest, 
upgraded security measures, and renewed efforts to invest in local infrastructure and economy. Over 
the next few years, however, the government progressively gave more priority to social stability and 
displayed a declined interest to buy ethnic minorities’ political loyalty with economic benefits. As a 
result, local governments in Xinjiang and Tibet adopted many practices which were inconsistent – if 
not in direct conflict with – the principles laid out in the national laws on ethnic minorities affairs. 
The tensions between these repressive policies and the official line manifested in the frequent 
personnel changes in officials posts closely related to ethnic minority affairs and the slight yet 
observable inconsistencies in different officials’ interpretation of the state’s minzu policy.  
On the other hand, as the research agenda of different disciplines expand into more areas and 
overlap, studies on ethnic minorities were no longer monopolized by either the minzu studies 
community or the historically related and thematically adjacent disciplines such as sociology or 
anthropology. Importantly, political science and legal studies became increasingly involved, and 
particularly in discussions on minzu policy design and implementation. At the same time, the push 
by younger generation of ethnologists to focus the attention of the discipline on culture and history 
also contributed to a general less engagement with the research on ethnic minorities from the policy 
perspective. As a result, the knowledge community continued further fragmentation.  
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The tension in policy subsystem and the fragmentation of knowledge community led to a highly 
politicized open debate. A number of prominent scholars –sociologists, political scientists, and legal 
scholars – faulted at the existing policy for sending China down a similar path of disintegration as 
the former Soviet Union. They openly advocated for a major policy reorientation, even arguing for a 
complete abolishment of the ethnic regional autonomy, while defenders of the existing policy 
counterattacked with moralized languages reminiscent of the ideological campaigns during the 
Cultural Revolution. The highly politicized debate on minzu policy continued through the leadership 
transition into Xi Jinping’s first term.  
 
6.2 Adversarial Policy Subsystem 
6.2.1 Building “Harmonious Society” through Development 
During the period from 2003 to 2013, China was under the leadership of Hu Jintao and the so-
called the “Fourth Generation Leading Collective”. Minzu policy under Hu experienced an initial 
slight shift away from emphasis on repressive tactics in the framework of Hu’s vision for a “socialist 
harmonious society,” as well as a continuation of emphasis on using development to win over ethnic 
minorities’ loyalty. This slightly moderated approach became more pronounced in the later part of 
Hu’s first term (2002-2007), when he took over the chairmanship of the Central Military 
Commission from Jiang Zemin and consolidated his position within the top leadership. However, 
two high-profile ethnic riots, respectively in 2008 and 2009, compelled Hu to make significant 
adjustments to his development-oriented minzu policy towards a more hardline approach, 
particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, where the riots occurred.   
Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of the CCP at the First Plenum of the 16th Party 
Congress in November 2002. Four months before he took on the post of PRC President. At the 
First Session of the 10th NPC in March 2003, Hu made his first major speech on minzu policy. The 
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speech offers a glimpse of the basic priorities of the new party leadership regarding ethnic minority 
affairs. Titled “Unite and Struggle Together, Prosper and Develop Together” (SEAC and PLRC 
2010, 1–6),13 Hu’s speech mentioned four major areas of tasks for ethnic work in the future. 
Contrasting the ordering of these tasks with the one we have seen in Jiang Zemin’s speech more 
than a decade earlier at the first Central Ethnic Work Conference, one can observe the differences 
between the two in terms of their priorities.  
Table 8 – Comparison between Jiang Zemin (1992) vs. Hu Jintao (2003)14 
“Strengthen the Great Solidarity of All Nationalities, 
March Ahead Hand in Hand for Building Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics”  
January 14th, 1992 – Jiang Zemin 
“Unite and Struggle Together, Prosper and Develop 
Together” 
 
March 4th, 2003 – Hu Jintao 
  
1) To accelerate the development of ethnic 
minorities and ethnic regions, so that they 
would adapt to the development of the whole 
country 
1) To make efforts to accelerate the economic 
and social development of ethnic minority 
areas 
2) To greatly develop the social programs of 
ethnic minorities and ethnic regions, so to 
promote the comprehensive progress of all 
nationalities  
2) To give special emphasis on developing 
human resource and building the ethnic 
minority cadre corps  
3) To uphold reform and opening-up, and 
continuously strengthen the vitality for self-
development of ethnic minorities and ethnic 
regions  
3) To resolutely protect the unity of the 
motherland and national solidarity  
4) To uphold and perfect the system of ethnic 
regional autonomy, and comprehensively 
implement the Law on Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy 
4) To uphold and perfect the system of ethnic 
regional autonomy 
5) To further strengthen the grand solidarity of 
all nationalities, and resolutely protect the 
unity of the motherland  
N/A  
 
A higher priority to ethnic solidarity over upholding the ethnic regional autonomy is evident in 
Hu’s speech. This is understandable given the shift in the center’s approach to ethnic tensions in 
                                                      
13 Original Chinese title: “共同团结奋斗，共同繁荣发展” The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
14 Source: (SEAC and PLRC 2010) https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-
372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html  
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Xinjiang as reflected in the Document No. 7 of 1996. While ethnic solidarity was a higher priority 
from the beginning of Hu’s tenure, Hu attempted to maintain a balance between development and 
integration. In some areas, Hu also made efforts to further institutionalize the existing minzu policy. 
For example, the State Council issued the “Regulations on Religious Affairs”15 in July 2004, which 
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to the freedom of belief, while at the same time creating a 
certain – however limited – space for faith communities to operate legally in the country. Hu also 
made it his signature move to cultivate the Chinese Communist Party into a “Party of Learning” 
(Ch: xuexixing zhengdang) by introducing the concept of “Learning Organization” from modern 
management science. Accordingly, the CCP Central Politburo held a series of “Collective Study 
Sessions” on various themes related to domestic and international political affairs.16 From December 
2002 to May 2012, the Central Politburo held a total of 77 study session under Hu Jintao’s 
leadership. Among them, two study sessions were specifically relevant to minzu policy: the 16th 
session of the 16th Central Politburo on “A Few Questions Regarding China’s Minzu History” 
(2004.10.21) and the 2nd session of the 17th Central Politburo on “Contemporary World Religions 
and Strengthening China’s Religion Work” (2007.12.18). Both sessions show that the central 
leadership had no intention to alter the current policy arrangement but remained committed to the 
policy status quo. For the 2004 study session on ethnic work,17 senior ethologists Yang Shenmin 
from the Central Minzu University and Hao Shiyuan from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
were invited to give lectures to the leadership. Importantly, at the meeting, Hu Jintao for the first 
                                                      
15 Original Chinese title: “宗教事务条例”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
16 “CCP Central Politburo Collective Study” (“中共中央政治局集体学习”), Communist Party Member, 
http://www.12371.cn/special/lnzzjjtxx/shouye/index.shtml, accessed July 13th 2018.  
17 “Hu Jintao Presides Politburo Collective Study Session, Request to Carry On Well Minzu Work” (“胡锦涛主持政治
局集体学习要求做好民族工作”), Central People’s Government, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2004-
10/21/content_11675.htm, accessed July 13th 2018.  
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time employed the term “Scientific Outlook on Development” (Ch: kexue fazhan guan) in discussing 
minzu policy. The speech was titled “Firmly Establish and Implement the Scientific Outlook on 
Development, Comprehensively Carry Out Properly Ethnic Work under the New Circumstances” 
(SEAC and PLRC 2010, 49–53).18  
Hu Jintao’s moderation of minzu policy – particularly with regards to restraining repression of 
ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet – became pronounced after 2004, when he consolidated his 
power as the paramount leader of the country. As observers and scholars have pointed out, the 
leadership transition from Jiang to Hu did not go very smoothly. Although Hu managed to be 
elected as the General Secretary of the Party in 2002 at the 1st Plenary Session of the 16th Party 
Congress.19 He was considered as a paramount leader since the control over the military were not 
passed on to him by his predecessor Jiang Zemin. It was not until almost two years later, in 
September 2004, that Jiang relinquished his control over the CCP Central Military Commission 
(CMC) by stepping down from its chairmanship. This position is considered important in the 
contemporary Chinese context because without it, the General Secretary has no real authority to 
command the armed forces of PRC, which include not only the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA, Ch: jiefangjun), but also the Chinese People’s Armed Policy (PAP, Ch: wujing) as well as the 
Chinese Militia (Ch: minbing). The CMC is in fact one agency but with two different titles: one for the 
party “the CCP Central Military Commission” and one for the state “the PRC Central Military 
Commission,” symbolizing the absolute leadership of the party over the military. Being the CCP 
General Secretary without concurrently holding the chairmanship of CMC (both of the party and 
the state) is in effect a civilian leader without control over the military. Following the transfer of the 
                                                      
18 Original Chinese title: “牢固树立和落实科学发展观，全面做好新形势下民族工作”. The full-text of the article 
can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html 
(Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
19 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20021115/867826.html  
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CC-CMC chairmanship to Hu, Jiang also stepped down from the Chairman of the PRC Central 
Military Commission six months later at 3rd Meeting of the 10th NPC, in March 2005. Thus, Hu 
Jintao became the Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission on September 19th, 2004 and 
also the Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission six months later, on March 13th, 2005. 
By doing so, Hu is believed to have succeeded finally consolidated his position at the very top level.   
The consolidation of Hu Jintao’s position might have offered him more breathing room to 
implement policies somewhat different from his predecessor. In particular, minzu policy under post-
2004 Hu’s leadership seems to have become a combination of more socioeconomic development 
and less repression. Adrian Zenz, for example, believes that Hu hoped to use development to 
substitute or reduce to the need for later (Zenz 2014, 73–75). The second comprehensive 
articulation of Hu Jintao’s minzu policy in 2005 offers more clues of such a shift. On May 27th, the 
Third Central Ethnic Work Conference and the State Council’s Fourth All-China Ethnic Solidarity 
and Progress Commendation Conference was convened in Beijing. There Hu Jintao addressed the 
participants with a longer speech which could be seen as the definitive statement of his minzu policy 
after he had fully consolidated his leadership position.20 While Hu by and large repeated the same list 
of tasks highlighted in his earlier statement, the new speech did highlight the importance of 
recognizing the “new circumstance” and of pushing hard for development in ethnic minority 
regions. The speech argues that one should not hope for a rapid withering away of ethnicities, but 
should instead work patiently to accommodate differences and reduce developmental gaps between 
ethnic minority areas and the more developed – presumably Han – areas:  
 
                                                      
20 Original title: “Speech at the Central Conference on Ethnic Work and the State Council’s Fourth All-China Ethnic 
Solidarity and Progress Commendation Conference” (“在中央民族工作会议暨国务院第四次全国民族团结进步表
彰大会上的讲话”). The full-text of the article can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-
4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), 
accessed July 13th, 2018.  
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The fundamental interests of people of all ethnicities are the same […] but ethnic characteristics, 
ethnic differences, cross-ethnic gap in economic and cultural development will persist for a long 
time. Wes should be fully aware of this point. With regards to the differences between ethnicities 
in terms of their historically rooted traditions, language, culture, custom and norms, 
psychological identification and so on, we should give our full respect and understanding, and 
should not ignore their existence, or change them using forcible means. With regards to cross-
ethnic developmental gaps, we should actively create conditions so to reduce and eliminate them 
with efforts. […] In sum, ethnic work in the new century and under the new circumstances must 
take the solidarity and common struggling of all ethnicities, and the common prosperity and 
development of all ethnicities as the main theme.” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 70–73) 
 
What are the main tasks under the “new circumstance”? Again, Hu touched upon four main 
themes: The first one is to accelerate the economic and social development of ethnic minorities and 
ethnic minority areas: “development […] is the key to all the problems in China as well as the key to 
solve the difficulties and problems in ethnic minority areas” and “accelerate the economic and social 
development of ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas is not only the pressing demand of the 
masses of all ethnicities, but also the fundamental solution to solve the minzu question under the 
current phase, and [thus] must be treated as a more prominent strategic question” (SEAC and PLRC 
2010, 74–76). The second one is to strengthen human resource development and the building of 
ethnic minority cadre corps in ethnic minority areas: “for the leadership in ethnic autonomous areas, 
[the authority] must select and assign ethnic minority cadres according to regulations. For the leadership 
of working units under the autonomous governments of ethnic autonomous areas, [the authority] 
should try to recruit ethnic minority cadres” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 78–79).  
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The third topic is to strengthen ethnic solidarity and protect the unity of the motherland, “the 
unity of the motherland is the highest interest of people of all ethnicities, and ethnic solidarity is the 
fundamental guarantee for the unity of the motherland” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 79–81). 
Specifically, Hu called upon the governments to carry out ethnic solidarity propaganda and 
education campaign widely and to promote the “the Chinese national spirit” (Ch: zhonghua minzu 
jingshen) with patriotism as its core. At the same time, he also emphasized the need to fully 
implement the party’s freedom of religious belief policy. Lastly and interestingly, Hu states that one 
should not treat every issue involving ethnic minorities as a minzu issue but should treat different 
problems differently according to their nature. For example, “contradictions among the people” 
should not be confused with issues of “national splittism”. In a way, this is both giving rhetorical 
resource for repressive actions in “problematic areas” while at the same limiting or preventing the 
spread of such practices into other regions or policy areas. Finally, Hu argues that it is important to 
also uphold and improve the system of ethnic regional autonomy, “[the authorities] should step up 
their efforts to enact laws, regulations, concrete measures and instructions for implementations that 
are supportive [of the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy], [they should also] enact or amend 
autonomous regulation and special regulation, gradually building up the system of laws and 
regulations on ethnic affairs with Chinese characteristics” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 81–82).  
At the same meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao also made a speech which was titled “Deeply Grasp 
the Fundamental Features of Ethnic Relations in China, Diligently Promote the Development of 
Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Areas”.21 In line with the Hu’s chosen emphasis, Wen’s 
speech focuses exclusively on economic development, including infrastructure building, ethnic 
                                                      
21 Original Chinese title: “深刻认识我国民族关系的本质特征，努力促进少数民族和民族地区发展”. The full-text 
of the article can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-
372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 
13th, 2018. 
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industries and industries with comparative advantages, continuing reform and opening-up, and 
redouble assistance program of the state. Subsequently, the central government enacted a number of 
policies according to the directions set at this meeting. A few notable examples include the decision 
to further accelerate socioeconomic development of ethnic minorities and minority areas,22 “high-
level” ethnic minority talent training program,23 and assistance program for small-population ethnic 
minorities.24 One can see the emphasis on development in Hu’s Xinjiang policy as well. From 
September 6th to 11th 2006, Hu Jintao visited Karamay, Khotan, Ili, and Urumqi in XUAR. His 
speech on the last day of his trip placed promoting “fast and good” socio-economic development 
“according to the Scientific Outlook” and promoting rural development in the framework of “new 
socialist countryside” on the top of the list of key tasks in Xinjiang. Only then did Hu mention 
“promoting the construction of socialist harmonious society” and “maintaining the peace and 
solidarity of the society”. Even then, “stability maintenance” came only as the last point. Hu 
explicitly defined the potential discontent of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as “contradictions among 
the people” and called for establishing and perfecting an “appropriate working protocol” (Ch: 
zhengque de gongzuo jizhi) for dealing with such contradictions and prevent mistakes in policy decisions 
or practices that may cause discontent of the masses (PLRC and XUARPC 2010, 640–50).  
Another example suggestive of Hu’s refraining from repressive policies toward minorities is the 
release of the Uyghur political prisoner Rebiya Kadeer in 2005. A well-known wealth 
                                                      
22 See “CCP Central Committee and State Council’s Decision to” original Chinese title: “中共中央、国务院关于进一
步加强民族工作加快少数民族和民族地区经济社会发展的决定”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
23 See “Implementation Plan for Training High-level Ethnic Minority Backbone Talent,” original Chinese title: “培养少
数民族高层次骨干人才计划的实施方案”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
24 See “Plan for Assisting Development for Small-Population Ethnic Minorities (2005-2010),” original Chinese title: “扶
持人口较少民族发展规划（二〇〇五———二〇一〇年）”. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018. 
 195 
businesswoman from XUAR, Rebiya was once working rather closely with the Chinese government, 
serving as the vice president of Xinjiang Federation of Industry and Commerce (Ch: xinjiang 
gongshang lian) and the vice president of Xinjiang Association of Female Entrepreneurs. Her story 
was even propagated as a positive example of ethnic minority participating in a China’s growing 
economy in domestic publications (“中国女大亨——热比娅 [China’s Female Tycoon - Rebiya]” 
1994). In 1993, a 46-year-old Rebiya was elected as a delegate of the 8th National Committee of 
CPPCC. In August 1999, however, she was arrested in China for “threatening national security” and 
sentenced to 8 years in jail for “supplying state’s intelligence to foreign organizations” by Urumqi 
Intermediate People’s Court in the following March.25 However, she was discharged early on medical 
grounds in March 2005 and allowed to fly to the United States before a visit by U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice to the region. The U.S. government had pressured the Chinese authority for 
her release. It was believed that her release was a bilateral agreement between China and the US, 
according to which the US would drop a resolution against China in the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights.26 At the same time, it could not be ruled out that Hu’s slightly 
moderated minzu policy enabled the consideration of Rebiya’s release.  
 
6.2.2 “3-14” & “7-5” Incidents and Subsequent Policy Changes 
Between 2008 and 2009, two key events challenged Hu’s initial attempt of maintain a 
development-oriented minzu policy. On March 14th, 2008, a peaceful demonstration in Lhasa 
commemorating the 1959 Tibetan Uprising became violent when the TAR authority sent police, 
                                                      
25 “Rebiya: From the Richest Woman in Xinjiang to a Prisoner” (“热比娅其人：从新疆女首富到阶下囚”), Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34952/9612923.html, accessed July 15th 
2018.  
26 “China Frees Rebiya Kadeer”, Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/china/uyghur_kadeer-20050317.html, 
accessed July 15th 2018.  
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firefighters, and government officials to disperse the crowd near the Ramoche Temple.27 According 
to the news report, the demonstrator-turned-rioters – who were mostly if not exclusively Tibetans – 
attacked indiscriminately Han Chinese and Hui Muslims on the street with stones and knives. Non-
Tibetan-owned businesses were attacked, vandalized, and in some cases destroyed. Government and 
school facilities also suffered various forms of attacks. In response, the authority called in the 
People’s Armed Police (PAP) to suppress the riots, while ordering foreign and Hong Kong 
journalists to leave Lhasa. Not only TAR was affected, but also provinces such as Qinghai, Gansu, 
and Sichuan, all of which have a significant number of indigenous Tibetan population.  
Immediately following the suppression of the riot, on April 7th, Jia Qinglin, a member of the 
Central Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, gave a 
speech titled “Ensure the Development and Stability of Tibet and Tibetan Area” at an unnamed 
central meeting (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 269–80).28 A few things of Jia’s speech were worth noting. 
The genealogy of the party’s policy did not include Hu Yaobang and his policy in the mid-1980s. 
Instead, Jia listed only four important “moments” in his account: summary of the meeting of Central 
Politburo Standing Committee by Jiang Zemin on Tibet work in October 1989,29 two Tibet Work 
Symposium in respectively July 1994 and June 2001, and finally, the directive from the party 
leadership in September 2005 in the form of “the Central Committee and the State Council’s 
Opinion on Further Improving the Development and Stability Work in Tibet” (SEAC and PLRC 
2010, 269–70).30 Jia also framed the incident as the result of a few criminals: “[…] those who caused 
                                                      
27 Ramoche Temple is known in Chinese as xiaozhaosi (“小昭寺”).  
28 Original Chinese title: 确保西藏及其藏区的发展和稳定. The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018. According to the source, this was a speech 
given by Jia Qinglin at a related, central meeting (Ch: zhongyang youguan huiyi).  
29 The summary was released under the title: “Summary of the Central Politburo Standing Committee’s Discussion on 
Tibet Work” (“中央政治局常委讨论西藏工作纪要”).  
30 Original Chinese title: “中共中央、国务院关于进一步做好西藏发展稳定工作的意见”.  
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trouble were but a few law-breaking monks and a few criminal elements in the society, the vast 
majority of the masses in the Tibetan area resolutely support the center’s policy and arrangement 
regarding Tibet work, [they] resolutely oppose the separatist and subversive activities of the Dalai 
Clique, [they] are fully trustworthy and reliable” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 273). At the same time, Jia 
also acknowledge the influence of the exiled Tibetan leader inside China: “[…] the Dalai Clique 
remains strongly deceitful towards some parts of the masses in the Tibetan area of China. The Dalai 
Clique operates under the disguise of ethnicity and religion, wearing various ‘crowns’ that the West 
granted to the Dalai [Lama], still possess the power under specific time and circumstances to 
instigate, mobilize monks from some temples within China as well as religious believer to oppose 
the party and the government” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 274).  
To maintain stability, Jia highlighted the importance that the government should adopt an 
assertive position and also establish “comprehensive control over the situation” (Ch: quanmian 
zhangkong jushi), by further integrating different functions of the government and party to facilitate 
coordination with regards to internal security, as well as redoubling efforts on the political education 
both in and outside school. Jia also emphasized the need for strengthening government’s control 
over the monastery, e.g. intensifying political education of the monks and sending working team 
(Ch: gongzuo zu) to key monasteries to carry out such education program and perform active 
surveillance. Economic development was given a comparatively lower priority in the speech, while 
almost nothing was said about expanding cultural accommodation towards the Tibetan population.  
Interestingly, on the 23rd of the same month, the State Council issued a notice which warned that 
stability maintenance should not go against established minzu policy of the party. Titled “Notice 
from the General Office of the State Council on Questions Regarding Firmly Implementing the 
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Party and the State’s Minzu Policy,”31 this notice makes it clear that its intended audience are those 
who are in the Tibetan area: “[…] in recent works on maintaining the stability of the Tibetan area 
and strengthening counter-terrorism, a few units have exhibited behaviors that violated the minzu 
policy in their work” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 281). Citing instances such as “ethnic-profiling” at the 
security check-up of the airport, hiring taxis, seeking accommodations at hotels, and shopping at the 
stores, the document argues that “these behaviors hurt the feelings of the ethnic minority masses 
and caused their discontent”. It goes on to suggest that “although these issues happened only at a 
few places and units, if [we] let it develop without intervention, [it] will seriously damage the ethnic 
solidarity and affect the social stability, [thus we] must pay full attention [to it] and resolutely correct 
it, putting an end to similar incidences”.  
The document repeats a number of slogans such as ethnic equality and ethnic solidarity. 
However, it mainly criticizes discriminatory behaviors against ethnic minorities in a rather abstractly-
defined way. No clear guidelines were given as to what account as “discrimination” beyond 
ambiguous statements such as “hotels, stores and restaurants should not refuse ethnic minority 
masses to stay, shop, or eat in; transportation operators should not refuse their services to ethnic 
minority masses”. There was also no mentioning of any legal consequences or other forms of 
penalties to the violators of the requirements specified in this document. While it does ask the local 
governments to ensure the proper observance of the party’s minzu policy and to correct any 
violations, including pressing criminal charges against serious violations “according to law,” it is 
unclear what specific “laws” this statement refers to. It should be noted that there was no anti-
discrimination law of any kind in China at this point. In sum, the contrast between the two 
                                                      
31 Original Chinese title: 国务院办公厅关于严格执行党和国家民族政策有关问题的通知. The full-text of the 
article can be viewed via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-
372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 
13th, 2018.  
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documents, i.e. Jia Qinglin’s speech and the State Council’s notice, may suggest a certain degree of 
intra-elite conflict in the immediate aftermath of the Lhasa Riot. At the same time, it seems that the 
top leadership prefers to send a much clearer and stronger message to the cadres around the country 
about the importance of stability maintenance than the need for caution against potentially 
mistreating ethnic minorities.  
In the months after the riot, referred to by the authority as the “3-14 Incident,” the party 
leadership shifted increasingly more towards maintaining stability in ethnic minority regions. 
Reversing the priorities set in Hu Jintao’s earlier speeches, promoting ethnic solidarity now became 
the fundamental task of the party’s ethnic work, even taking precedence over promoting 
socioeconomic development and upholding interethnic equality (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 286).32 On 
November 26th, in response to the call for strengthening political education on the students, Ministry 
of Education and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission issued “Guidelines for Ethnic Solidarity 
Education in Schools (Trial Version)” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 298–308).33 It states that “ethnic 
solidarity education is an important special-subject education (Ch: zhongyao zhuanxiang jiaoyu) that is 
incorporated into local curriculum as uniformly mandated by the state, [it] is an important part of 
the school education. The top objective of the policy is to “make the thinking and behavior of 
students from all ethnicities to voluntarily align with the demand of the party and the state, to 
enhance the identification with the Chinese nation and knowledge about the [national] history and 
culture, and to promote the exchange, inheritance, and promotion of the outstanding cultural 
                                                      
32 See, for example, Hu Jintao’s annotation on the Xinhua News Agency’s high-level internal reference document 
“Domestic News Update” (Ch: guonei dongyang qingyang, “国内动态清样”), September 15th, 2008. Full-text of the 
annotation available via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-
372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 
13th, 2018.  
33 Original Chinese title: 学校民族团结教育知道纲要(试行). The full-text of the article can be viewed via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
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traditions of the fifty-six ethnicities”. Specifically, the education should have the students “firmly 
establish the correct outlook on the motherland, on ethnicity, and on culture” through different 
forms of teaching methods, and to enhance their understanding and adherence to the principles of 
“Three Inseparables”34 and “Free Safeguards,”35 so to “continuously strengthen the centripetal force 
and cohesion of the Chinese nation” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 300–301).  
According to this Guideline, ethnic solidarity education would be conducted in five consecutive 
phases throughout the typical 12 school years before one enters a college, with specific content and 
instructional emphasis for each phase. In sum, the five phases cover a total number of eight years 
for anyone who go through primary school, middle school, and either high school or secondary 
vocational school (Ch: zhongdeng zhiye xuexiao, usually abbreviated as zhongzhuan). During each phase, 
the students are expected to receive two years of schooling on a related and progressively 
sophisticated theme, ranging from basic knowledge about the ethnic makeup of the country to basic 
PRC political and legal principles governing ethnic affairs to more focused discussion about the 
practice of minzu policy and the importance of ethnic solidarity, safeguarding the unity of the 
motherland, and opposing ethnic splittism. During the last phase (high school/secondary vocational 
school), students are asked to not only grasp the party’s minzu theory and form a Marxist Outlook 
on Minzu (Ch: makesi zhuyi minzuguan), but also to “deepen the understanding about the superiority 
of our party and state’s minzu policy through comparison [with other multiethnic countries around 
the world], and firmly establish the faith in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Ch: 
zhonghua minzu weida fuxing)” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 302–4). As such, ethnic solidarity education is 
designed to be a standalone subject to be taught throughout a student’s pre-college years in addition 
                                                      
34 “Han are inseparable from ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities are inseparable from Han, ethnic minorities are 
inseparable among each other” (“汉族离不开少数民族, 少数民族离不开汉族, 各少数民族之间也互相离不开”)  
35 “Safeguard Interests of the People, Safeguard Sanctity of Law, Safeguard Ethnic Solidarity, Safeguard Unity of the 
Motherland,” (“维护人民利益, 维护法律尊严, 维护民族团结, 维护祖国统一”) 
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to the existing political education curriculum, which often operates under the title of “thought and 
political education” (Ch: sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu) and involves a variety of topics regarding domestic 
and international political affairs from the official point of view.  
Table 9 – Guidelines for Ethnic Solidarity Education in Schools36 
Phase Theme 
Primary School: 3rd-4th grade Minzu Knowledge Enlightenment Education37 
Primary School: 5th-6th grade Minzu Knowledge Common Sense Education38 
Middle School: 7th-8th grade Minzu Policy Common Sense Education39 
High School: 10th-11th grade Minzu Theory Common Sense Education40 
Secondary Vocational School: 1st-2nd grade  Minzu Theory Common Sense & Practice Education41 
 
Ethnic solidarity education also goes beyond mere classroom activities. Rather, it is more 
appropriate to consider it a society-wide mobilization with the aim of socializing the youth into a 
particular kind of citizenhood that endorses the “unity of the motherland” and “solidarity among 
ethnicities” above everything else. Besides the top-down implemented school curriculum, the 
Guideline also demands that every household and the society at large should shoulder the 
responsibility of implementing ethnic solidarity education, as it is their “shared obligation”. Schools 
have limited discretion in how the task is carried out, as all the teaching materials on the subject will 
be produced under the strict supervision of two state-level agencies, the Ministry of Education 
(MOE) and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC), and reviewed and approved by a special 
committee created just for this purpose (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 307).  
Despite the general scope of above policy, minz policy in other regions were not substantially 
affected by the events in TAR and its adjacent areas right away. For example, socioeconomic 
                                                      
36 Source: “Guidelines for Ethnic Solidarity Education in Schools” (学校民族团结教育知道纲要(试行)) 
37 Original Chinese term: 民族知识启蒙教育 
38 Original Chinese term: 民族常识教育 
39 Original Chinese term: 民族政策常识教育 
40 Original Chinese term: 民族理论常识教育 
41 Original Chinese term: 民族理论常识实践教育 
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development and the implementation of ethnic regional autonomy remain listed before promoting 
ethnic solidarity in the party’s pronouncement of its minzu policy for Ningxia (SEAC and PLRC 
2010, 290–97).42  
However, just a little more than a year after the “3-14” Tibetan riot, ethnic tensions in Xinjiang 
draw Hu’s administration again into a political crisis. The Urumqi riot, which broke out on July 5th, 
2009 and became subsequently known the “7-5 Incident,” was triggered by an earlier civil 
disturbance in Shaoguan, Guangdong province. There Uyghur and Han Chinese workers at a local 
toy factory were drawn into a violent confrontation over allegations of a sexual assault of a Han 
female worker by Uyghur coworkers. Two Uyghur men were killed by angry Han workers in their 
attempt to avenge the Han woman for the alleged sexual assault, with over one hundred workers – 
most of whom were Uyghur – wounded in the confrontation. When the news reached Xinjiang, a 
street protest by Uyghurs broke out in provincial capital city Urumqi, demanding the authority to 
intervene and prosecute the perpetrator of the murder. Soon, however, the demonstration turned 
into a massive riot. According to news report, around 1000 Uyghurs participated in the ensuing 
violent attacks mainly targeting Han people in the city. The Chinese official media claimed that there 
were in total 156 civilian victims, out of which 134 were Han, 11 Hui, 10 Uyghur, and 1 Manchu. In 
the immediate aftermath of the initial riot, Urumqi’s Han community was enraged and staged 
another protest on July 7th, some of whom also engaged in seeking revenge from the other side. 
XUAR party secretary Wang Lequan was compelled to make a televised speech broadcasted to the 
entire region, calling both sides to restrain and to give priority to ethnic solidarity. But the Han 
protestors were not satisfied with the reactions from the authority. Two month later, between 
                                                      
42 See, for example, speech by He Guoqiang (CCP Politburo Standing Committee member and Secretary of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection) at the Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region, September 23rd, 2008. Full-text of the speech is available via 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
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September 2nd and 4th, another major Han demonstration broke out in the city again, during which 
protestors marched together to the Urumqi Municipal Government, where they shouted slogans 
demanding the XUAR party secretary Wang Lequan to resign.  
When the very first demonstration by Uyghurs occurred on July 5th, Hu Jintao was in the middle 
of a state visit to Italy and was expected at a later international meeting where state leaders from the 
G-8 would be sitting down with those from the developing world.43 Due to the riot in Urumqi, Hu 
Jintao interrupted his trip and returned to China immediately. Once back in Beijing, Hu immediately 
called an emergency Politburo meeting. From July 8th to September 18th, Hu made a series of 
speeches at various meetings in both Beijing and Xinjiang.  
If the policy adjustment after Lhasa riot was localized and restrained, the one after the Urumqi 
riot represents a significant shift with implications for minzu policy on the national level. In the last 
speech included in the official collection of Hu’s speeches, made after the second full meeting of 4th 
Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress, Hu Jintao linked the “7-5 Incident” with the “3-14 
Incident” together and discussed their implications for ethnic work in general. Hu stated that: “[‘7-5 
Incident’ and ‘3-14 Incident’] realistically made us further realize the utmost importance of 
maintaining the unity of the motherland, of maintaining ethnic solidarity, and of maintaining social 
stability. The struggle between splittism and anti-splittism in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other places is not 
only prolonged, complicated, and intense, but sometimes also quite ferocious. This is not 
determined by our will”. If one compares the text with minzu policy documents from the late 1980s, 
the language that Hu employed in his speech suggests almost a revival of the class-struggle 
approach: “All party comrades and especially the high-ranking cadres must […] fully grasp the fact 
that our struggle with the domestic and foreign splittists, as well as with hostile forces is at its core a 
                                                      
43 “After Completing His State Visit to Italy, President Hu Jintao Return Early to China” (“在结束对意大利国事访问
后 胡锦涛主席提前回国”), the State Council Information Office of PRC (“国务院新闻办公室”), 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/gdxw/Document/360952/360952.htm, accessed July 15th 2018.  
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continuation of the Chinese people’s struggle against imperialist invaders’ scheme to split up China 
since the modern era, a major trial of political strength regarding maintaining the unity of the 
motherland and national security, a real and concrete struggle of opposing the Western hostile 
forces’ scheme to westernize and divide our country, and a serious political struggle of upholding the 
leadership of the CCP, upholding the socialist path with Chinese characteristics, upholding the grand 
solidarity of all ethnicities of China […]”. 
  
6.2.3 Policy Evolution during Later-Hu Jintao Period 
Following Hu’s speech, the central leadership made a series of changes to minzu policy. These 
changes not only reflect the changing attitude towards ethnic minorities and inter-ethnic relations in 
China, but also the intense intra-elite struggle heightened due to the political crisis created by those 
events. From May 17th to 19th 2010, the First Central Symposium on Xinjiang Work (Ch: zhongyang 
xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui) was convened in Beijing.44 At this meeting, Hu Jintao employed for the 
first time the expression “contact, exchange, and integration among ethnic groups” (Ch: minzu 
jiaowang jiaoliu jiaorong) in his speech titled “Deepen the Implementation of the Scientific Outlook on 
Development, Promote the Leaping-Style Development and Long-Term Stability of Xinjiang”.45 
One specific example of those changes is found in the case of ethnic solidarity education. In the 
aftermath of “7-5 Incident,” the central authority redoubled their efforts to promote it nationwide. 
On August 20th, 2009, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
                                                      
44 “CCP Central Committee and the State Council Convened Symposium on Xinjiang Work in Beijing” (“中共中央、
国务院召开的新疆工作座谈会在京举行”), China Net (“中国网”), http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2010-
05/21/content_20087432.htm, accessed July 14th 2018. More information about the meeting can be accessed via 
People’s Net (“人民网”), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/189866/189893/index.html.  
45 Original Chinese title: “深入贯彻落实科学发展观, 努力推进新疆跨越式发展和长治久安”. The full-text of the 
article can be viewed via http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/138903/13241236.html, accessed July 13th, 2018.   
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issued “Opinions on Deepening Ethnic Solidarity Propaganda and Education Activities,”46 
expanding the original scope of policy beyond school children to further incorporate a society-wide 
propaganda campaign down the street level. According to the Opinions, practically every citizen 
would have to be involved in some forms of education about the topic. Media are also given the 
tasks of carrying out ethnic solidarity propaganda. Even public spaces such as bus and train stations, 
airports, hospitals, hotels, public streets and squares, and tourist sites are required to partake in this 
effort. In terms of the content, particularly important for the renewed effort is to make the masses 
grasp “the fact that both the Lhasa ‘3-14’ Incident and Urumqi ‘7-5’ Incident were severely violent 
criminal acts meticulously orchestrated by domestic and foreign hostile forces, whose evil nature was 
to split the motherland and whose sinister intention was to undermine the stable reform and 
development of our country” (SEAC and PLRC 2010, 356–66).  
While the leadership appeared determined to carry out the ethnic solidarity education campaign, 
disagreements soon emerged between the central and the regional governments regarding the 
specific manner in which it should be implemented. Following the “Notice regarding Carrying Out 
Ethnic Solidarity Education in Schools” by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD),47 Ministry 
of Education (MOE), and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) in August 20th, 2009,48 a 
four-part textbook series was made by the central government and distributed to all primary and 
middle schools across the country. The series consist of the following four books: 1) China’s Big 
Family (Ch: zhonghua da jiating), used from 3rd to 4th grade (primary school); 2) Common Sense about 
                                                      
46 Original Chinese title: “关于深入开展民族团结宣传教育活动的意见”. The full-text of the article can be viewed 
via https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/ebook/1c8b7fdd-31a2-4180-9551-372f15f691ec/flipviewerxpress.html (Party Literature 
Research Center of the CCP Central Committee), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
47 The department has renamed itself to “Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China,” while the Chinese 
title remains the same (“中国共产党中央委员会宣传部”).  
48 Original Chinese title: “中宣部 教育部 国家民委关于在学校开展民族团结教育活动的通知”. The full-text of the 
document can be viewed via 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/gk_gbgg/moe_0/moe_2642/moe_2800/tnull_52932.html (PRC Ministry of 
Education), accessed July 13th, 2018.  
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Minzu (Ch: minzu changshi), used from 5th to 6th grade (primary school); 3) Common Sense about Minzu 
Policy (Ch: minzu zhengce changshi), used from 1st to 2nd grade (middle school); 4) Common Sense about 
Minzu Theory (Ch: minzu lilun changshi), used from 1st to 2nd grade (high school). According to both the 
Guideline (2008) and Opinions (2009), ethnic solidarity education is to be directed by the central 
government. Textbooks are designed by the center and distributed to the entire country. Local 
governments do not have the authority to create or use their own textbooks. Thus, the four-part 
series presented above was intended to be the standard national textbook.  
However, officials of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region soon found themselves in 
disagreement with the national standardized textbooks. Following the former’s release and 
nationwide distribution, a few experts49 working for the Xinjiang Department of Education (Ch: 
xinjiang jiaoyu ting) soon determined the material “unsuitable” for the region. The regional 
department of education reported their concerns to the SEAC’s Department of Ethnic Education, 
who then summoned the experts in charge of writing the national standardized textbooks to meet 
with representatives from the XUAR. According to the news report, the experts refused to change 
the content despite pleas of the Xinjiang representatives. In response, four Xinjiang-based experts 
submitted a co-authored report titled “The Biases and Inappropriate Content of the MOE’s Ethnic 
Solidarity Education Textbook Should Be Corrected”50 to the Xinjiang Department of Education, 
who then forwarded it to the MOE. The report allegedly argued that the four textbooks “put too 
much emphasis on the separateness and distinction of different ethnicities, and whose main theme is 
to reinforce the ‘separation’ (Ch: fen) of ethnicities instead of their ‘unity’ (Ch: he), thus [it] would 
enhance the sense of ethnic distinction and be counterproductive to both the identification with the 
                                                      
49 Several known figures involved include Ma Pinyan (Researcher at Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences), Ji Guangnan 
(Researcher at Xinjiang Association of Social Sciences), Pan Zhiping (Researcher at Xinjiang Academy of Social 
Sciences), and Meng Nan (Editor at Journal of Xinjiang University). See 
https://www.guancha.cn/CaoZhiHeng/2014_08_19_257459.shtml  
50 Original Chinese title: “教育部民族团结教育教材倾向性问题和不妥之处应予纠正”. 
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Chinese nation and the peace and stability of the border regions”.51 The report apparently managed 
to reach the top leadership and received the positive annotation of several senior leaders at the 
central level, including then Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun52 and Zhou 
Yongkang (who was also the Secretary of CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission),53 
Politburo regular member and Director of Central Propaganda Department Liu Yunshan,54 and 
Politburo regular member and State Councilor Liu Yandong.55 The opinions from Xinjiang and the 
support from the members of the central leadership were strong enough that the central government 
agreed that the entire textbook-series would have to be reexamined and adjusted. The Central 
Coordination Office for Xinjiang Work56 sent a letter to Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences to 
convey the center’s endorsement of the experts’ opinion. Disagreements, however, remained as to 
which direction the new textbook should take. Since then, the re-writing has been in effect put on 
hold. At the same time, the Xinjiang Department of Education obtained the approval from the 
center to stop using the national standardized textbook and went ahead to create their own 
textbooks exclusively for the region. The new textbook, written under the directorship of Xinjiang 
Association of Social Sciences researcher Ji Guangnan and titled Grand Solidarity of the Chinese 
Nation,57 was published by Xinjiang Education Publishing House in December 2012, became the 
only one used in XUAR. This book was reportedly “very different” from the national standardized 
                                                      
51 “Why Experts in Xinjiang Call to Halt the State’s ‘Minzu Textbook”(“新疆专家为何叫停国家‘民族教材’”), 
Observer (“观察者”), http://www.guancha.cn/CaoZhiHeng/2014_08_19_257459.shtml, accessed July 14th 2018.  
52 Li Changchun, Baidu Encyclopedia, 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9D%8E%E9%95%BF%E6%98%A5/115533#viewPageContent  
53 Zhou Yongkang, Baidu Encyclopedia, 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%91%A8%E6%B0%B8%E5%BA%B7/116813#viewPageContent  
54 Liu Yunshan, Changchun, Baidu Encyclopedia, 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%88%98%E4%BA%91%E5%B1%B1/116471#viewPageContent  
55 Liu Yandong, Changchun, Baidu Encyclopedia, 
https://baike.baidu.com/link?url=59sYJ_zZE5Na_rsIeLcMpKsxpAnN3YBwlq0KfApu6kyKb86-
H437N36PWcuiWTnVqLJ8IZ_7ES_rb7HmJljG5irqGM0sRCNctl9iSnKUZUSMqzFHMmXK7Jp9hxt5r4C8  
56 Original Chinese title: “中央新疆工作协调小组” 
.57 Original Chinese title: “中华民族大团结” 
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textbooks. He Xingliang,58 senior researchers of the Beijing-based CASS Institute of Anthropology 
and Ethnology reported applauded the Xinjiang textbook well-designed to “strengthen the Chinese 
national consciousness” and “weaken the parochial ethnic consciousness”.59  
The central leadership was likely under increasing pressure to adjust its minzu policy towards a 
more hard-line, integrationist approach. Possibly attempting to balance different interests and to 
walk a fine line between accommodation and integration, Hu Jintao did not immediately forgo his 
commitment to the existing minzu policy – particularly the commitment to ethnic regional 
autonomy and the development-oriented strategy. He did, however, incorporate more emphasis on 
the fighting ethnic splittism, likely due to the pressure from those who strongly favor a more hard-
line approach. At the 2nd meeting of the 4th Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress, Hu Jintao 
again talked about the priorities in ethnic work. This time, he listed again four key tasks, with the 
first two about fully implementing the party’s minzu policy and the system of ethnic regional 
autonomy, as well as accelerating the socioeconomic development of ethnic minorities and ethnic 
minority areas. The rest two, on the other hand, are both devoted to issues of stability and security.  
Table 10 – Comparison between Hu Jintao (2003) vs. Hu Jintao (2009)60 
“Unite and Struggle Together, Prosper and Develop 
Together” 
March 4th, 2003 – Hu Jintao 
“On Carrying Out Well Ethnic Work” 
 
September 28th, 2009 – Hu Jintao 
  
1) To make efforts to accelerate the economic 
and social development of ethnic minority 
areas  
2) To give special emphasis on developing 
human resource and building the ethnic 
minority cadre corps  
3) To resolutely protect the unity of the 
motherland and national solidarity  
4) To uphold and perfect the system of ethnic 
regional autonomy 
1) To comprehensively implement and realize 
the party’s minzu policy and the system of 
ethnic regional autonomy  
2) To accelerate the socioeconomic 
development of ethnic minorities and ethnic 
minority areas  
3) To strengthen the grand solidarity of all 
ethnicities   
4) To effectively prevent and attack the ethnic 
splittist activities   
 
                                                      
58 He Xingliang, Baidu Encyclopedia, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%BD%95%E6%98%9F%E4%BA%AE  
59 https://www.guancha.cn/CaoZhiHeng/2014_08_19_257459.shtml  
60 Source: Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Volume 2 (2016) and Volume 3 (2016) 
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The assignment of cadres to key positions concerning ethnic work also reveals undecidedness of 
the central leadership regarding the future direction of minzu policy, likely a result of the heightened 
intra-elite struggle during this period. Less than a year after the Urumqi, in April 2010, XUAR party 
secretary Wang Lequan was replaced by Zhang Chunxian, who became the new party secretary and 
the first political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XJPCC) in the 
same month.61 Two months later Zhang took over the post of the first secretary of XJPCC. One 
year later, in July 2011, Zhang also took over the position of the first secretary of the Xinjiang 
Military District Party Committee. During his tenure as the leader of the autonomous region, Zhang 
had been trying to accommodate both the needs for heavy-handed repression against ethnic 
splittism and for promoting development and maintaining social harmony. His Xinjiang policy was 
first summarized in 2014 at the XUAR “Two Sessions,” which became incorporated into the official 
regional policy in the same year at the Enlarged Meeting of the XUAR party committee.62 
Abbreviated as “Five Keys” (Ch: wuba yaoshi), Zhang’s Xinjiang policy could be interpreted as 
seeking to strike a balance between several different – if not conflicting or even contradictory – 
policy goals without making substantial sacrifice to any single one of them. A brief elaboration of 
Zhang’s principle of “Five Keys” are as follows:  
Table 11 – “Five Keys” Policy of Zhang Chunxian63 
The 1st Key Problems with mind should be worked through mind 
The 2nd Key Problems with culture should be worked through with culture 
The 3rd Key Problems with conventions should be treated with respect 
The 4th Key Problems with religion should be handled according to the actual conditions of the religion 
The 5th Key Problems with violent terrorism should be dealt with through the rule of law and strike-hard 
actions64 
                                                      
61 “Zhang Chunxian Holds Concurrently the Post of the First Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps”(“张春贤兼任新疆生产建设兵团第一政委”), Tianshan Mountain Net (“天山网”), 
http://news.ts.cn/content/2010-05/06/content_4953238.htm, accessed July 14th 2018.  
62 “How Do ‘Five Keys’ Deal with Governance of Xinjiang”(“‘五把钥匙’如何治疆?”), People’s Net (“人民网”), 
http://sh.people.com.cn/n/2015/0420/c369653-24566405.html. accessed July 14th 2018.  
63 Source: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0527/c64094-27065499.html  




Some scholars have privately confided in semi-public occasions that “while Party Secretary 
Zhang has proposed ‘five keys’ for Xinjiang, some [keys] are used much often than others, whereas 
some have already rusted away”.65 Nevertheless, Zhang’s attempt to handle the situation in Xinjiang 
with an even-handed approach created a counter-force to the securitizing tendency since 2009. 
Zhang’s political career following his appointment to Xinjiang also indicates that his performance 
was by and large endorsed by the top leadership. He governed the autonomous region for six years, 
from 2010 to 2016. In the second year of his tenure in Xinjiang, Zhang was promoted to a member 
of the Central Politburo, a 25-member body whose power stands only next to the 7-member 
Politburo Standing Committee. Importantly, this promotion occurred at the 1st Plenary Session of 
the 18th Party Congress when Xi Jinping officially became the CCP General Secretary and the 
Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) at the same time, thus taking over the position of 
paramount leader from Hu Jintao.66 Workings under Xi, Zhang went on to serve as both XUAR 
party secretary and Politburo member for another four years, until his reassignment to other posts in 
2016. Judging from Zhang’s longer-than-one term appointment in Xinjiang which started in the 
immediate aftermath of the “7-5 Incident” and endured a central-level leadership turnover, one may 
also argue that Zhang’s Xinjiang policy did receive sufficient support from the top leadership.  
On the other hand, the party secretary of TAR, Zhang Qingli, stayed on the post until August 
2011, when he was replaced by Chen Quanguo, who has been the governor of Hebei Province for 
less than two years (since December 2009).67 At the same time of Chen’s reassignment to Xinjiang, 
Zhang Qingli was relocated to the position of the party secretary of Hebei Province. The sudden 
                                                      
65 Field notes 20150724YMA. 
66 “Report of the First Plenary Session of the CCP’s 18th Central Committee”(“中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第一
次全体会议公报”), Xinhua Net (“新华网”), http://www.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/15/c_113697156.htm, 
accessed July 14th 2018.  
67 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/15514577.html;  http://renshi.people.com.cn/GB/15516470.html  
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appointment of Chen to TAR after serving in Hebei for a very short period of time (a single term 
for a secretary of provincial party committee is five years) was clearly a political consideration and 
very likely done in response to the center’s changing perception about Tibet. In his inauguration 
speech on August 25th, Chen hinted at the motive behind his appointment by stating that his 
appointment is “not only a precious opportunity given to me [by the central leadership] to serve and 
develop Tibet, but also a test for me from the party and the people”.68 He promised that he would 
“keep his head cool and stand firm regarding major questions of principle” and uphold “scientific 
development, stability maintenance, valuing solidarity, improving people’s welfare, focusing on 
concrete deeds”.69 Reading the ordering of these tasks already gives one a sense of the priority that 
Chen decided to give to stability maintenance in the region.  
This interpretation is soon validated by the security measures Chen undertook immediately after 
he became the new regional leader. One signature initiative is the creation of a massive social 
surveillance and control system through building and inter-linking hundreds of “Convenience Police 
Stations” (Ch: bianmin jingwu zhan) so to achieve total control of an area by the authority.70 Chen 
made it a top priority to create “an inescapable net” (Ch: tianluo diwang) for public security and threat 
prevention and “an iron great wall” (Ch: gangtie changcehng) of maintaining social stability.71 The goal is 
to achieve what he refers as the “networked urban management” (Ch: chengshi wangluohua guanli). 
Following his directives, TAR authority began massively building such stations across the region and 
deploying police forces to staff them. From September 28th, 2011 (which the policy was first 
launched) to March 3rd, 2012 – within a total of five months or so – a total of 675 “Convenience 
Police Stations” have been established and are operational. These stations divided a city into 
                                                      
68 http://renshi.people.com.cn/GB/15516470.html  
69 Original in Chinese: “坚持科学发展、坚持维护稳定、坚持珍视团结、坚持改善民生、坚持真抓实干”. 
http://renshi.people.com.cn/GB/15516470.html  
70 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/117005/16023546.html  
71 Original quote in Chinese: “布下治安防控的天罗地网，筑起维护稳定的钢铁长城”  
 212 
numerous smaller “cells” of a larger inter-connected urban network, each of which is managed and 
policed by a station as a “patrol zone” 24-hour nonstop.72  
Intensified security measures were not confined only to TAR but also observed in Tibetan areas 
of other provinces. For example, during the 2013 “Monlam Prayer Festival” (also known as the 
“Great Prayer Festival,” Tib: smon lam chen mo), authorities in Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture of Qinghai Province mobilized party cadres, regular and armed police force, hospital 
staffs, as well as other local residents to form various task forces in order to “protect the order of 
the event” at the Rongwo (a.k.a. Longwu) Monastery of Tongren County (Tib: Reb gong rdzong), the 
main site of activities for this festival in Qinghai.73 An official report from the provincial United 
Front Department detailed the variety of strategies employed for this event:  
First of all, an Event Stability Maintenance Work Headquarter (Ch: fahui weiwen gongzuo zhihuibu) 
was established under the supervision of the director of the Prefectural United Front Department, 
who is joined by the Vice Prefectural Governor, head of the Qinghai Armed Police Force, as well as 
the leadership of the party committees, governments, and public security departments of both 
Tongren County and Zeku County (Tib: Rtse khog rdzong). Separate “Statements of Responsibility” 
(Ch: ze’ren shu) were signed, respectively 1) between the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission of 
Tongren County’s United Front Department on the one hand, and the Rongwo Monastery 
Administration (Ch: longwusi guanliju), Rongwo Monastery Democratic Management Committee (Ch: 
longwusi minguanhui) on the other hand; 2) between the two county party committees and 
governments and the townships where the monastery-supporting villages are, and 3) between the 
townships and the monastery-supporting villages themselves.  
                                                      
72 http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2255079/n2255953/n2255956/c3912273/content.html  
73 The name of the festival is translated into Chinese, officially, as Zhengyue Qiyuan Fahui (正月祈愿法会).  
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Secondly, officials were sent to hold conversations with “key individuals” (Ch: zhongdian renyuan) 
prior to the event, whereby the bottom line of the government policy (Ch: zhengce dixian) was relayed 
and specific demands were made so to ensure the “mental stability of the key individuals”.  
Thirdly, to cope with emergencies or issues on the spot, two special Emergency Task Forces 
(Ch: chutu gongzuozu) were established by regrouping 20 police officers, 100 armed police soldiers, 4 
medical staffs, ambulances and fire engines. These two units are assigned to the Rongwo Monastery 
Plaza and the gate to Tongren County Senior Center. At the same time, the authority assigned 200 
regular and armed police, 300 local cadres, and 200 public security joint prevention corps members 
(Ch: zhi’an lianfang dui) to form eight Task Forces covering every corner and every aspect of the 
monastery event. The area of focus of each Task Force is clearly indicated in its title: 
1) In-Monastery Prevention and Control Unit 
2) Monastery Plaza Prevention and Control Unit 
3) Monastery Plaza Joint Prevention Unit 
4) Monastery Outer Parameter Prevention Unit 
5) Civilian-Watching-Civilian Unit 
6) Monk-Watching-Monk Unit 
7) Traffic Management Unit  
8) Handicapped and Panhandler Management Unit74 
Fourthly, the managing authority for the event sent invitation for joint security operation to 
adjacent prefectures both within and outside the province by invoking the “Agreement on 
Collaborative Mechanism for Security Maintenance in the Tibetan Area”.75  
                                                      
74 Original Chinese titles for the eight units are: 1) 寺内防控组, 2) 寺院广场防控组, 3) 寺院广场联防组, 4) 寺院外
围防控组, 5) 乡镇民管民工作组, 6) 僧管僧工作组, 7) 交通管控组, and 8) 残疾人和乞丐管理组.  
75《藏区维稳工作协作机制协议》 
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Lastly, the authority also implemented a policy of “civilians watching civilians, monks watching 
monks” (Ch: min guan min, seng guan seng), as already reflected in the title of two Task Forces in the 
above list (#5 and #6). These mechanisms are designed to delegate the responsibility of surveillance 
to the grassroot level by asking local cadres, public and security personnel to ensure the security 
within their own jurisdiction. In the first case (“civilians watching civilians”), member of party 
committees of all the involved administrative areas, villagers, and 100 public security joint 
prevention corps members were re-organized into three different task forces which conducted 24-
hour patrol both inside the monastery and in its surrounding areas. They were tasked with 
preventing – among others – “illegal religious activities” such as lighting butter-lamp and self-
immolation. In the second case (“monks watching monks”), members of the Rongwo Monastery 
Administration and members of the Democratic Management Commissions of Rongwo and other 
participating monasteries were reorganized into task forces, which carried out 24-hour surveillance 
on the monks. One incident, according to the same official report, involved intercepting and 
returning 35 monks from Sichuan (Qinghai United Front 2013).  
 
6.3 Fragmented Knowledge Community 
During this period, the fragmentation of the knowledge community on minzu policy continued 
to deepen. Among the contributing factors, the growing interest to bring alternative disciplinary 
perspective – particular of that of political science – played the most important role. This is reflected 
in a number of scholarly initiatives.  
 
6.3.1 Minzu Political Studies: Further Development 
One strand of efforts to bring Chinese ethnology or minzu studies closer to political science 
came from scholars within either of the two community. On the one hand, ethnologists no longer 
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satisfied with the study of culture began broadening their research focus to include discussion of the 
state, central-local relations, as well as the political implications of ethnic identifications. Xiamen 
University Professor Dong Jianhui’s 1999 book Political Anthropology offered the first systematic 
introduction about the subject (Dong 董 1999). On the other hand, political scientists with interest 
in ethnicity began extending their analysis into topics such as inter-ethnic relations, political 
participation of ethnic minority community, and multiethnic/multicultural governance. This interest 
was further encouraged by the Great Western Development, launched by the Jiang Zemin 
administration (P. 平 Zhou 周 2001a). Following Zhou Xing’s seminal book Ethno-National Politics, a 
number of scholars were attracted into this field and began working under the same, common title 
to advance ethno-national political studies. In 2000, Professor of Political Science at Yunnan 
University, Zhou Ping, published his first book on the subject An Analysis of Ethnic Minority Politics in 
China (Ch: zhongguo shaoshu minzu zhengzhi fenxi) in 2000 (P. 平 Zhou 周 2000). He went on write An 
Introduction to Ethno-National Politics (Ch: zhongguo shaoshu minzu zhengzhi fenxi) and Ethno-National 
Politics (Ch: minzu zhengzhixue), respectively, in 2001 and 2003 (P. 平 Zhou 周 2001b, 2003a). Central 
Minzu University Professor Guan Kai, who had background in both sociology and anthropology 
and working experience for the State Ethnic Affairs Commissions (SEAC) before becoming a 
professional scholar, published his first and major book titled Ethnic Politics (Ch: zuqun zhengzhi) in 
2007 (Guan 关 2007). One year later, Gao Yongjiu, Professor of Political Science at Nankai 
University published his own introductory monograph A General Introduction to Ethno-National Politics 
(Gao 高 2008). Zhu Lun, Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of CASS, 
also contributed to the stream of theoretical works on the topic with his book Ethno-National Co-
Governance: A New Proposition on Ethno-National Politics in 2013 (L. 伦 Zhu 朱 2013).  
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In their 2010 review article, Lu Haifa and Huang Sha observed that during the first decade of the 
20th century, scholarly work on ethno-national politics in China have made evident progress in 
broadening its scope of inquiry, which can be largely grouped into the following four categories: 1) 
study of ethno-national political system (Ch: minzu zhengzhi tixi), by which they meant the study of 
nation-states and the study of political institutions concerning ethnic groups; 2) the study of ethno-
national political relations (Ch: minzu zhengzhi guanxi), by which they meant the study of relationship 
among different ethno-national communities in China and elsewhere; 3) the study of nationalism, 
which includes studies about nationalism and international relations, regional-level nationalisms, as 
well as historical and contemporary Chinese nationalism; and 4) the study of ethno-national political 
development (Ch: minzu zhengzhi fazhan), by which they meant the political development of ethnic 
minority community within the framework of a nation-state. This last category can be further 
divided into four sub-themes, including ethno-national political stability (Ch: minzu zhengzhi wending), 
ethno-national political participation (Ch: minzu zhengzhi canyu), construction of ethno-national 
political culture (Ch: minzu zhengzhi wenhua jianshe), and ethno-national political socialization (Ch: 
minzu zhengzhi shehuihua) (Lu 陆 and Huang 黄 2010a, 110–13).  
Most scholars of ethno-national politics admit that the field owes theoretical and methodological 
inspiration to two older disciplines, whose names are reflected in the title, i.e. ethnology (Ch: 
minzuxue) and political science (Ch: zhengzhixue) (P. 平 Zhou 周 2003b; C. 春洋 Yu 于 2012; Liao 廖 
2012; Qing 青 2013; Yan 严 and Jiang 姜 2015). Zhou Ping, for example, argued that political 
science and ethnology form the disciplinary foundation of ethno-national politics in his article 
“Ethno-National Politics: Research Object, Nature, Character, and Development”. He emphasized, 
however, that “it [ethno-national politics] is a specific field established for the study of the political 
life and political issues of ethno-national communities from a political science perspective, thus it 
belongs to the discipline of political science […] even though it borrows many things from 
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ethnology” (P. 平 Zhou 周 2003b). This view is widely shared among scholars in the field, many of 
whom also hail from Yunnan University (where Zhou Ping teaches) which has become a major 
center of ethno-national political studies under Zhou (Tang 汤 2010; Lu 陆 and Huang 黄 2010a, 
2010b). Interestingly, ethno-national politics is not the only one that claims to be the product of 
cross-fertilization between ethnology and political science. Another discipline seeking to 
reinvigorate/reinvent itself which makes a similar claim of its genealogy is examined below.  
 
6.3.2 (Re)inventing Borderland Studies 
Borderland Administration (Ch: bianzhegnxue) has existed as a discipline since the time of the 
Republic of China. The scope of borderland administration was defined in relation to the concept of 
“internal administration” (Ch: neizheng), which deals with administration of the “core” of the 
country, i.e. China. Borderland administration or bianzheng, in contrast, concerns the administration 
of the “periphery/borderland” (C. 楚克 Wu 吴 2012, 15–16). In 1983, the Center for Chinese 
Borderland History and Geography Studies (Ch: zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin) of Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences was inaugurated in Beijing and became a dedicated research center for 
borderland administration on the national-level.76 Since early 2000s, scholars at the center started 
calling for a reinvention of the discipline under a new title: “Borderland Studies” (Ch: bianjiangxue). 
As opposed to borderland history and geography studies, which many felt put too much emphasis 
on the history, borderland studies would address both past and present issues but in particular tackle 
policy issues that are immediate relevance for the government, including ethnic conflicts, separatism, 
terrorism, and borderland social stability in the context of the Great Western Development (W. 伟
                                                      
76 This institute was renamed in 2014 to Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(Ch: zhongguo bianjian yanjiusuo). For more information, see http://bjs.cssn.cn/  
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洲 Zhou 周 2001). Ma Dazheng, Researcher at the Center for Chinese Borderland History and 
Geography Studies, wrote tirelessly about the need for a separate field of borderland studies (D. 大
正 Ma 马 2001, 2002b; D. Ma 马 2003; Tian 田 and Ma 马 2009). Aside from writing to advance 
the field, Ma was also known for his influential policy report, titled National Interests Above Everything 
Else: Observation and Reflection of the Stability Issue in Xinjiang (Ch: guojia liyi gaoyu yiqie: xinjiang wending 
wenti de guancha yu sikao), which was published as a monograph in 2002 (D. 大正 Ma 马 2002a).77  
At the same time, a number of scholars with background in ethnology and political science 
advocated the reinvention of the field under an alternative new title: “Borderland Politics” (Ch: 
bianjiang zhengzhixue). This effort has been led mostly by Wu Chuke, Professor of Ethnology at 
Central Minzu University. Wu explicitly distinguished this new field from its early 20th century 
predecessor, “Borderland Administration” (Ch: bianzhengxue), while also implying that the research 
carried out under the banner of borderland history and geography studies did not manage to 
separate itself from ethnology or history due to its lack of a unique, integrated theoretical approach 
to study political issues concerning China’s borderland (C. 楚克 Wu 吴 2003). As a result, a 
dedicated field – borderland politics – is urgently needed. According to Wu, this new field draws 
from a variety of disciplines, including geopolitics, international strategy, ethno-national politics, 
border defense, political anthropology, and Chinese borderland historical studies. The purpose of 
this field is, on the one hand, to create the theoretical foundation for borderland studies (see above); 
on the other hand, it would serve the interests of the Chinese state in preserving and promoting 
national unity,  borderland security, and relations between China and its neighboring countries (C. 
楚克 Wu 吴 2008, 57). In this sense, borderland politics does not necessarily focus on the question 
of ethnicity in China’s vast border regions but covers a wide range of topics concerning PRC’s 
                                                      
77 Original Chinese title: “国家利益高于一切: 新疆稳定问题的观察与思考” 新疆人民出版社 
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frontier. As Wu himself also acknowledged, the concept of frontier (Ch: bianjiang) could be further 
conceptually divided into nine sub-types such as geographical, ethno-national, historical, 
identificational, etc. Notable works on China’s borderland or frontier that were published during the 
first decade of the 21st century confirmed this broad definition of the field, among which only a very 
few number dealt with ethnicity (C. 楚克 Wu 吴 2012).  
In sum, the continuous development of adjacent fields such as the ones examined above (ethno-
national politics, borderland studies, borderland politics) further challenged the monopoly over the 
knowledge production about minzu policy by scholars from a few intimately related disciplines 
(ethnology, anthropology, sociology, ethno-national/minzu studies, etc.).  












# "policy" in ethnology & ethno-national(minzu) studies projects
# "ethno-nationality(minzu)" in political science projects
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A survey of the research projects funded by the National Social Science Foundation78 (see the 
figure above) shows a continous growth of policy studies conducted in the field of ethnology and 
ethno-national question studies (Ch: minzu wenti yanjiu) and studies on ethno-nationality (Ch: minzu) 
in the field of political science – a trend that was already observed since the early 1990s (see last 
chapter). In other words, there are increasingly interests from both communities in political research 
on ethno-national questions. This means that the topic has become less and less the exclusive 
“playground” of the traditional knowledge community on minzu policy, i.e. Chinese Marxist 
Ethnologists. As a result, alternative disciplinary perspectives became increasingly relevant to the 
policy discussion during this decade, as the section below shows.  
 
6.4 Inter-paradigm Political Debate 
The period between 2000 and 2013 witnessed one of the most significant public debates over 
minzu policy in China in the post-Mao era. In particular, after the events in 2008 and 2009,79 a 
nationwide discussion broke out over the future direction of China’s minzu policy, in which not only 
experts and scholars of the professional academic background published their opinions, but also 
average citizens and public intellectuals participated to express their concerns and suggestions. It was 
also during this period that the discussion became explicitly focusing on the “policy design”. To be 
more precise, whereas earlier discussion tends to approach the topic indirectly, either by focusing on 
a specific aspect (“de facto inequality or equality among ethnicities”) or a specific concept (“ethnic 
consciousness, ethnic integration, ethnic solidarity”), the latest episode features debate which openly 
and explicitly refers to the “policy design” aspect of the topic. The growing interests in Minzu Policy 
                                                      
78 National Social Science Foundation Project Database, http://fz.people.com.cn/skygb/sk/index.php/Index/index, 
accessed October 1st 2018.  
79 Lhasa Riot and Urumqi Riot. See the section “‘3-14’ & ‘7-5’ Incidents and Policy Challenges” of this chapter.  
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Studies (Ch: minzu zhengce xue) and Minzu Political Science (Ch: minzu zhengzhi xue) that we observed 
ealirer seem to have finally borne fruit.  
Judging from the level of intensity and the character of its content, the scholarly discourse on 
minzu policy of this period can be roughly divided into two phases. The first period runs from early 
2000 to 2010. During this time the discussion revolved by and large around the reform proposal 
made by PKU sociology professor Ma Rong, who had articulated a reformulation of minzu identity 
from a largely social constructivist perspective and advanced accordingly a “de-politicization” (Ch: 
qu zhengzhihua) approach to ethnic relations in today’s China. Specifically, Ma believes that the Soviet 
legacy in China’s minzu policy design would lead China towards inevitable political and territorial 
disintegration, an extremely probable outcome that – he believed – has been convincingly 
demonstrated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union a decade earlier. As a result, argues Ma, the 
Chinese government must replace its current policy – which he saw as emphasizing ethnic 
consciousness and distinction – with one that promotes solidarity and unity among ethnicities. To 
him, the solution to create and maintain harmonious interethnic relations in China was precisely to 
stop emphasizing the differences between ethnicities but to emphasize commonalities, such as 
shared Chinese citizenship, instead. Ma’s proposal triggered an immediate reaction from both the 
Minzu Studies circle and the Chinese ethnologist community in general. A number of influential 
scholars, notably those affiliated with the SEAC-affiliated think tank, responded to Ma’s proposal 
with sharp critiques and rejections. A few scholars did voice support for Ma Rong in different 
degrees. Among those supporters, scholars with background in political science clearly stood out.  
The second period breaks away from the first period in that it featured an even more explicit and 
direct challenge to the existing policy. This new “offense” was led by prominent establishment 
intellectuals and was followed a much wider mobilization of Chinese Marxist Ethnologists (Minzu 
Studies scholars) to respond and criticize in coordinated manner, thereby transforming the 
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discussion into a full-scale open policy debate. This period runs from 2011 to 2014. The starting 
point was the publication of an article titled “Towards a Second Generation Minzu Policy” and by 
Tsinghua University professor and Director of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies (Ch: 
guoqing yanjiu yuan, literally “Institute of Research on National Condition”) Hu Angang and his 
colleague Hu Lianhe. Because both author’s last names were Hu, they were often referred to as the 
“two-Hus”. The article by “two-Hus” caused an immediate reaction from the wider scholar circle. 
Most notably, a number of high-level meetings were organized by both minzu schools (Ch: minzu 
yuanxiao) as well as state and party agencies in charge of minzu policy, where scholars and 
researchers from across the country were invited to discuss and – as if coordinated a prior – criticize 
the “Second Generation” proposal of the “two-Hus”. Following the meeting, minzu researchers – in 
particular by Minzu Studies scholars or Chinese Marxist Ethnologists – began publishing articles in 
all sorts of academic journal across the country to attack, discredit, and reject the “Second 
Generation” thesis. Surprisingly, despite the overwhelming negative reaction, no political action was 
taken to punish either the authors of the “Second Generation” thesis or Ma Rong, whose idea 
featured prominently (without given credit) in the article by “two-Hus”. The SEAC official website 
even maintained a webpage openly displaying the arguments and related articles of the two debating 
sides. The apparent highly politicized discourse among scholars stands in contrast to the rather mild 
reactions from the government, which tends to be more sensitive and less tolerant of such explicit 
and critical policy discussions. In many ways, the debate itself was a great showcase of both the 
intra-elite struggle within the core political domain and the growing division within the knowledge 
community on minzu policy.  
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6.4.1 The “De-politicization” Debate 
The discussion about the source of ethnic tensions in China has gone on since the 1980s and has 
produced several strands of explanations (Tang 唐 2002). By the early 2000s, scholars increasingly 
focused on the issue of policy-induced ethnic identification and its social and political implications 
(or complications). Yu Pengjie from Sichuan University’s School of Public Management, who did 
research on the Miao people in Hunan, for example, argues that ethnic identification (Ch: zuqun 
rentong) was primarily the result of policy guidance (P. 鹏杰 Yu 于 2004). Soon after Yu’s article 
came, Luo Shujie from Guangxi University for Nationalities published his rebuttal of the former’s 
argument (Luo 罗 2005). At the core of this exchange was the question that has occupied Chinese 
scholars for already more than two decades, i.e. whether the Chinese term “minzu” should be 
understood as “nationality” or “ethnic group”. In the official terminology of PRC, the word 
“minzu” could mean either nation, ethnic group, or ethnic minority. To avoid the confusion and, in 
particular, the possibility that the word minzu could be read in a way to justify treating certain 
groups in China as deserving complete political autonomy or even an independent state, some 
scholars have advocated drawing a direct correspondence between minzu and ethnic group, while 
others have favored replacing minzu with a different term – “zuqun” – altogether (D. 东明 Wang 
王 2005). Ma Rong’s proposal was precisely based on this later position. According to Ma, while 
ethnic group and nation exist along a continuum and could move back and forth from one to 
another, the former is capable of coexisting peacefully with other, similarly-constituted groups in 
one nation-state, whereas the latter would most likely desire an independent state to represent its 
interests. Ma further believes that government policy plays an important role in determining which 
tendency a group would adopt, specifically, whether the policy is one of “culturalization” (Ch: 
wenhuahua) or “politicization” (Ch: zhengzhihua). Relating the former with the US and ancient China 
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and the latter with the former Soviet Union and post-1949 China, Ma argues that the Chinese 
government should learn from the past experience and stop “politicizing” ethnic identity; instead, it 
should (according to Ma) seek to “culturalize” it, starting with replacing the concept of minzu with 
zuqun (R. 戎 Ma 马 2004, 132).  
Ma Rong’s argument immediately met with questioning voice from across the country. Chen 
Yuping from Southwest University for Nationalities, for example, stated that he shared with Ma a 
number of his observations while disagreeing with his conclusion, i.e. ethnic identity in China should 
be “depoliticized” in order to promote ethnic solidarity and national unity. Specifically, Chen Yuping 
argued that it is theoretically impossible to separate politics from ethnicity, nor is it practically 
feasible. On the first point, Chen Yuping argued that as long as the government is intervening in 
people’s ethnic identification or the relationship among different ethnic groups through policy, it is 
in a way “politicizing” ethnicity, as it is a form of political behavior with redistributive implications 
carried out by the state power (Y. 玉屏 Chen 陈 2008, 3). On the second point, Chen Yuping 
argued that while deemphasizing ethnic consciousness and promoting national identification might 
be suitable for countries such as the United States where no single ethnic group could claim absolute 
dominance over the state’s power, in China the advantage of Han in this regard is evident; as a 
result, it is necessary to keep highlighting issues of ethnicity and interethnic relations in public policy 
(Y. 玉屏 Chen 陈 2008, 5). In sum, Chen Yuping shared – and in fact applauded – Ma’s concern 
but rejected his “depoliticization-thesis” as a reasonable or desirable solution.  
Senior CASS researcher Wang Xi’en also expressed his rejection of Ma’s thesis with a friendly 
tone towards what he perceived as the latter’s “noble” intention. Wang’s response opened with the 
statement that “these essays [by Ma Rong] are based on hard evidence and straightforward, 
reflecting a strong spirit of criticality and courage for innovation, leading to widespread attention 
among people who are in the field of ethno-national research and care about ethno-national 
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question” (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 2009, 1). However, Wang rejected Ma’s claim that China’s ethnic 
classification artificially created ethnic groups but insisted on the “spontaneity” of ethnicities 
recognized by the government. He also rejected Ma’s claim that the system of ethnic regional 
autonomy was made to promote self-determination of a single ethnicity in a region but insisted that 
it was designed with the intention to facilitate inter-ethnic solidarity and cooperation. Similar with 
Chen, Wang further took issues with Ma’s characterization of interethnic relations and the related 
policies in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Specifically, Wang argued that the PRC 
policy of “ethnizing autonomous government” (Ch: zizhi jiguan minzuhua) was very different from 
the USSR policy of nativization (Ru: коренизация/korenization) in that the Chinese practice 
focused on the representation of ethnic minority in the government and legislature according to the 
actual proportion of different groups in the local population, as opposed to (alleged) Soviet practice 
of letting only the titular group(s) take over the authority (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 2009, 12). However, 
Wang nonetheless agreed that Ma’s critique served as a positive intervention. Pointing to a number 
of developments since the early 1980s, including the “ethnic consciousness” debate, the emergence 
of Ethno-National Politics (Ch: minzu zhengzhixue), and the “minzu vs. zuqun” debate, Wang called 
for further enriching and improving the discursive and theoretical of China’s minzu policy based on 
the national condition (Ch: guoqing) (Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 2009, 17).  
Wang’s colleague at CASS and researcher at the Theory Department of the Institute of 
Ethnology and Anthropology, Chen Jianyue, was less friendly towards Ma’s thesis. Chen Jianyue first 
faulted Ma for drawing a “simple equivalency” between ethnic consciousness with the nationalistic 
notion of “one state, one nation,” which Ma used to argue for the necessary transition from ethnic 
consciousness to ethnicity-based political and even military mobilization (Jianyue 建樾 Chen 陈 
2005a, 9). Citing Chinese scholars’ work on federalism in the Soviet Union and Ainu people in 
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Japan, he then disputed the examples provided by Ma which were supposed to showcase the 
disadvantages of a “politicizing”-approach and the advantages of a “culturalizing/depoliticizing”-
approach. In the next step, Chen Jianyue raised the issue of replacing minzu with zuqun, a 
terminological change core to Ma’s proposal. Although Chen Jianyue appeared to be neutral with 
regards to the adoption of one term as opposed to another, he criticized Ma for being logically 
inconsistent when describing their relationship. Finally, Chen Jianyue concluded his critique by 
implying that Ma’s writing could be not only “a question of loss of one’s academic conscience and 
damage to one’s academic reputation,” but also “a question of misleading academic research and 
using research to ‘kidnap’ politics” (Jianyue 建樾 Chen 陈 2005a, 13) 
Some scholars openly supported Ma’s argument. Zhou Ping, Professor at the Department of 
Political Science of Yunnan University and a well-known figure in China in the emerging field of 
Ethno-National Politics (Ch: minzu zhengzhixue), challenged the existing minzu policy from the 
perspective of “value orientation” (Ch: jiazhi quxiang) of the policy. Beginning with the assertion that 
the basic value orientation of PRC’s minzu policy since its early years was “nationalism” (Ch: minzu 
zhuyi), Zhou first admitted the necessity and benefit of such a choice as the basis for the Chinese 
government’s approach to interethnic relations inside the country. Specifically, Zhou believed that 
such a value orientation was rooted in a particular political ethics which emphasized the need for 
Han to “apologize” and “pay the debts” to the minorities (P. 平 Zhou 周 2010, 137). He then went 
on to list several positive functions performed by CCP’s allegedly nationalism-oriented policy, 
including mobilizing minorities to join the revolution, integrating minorities into the new state, 
restructuring interethnic relations based on principles of equality and mutual assistance, and 
promoting development. But he also suggested that there might be several risks associating with it, 
including intensifying interethnic conflict, affecting the balance between (sub-national) ethnic 
consciousness and national consciousness, incapable of dealing with new circumstances in ethnic 
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relations due to its built-in assumptions (e.g. minorities are considered necessarily disadvantaged and 
would be thankful for special treatment given to them by the state), and undermining the internal 
assimilation of Chinese nation due to institutionalizing and politicizing ethnic differences. To cope 
with these issues, Zhou concluded that the value orientation of China’s minzu policy must be 
adjusted towards the direction of “statism” (Ch: guojia zhuyi), which he defined as “emphasizing the 
overall interests of the state, always putting the interest of the state at the top, always treating the 
interests of the state as the starting point and objective of policies, dealing with ethnic relations and 
ethno-national question from the perspective of improving the state’s governance” (P. 平 Zhou 周 
2010, 140). In practice, this means to deemphasize ethnic identity and highlight national identity, to 
promote inter-ethnic assimilation, to use geographic-/regional-thinking to solve issues in border 
regions instead of ethnicity-based reasoning, and to be cautious against the rapid increase of ethnic 
consciousness among “certain ethnic groups” (P. 平 Zhou 周 2010, 141). Without citing or even 
mentioning Ma Rong, Zhou’s piece offered basically the same proposal as Ma’s while situating his 
discussion within the realm of nationalism and state.80  
Part of the above exchange was recorded in the edited volume published by the Social Sciences 
Academy Press of China under the same title as Ma’s 2004 article, where he first systematically laid 
out his argument (L. 立中 Xie 谢 2010). The editor of this volume, PKU professor Xie Lizhong and 
a colleague of Ma Rong at the Department of Sociology, was also sympathetic towards Ma’s ideas. 
In this English version of the volume, published by World Scientific Publishing and under the title 
De-Politicization of Ethnic Questions in China, a few essays included in the Chinese version were missing 
                                                      
80 For a rebuttal of Zhou Ping’s thesis, see a 2011 essay by Wang Zhili, then PhD Candidate at the Henan Academy of 
Governance (Ch: henan xingzheng xueyuan), titled “On Value Orientation of China’s Minzu Policy -- Discussing with 
Professor Zhou Ping” (Z. 志立 Wang 王 2011). 
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but a new preface by the book editor Xie Lizhong was added.81 Xie agreed with most of Ma’s critics 
that “ethnic” issues should not and are difficult to be depoliticize, but he insisted that Ma was right 
in asking the government to promote political unity among different ethnicities:  
 
“I fully agree [with Ma’s proposal] that we must make every effort to build a “Chinese culture” 
shared by all ethnic groups of the “Chinese nation”, which should include the perception of 
identity with the “Chinese nation”, […] Carrying out pluralism at the ethnic group level must 
observe an absolute precondition of avoiding damage to the unified nation-state mechanism, 
whether it be in the economic, social, political, or cultural field.” (L. Xie 2014, xxviii–xxix) 
 
6.4.2 The “Second Generation Minzu Policy” Debate 
Hu Angang is Professor of Economics at the Tsinghua University in Beijing, the founder and 
director of the Center for China Studies at Tsinghua, and a well-known public intellectual in China. 
He has penned numerous articles covering almost every aspect of contemporary Chinese politics 
and economy and is often considered as belonging to the group of intellectuals known as the “New 
Left” (Ch: xin zuopai).82 In 2011, Hu Angang and his colleague at the Center for China Studies, Hu 
Lianhe, authored an article together titled “The Second Generation Minzu policy: Promoting 
Integrated Ethnic Fusion and Co-Prosperity” (hereafter “second generation”). Published by the 
Urumqi-based Journal of Xinjiang Normal University in September, the article instantly triggered a 
new wave of intense debate over minzu policy that went beyond the “depoliticization debate”.  
                                                      
81 Original English title: “My Views on the Debate Over ‘Depoliticizing Ethnicity in China’”. This essay was published in 
Chinese as an article in 2014 by Social Sciences in Chinese Higher Education Institutions (Ch: zhongguo gaoxiao shehui kexue) but 
with slight differences in its content from its English version. See Xie Lizhong’s “‘族群问题的去政治化’争论之我见” 
(L. 立中 Xie 谢 2014).  
82 “New Left” (“新左派”), Baidu Encyclopedia, 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%96%B0%E5%B7%A6%E6%B4%BE, accessed August 30th 2018. 
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Asserting that the central government has already signaled at the Fifth Central Conference on 
Ethnic Work that its minzu policy was transitioning from the first generation to the second, Hu 
Angang and Hu Lianhe (hereafter Hu and Hu) stated in their article that “we must […] keep pace 
with the time and promote ‘contact, exchange, and integration among ethnic groups’ (Ch: minzu 
jiaowang jiaoliu jiaorong), so to ensure the continuous consolidation and prosperous development of 
the Chinese nation’s integration” (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011, 1). Echoing Ma Rong, Hu and 
Hu claimed that there were mainly two approaches for dealing with ethnic minorities around the 
world: one is the so-called “Big Forge Model” (Ch: da ronglu moshi), represented by the United States 
and characterized by an emphasis on state-national identification (Ch: guozu rentong) over ethnic 
identification; the other one is the so-called “Big Mixed-Platter Model” (Ch: da pingpan moshi), 
represented by the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and characterized by an emphasis on ethnic 
identification, ethnic distinction, and territorial pluralism (Ch: diyu duoyuan zhuyi) which prevented 
ethnic assimilation towards a unified “state-nation” (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011, 3–6). Without 
explicitly linking China with either “model”, Hu and Hu went on to argue that China faces a 
particularly serious challenge with regards to national integration because of the relatively short time 
that it has established a modern nation-state, and as a result, must push for the transition towards a 
second generation minzu policy (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011, 6). This transition would focus on 
promoting “contact, exchange, and integration among ethnic groups” in the political, economic, 
cultural, and social realms, which entails a variety of specific policies ranging from deemphasizing 
ethnic consciousness and strengthening national identification, promoting economic exchange and 
cooperation between eastern China and the minority-concentrated western China, promoting 
Standard Mandarin, as well as promoting mixed-ethnicity residential patterns and inter-ethnic 
marriages (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011, 6–12).  
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In their article, Hu and Hu used the term “unpoliticization” (Ch: fei zhengzhihua) as opposed to 
the one coined by Ma Rong, i.e. “depoliticization” (Ch: qu zhengzhihua). Nonetheless, their argument 
and proposal resemble much of what Ma had argued earlier without citing or even mentioning Ma’s 
name once. On the other hand, different from many of the writings during the above period, Hu 
and Hu’s article did not delve into the conceptual debate regarding “minzu,” “zuqun,” “nationality,” 
“ethnicity”,83 and so on. Rather, it focuses exclusively on the practical implications of the above 
“two models” for China’s minzu policy. Based on their discussion, they elaborated extensively a 
policy reform proposal based on the expression, “contact, exchange, and integration among ethnic 
groups”, a concept that was first used officially in Hu Jintao’s speech at the First Central Symposium 
on Xinjiang Work in 2010.   
Following the publication of Hu and Hu’s article, many scholars across the country – mostly 
from the circle of minzu studies (Chinese Marxist Ethnology) – immediately took issues with their 
argument and began writing critiques in response. Du Yonghao, researcher at Heilongjiang Institute 
of Nationalities and a veteran to debate over China’s minzu policy,84 penned two lengthy articles to 
be published in Heilongjiang National Series (Ch: Heilongjiang minzu congkan) in 2012 that 
interrogated the “second generation” thesis from its theoretical basis, empirical evidence, logical 
coherence, to its practical and legal implications (Du 都 and Zuo 左 2012; Du 都 2012). Senior 
UFWD and SEAC official Huang Zhu, who was behind the 1980 People’s Daily critique of the 
“class approach” to minzu question,85 while admitting the “good intentions” of the “second 
generation” proposal, nonetheless disagreed with its authors and called their proposal “being too 
                                                      
83 As the preceding discussion has shown, all of these terms can be expressed using the same Chinese word “minzu/民
族”.  
84 See chapter 5, section 5.4.1 “The ‘Ethnic Consciousness’ Debate”. 
85 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1 “Ideological Reorientation and Organizational Restoration”. 
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eager to realize ethnic assimilation” and their specific policy recommendations “unadvisable” (Z. 铸 
Huang 黄 2012, 5).  
Northwest Minzu University (Ch: xibei minzu daxue) professor Jia Donghai and master student at 
the same university Chen Xiaojia called the authors of the “second generation” thesis “not 
respecting the national condition”. They charged the proposal that it displayed “confusion on the 
theoretical, conceptual, and logical level” and as such, should receive proper attention from the 
government authority and the academic community due to these problems (Jia 贾 and Chen 陈 
2012, 20). After detailing how the “second generation” thesis caused those confusion, Chen and Jia 
suggested three reasons for this outcome. First, citing the history of slavery in the US and Brazil and 
the caste system in India, Jia and Chen criticized Hu and Hu for overlooking the historically forced 
assimilation policy and enduring rampant racism of those countries. Second, Jia and Chen argued 
that the authors of “second generation” went against the principles laid out in the Chinese 
Constitution, which stipulates that China is an “unified, multiethnic country forged together by 
people of all ethnicities of the country”. Finally, Jia and Chen faulted them for going against the 
basic state policy and political institution, i.e. the constitutionally and legally enshrined system of 
ethnic regional autonomy (Jia 贾 and Chen 陈 2012, 22–25). Senior scholar and professor at Central 
Minzu University Jin Binggao made a similar assessment in his coauthored critique published in 
Journal of Northwest University for Nationalities, calling it not only violating the minzu theory and 
minzu policy of socialism with Chinese characteristics, but also ignoring the basic national condition 
of China as a multiethnic country (B. 炳镐 Jin 金 and Xiao 肖 2012).  
Interestingly, both above coauthored pieces faulted the “second generation” thesis for 
promoting “depoliticization”, even though the term itself never appeared in Hu and Hu’s article 
(which used the expression “unpoliticization” instead) but was coined and promoted by Ma Rong 
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for more than a decade by then. The obvious linkage between Ma’s proposal and Hu and Hu’s was 
highlighted by Xie Shengjun in his review of the debate in late 2012. In this piece, Xie considered 
the “second generation” thesis to be associated with a number of public figures aside from the 
authors of the original piece in Journal of Xinjiang Normal University, including Ma Rong (PKU 
professor), Pan Zhiping (researcher at Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences and scholar of Central 
Asia),86 and Wu Chuke (professor at Central Minzu University and scholar of borderland political 
studies).87 Importantly, Xie also named an incumbent high-ranking party official – Zhu Weiqun, then 
deputy director of the Central United Front Work Department (UWFD)88 – as one of the advocates 
of the “second generation” thesis. The practice of naming an incumbent official in the context of an 
ongoing policy debate is rare in contemporary China, even less so when the person is being 
criticized for his/her political views. Thus, one could already sense that the debate has gone beyond 
a purely academic one at this point, or at least beyond what it appeared to be from 2004 to 2011. 
After naming these figures, Xie went on to detail the critiques from different scholars with an 
evidently agreeing tone, including 1) conceptual and theoretical confusion, 2) ignoring the basic laws 
governing ethnic groups and the minzu question, 3) ignoring the basic national condition and the 
principle of “seeking truth from the facts,” 4) ignoring the values and ideals underlying China’s 
minzu policy, and 5) being “destructive without constructive” (S. 胜君 Xie 谢 2012, 47–48). In the 
end, Xie concluded that the “second generation” thesis has caused both panic among ethnic 
minorities and confusion in the general public, and could become a “Pandora’s Box” should its 
concrete recommendations be adopted by the authority (S. 胜君 Xie 谢 2012, 49).  
                                                      
86 https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%BD%98%E5%BF%97%E5%B9%B3/71868  
87 https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%90%B4%E6%A5%9A%E5%85%8B  
88 https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9C%B1%E7%BB%B4%E7%BE%A4  
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Director of CASS Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology and senior scholar on minzu studies 
Hao Shiyuan offered the most elaborated critique of the “second generation” thesis as well as Ma 
Rong’s “depoliticization” thesis. Beginning from early 2012, Hao published four long pieces in a 
row, attacking almost every claim the latter has made. The first piece of this “series” – which was 
published in Social Sciences in Xinjiang (Ch: xinjiang shehui kexue) – presented a systematic critique of 
the thesis with particular focuses on the arguments that ethnic minorities in China have received 
improvement in socioeconomic conditions at the expense of the rest of the country and that ethnic 
minority masses and elites were to be paid with special attention for their potential of carrying out 
terrorist and separatist activities (Hao 郝 2012a). The rest three articles took issues with the country 
cases present in Hu and Hu’s article, respectively, the United States (Hao 郝 2012b), Brazil (Hao 郝 
2012c), and India (Hao 郝 2012d). In all those pieces Hao took an evidently hostile tone. In his 
second piece, titled “Is the United States a Role Model for Solving Ethnic Issues in China?”, Hao 
wrote that the “second generation” thesis was based on a misreading of the ethnic relations and 
minzu policy of the US, and as such, “cannot offer any meaningful lessons for China” (Hao 郝 
2012b, 1). In his third piece, titled “What ‘Lesson’ Can Brazil Offer for China’s Ethnic Affairs?”, 
Hao asserted that the “success story” of Brazil in managing ethnic relations as claimed by the 
“second generation” advocates was a “fake argument” that was “inconsistent with facts” and a “fake 
lesson passed around without properly verified” (Hao 郝 2012c, 1). In the last piece, titled “The 
Experience of India in Constructing ‘State-Nation’ Is Not Worthy Studying for China”, Hao 
summarized his critiques in previous pieces and asserted that the “second generation” thesis has 
committed “serious academic misbehavior” (Ch: yazhong de xueshu shifan) and “deliberately political 
misleading” (Ch: keyi de zhengzhi wudao) (Hao 郝 2012d, 9).  
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As one can already sense from the language of the debate, the sweepingly critical reactions to Hu 
and Hu’s article was not merely a product of the intellectual disagreement between these two 
authors and the wider academic community in PRC. Rather, existing evidence suggests that from 
2011 to 2014 the minzu studies scholars initiated and carried on a systematic anti-reform campaign. 
In April 2012, about six months after the publication of Hu and Hu’s article, a symposium on minzu 
theory89 was convened in Beijing to discuss a collective response to it. This meeting is joined by not 
only researchers from universities and colleges across the country, but also chief editors of several 
major academic journals, as well as representatives from party and government agencies including 
SEAC, UFWD, and Central Party School. According to one report, participants at the meeting 
extensively discussed the “second generation” thesis and uniformly agreed that the it is but a 
“political fantasy” of its advocates and a false idea, and that China’s minzu policy has been 
successful, correct, and must be upheld (Pei 裴, Chen 陈, and Gong 公 2012).  
Against the negative reception and coordinated attack of Hu and Hu’s argument, a few scholars 
nonetheless came forth to express their support. Xu Xianlong from South-Central University for 
Nationalities (Ch: zhongnan mizu daxue) and his coauthor, Yuan Nianxing from Beijing University, 
shared with the “second generation” advocates their diagnosis of the problems with ethnic relations 
in today’s China. “We are being cautioned by facts that,” wrote Xu and Yuan, “the raise of 
economic standard and living quality of the majority of an ethnic group does not equal the stability 
and solidarity of the overall ‘Diversity in Unity’ (Ch: duoyuan yiti) order of the Chinese nation” (Xu 
许 and Yuan 袁 2012, 18). Xu and Yuan did not endorse all the claims made of the “second 
generation”. But they agree with a number of specific points, including the ideas that in today’s 
China more and more ethnic issues are being “politicized” while many social issues are being 
                                                      
89 Original Chinese title: “民族理论研究热点问题学术研讨会” 
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“ethicized” (Ch: minzuhua), and that the government should intervene in and offer guidance to 
people’s ethnic consciousness in order to maintain and strengthen the “symbolic order” of a unified 
China. Their moderate tone stands in apparent contrast to the one by Hao Shiyuan, when they 
stated that while the “second generation” advocate might have made “inappropriate policy 
recommendations”, the debate nonetheless helped to facilitate a deep rethinking and reflection of 
China’s current minzu policy (Xu 许 and Yuan 袁 2012, 18–19).  
Similarly, while Peng Yingming (2012) and Xu Changjian (2013) chose not to endorse a policy of 
“depoliticization” or “unpoliticization” as a solution to China’s ethnic issues, both of them 
expressed implicit support to Hu & Hu’s diagnosis that people’s ethnic consciousness, especially that 
of ethnic minorities, should be properly guided by the government so to avoid evolving towards a 
parochial direction and becoming disruption to social stability. For example, Peng suggested that 
“centralization and unity” should be given more attention in the “present circumstance” as opposed 
to ethnic autonomy. Specifically, he highlighted the issue of fighting against ethnic splittism, 
terrorism, and local parochial nationalism, as well as safeguarding national unity and ethnic solidarity. 
He also explicitly endorsed the suggestion of “constructing a state-nation (Ch: guozu)” – an idea 
present in both Ma Rong and Hu & Hu’s proposal – as a way to strengthen the national 
identification of ethnic minorities (Peng 彭 2012, 22–23). Xu disputed the claim that changing the 
concept of “minzu” into “zuqun” and replacing a politically-oriented collective identification with a 
culturally-oriented one would eliminate problems in China’s ethnic relations once and for all. Stating 
that the real cause for the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia lay in the forced 
suppression of ethnic consciousness and ethnic assimilation, Xu went on to argue that it would be 
counterproductive to enforce a rigid form of de-ethicized identification through administrative 
means. Nonetheless, Xu suggested that it was important to “correctly guide ethnic consciousness 
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and cultivate a tolerant social mentality” so to achieve ethnic assimilation voluntarily (C. 畅江 Xu 徐 
2013, 14–17). 
To date Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe made no response to their critics, neither did they produce 
any further writings on the subject following the initial article. In the years following its publication, 
the debate revolving the “second generation minzu policy” was carried on by scholars from across 
the country, many of whom treat Hu and Hu’s proposal as an inspired product if not a direct 
continuation of Ma Rong’s proposal of “depoliticization”, first publicized in 2004. The intensity of 
the debate was evidenced by the joint effort of both scholars and officials to coordinate their attack 
on the proposal and the rather obviously moralistic language employed by the critics. A further and 
more important feature of the “second generation debate” is that a good number of the participants 
to the debate were writing from an extra-disciplinary perspective. While Ma Rong based his proposal 
for policy change on a conceptual discussion of “minzu” and “zuqun”, Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe 
made no such effort. Rather, they framed their argument entirely from a policy perspective.  
 
6.4.3 A House-Divided over Minzu Policy 
Following the change of leadership, there were some attempts by the scholars to bridge their 
differences as manifested during the debate on minzu policy (Hao 郝, Zhang 张, and Ma 马 2014, 
65) In 2013, three prominent figures and scholars, representing three different policy positions, 
came together to engage in a frank and open discussion about the problems with China’s minzu 
policy, touching upon a range of issues with unprecedented willingness to share their personal views 
on a sensitive topic. 
In this heated dialogue, Hao Shiyuan rejects that the tensions in Xinjiang and Tibet were 
anything special, given that “in fact, from the perspective of the whole country, ‘mass incidents’ (Ch: 
qunti xing shijian) are not only quite common but also concentrating more in eastern regions and 
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inland […]” (Hao 郝 2015, 10). Hao also rejects the problem in Xinjiang and Tibet has anything to 
do with separatism. Instead, he points to poverty, unemployment, and lack of development as the 
root cause for the social tension. Although he acknowledges that there are certain oversea 
individuals and organizations working to undermine China’s ethnic relations, he considers their 
influence insignificant. For Hao, the real problem with China’s ethnic work is that the authority has 
failed to comprehensively and correctly implement the policy. Thus, the practical implications from 
this conclusion naturally point towards measures to better carry out minzu policy enshrined in 
existing laws and regulations. More specifically, Hao argues that the authorities should work to 
ensure enactment of autonomous regulations for all ethnic autonomous areas, thereby establishing 
legal guarantee for carrying out properly the policy of ethnic regional autonomy. Specifically, Hao 
raised the issue of autonomous regulations. Citing statistics, he stated explicitly that the making of 
autonomous regulations for the five provincial-level Autonomous Regions (ARs) have experienced 
great difficulty is because it involves demarcating central-local relations, which concerns the issue of 
political system reform.  
Zhang Haiyang, another prominent figure in the earlier debate, shares with Hao’s confidence in 
the existing minzu policy and associated institutional arrangement, as well as Hao’s diagnosis that the 
main problem with regards to the current ethnic tension lies in improper or inadequate 
implementation of the “good” policy. Zhang’s central argument is that ethnic relations should not 
understood as a relation concerning interests (Ch: liyi guanxi). He argues that the purpose of 
managing ethnic relations through minzu policy is to realize decency, recognition, and fairness and 
justice in distributing rights. Only from such a perspective can we realize the true purpose of minzu 
policy, to sustain the legitimacy of the Chinese government over ethnic minority population and 
their homeland. For Zhang, minzu policy – even though designed with the best intentions – was 
never put into practice fully and correctly. He criticized Jiang and Hu administration (from the 14th 
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to 17th Party Congress) for failing to pay sufficient attention to ethnic work, pointing fingers at the 
Great Western Development, assistance programs in Tibet, and energy exploitation in Inner 
Mongolia. Zhang also ridicules the high-profile policy of ethnic solidarity education for targeting 
primarily ethnic minority population, whereas he believes it should be the Han people who need to 
understand ethnic solidarity better and keep it in mind. For Zhang, the solution should be carrying 
out the existing minzu policy to its full extent. Citing the example of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, 
Zhang implied that he would likely prefer an even stronger version of multiculturalism which would 
give minorities more autonomy to decide their fate within the Chinese state. 
As the arguably the most adamant and sophisticated advocate of minzu policy reform, Ma Rong 
disputes the consistency of the authority’s minzu policy. Using post-Cultural Revolution minzu 
policy in Tibet as an example, Ma suggests that the changes toward accommodationist approach 
under Hu Yaobang were already wrongly-headed. For him, the rectification campaign which aimed 
at correcting the wrongs from the earlier practices, particular during the Cultural Revolution, in fact 
alienated those Tibetans loyal to the Chinese Communist Party and undermined the legitimacy of 
the Chinese authority. Ma interpreted the rising ethnic tensions as a result of the post-Mao Chinese 
authority’s minzu policy, which encouraged people to see all kinds of social issues through the lens 
of ethnicity. He asserted that – without referring to any scholarship and clearly ignorant of the 
findings contrary to his claim – during the Cultural Revolutions the conflict was not fought between 
different ethnicities, but different political factions. Yet because of the post-Mao Chinese authority’s 
minzu-oriented policy, a discourse of “minzu” began to take hold, causing sociopolitical discussion 
to become ethicized.  
While Ma agrees with Hao that “mass incidents” (Ch: qunti shijian) occur across the country, he 
believes that they only become “ethnic issues” in ethnic minority areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet. 
The tendency of interpreting everything through the ethnic lens and acting on it leads to racism in 
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the society, exemplified by the ethnic riots and killings during the “Urumqi Incident” (“7-5 
Incident”) in 2009. The problem lies in minzu policy’s strengthening of people’s ethnic 
consciousness through ethnicity-centered political discourse, ethnicity-based policymaking, and 
overemphasis of ethnicity in education and cultural production. Thus, for him, it is insufficient – if 
not impossible – to solve the problems in ethnic relations through promoting socioeconomic 
development alone. The equally important issue is to deemphasize people’s ethnic consciousness 
and to strengthen their national consciousness, or identification with the Chinese nation (Ch: 
zhonghua minzu). In the end, Ma rejects using political empowerment of ethnic minority and ethnic 
minority areas as a solution. His argues that such an approach would lead to inevitable conflict 
between an autonomous region and the jurisdictions of central ministries as well as the state-level 
development planning. It would also lead to further strengthening of ethnic consciousness, thus 
preparing for greater ethnic tensions, even risking splitting the entire nation. In contrast, Ma prefers 
to solve existing problems within the framework of citizen’s right (Ch: gongming quanli) as enshrined 
in the Constitution and other laws. This exchange reflects by and large the division at the beginning 
of Xi Jinping’s first term. It also shows that by late 2013, the scholarly community remained in deep 
disagreement. In fact, Hao Shiyuan argued in a solo-authored piece published later that no 
consensus was reached, despite the promise of the panel discussion’s organizer (Hao 郝 2015, 10).  
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Chapter 7 Securitizing National Identification, 2013-2017 
 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
During his first term, Xi Jinping sought to provide a new policy discourse which can 
accommodate the securitization of minzu policy in Xinjiang and Tibet without altering the basic 
language of the state’s minzu policy as reinstituted at the beginning of the Post-Mao era. While the 
security policy in border regions does not carry the title of minzu policy, in the regional context of 
Xinjiang and Tibet it is designed in such a way that it affects primarily the lives of the ethnic 
minorities, particularly Uyghurs and Tibetans. To resolve these tensions, Xi Jinping convened a 
number of state-level meetings to unify policy discourse immediately after taking office and carried 
out a major restructuration of the State Council. The latter move significantly diminished the 
influence of both SEAC and SARA, through putting the former under the leadership of the party’s 
United Front Work Department (UFWD) and letting the latter be entirely absorbed by UFWD. As a 
result, the policy subsystem became less divided as compared with the previous period.   
On the other hand, the scholarly community on minzu policy remain fragmented. Ethno-
national political studies as a dedicated research program that adopts a political science approach to 
ethnic minority affairs grew more mature and salient. Under the initiative of creating “think tanks 
with Chinese characteristics,” the government also actively cultivated explicitly policy-oriented 
knowledge communities that serve their interests, such as the “Xinjiang Think Tank” and “Tibet 
Think Tank”.   
As a result of a fragmented knowledge community and a collaborative policy environment, the 
academic debate on minzu policy returned to a less politicized yet nonetheless divided state, where 
the critics of the reform proposals from previous period continued to express their discontent 
towards those proposals but had to give in on many specific policy adjustments due to their 
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legitimation by the central leadership. Increasingly we see scholars simply paying lip-service to the 
rejection of the reform proposals while continuing advancing policy changes on various practical 
aspects.   
 
7.2 Collaborative Policy Subsystem 
7.2.1 Attempts to Unify Policy Discourse under Xi Jinping 
Faced with the sharp division of opinions on minzu policy, Xi Jinping wasted no time in 
summoning elites across the country to discuss its future. Two important meetings concerning 
minzu policy occurred in 2014. First, from May 28th to 29th, 2014, the Second Central Conference on 
Xinjiang Work was convened in Beijing.90 Second, from September 28th to 29th, the Fourth Central 
Conference on Ethnic Work was also convened in Beijing. The meeting on Xinjiang work was the 
second of its kind, with the first meeting convened only four years earlier in 2010. The meeting on 
minzu work has a longer history, with the third meeting convened in 2005, during the first term of 
Hu Jintao. The decision to have both meetings immediately after the new leadership took power was 
most likely the consequence of the already society-wide acknowledged, heightened ethnic tensions in 
the country, as well as the serious elite disagreements regarding the appropriate government policy 
response as evidenced by the debate. As such, the message of these two meeting was important not 
only for getting to know the policy preference of the central leadership but also for understanding 
the power dynamics during the leadership transition. Unfortunately, to date the full-text Xi Jinping’s 
speeches at both meetings have not yet been made available to the public. There are compilations of 
Xi’s speeches in the Selected Works of Xi Jinping on Socialist Political Development edited by Party 
Literature Research Center. This volume contains a number of excerpts of various lengths taken 
                                                      
90 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0529/c1024-25083277.html  
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from the speeches given by Xi during the above said meetings. From these limited materials, we can 
nonetheless get a glimpse of some of Xi’s words and ideas regarding minzu policy.  
Xi’s speech at the 2014 Central Conference on Xinjiang Work, which was also his first major 
speech on minzu policy, clarified the fundamental goal of the new leadership’s Xinjiang policy as 
both “social stability (Ch: shehui wending) and long-term stability and peace (Ch: changzhi jiu’an)”. It 
also defined the main focus of Xinjiang policy as “promoting ethnic solidarity and containing the 
spread of religious extremist ideas”. Specifically, Xi stated that the government must “take it as the 
main focus of the current struggle to strike hard against violent terrorist activities, hold high the 
banner of socialist rule of law (Ch: shehui zhuyi fazhi), make effort to improve the capability to predict 
and confront collective actions, and build a wall of iron and bronze and an inescapable net”. To 
further highlight the importance of those goals, Xi stated that “solidarity and stability are fortunes 
(Ch: fu), separation and chaos are disaster (Ch: huo). Ethnic solidarity is the lifeline of people of all 
ethnicities. [We] must uphold solidarity and stability in Xinjiang, hold high the banner of the grand 
solidarity of all ethnicities, and establish firmly among all ethnicities the national consciousness, 
citizen consciousness, and the consciousness of Chinese national community (Ch: zhonghua minzu 
gongtongti)” (PLRC 2017, 148). In response to the debate prior to the meeting, Xi made it clear that 
he did not endorse the proposed radical changes to the policy, but at the same time is willing to 
consider adjustments on the practical level. In an ambiguous tones, Xi stated that “we must 
resolutely uphold the party’s minzu policy, uphold the system of ethnic regional autonomy […] As 
the situation develops, those that need to be improved can be improved, those that need to be 
reformed can be reformed, but [we] cannot be undecided with regards to our fundamental stance” 
(PLRC 2017, 148). 
In September 2014, four months after the meeting on Xinjiang work, the Fourth Central 
Conference on Ethnic Work was convened in Beijing. Here Xi emphasized the relationship between 
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two key concepts – “Diversity” (Ch: duoyuan) and “Unity” (Ch: yiti) – which are the two constituting 
phrases of the famous slogan proposed by Fei Xiaotong to describe – or one may say, prescribe 
(Mullaney 2011) – ethnic relations in China: “Diversity in Unity” (Ch: duoyuan yiti). In elaborating the 
two concepts, Xi sought to highlight the need to always keep both in mind: “[when] we talk about 
the pattern of ‘diversity in unity’ of the Chinese nation, [it means] the unity includes the diversity, 
while the diversity constitutes unity; unity cannot be separated from diversity, and diversity cannot 
be separated from unity; unity shows the mainstream and direction, while diversity is a key element 
and driving force”. Xi further used the analogy to a traditional family to describe/prescribe this 
relationship: “the relationship between the Chinese nation and all ethnicities, to describe it 
figuratively, is the relationship between a big family and the family members; the relationship among 
various ethnicities is the relationship among different members of the big family” (PLRC 2017, 150).   
Given the open challenges to existing policy and radical reform proposals during the intense 
debate about minzu policy before Xi took office, many people anticipated some sort of response to 
those ideas from the meetings and were curious to see which side the new leadership would take. 
Again, because of the scarcity of the information, it is difficult to reach a conclusive assessment. But 
judging from what is available, it seems that there was no doubt the leadership wished to respond to 
the debate and Xi’s speech was drafted in such a way to show that he had taken into account the 
minzu policy debate immediately before his term. In his discussion on ethnic regional autonomy at 
the Central Conference on Minzu Work, Xi emphasized the need to consider not only the “ethnic 
factor” but also the “regional factor” when implementing the policy, which resembled both the 
proposal of Ma Rong (2004) and Hu & Hu (2011) in terms of reorienting the preferential policy for 
minorities from an ethnicity-based formula (i.e. one receives preferential treatment because of one’s 
ethnicity) to a region-based formula (i.e. one receives preferential treatment because of one’s place 
of residence/registration). To change the existing minzu policy from an ethnicity-oriented 
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redistributive program into a more flexible and dynamics one in which other factors such as 
geography are taken into account is one of the key recommendations of the “depoliticization” thesis, 
which was also appropriated by the “second generation” (R. 戎 Ma 马 2004; A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 
胡 2011). Specifically, Xi stated that:  
 
“To uphold and improve the system of ethnic regional autonomy, [we] must achieve ‘two 
combines.’ The first is to uphold the combining between unity and autonomy. Solidarity and 
unity are the highest national interests, the common interest of all ethnicities, and the 
prerequisite and foundation for ethnic regional autonomy. No national solidarity and unity, no 
ethnic regional autonomy. […] The second is to uphold the combining between ethnic factor and regional 
factor.91 Ethnic regional autonomy includes both ethnic factor and regional factor. Ethnic regional 
autonomy is not an autonomy enjoyed by any particular ethnicity alone, nor is ethnic 
autonomous region a region enjoyed by any particular ethnicity alone. This point must be made 
very clear, otherwise [we] will go into the wrong direction.” (PLRC 2017, 151–52) 
 
Xi also attempted to mediate the gap and rationalize the differences between what is 
pronounced at the central level and what has been practiced in the western border regions of the 
country. Eluding to the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet, Xi suggests that those deviant practices do 
not mean a drastic change of the existing minzu policy. At the same time, his open, non-critical 
acknowledge of the deviating practices in “certain regions” and “certain minority groups” clearly 
indicates his endorsement of the this somewhat awkward situation:  
 
                                                      
91 Italics added.  
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“Ethnic splittists attempted to undermine ethnic solidarity, and a very few ethnic regions 
experienced ethnic tensions, these are the ‘side-streams,’ not the ‘main-stream.’ [We] should not 
confuse problems occurred in some parts of an ethnic autonomous region with the entirety of 
this ethnic autonomous region, [we] should not confuse trouble-making by a very few people of 
an ethnic minority group with the entirety of this ethnic group, and [we] should not confuse 
what happened with members of ethnic minorities with minzu polices that have been 
demonstrated through practice and shown to be effective in the long-term.” (PLRC 2017, 152–
53) 
 
Xi did not forget to mention the pair of Han chauvinism and parochial nationalism and call both 
“archenemies” to ethnic solidarity in China. But he also cautioned against treating all issues through 
these two lenses. Similar to his predecessors, Xi maintained that development represents the most 
effective solution to all the problems concerning ethnic minority and their home regions. He did, 
however, go further to emphasize the need to differentiate “fake development for boasting about 
one’s achievement” from “genuine development that benefit the people,” arguing that the 
governments need to do the latter more and thus, tacitly admitting that even on the developmental 
front the achievement has not up to the expectation of the leadership (PLRC 2017, 155).  
Xi also suggests that one key to strengthen ethnic solidarity is to enhance people’s cultural 
identification with the country, through building a “common spiritual home” (Ch: gongyou jingshen 
jiayuan) for all ethnicities, and actively cultivating the consciousness of the Chinese national 
community (PLRC 2017, 157). In comparison with some of the explicitly statist proposals circulated 
during the debate – building a state-nation (Ch: guozu), for example, Xi’s chosen expression sounded 
much milder and seemed to imply a more spontaneous or deliberative form of identify 
construction/negotiation rather than forced assimilation. On the stricter side of his message, 
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language also featured prominently in Xi’s speech. Specifically, Xi highlighted the need for ethnic 
minorities to learn Mandarin Chinese. While he also talked about Han learning minority languages, 
the emphasis was clearly on the former. “When [the authority] promotes bilingual education in some 
relevant ethnic minority areas, not only the ethnic minorities should be required to learn National 
Standard Language, but also the Han masses who live in ethnic areas should be encouraged to learn 
ethnic minority languages” (PLRC 2017, 157).92 As one can clearly see, Han are only to be 
encouraged whereas minorities would be required to study a language different from their mother 
tongue, even though according to LERA, minority language should enjoy equal status with Standard 
Mandarin for governments in ethnic autonomous areas and are required for Han cadres working 
there.93  
Following the conference, on October 6th, 2014, SEAC Director Wang Zhengwei authored a 
piece for the CCP Central Committee-managed magazine Seeking Truth (Ch: qiushi).94 In this piece, 
Wang specifically highlighted Xi’s rejection of “those who questioned the existing policy and 
recommended major reform” during the previous debate. Without naming either Ma Rong or Hu 
Angang and his coauthor, Wang simply summarized their theses as contending that China’s minzu 
policy imitated the nationalities policy of the former Soviet Union and as a result, must be changed 
lest China would be allowed to go down the path of disintegration along ethno-national lines. 
Importantly, wang recited an expression allegedly from Xi’s speech that seemed to provide the most 
forceful rejection of the reform proposals. In this singled-out one-line quote, Xi reportedly said: “the 
idea that the system of ethnic regional autonomy should be abolished must stop”. Wang’s comrade 
and SEAC vice director Tondrub Wangben (Ch: danzhu ang’ben) also authored a piece for the official 
SEAC newspaper China Ethnic News (Ch: zhongguo minzu bao) a few days later, on November 15th, 
                                                      
92 Italics added.  
93 See PRC Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy (2001), article #21, article #47, and article #49.  
94 http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-10/16/c_1112805236.htm  
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2014.95 In his piece, Tondrub Wangben also highlighted Xi’s affirmation of the existing policy. In 
addition, Tondrub Wangben made a number of points related to “ethnic equality”. He wrote that 
“ethnic equality is the corner for ethnic solidarity; no equality, no solidarity”. Quoting Xi, he argued 
that the authority must take “ethnic equality” as the founding principle of the country (Ch: liguo 
yuanze), which he listed as the top priority for ethnic work in the future.   
A year later, in late May 2015, Xi Jinping presided over the Central United Front Conference in 
Beijing and spoke again about minzu policy, this time with a particular emphasis on religion. In this 
speech, Xi criticized discriminatory practices targeting ethnic minorities, such as ethnic profiling at 
the airport or hotels. Commenting on religion, Xi stated that while the Chinese Constitution and 
laws ensure the rights of the citizen to believe in religion, the authority must caution against the 
danger of “religious infiltration” (Ch: zongjiao shentou) as well as “religious demands with political 
purposes” (Ch: daiyou zhengzhi yitu de zongjiao suqiu) (PLRC 2017, 163). According to Xi: “sinicization” 
(Ch: zhongguohua) is the only correct direction for “guiding the religions to be in tune with a socialist 
society.” Specifically, this means “to guide and lead various religions in China with Core Socialist 
Values (Ch; shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) and to ‘soak’ them with Chinese culture, to support the 
religious community to interpret religious thoughts and doctrines in accordance with the progression 
of the time, to resolutely guard against the infiltration of western ideologies, and to voluntarily resist 
the influence of extremist thoughts” (PLRC 2017, 163–64).  
The same message was repeated later again at the All-China Religious Work Conference from 
April 22nd to 23rd 2016, where Xi emphasized that Communist Party members must never follow any 
religion: “Communist Party member must resolutely be a Marxist atheist, strictly follow the Party 
Charter, strictly uphold their ideal and faith, always remember the party’s principle, must never look 
for their value and belief in religions” (PLRC 2017, 172).  
                                                      
95 http://qhsmzw.gov.cn/zwxx/bwxx/ccc1f459_d5c8_4437_80da_132143d8fa4a.aspx  
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Within only three months’ interval, in late August 2015, the Sixth Central Tibet Work 
Conference was convened in Beijing, which was for the first time given the title “Central” as a result 
of being led by the Central Committee of the CCP (previous meetings, such as the one led by Hu 
Yaobang, did not bear such title).96 Accoridng to the official news report, five major topics were 
discussed at the meeting in the following sequence: 1) the six-point “Strategy for Governing Tibet” 
(Ch: zhizang fanglue); 2) safeguarding ethnic solidarity in Tibet; 3) ensuring and improvking the 
people’s livelihood in Tibet; 4) promoting the tradition of “loving the country” and “loving the 
religion;” 5) caring for the cadres and personnel serving in Tibet. The conference not only addressed 
issues of development and stability related to Tibet (TAR), but also to adjacent Tibetan areas of 
neighboring provinces including Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai.97 In total, six documents 
were reportedly prepared for the conference, including speeches by three state leadership: Xi 
Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Yu Zhengsheng.98  
For Xi, the areas calling for more attention and those calling for more efforts in Tibet work 
include “safeguarding national unity,” “strengthening ethnic solidarity,” and “taking it as a hard-
target to maintain the continuing stability, long-term stability, and comprehensive stability of the 
society”, and “always being in firm control of the anti-splittism struggle”.99 Xi specifically 
emphasized four tasks that are to be “resolutely” carried out and four targets that the authority must 
“ensure”. The four “resolutely” and four “ensure” are, respectively, “resolutely carry out anti-splittist 
struggles, resolutely promote socioeconomic development, resolutely safeguard and improve 
people’s livelihood, resolutely promote the contact, exchange, and integration between ethnic 
groups, ensure national security and long-term stability, ensure the continuing and healthy 
                                                      
96 http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/qwjd/201508/91825593772d4aa485ff613b25b62861.shtml  
97 http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-08/26/c_128168342.htm  
98 http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150907/44597695_0.shtml  
99 http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150907/44597695_0.shtml  
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socioeconomic development, ensure the continuing improvement of material and cultural lives of all 
ethnicities, ensure a good condition of ecology and environment”.100 
Xi’s speech also emphasized political education of the students, demanding that “the education 
of Core Socialist Values should be integrated into the curriculum of all kinds of schools and at all 
levels of studies,” that “both the standard spoken and written Chinese language should be 
promoted,” and “[schools] should make effort to cultivate builders and heir of the socialist cause 
who love the party and the country”. In characterizing the situation and task for the government in 
Tibet, Xi continued the acknowledgement of two types of contradictions in the autonomous region 
– a “primary contradiction” (Ch: zhuyao maodun) and a “particular or specific contradiction” (Ch: 
teshu maodun) – which was the official line decided since the last Central Tibet Work Conference led 
by Hu Jintao in 2010. The “primary contradiction” refers to the “contradiction between the growing 
material and cultural demand of the people and the backward social productive force,” whereas the 
“particular contradiction” refers to the “contradiction between people of all ethnicities and the 
splittist force represented by the Dalai Clique”. Taken together, this interpretative framework 
confers legitimacy to both a strong developmental program and a heavy-handed repressive approach 
against any “hostile elements” identified by the government. To avoid giving the impression of 
giving too much importance to repression, at the end Xi also cautioned against overemphasizing 
stability maintenance in inner-China (Ch: neidi), a broad geographical concept that refers to the 
mostly Han China, i.e. area that does not include border regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, or Inner 
Mongolia. He stated that “[authorities in] inner-China should be careful with their approaches in 
carrying out stability maintenance, strictly follow minzu policy, must not treat an entire ethnic group 
as something to be guard against; such simplifying approach that hurts ethnic feelings could only be 
counterproductive” (PLRC 2017, 166). This limited moderation – specifically excluding non-
                                                      
100 http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/tujie/201508/4afc5aaa0179454c8cd1550a49da0127.shtml  
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minority areas from the potential danger of over-securitization, where over-securitization was more 
likely than elsewhere – shows that Xi was more interested in maintaining stability in minority areas at 
all cost.  
 
7.2.2 Continuing Securitization of Minzu Policy for Tibetans and Uyghurs 
Under the tolerant message from the central leadership, security policy targeting ethnic 
minorities in both Xinjiang and Tibet (as well as ethnic Tibetan regions in adjacent provinces) 
continued to operate and in some cases, further deepen. For example, in 2015, authorities in 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture selected a total number of 4855 cadres from different 
levels of local governments within the prefecture to take part in the political education campaign 
under the titles of “ethnic solidarity education” (Ch: minzu tuanjie jiaoyu) or “Tibet-related stability 
maintenance propaganda” (Ch: shezang weiwen xuanchuan). Over 600,000 copies of political education 
materials were printed and circulated in the prefecture. Primary schools in Huangnan are also asked 
to hold a lesson on ethnic solidarity and progress education every week.101 Authority in Tongren 
County, Huangnan Prefecture, Qinghai issued a list of “20 illegal behaviors with Tibetan-
independent leaning”.102  
This period also saw the emergence of within province, cross-prefecture security collaboration: 
Guinan County of Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Zeku (Zêkog) County of Huangnan 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture signed an “Agreement on Collaborative Mechanism for Stability 
Maintenance”.103 The agreement was reportedly negotiated between the Stability Maintenance 
                                                      
101 http://www.qhwmw.com/system/2016/03/24/011963511.shtml (“Big Family of Nationalities 民族大家庭同心共
谱和谐曲-民族团结-青海文明网” 2016) 
102 https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shaoshuminzu/dz-02242015102113.html (“Tongren 青海同仁县下发
二十种‘涉藏独’活动禁令” 2015)  
103 《黄南藏族自治州泽库县-海南藏族自治州贵南县维稳工作协作机制协议》 
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Leading Groups (Ch: weiwen lingdao xiaozu) of both counties. According to the agreement, the two 
counties will strengthen their collaboration in the following areas: 1) communicating important 
information, 2) intelligence sharing, 3) monitoring and controlling person of interest, 4) 
administering and controlling monasteries, 5) investigation and handling of cases, 6) maintaining 
public security and targeted security operations, 7) investigation and handling of cross-county 
disputes, and 8) handling of sudden incidents. The agreement also establishes that a two-county 
stability maintenance meeting will be convened ever year to study and analyze the update-to-date 
situation and resolve salient issues; a briefing and coordination meeting will be convened every six 
months; and a contact person per county will be responsible for daily communication between the 
two counties.104 
In 2017, authority in Gonghe County, Hainan Tibetan Autonomus Prefecture, Qinghai boasted 
about their investment in security equipment for Qabqa Township. According to the officials news, 
the local authority spent over 800,000 RMB on 177 surveillance cameras, 10 call-police buttons, 10 
security access systems for 10 residential quarters within the township.105 In the same year, 248 
WeChat Group administrators/moderators in Zeku (Zêkog) County, Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomus Prefecture, Qinghai forced to sit through political education.106 In late August, Local 
official news reported that 26 local cadres and monks in Jianzhatan Township, Jianzha (Jainca) 
County, Huangnan Prefecture, Qinghai participated in a political education campaign titled “love the 
country, be grateful, stand in solidarity, rule by law” (Ch: aiguo, gan’en, tuanjie, fazhi).107 Materials used 
                                                      
104 http://www.qhchangan.gov.cn/jrbb/36190.jhtml (“Guinan County 贵南县与泽库县签订维稳工作协作机制协
议” 2015)  
105 http://www.qhnews.com/newscenter/system/2017/11/22/012475083.shtml (“Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture 海南藏族自治州政法综治工作亮点纷呈打造新亮点谱写新篇章--新闻中心” 2017)  
106 https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shaoshuminzu/dz-10022017103951.html (“Zekog 青海泽库县 248 名
微信群主被强制接受教育” 2017)  
107 http://www.jianzhanews.com/system/2017/08/25/012396642.shtml (“Jianzha Country 尖扎县各寺院相继开展
‘爱国 感恩 团结 法制’宣讲活动--尖扎新闻网” 2017) 
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during the sessions include: 1) “Ten ‘Made-Clear’ Propaganda Material for Stability Maintenance in 
Tibetan Area,”108 “Compilation of Propaganda and Study Material for Stability Maintenace in 
Tibetan Area,”109 “20 Illegal Behaviors Related to Tibet,”110 “Public Education Reader for Legal 
Knowledge”.111 Ang’la County saw 31 local cadres and monks participating in a similar education 
campaign with the same title. Here the material included also “Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Regulation on Ethnic Solidarity and Progress”112 and “Regulation on Monastery 
Administration and Working Regulation for Democratic Administration Committee”113  
Similar trends can also be observed in Xinjiang. Already in May 2013, XUAR Party Committee 
issued an internal document regarding work on containing the spread of “religious extremist 
thoughts” (Ch: zongjiao jiduan sixiang). The full title of the document is “Several Guiding Opinions 
Regarding Further Managing Illegal Religious Activities and Containing the Infiltration of Religious 
Extremist Thought According to Law”.114 Also known as the Document No. 11 of the XUAR Party 
Committee, this document offered detailed working instructions on how the regional government 
should separate “normal religious activities” and “ethnic customs” from “religious extremist 
thoughts”. Prefectural-level government took this document as their guide to implement de-
extremification policy.115 A key instrument, according to commentators of this policy, is to employ 
cultural and educational resource to counter the influence of “religious extremist thoughts,” through 
                                                      
108 《十个“讲清楚”藏区维稳宣传材料》 
109 《藏区维稳宣传学习材料汇编》 




114 Original Chinese title: 《关于进一步依法治理非法宗教活动遏制宗教极端思想渗透工作的若干指导意见》
（新党办发〔2013〕11 号） 
115 http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/xjqjdh/  
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organizing cultural events and public campaigns revolving around “de-extremification” and “modern 
culture,” as well as promoting public education on strengthening one’s national identification.116  
Despite Zhang’s effort to repress the ethnic minority dissidents, the central leadership was 
apparently not satisfied with his performance. Two years after Xu assumed the top leadership, in late 
August 2016, the state media suddenly announced that the central leadership decided to replace the 
XUAR leadership. Chen Quanguo, who had worked as the Party Secretary of Tibet (TAR) since 
2011, will be reassigned to Xinjiang (XUAR) to replace Zhang Chunxian.117 Observers believed that 
the reassignment was intended to apply Chen’s securitization strategy, tested in Tibet since 2011, 
now to Xinjiang as well. Indeed, immediately after Chen took over the XUAR leadership, the 
autonomous regions saw a dramatic shift towards heavy-handed measures against the indigenous 
Turkic-speaking minorities, particularly the Uyghurs. The regional government stopped issuing 
passports to local residents who are ethnic Uyghur while also began recalling those already issued. 
Media reported that Uyghur students studying abroad – particularly in countries such as Egypt and 
Turkey – have been either blackmailed, incentivized, or lured back to China, upon which they were 
immediately arrested and sent back to detention in Xinjiang. The local authority also engaged in a 
number of mass propaganda campaign in the name of promoting ethnic solidarity, targeting religious 
practices by the indigenous Muslim population. Last but not least, starting from 2017, Xinjiang 
witnesses a massive buildup of detention centers across the autonomous region. Tens of thousands 
of ethnic minorities, mostly Uyghur, are now believed to be held in hundreds of such centers, which 
are publicly known as “De-extremification Training Center”. XUAR Regulation on De-
                                                      
116 http://www.cssn.cn/zjx/zjx_zjsj/201507/t20150703_2065158.shtml  
117 http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0830/c1001-28676010.html  
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extremification (2017)118 passed by XUAR People’s Congress Standing Committee seems to provide 
the legal basis. For reference, see article 14 of the regulation.119 
 
7.2.3 Consolidating Central Control 
There were also a number of important developments at the center level. In April 2016, Wang 
Zhangwei was removed from the SEAC directorship, a position that he had held since 2013, and 
replaced by Bater (Ch: bate’er), former chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
(IMAR). Wang was also relieved from his duty as the vice director of the United Front Work 
Department (UFWD), which he had held since 2015 and which was taken over by Bater as well. 
Wang’s old comrade and SEAC vice director Tondrub Wangben was also relieved from his position, 
which was turned over to Li Changping, an ethnic Tibetan cadre, a former member of the Sichuan 
Party Committee Standing Committee, as well as the director of the Sichuan Agricultural Work 
Committee (Ch: nonggongwei).120 Before Li’s last position, he was the governor of the Ganzi Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture. It was widely rumored that Wang’s removal had to do with his conciliatory 
approach towards ethnic and religious minorities, in particular, his leniency towards Islam in China’s 
northwest.  
During the 2018 “Two Session” – the annual twin meetings of the National People’s Congress 
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – Xi administration announced a major 
reform plan, which involving a restructuration of the central government and party organizations. 
Observers pointed out that the move was designed to resolve the bureaucratic “turf war,” 
consolidate central control over the policy-making process, as well as improve inter-departmental 
                                                      
118 Original Chinese title: “新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例” 
119 Original Chinese content: “第十四条 去极端化应当做好教育转化工作，实行个别教育与集中教育相结合，
法治教育与帮教活动相结合，思想教育、心理辅导、行为矫正与技能培训相结合，教育转化与人文关怀相
结合，增强教育转化成效” http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0330/c186332-29942874.html  
120 https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1455535  
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coordination in implementing major national strategies. Two agencies particularly relevant for minzu 
policy – the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) and the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs (SARA) – were affected. SEAC, a ministerial body within the State Council, would from now 
on be under the command of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP. SARA, an 
agency belonging to the State Council, would be absorbed into the UFWD and become its 
subdivision. UFWS would lead the work regarding religious affairs, ethnic affairs, as well as oversea 
Chinese affairs (Ch: qiaowu).121   
 
7.3 Fragmented Knowledge Community 
7.3.1 Further Professionalization of Minzu Political Studies 
During this period, the knowledge community of minzu policy continued to show diversifying 
and pluralizing trends. Ethno-National Politics continues to be a main driving force behind this 
development. In December 2013, the Institute of Nationality Politics and Borderland Governance 
(Ch: minzu zhengzhi yu bianjiang zhili yanjiuyuan) is inaugurated at Yunnan University.122 The institute’s 
stated goal is “to become an ‘academic high-ground’ (Ch: xueshu gaodi) for research on ethno-
national politics (Ch: minzu zhengzhi)123 and borderland governance both in and outside China, a 
high-level think tank providing policy consultation for the party and the government, and a key base 
for training talents in ethnic politics and borderland governance in China”. Research being 
undertaken at the institute can be sub-divided into ten categories, including: 1) deepening and 
expanding of basic theories of ethno-national politics, 2) political science on minzu questions in 
China, 3) comparative study of ethno-national politics in China and abroad, 4) basic theories of 
borderland political science, 5) theory and practice of borderland governance, 6) China’s land 
                                                      
121 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2018-03-22/doc-ifyskeue4716783.shtml  
122 http://www.inpfg.ynu.edu.cn/gywm/jj.htm  
123 See translation notes in chapter 1. 
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frontier and its governance, 7) China’s interest frontier (Ch: liyi bianjiang) and its governance, 8) 
China’s security frontier (Ch: anquan bianjiang) and its governance, 9) comparative study of 
borderland governance in China and abroad, 10) challenges for China’s borderland governance as a 
result of neighboring countries’ borderland policy.  
Zhou Ping, now a leading scholar of ethno-national politics in China, heads the institute and is 
accredited as the Chief Expert (Ch: shouxi zhuanjia).124 Zhou is also the current vice president of the 
Chinese Political Science Association and receives stipend from the State Council as a special expert 
of the government. As previous chapters have shown, Zhou has been working to promote the field 
of ethno-national political science in China since the 1990s. According to the institute’s own records, 
Zhou was heavily involved in behind-the-door consultation for the SEAC’s preparatory work for the 
2014 Central Conference on Ethnic Work as well as for Xi Jinping’s speech at the conference.125 In 
the first case, Zhou provided SEAC a special research report on the topic “Salient Questions in 
Ethno-National Theory and Policy in Contemporary China and Abroad”.126 In the second case, Xi 
Jinping’s speech allegedly incorporated a number of Zhou’s opinions, particularly regarding the 
adjustment of the value-orientation Chinese nation (Ch: zhonghua minzu) and minzu policy and the 
idea that ethnic autonomous regions should assume also certain obligations aside from enjoying 
their (special) rights. It is also reported that Zhou was commissioned by SEAC to conduct research 
on incorporating the idea of Chinese nation into both the Chinese Constitution and the Party 
Charter.  
In addition to research, the institute works actively with the authority to provide training services 
to cadres. Since its inception, the institute has been working with both the Yunnan Provincial United 
Front Work Department and Provincial Ethnic Affairs Commission to train “provincial-level 
                                                      
124 http://www.inpfg.ynu.edu.cn/gywm/sxzj.htm  
125 http://www.inpfg.ynu.edu.cn/shfw/jczx.htm  
126 Original Chinese title: 当代国内外民族理论政策聚焦问题.  
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religious leaders” (Ch: shengji zongjiao lingxiu). Until 2016, the institute has trained more than 900 
cadres in ethnic work and more than 100 personnel in religious affairs management.127 In June 2016, 
the institute became the host for “Research Base (Ch: yanjiu jidi) for Nationality Politics and 
Borderland Governance of Chinese Association of Political Science”.128 It also operates two major 
databases: Specialty Database of Geopolitics and Borderland Governance129 and Big Data Platform 
for Borderland and Geopolitics.130  
2013 also saw the founding of another research center for ethno-national politics, the Institute 
of Ethno-National Political Research (Ch: minzu zhengzhi yanjiuyuan) at Southwest University of 
Political Science and Law.131 Zhou Ping also serves as the Chief Expert for this institute, as well as 
its director. The institute is a collaboration between the university and the State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission (SEAC) and operates under the designation “SEAC Research Base for Minzu Theory 
and Policy”.132  
During this period, scholars of ethno-national politics also began to mobilize their members 
across the country and sought to consolidate a dedicated community of their particular interests. 
From 2013 to 2016, the publishing house of the CASS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology’s 
flagship journal Ethno-National Studies (Ch: minzu yanjiu) led the initiative to organize four “Forum on 
Chinese Minzu Theory and Ethno-National Politics,” each year with a different institutional partner. 
The first Forum was co-organized with East China University of Political Science and Law’s 
Institute of Political Science under the title “Ethno-National (Minzu) and Ethnic Politics Studies in 
                                                      
127 http://www.inpfg.ynu.edu.cn/shfw/shpx.htm  
128 http://www.inpfg.ynu.edu.cn/info/1042/1017.htm ; http://www.cqjw.gov.cn/Item/6370.aspx  
129 Original Chinese title: 地缘政治与边疆治理特色资料库. 
130 Original Chinese title: 边疆与地缘大数据平台.  
131 http://appa.swupl.edu.cn/ghgk/ghgk1/index.htm  
132 For more information about this type of “research bases,” see 
http://www.seac.gov.cn/art/2018/1/23/art_144_298504.html (SEAC)  
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Comparative Perspective” in August 2013.133 According to conference participants, the forum 
started a useful platform for interdisciplinary research and exchange between ethnology and political 
science in China.134 The second Forum was co-organized with Guangxi University for Nationalities 
under the title “Academic Symposium on Institutions, Rights, and National Identification”135 in 
October 2014. The conference agenda reflected an increasing recognition of the need for rethinking 
and reorienting institutions of ethnic affairs management around the strengthening of national 
identification (J. 俊毅 Ma 马 2015). The third Forum was co-organized again with East China 
University of Political Science and Law’s Institute of Political Science under the title “Academic 
Symposium on Ethno-National Politics and Modernizing Ethnic Affairs Governance”136 in 
December 2015. The fourth and the latest Forum was co-organized with Dianxi Normal University 
of Science and Technology under the title “Minzu Theory with Chinese Characteristics and 
Significant Development in Ethno-National Politics in the New Era in Comparative Perspective”137 
in October 2016.  
These meetings reflect the increasing salience of ethno-national politics in China as well as the 
growing recognition of the need for an interdisciplinary effort to approach the minzu question in 
China. Moreover, they demonstrate the pluralization of the knowledge community as increasingly 
more fields are invited to participate in the discussion. Take the second Forum in Nanning as an 
example, more than 80 participants came from over 17 universities and research institutes across the 
country, roughly half of them (8) were not from traditionally minzu-focused schools, such as the 
                                                      
133 Original Conference title in Chinese: “比较视野下的民族与族群政治研究” 
http://psi.ecupl.edu.cn/cp/cpchina/inner_pages/conferences/201308/agenda.htm  
134 http://www.cssn.cn/zx/201604/t20160403_2949886_5.shtml  
135 Original Conference title in Chinese: “制度·权利·国家认同学术研讨会” 
http://www.scuec.edu.cn/s/211/t/1322/6e/7b/info93819.htm  
136 Original Conference title in Chinese: “民族政治与民族事务治理现代化学术研讨会” 
http://www.ecupl.edu.cn/_s2/9c/07/c65a39943/page.psp  
137 Original Conference title in Chinese: “比较视野下新时期中国特色民族理论与政治大发展” 
http://www.wynu.edu.cn/info/1088/3202.htm  
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nationalities institutes (Ch: minzu yuanxiao). The Third Forum in Shanghai attracted more than 60 
participants from over 12 universities and research institutes, again roughly half of them (5) were 
from non minzu-focused schools. The latest one in Lincang also had a similar composition in terms 
of its participants.  
Lastly, scholars also began to utilize venues outside of traditional academic journals to publish 
their research and exchange opinions. From 2013 to 2017, a book-series were compiled every year 
under the title “Studies of Ethno-National Politics” (Ch: minzu zhengzhi jikan).138 By 2017, four 
volumes have been published by the Social Sciences Academic Press (Ch: shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe) in Beijing. The leading editor is Qing Jue, professor and vice chancellor of the Central 
Minzu University and also a nationally known expert on ethno-national politics.   
 
7.3.2 Rise of Government Think Tanks 
During this period, the government also became increasingly active in pursuing cultivating 
knowledge communities that suit their particular policy and/or political needs. A number of scholars 
also actively pushed for the development of specialized knowledge community oriented towards 
policy consultation (Jian 鉴 Wang 王 2014) . A dedicated policy research unit for governance in 
Xinjiang, “Xinjiang Think Tank” (Ch: xinjiang zhiku) was established in February 2015, led by the 
Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies of CASS.139 The state-led initiative was met with strong 
receptive attitude from the officials, including members from the Central Politburo Standing 
Committee, the XUAR Party Committee, the Central Secretariat, State Ethnic Affairs Commission 
(SEAC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and the CPPCC’s Ethnic 
                                                      
138 Original Chinese title of the volume: “民族政治辑刊”, see http://www.jikan.com.cn/collectedPapers_516.html  
139 http://bjs.cssn.cn/xwzx/xwzx_tzgg/201805/t20180502_4220551.shtml  
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and Religious Affairs Committee.140 According to the press release from CASS, more than 60 
experts from government and civilian research units as well as universities participated in the 
founding events as well, suggesting that the personnel make-up of Xinjiang Think Tank is likely also 
a combination between the policy researchers and academic ones.  
In June 2016, a similar policy research unit for Tibet, “Tibet Think Tank” (Ch: xizang zhiku) was 
also established in Beijing and led by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of CASS.141 
Similar to the Xinjiang Think Tank, Tibet Think Tank received endorsement from a wide range of 
high-level party and state officials. Interestingly, neither Xinjiang Think Tank nor Tibet Thank Tank 
is based or led by their respective regional Academy of Social Sciences, which have been and remain 
the one of the most influential government-sponsored research units on socio-political issues within 
each region. The concentration of leadership in the capital-based Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences seems to confirm the central leadership’s intention to exert greater influence over regional 
policy-making under Xi Jinping. At the same time, the division of labor between two different units 
with the CASS also suggests a possible differentiated approach for Xinjiang and Tibet policy 
respectively. The Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies – which is charge of the Xinjiang Think 
Tank – has a known record of promoting hardline approach towards ethnic minorities in particularly 
Xinjiang, whereas the SEAC-affiliated Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology has the stronghold 
of the party’s theoreticians of minzu policy, defending the status quo against challengers such as Ma 
Rong and the “two-Hu” during the debate from early 2000s to 2014.  
In addition to the aforementioned SEAC Research Base for Minzu Theory and Policy, which 
have been established in collaboration with universities and research institutes across the country for 
years, SEAC made renewed effort to strengthen its inventory of policy consultation by announcing 
                                                      
140 http://www.guoyancm.com/dongtai/zk/2015-02-16/1412.html  
141 http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/zzxzt_zzx/ds/dsj/201612/t20161226_3358532.shtml  
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further plan for creating and supporting policy think tanks. In December 2016, the SEAC released 
the “Plan for Building the State Ethnic Affairs Commission’s Ethnic Work Think Tank (2016-
2020)”.142  
 
7.4 Inter-paradigm Professional Debate 
The Second Xinjiang Work Conference and the Fourth Central Conference on Ethnic Work in 
2014 had some limited effect on tempering the tension caused by the division among scholars of 
minzu. Nonetheless, disagreements persisted. Such an outcome is likely due to the ambiguous 
message sent from the central leadership, which is best summarized in the statement that the 
authority would continue to “uphold and improve the system of ethnic regional autonomy”. 
Although the expression already existed during Hu Jintao administration, the continuing 
endorsement of this expression against the sharp disagreement regarding this policy suggests a 
neutral, if not deliberatively ambivalent, stand of the leadership towards it. Key participants from the 
pre-Xi debate were quick to capitalize on the ambiguity of the term to elaborate on how their 
preferred policy direction has received the authority’s endorsement (Hao 郝 2015; R. 戎 Ma 马 
2015).  
The full-text of Xi’s speech was not (and remains not) publicized, with only partial segments 
included and released in the edited volume of selected speeches by Xi. Some scholars have 
attempted to use un-disclosed content to further advance their case. Yet the apparent semi-secret 
nature of those content limited their impact on the wider scholarly discourse. Notably, despite the 
allegedly explicit call by Xi Jinping asking to stop using the term “de-politicization”, scholars 
                                                      
142 Original Chinese title: “国家民委民族工作智库建设规划（2016—2020 年）”. The full-text of the document is 
available via http://www.ncpssd.org/topics/message.aspx?id=88  
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continued to employ alternative expressions of the same idea in their exchanges. It appears that in 
the immediate aftermath of two meetings, there were relatively little substantive base.  
 
7.4.1 Interpreting the Center’s Message 
Immediately following the Second Central Conference on Xinjiang Work (2014.05.28-29) and 
the Fourth Central Conference on Ethnic Work (2014.09.28-29), main participants in the previous 
debate published their response and updated their positions. Hao Shiyuan was first to react to the 
twin meetings in 2014. Writing in Journal of Minzu University of China (Ch: zhongyang minzu daxue 
xuebao), Hao explicitly titled his article as an interpretation of the message from central leadership: 
“Ethnic Regional Autonomy: What Was Discussed at the Central Conference on Ethnic Work?” In 
this article, Hao focused on the criticism against ethnic regional autonomy during the earlier 
debate143 – a point both the “depoliticization” thesis and “second generation” thesis have made. To 
show that the central leadership has sided with his view, Hao used a quote from Xi – the one which 
SEAC director Wang Zhengwei also referred to144 – as his weapon to attack anyone who dare to 
question further the legitimacy of his position:  
 
“He [Xi Jinping] further pointed out that: ‘some people said that we should no longer keep the 
system of ethnic regional autonomy anymore and that ethnic autonomous regions could run the 
same arrangements as other provinces and municipalities. This view is wrong and politically 
harmful. I shall state it again clearly: the idea that the system of ethnic regional autonomy should 
be abolished must stop.’” (Hao 郝 2015, 8) 
 
                                                      
143 See chapter 6, section 6.4 “Inter-paradigm Political Debate”.  
144 See chapter 7 (this chapter), section 7.2 “Collaborative Policy Subsystem”. 
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Hao was careful, however, not to let him be interpreted as promoting ethnic federalism. Once he 
made it clear that any attempt to abolish China’s ethnic regional autonomy would be illegitimate, 
Hao went to great length to clarify what he exactly advocates. A careful comparison of his 
discussion of ethnic regional autonomy with his earlier pieces shows that Hao has in fact adjusted 
his position to become consistent to the balanced position of the leadership, despite what might 
appear to be a one-sided victory of his position from his confident language in the first part of his 
article. For example, Hao explicitly prioritized national unity over ethnic regional autonomy, quoting 
what was likely lines from the speeches at the Central Conference on Ethnic Work that:145 
 
“Ethnic regional autonomy is not the kind of autonomy enjoyed solely by any particular ethnic 
group; an ethnic autonomous region is not a region owned solely by any particular ethnic group. 
This point must be understood clearly, otherwise [we] will get on a wrong path” (Hao 郝 2015, 
9) 
  
For another example, Hao echoed Xi Jinping in suggesting that ethnic regional autonomy must 
not only consider the “ethnic factor” but also the “regional factor” (Hao 郝 2015, 10) As previously 
discussed, this is a point made by Xi in his speech at the 2014 meeting on ethnic work, which was 
something quite plausibly inspired if not directly informed by the reform advocates such as Ma Rong 
and Hu Angang & Hu Lianhe. By emphasizing his categorical rejection of the earlier reform 
proposal while explicitly aligning himself with ideas clearly traceable to the former, Hao appeared to 
be contradicting himself. However, what is clear from a comparison of his 2015 article and Xi’s 2014 
                                                      
145 The content was put between quotation marks in Hao’s article without any source provided. Given that Hao was 
present at the Central Conference on Ethnic Work and this article of him was mainly about interpreting the discussion at 
the meeting, it is very likely that he was referring to specific passages of the documents being circulated at the meeting, 
but which was not convenient for him to share or even name.  
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speech is that Hao has adjusted his position according to the tones set by Xi Jinping. It is this tone – 
which, as previously discussed, represents the new leadership’s attempt to mediate and rationalize 
the gap between different interests and demands revolving around minzu policy – that gave both 
Xi’s speech and Hao’s interpretation the self-contradictory character.  
The earliest and one of the major contenders in the debate, PKU professor Ma Rong, also 
published his reading of the twin meetings. A month after Hao’s article, Ma’s reaction to the 
meeting, titled “Holding the Flag, Standing the Ground, Adjusting the Direction, Carrying Out 
Reform Based on Reality——An Interpretation of the Central Conference on Ethnic Work”, was 
published in Qinghai Journal of Ethnology (Ch: qinghai minzu yanjiu). Ma first reviewed different opinions 
present in the previous debate. After carefully avoiding the phrase “depoliticization” or “second 
generation minzu policy” in discussing his and other reform advocates’ views while highlighting 
their opponents’ criticism against the existing policy, Ma concluded that these seriously divergent 
and antagonistic positions have “led to a certain degree of ideological confusion and disagreements 
in our country’s minzu theory circle and ethnic work community” (R. 戎 Ma 马 2015, 83). The main 
body of Ma’s article was devoted to offering his understanding of the central leadership’s message at 
the meeting. As his 16-character title already implied, Ma’s interpretation consists of two parts: 
“Holding the Flag, Standing the Ground” and “Adjusting the Direction, Carrying Out Reform 
Based on Reality”. The first part, on which Ma spent only half a page, refers to maintaining the 
consistency of ideological framework so to ensure political stability during times of reform and 
transition, a practice that Ma believed was similar to Deng Xiaoping’s strategy in pushing the 
“Opening-Up and Reform” (R. 戎 Ma 马 2015, 84). The second part, which Ma used more than five 
pages and broke down into 11 sub-sections to elaborate, detailed his understanding of all the “new 
elements” to minzu policy that the center has adopted at the meeting. Clearly Ma wanted his reader 
to know that the meeting was mainly about “change” rather than “non-change”. Although he 
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admitted that ethnic regional autonomy should not be abolished, he went into great detail discussing 
how the existing minzu policy should be “improved” along the lines that he had been advocating, 
e.g. considering both “ethnic factor” and “regional factor” in designing affirmative actions, 
promoting “contact, exchange, and integration among ethnic groups”, and guarding against “local 
parochial nationalism” in minority-concentrated areas.    
 
7.4.2 “Signaling Left, Turning Right”? 
In a way, Hao Shiyuan and Ma Rong’s reactions capture the essence of the scholarly discourse 
about minzu policy in the post-2014 era. On the one hand, the twin meetings in 2014 made it clear 
that the new central leadership under Xi Jinping had no intention to systematically redesign the 
policy in a top-down fashion as some had advocated; on the other hand, the meetings did reveal or 
at least imply that the center would be willing to adjust the policy in face of new circumstances and 
new challenges and to allow inconsistencies across different places and groups. This seemingly self-
contradictory – or “pragmatic” – message essentially opened door to a multiplicity of policy changes 
that the reform advocates had wanted and that would allow the policy to move in an integrationist 
direction without naming them a “depoliticization” policy or “second generation policy”. Although 
the center sent a strong message rejecting any proposal to abolish ethnic regional autonomy, given 
its widely acknowledged insufficient implementation even among Chinese academics themselves 
(Hao 郝, Zhang 张, and Ma 马 2014), it is rather evident that the center intends only to maintain the 
existing policy – of which ethnic regional autonomy constitutes the core element – on a rhetorical 
level while allowing reforms that could undermine the autonomy of ethnic minorities to be carried 
on, e.g. pushing nationwide Mandarin education and enforcing stricter control over practice of 
religious faith. The scholar discourse was highly responsive to this message: aside from implying a 
small victory from Xi’s rejection of abolishing the ethnic regional autonomy, Hao had to conceded 
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to a number of points which were originally championed by the reform advocates and now 
accredited by the central leadership; Ma, on the other hand, need only to admit that there were some 
“disagreements” and acknowledge the correctness of the leadership’s decision to maintain ethnic 
regional autonomy, before boldly delving in great detail into all sort of policy adjustments that are 
not only consistent with his earlier position but now granted legitimacy from the top.  
This pattern is reflected in the broader scholarly community as well. On the other hand, a few 
scholars continue to pen criticism against the “de-politicization” and “second generation minzu 
policy” thesis, and use venues such as the Annual Conference of the Association of Chinese Minzu 
Theory to publicize their view (Shizhe 世哲 Liu 刘 2015; Zuo 左 and Liu 刘 2015). On the other 
hand, an increasing number of people began to discuss ideas that were included in the earlier reform 
proposals while paying a lip service to a rejection of “de-politicization” and “second generation” in 
order to appear “politically correct”. For example, law professor at Shanghai University Pan 
Chuanbiao proposed a “de-legalization” of ethnic status (C. 传表 Pan 潘 2016). In their coauthored 
article, Chen Huaichuan from Xinjiang Normal University and Gan Wenxiu from Hexi Academy 
sought to delink the concept of “ethnic minorities” from “socially disadvantaged” (H. 怀川 Chen 陈 
and Gan 甘 2016). Hu Youze and Cheng Rong from Northwest University for Nationalities 
discussed the problems the problems with the policy of “Two Fewers, One Lenienncy”, a measure 
designed to grant legal leniency to individuals of ethnic minority background, and proposed that the 
policy should be abolished in the future (Hu 虎 and Cheng 程 2016). In a different article, Li Jian 
from Sichuan University also discussed this topic, linking specifically the policy “Two Fewers, One 
Lenienncy” with the problem of “politicizing” or “ethicizing” otherwise normal legal disputes (Jian 
剑 Li 李 2016). On the more theoretical side, Zhao Gang from Yanbian celebrated the introduction 
of the concepts such as “governance” and “citizen-society” (Ch: gongmin shehui) into the minzu policy 
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discourse while highlighting his rejection of both the “depoliticization” and “second generation” 
theses (Zhao 赵 2016).  
All in all, greater space for more critical discussion of minzu policy has clearly followed in the 
years after the twin meetings. Critics of the earlier reform proposals, represented by Hao Shiyuan, 
adjusted their position in a way much closer to those proposals even as they continue to criticize the 
latter rhetorically. On the other hand, more scholars are emboldened to take on specific issues of 
minzu policy and examine them critically with theoretical and conceptual tools different from that of 





Chapter 8 Violence, Ethnicity, and Minzu Debate 
 
8.1 Alternative Explanations 
The analysis so far (chapter 4 to chapter 7) demonstrates that the evolution of the PRC debate 
from 1979 to 2017 generally corresponds to the expectation of my theory. It offers positive evidence 
that a covariation exists between the two explanatory variables – the conflict in the policy subsystem 
and the fragmentation in the knowledge community – and my dependent variable – the character of 
the academic policy debate, measured by the level of academic politicization and theoretical 
heterogeneity. However, as we discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3), this analysis alone – i.e. the single 
unit, diachronic analysis of PRC minzu debate from 1979 to 2017 – is not sufficient to rule out 
alternative explanations.  
Specifically, I considered two alternative explanations based on two potentially relevant yet 
unaccounted for factors. The first one is the intensity of ethnic violence (hereafter abbreviated as 
“violence”), which could act as an external factor politicizing a debate through incentivizing 
academics to seize the window of opportunity so to maximize their impact on the policy discourse. 
This could challenge my hypothesized causal link between the conflict in the policy subsystem and 
the academic politicization of the debate, because if politically-oriented writings of academics are a 
direct reaction to heightened ethnic violence in the country, then it means that the conflict among 
political elites has no significant bearing on the debate, if at all. The implication would be that 
academics are triggered by and directly act upon what common people would perceive as politically 
important events, i.e. incidents of ethnic violence, rather than motivated by and act on behalf of the 
policy-making elites. Should this be the case, we should observe that the level of academic 
politicization is most sensitive to the occurrence of ethnic violence. Alternatively, if ethnic violence 
has no direct bearing on the debate, then we should observe no such associations.  
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The second one is the ethnic identification of the authors (hereafter abbreviated as “ethnicity”), 
which could operate as an internal factor polarizing a debate through incentivizing authors of ethnic 
minority background to be particularly politically-active and to identify strongly with a particular 
(“accommodationist”) policy position. This would challenge my hypothesized causal link between 
the fragmentation in the knowledge community and the theoretical heterogeneity of the debate, 
because if accommodationist-leaning pieces by academics in the minzu policy debate are mostly 
caused by a writer’s ethnic identification – or more likely, the status of being an ethnic minority – 
then it means that a person’s identification with a particular research tradition has no significant 
bearing on one’s expressed opinions in the debate. By extension, this would also mean that a greater 
fragmentation of knowledge community – in the sense of a pluralization of research traditions – 
does not lead to a greater variety of theoretical viewpoints. Alternatively, if ethnic identification has 
no strong influence on a person’s expressed opinions in a debate, then we should observe no such 
associations.  
Both “violence” and “ethnicity” constitute reasonable competing alternative explanations. To 
reinforce the causal inference in my theory, I need to rule them out or at least demonstrate that their 
influence is not as strong as the primary explanatory variables in my theory. This chapter takes up 
that task. It consists of two separate tests, each dealing with one alternative explanation. The first 
test juxtaposes the occurrence of ethnic violence with scholarly pieces dedicated to debating minzu 
policy from 1990-2005 in order to check whether a plausible correlation exists between the two. The 
second test measures and compares the impact of a list of individualized demographic factors on 
one’s policy position in order to check whether ethnic identification – specifically the status of being 
an ethnic minority – plays a bigger role than one’s disciplinary background in shaping one’s policy 
position. This test was carried out using a content analysis of the minzu policy debate between 2000 
and 2014. To perform these two tests, I use an original dataset, the PRC Minzu Debate Dataset, that 
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consists of Chinese academic journal articles which were published between 1990 and 2014 and 
which focus specifically on minzu policy of China. For the first test, I also borrowed the Ethnic 
Violence in China (EVC) dataset created by Xun Cao, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu, James A. Piazza, 
and Yingjie Wei (X. Cao et al. 2018)146. Below I first present the research design (8.2), where I 
elaborate on the logic behind the research design as well as the data used for the tests. Then I 
present my analysis and discuss my findings (8.3). Based on the two tests, I argue that both 
alternative explanations seem unpersuasive and that my theory still holds (8.4).  
 
8.2 Research Design 
8.2.1 Logic 
The first test is concerned with the following proposition: the occurrence of ethnic violence – 
instead of the conflict in the policy subsystem – plays a larger role in the politicization of the 
academic debate on minzu policy. If this is the case, then we should expect to see the debate 
reacting strongly to occurrence of ethnic violence. We know from our analysis in the previous 
chapters that during the period between 1989 to 2003, i.e. Jiang Zemin’s term, there was a gradual 
politicization of the debate due to the intensification of intra-elite conflict. The rising ethnic tensions 
in Xinjiang since the 1980s caused the balance between soft- and hard-line approaches no longer 
sustainable and led to a regressive turn in Beijing’s Xinjiang policy in the mid-1990s. As a result, the 
academic policy debate became more politically-oriented. The co-presence of both rising ethnic 
violence and increased intra-elite conflict during the same period means that it is challenging to 
separate the effect of one from the other. However, while intra-elite conflict as a structural feature 
of the policy subsystem does not usually vary greatly in a short period of time, the occurrence of 
                                                      
146 See Xun Cao’s personal webpage: https://sites.psu.edu/xuncao/data/ (accessed January 10th 2019).  
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ethnic violence does. Thus, given what we know about the structural feature of policy subsystem 
during the above said period, i.e. from 1989 to 2003, I could simply juxtapose the occurrence of 
ethnic violence in Xinjiang per year with the number of published academic articles on minzu policy 
per year during this period. If ethnic violence directly triggers more politicized debate, we should 
observe more pieces about discussing minzu policy following intense occurrence of violence.  
The second test is concerned with the proposition: a person’s ethnic identification – instead of 
his/her affiliation with a research tradition - plays a larger role in the person’s expressed policy 
preference during the debate. From the previous chapters, we know that during the intense inter-
paradigm political debate from 2003 to 2013, academics in the minzu debate was divided into two 
main opinion camps largely along the line of “accommodation vs. integration”. This result was due 
to both the intense conflict among elites in the policy subsystem and a greater fragmentation in the 
knowledge community from the previous period. The disagreeing policy opinions that we observed 
were not only expressed in highly politicized language but also rooted in strikingly different 
theoretical assumptions. However, if this later outcome was mainly caused by the writers’ ethnic 
identification rather than his or her affiliation with a particular research tradition, it means that we 
should observe a clear effect of one’s ethnic identification – e.g. Han vs. non-Han – on one’s 
preference for a particular policy position – e.g. integration vs. accommodation. To assess this 
proposition, I could look into a sample of academic policy debate in order to examine whether such 
association exists. The policy debate between 2003 and 2013 is a good candidate for the test because 
during this time we saw many academics openly and explicitly identifying with contrasting policy 
positions. A survey of this debate that incorporates both the content of each opinion piece and the 
demographic information of its author would allow me to check whether one’s ethnic identification 
explains better the policy preference than the affiliation with a research tradition, as my theory 




As said above, to perform the two tests I use a dataset consisting of academic journal articles 
that were published in PRC between 1990 and 2014 and whose substantive focus was China’s minzu 
policy. I used CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) academic journal database to 
generate a sample of the minzu policy debate. To select only articles that discuss contemporary 
Chinese minzu policy, I performed a two-steps filtering. In the first step, I run an automatic search 
on all academic journal articles from 1990 to 2014, using a keyword combination of “minzu policy” 
(Ch: minzu zhengce) in the article title and “China” (Ch: zhongguo) in the subject area. This operation 
allows me to pick out articles that place an emphasis on minzu policy (as it is significant enough to 
be in the title), with reference also to China. The automatic search returns me with over 450 results. 
Although this may look like a substantial size of material, the majority of them are in fact irrelevant 
to the topic of this study. To improve the sample representativeness, I had to exclude articles lacking 
a substantive discussion on contemporary Chinese minzu policy. This operation was done manually, 
but according to a clearly defined guideline and in a consistent manner. Those that are excluded can 
be broken down into four categories: 1) studies of foreign countries’ minzu policy (exempted from 
removal if discussion of China is included), 2) studies of pre-PRC minzu policy (e.g. ancient China, 
Republican China, exempted from removal if discussion of contemporary China is included), 3) 
book reviews (on related subjects), and 4) curriculum design (on related subjects). In the end, only 
225 articles were retained for the entire dataset. From here, two different sub-datasets were created 
for the different purposes of the two tests respectively.  
For the first test (the “violence” hypothesis), I limit the time scope to between 1990 and 2005, 
which gives me 76 articles. This is so because to test whether ethnic conflicts had any impact on the 
minzu policy debate, I borrowed the Ethnic Violence in China (EVC) constructed by Xun Cao et al, 
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which only has data on the occurrence of ethnicity-related violence in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) between 1990 and 2005. It would make little sense for me to include the debate 
data after 2005. EVC dataset is useful because it is to-date the most systematic dataset on ethnic-
conflicts in contemporary Xinjiang. Additionally, Xinjiang has been the major site of ethnic conflicts 
in the country during the last three decades or so. While it is geographically limited, the salience of 
ethnicity-related violence Xinjiang should give us some indication of the degree of the external 
shock on the knowledge community to produce policy-related pieces. According to the creators of 
EVC, ethnic violence is defined as “the intentional execution of violent acts, perpetrated by 
individuals or groups of ethnic minority status, with political motivations”. More specifically, 
because of the focus on Xinjiang, the dataset “only include[s] violent events that at least involved 
one ethnic minority” but not those that “occur between members of the Han majority or events 
occurring between Han civilians and the government” (X. Cao et al. 2018, 3). To perform the test, I 
compare the intensity of ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang with the intensity of academic policy debate 
during the same period (1990-2005) in order to see whether any correlation can be observed.  
For the second test (the “ethnicity” hypothesis), I carried out a content analysis on the academic 
policy debate using a sub-dataset limited to the period between 2000 and 2014. The content analysis 
allows me to capture the trajectory, patterns, and distribution of opinions of the entire expert 
community during the course of the debate. The time scope was chosen for the following reasons: 
2001 was the year when the first and, to-date, only amendment to the Law on Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy (LERA) was made. The amendment contains one important change with regard to the 
status of the law; instead of being an “important political institution” (Ch: zhongyao zhengzhi zhidu) of 
the PRC, LERA now is considered as a “basic political institution” (Ch: jiben zhengzhi zhidu). The 
LERA amendment set the stage for a new round of exchange of opinions. On the other hand, 2014 
saw the latest Central Conference on Ethnic Work, whereby the top leadership allegedly rejected a 
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minzu policy reform. By choosing to include articles from 2000 to 2014, I sought to capture the 
policy discourse during the entire cycle of post-2001 LERA amendment debate. All in all, 177 
articles were retained in the dataset for the second test. Below I further discuss the coding strategy 
for the content analysis required for the second test.  
 
8.2.3 Coding 
To enable the analysis for the second test, I coded the aforementioned 177 articles with a 
uniform scheme. For each piece, I extract two categories of information. The first category is 
“ideological reference”, which contains seven questions designed to summarize the general 
ideological frame of a given piece. I created the questions based on the signature terms of the 
successive CCP leadership’s ideological doctrine. To them I also added “Confucianism” (Ch: rujia or 
rujia sixiang) because of its recent revival as an alternative source of ideology to the orthodox party 
discourse (S. Wu 2014). “1” is given when an article invokes a certain term in the course of 
discussing China’s minzu policy, whereas “0” is given when the term is not mentioned or used in 
such a manner.  
Table 12 – Ideological and Prescriptive References 
# Ideological References 
Q1 Does the author emphasize Marxism? 
Q2 Does the author emphasize Mao Zedong Thought? 
Q3 Does the author emphasize Deng Xiaoping Theory? 
Q4 Does the author emphasize the Important Thought of Three Represents? 
Q5 Does the author emphasize the Scientific Outlook on Development? 
Q6 Does the author emphasize China Dream? 
Q7 Does the author emphasize Confucianism? 
# Prescriptive References 
Q1 Does the author emphasize the need to fight against ethnic splittism? 
Q2 Does the author emphasize the need to fight against religious extremism? 
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Q3 Does the author emphasize the need to fight against violent terrorism? 
Q4 Does the author emphasize the need to weaken ethnic consciousness of the minorities? 
Q5 Does the author emphasize the need to depoliticize ethnic relations? 
Q6 Does the author emphasize the need to adjust, update, or improve China’s minzu policy? 
Q7 Does the author emphasize the need to protect and promote minority languages? 
Q8 Does the author emphasize the need to protect and respect the freedom of religious faith? 
Q9 Does the author emphasize the need to uphold the system of ethnic regional autonomy? 
Q10 Does the author emphasize the need to enact autonomous regulations? 
 
The second category is “prescriptive reference”, which has ten questions and describes the types 
of tasks that an article prescribes for the Chinese government to focus on. I created these questions 
based on my knowledge of the policy discourse acquired from both my extensive fieldwork and the 
process of studying the material contained in this dataset. Similar with above, “1” is given when an 
article proposes a certain task to the reader, while “0” is given if this task is not mentioned or stated 
in such a manner. As one would expect, not every article addresses all the questions. However, this 
coding scheme fits the structure of most articles in my dataset.  
Once articles are coded, I proceeded to map out the trajectory and pattern of the policy debate, 
and clusters of opinions. To understand what each “cluster” means, i.e. what are the specific logics 
of their argumentation, I undertook an in-depth reading of the key texts within each cluster. The 
immersive experience in the Chinese scholarly community and interviews with key figures of the 
debate provide me particularly valuable insights as well as background knowledge. With a better 
understanding of the context and thus a more-informed examination of the texts’ arguments and 
rhetorical strategies, I was able to speculate on their effectiveness and impact on the discourse and 
policy-making.  
Lastly, in addition to analyzing the articles’ content, I also collected a basket of information on 
their authors. I obtained them either using the information in the articles, or when the former is 
unavailable, personnel profiles on school or other reliable public websites (e.g. Baidu Encyclopedia). 
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Relating the authors’ background with results from the content analysis of their articles allows me to 
test various explanations for the experts’ behaviors. Specifically, for each author I collect five 
categories of information: 1) membership in Chinese Marxist Ethnology, 2) ethnicity, 3) gender, 4) 
age, 5) position at a nationality institute (Ch: minzu yuanxiao). The first and the last question require a 
bit of clarification. “Chinese Marxist Ethnology” refers to the fields of studies most closely 
associated with the state’s minzu policymaking, e.g. “minzu theory” (Ch: minzu lilun), “minzu policy 
studies” (Ch: minzu zhengce yanjiu), and “ethnic and religious studies” (Ch: minzu zongjiao yanjiu). 
Nationality institutes, on the other hand, are higher education institutions historically designed for 
the tasks of policy-oriented ethnic minority studies, extending education to minority students, and 
the training of minority cadres (Jianmin 建民 Wang 王, Zhang 张, and Hu 胡 1998). As one can 
infer, a large number of Chinese Marxist Ethnologists used to work in nationality institutes. But this 
is no longer the case with the restoration of previously disbanded social sciences (L. Cheng and So 
1983). Thus, I consider them separately in my analysis. In sum, I expect the two to have a positive 
effect on one’s anti-reform/pro-status quo tendency, because they represent respectively the 
disciplinary and institutional link between an expert and the minzu policy establishment; in contrast, 
I expect ethnicity – the basis of the second alternative explanation – to have no effect on one’s anti-
reform/pro-status quo tendency.  
 
8.3 Testing Alternative Explanations 
8.3.1 Background 
To briefly recap the background of the debate captured in my dataset: since the 1980s, ethnicity-
related social conflicts in minority areas, particularly Tibet and Xinjiang, increasingly attracted 
people’s attention (M. Clarke 2007). Semi-public critical discussion surfaced in the early 2000s and 
gradually gained steam over the years. Among the earlier participants, Ma Rong’s “A New Approach 
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to Understand Ethnic Relations” was arguably the most notable piece (R. 戎 Ma 马 2004). In this 
article, Ma called for a major rethinking of minzu policy along the lines of “depoliticizing ethnic 
identities”. Critics stepped up their game in the aftermath of unrests in Tibet and Xinjiang, by calling 
openly for a different policy altogether. In 2011, Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe published their treaties 
on “the Second Generation Minzu Policy” (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011). When the article was 
republished by the prestigious Xinhua Wenzhai, a biweekly publication of the People’s Publishing 
House and a platform for discussing policy ideas among party elites, many believe this indicates 
potential support from the top. Within the academic community, voices against the reform appeared 
as early as Ma Rong’s 2004 “A New Approach”. Scholars from the Ethnology Institute of CASS 
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and various Nationality Institutes (minzu yuanxiao) were quick 
to sense the threat in Ma’s thesis and began taking counter-actions (Jianyue 建樾 Chen 陈 2005b; Y. 
玉屏 Chen 陈 2008; Xi’en 希恩 Wang 王 2009). Within months after the “Second Generation 
Minzu Policy” came out, the anti-reform experts exploded into a full-fledge policy advocacy 
campaign. 
The mobilization began in early 2012, when a “Symposium on Hot Topics in Ethnic Theory 
Studies” was convened in Beijing. Participants include not only ethnic minority studies experts 
across the country, but also representatives from State Ethnic Affairs Commission, United Front 
Work Department, Central Party School, and editors from a dozen of journal of ethnic minority 
studies. The symposium set the tone of the minzu policy establishment’s response: 
“depoliticization” and “second generation minzu policy” must be rejected (Pei 裴, Chen 陈, and 
Gong 公 2012). From then on, a nationwide coordinated counter campaign began. The leading 
writer of this camp, Hao Shiyuan from CASS, wrote and published four articles in a row in 2012 
alone, attacking the reform proposal from its logics to the evidence and the political implications 
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(Hao 郝 2012a, 2012b, 2012d, 2012c). Jin Binggao, Professor at Central Minzu University, also 
coauthored a number of attack pieces in very short span (B. 炳镐 Jin 金 and Xiao 肖 2012; B. 炳镐 
Jin 金, Pei 裴, and Xiao 肖 2012). From 2011 to 2014, the ethnic minority studies experts initiated 
and carried on a systematic anti-reform campaign. 
  
8.3.2 Violence and Academic Activism   
To test the “violence” hypothesis, I plot the occurrence of ethnic violence in Xinjiang and the 
number of academic articles on minzu policy debate per year together. As the graph below shows, 
there is very little correlation between the occurrence of violence and the intensity of debate. During 
the 1990s, the intensity of violence saw a first spike in 1993 before reaching the second spike as well 
as the most intense year in 1997. After 1997, however, the intensity of violence dropped significantly 
and never picked up again. In fact, from 2000 to 2005 the number of ethnic violence in Xinjiang was 
on average (3.5 incidents per year) much lower than the average number from 1990 to 1999 (19.2 
incidents per year). In contrast, the academic debate on minzu policy by and large maintained a 
similarly moderate pace. From 2000 to 2005 an average of 4.7 articles were published in comparison 
with the period from 1999 to 1999, when an average of 4.8 articles were published.  
This result is consistent with the finding in chapter 5, where I argue that during Jiang Zemin’s 
term, i.e. from 1989 to 2003, the academic debate on minzu policy was an intra-paradigm political 
one. The heightened ethnic conflict in Xinjiang did have a role to play in the debate, but only 
through its effect on the conflict in the policy subsystem. As it is shown in chapter 5, the party 
leadership under Jiang altered the policy for Xinjiang in response to the ethnic violence in the 
region. Because but it was a contested decision, the ensuing conflict among elites caused the debate 
to become politicized, even though the intensity of ethnic violence dropped afterwards, likely due to 
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the intensified security measures adopted by the XUAR authority. In sum, the test does not discover 
any correlation between the intensity of ethnic violence and the intensity of academic policy debate. 
The result is not conclusive, as the data on ethnic violence is limited to one region, however 
important it might be. Thus, I can only assume that given the available evidence, there is not 
sufficient proof for the first alternative explanation.  
 
8.3.3 Ethnicity and Policy Preference 
To test the “ethnicity” hypothesis, I first carry out a content analysis of the 177 articles. Below I 
first report the overall pattern uncovered through this operation. The overwhelming majority of the 
participants to the discussion on minzu policy are academics, including professors (30.94%), 
assistant professors (18.23%), lecturers (9.94%), doctoral students (9.94%), master students 
Table 13 – Ethnic Violence vs. 
Debate, 1990-2005 
Year # articles # violence 
1990 6 8 
1991 5 8 
1992 1 18 
1993 1 22 
1994 4 13 
1995 5 14 
1996 5 25 
1997 9 38 
1998 6 23 
1999 6 23 
2000 3 2 
2001 4 7 
2002 10 2 
2003 4 3 
2004 3 3 
2005 4 4 
 












# violence # articles
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(10.50%), research fellows (8.84%), assistant research fellows (2.76%). Together they comprise over 
90% of the authors. Less than one-third of the authors are female (26.52%).  
More than half of them are Han (55.80%), while slightly less than half are ethnic minorities as 
officially recognized by the Chinese government. Among the latter group, the Mongolian scholars 
made the most appearance (8.84%), followed by Korean (8.29%), Hui (4.97%), Manchu (3.87%) and 
Zhuang (3.87%). All in all, fifteen different ethnic groups are featured in the sample. While data on 
author’s age is incomplete, based on what we have -- 87% out of the total -- the age group “40-50” 
seem to have made the most appearance (28.18%), followed by age group “50-60” (21.55%) and age 
group “30-40” (16.02%).  
Most of the authors work in the higher education and research sector. 71 out of 181 (39.23%) 
work at nationality institutes, a special type of higher education institution similar to colleges and 
universities but with extra quota for ethnic minorities. Most of these schools are in regions with a 
relatively large ratio of minority in the local population. Colleges and Universities excluding 
nationality institutes comprise another 34.81%. Together they constitute 74.03%, or three-fourth of 
the entire sample. The next two in row are government-sponsored research institutes (10.50%), e.g. 
academy of social sciences, and Party Schools (8.84%). A handful of contributors also write from 
their official posts, either government agencies (2.75%) or party organs (1.10%).  
Geographically speaking, roughly one-third of the authors work in Beijing (32.60%), while the 
others spread across 26 provinces and autonomous regions (67.40%). The next three provincial 
units that made the most appearances are Hubei (8.84%), Yunnan (7.73%), and Inner Mongolia 
(5.52%). The allocation of the journal reflects an even more diverse pattern. While Beijing-based 
journals remains the relative majority (17.13%), the proportion is much closer to a few other 
provinces, such as Heilongjiang (12.71%), Guangxi (11.05%), and Yunnan (10.50%). 
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Figure 14 – Share of Articles by Author’s Affiliation, 2000-2014 
 
Figure 12 – Share of Articles by Author’s 
Occupation, 2000-2014 
 




Chronologically speaking, the discourse on minzu policy between 2000 and 2014 shows an 
increasing salience of the topic over time. During the first half of the entire period (2000-2007) the 
discussion appears to be less intense. One exception was 2002, which saw a spike in interests in 
minzu policy, possibly because the first amendment to the Law of Ethnic Regional Autonomy was 
passed by the National People’s Congress the year before (Feb 28th, 2001). After 2008, however, the 
topic became much more salient and continued to be so until the end of the second half (2008-
2014). The turning point is 08-09, when the number of articles suddenly jumped to double digits. 
This is likely due to the two widely publicized ethnic riots known as, respectively, the Lhasa “3-14 
incident” (2008) and the Urumqi “7-5 incident” (2009). Taken together, post-2007 articles account 
for 80.66% of the discussions on minzu policy, more than three-fourth of the sample. The intensity 
of discussion reached its peak around 2011, evidently due to the publication of Hu and Hu’s 
“Second Generation Minzu Policy” as discussed in the previous chapters. Breaking down the articles 
according to the occurrence of key prescriptive references identified for content analysis, it is 
apparent that it is also during the last four years, i.e. from 2011 to 2014, when the debate reached its 
climax in terms of the level of politicization.  
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Figure 16 – Trends of Prescriptive Reference, 2000-2014 
 
Lastly, from an epistemic community point of view, participants to the discussion appear to be 
much more willing to cite from their peers than from the western literature. Less than 5% of the 
authors cited original scholarly works from the west, and only 21.55% of them cited translated 
western works. In other words, less than one-thirds of the authors in the sample referred to western 
academic literature. In contrast and different from the findings of some earlier works on Chinese 
scholarly discourse, the authors cite overwhelmingly from their peers (71.43%), even more than 
from speeches made by the state leaders (53.04%). Given the political nature of the discussion, it is 
interesting that the academics in China are more willing to speak with one another than constantly 
referring to the party discourse.  
This pattern is also reflected in how frequent an author pays lip-services to the party doctrines. 
Only two-thirds of the articles emphasized that the connection between China’s minzu policy with 
Marxism (67.40%). With regard to the specific “signature ideologies” developed by PRC’s top 
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One might have expected the authors to be more willing to do so, in order to justify their argument 
or demonstrate their political loyalty when discussing such a highly sensitive topic. Yet only 12.15% 
mentioned Mao Zedong Thought (Ch: maozedong sixiang), 10.61% Deng Xiaoping Theory (Ch: 
dengxiaoping lilun), 11.60% Three Represents (Ch: sange daibiao), 25.41% Scientific Outlook on 
Development (Ch: kexue fazhanguan), and 3.87% China Dream (Ch: zhongguomeng). 
To identify how policy recommendations are distributed, I run a Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) using the ten “prescriptive references”. The result shows three prominent dimensions of 
opinion divisions. But as one can see from the figure above, the intensity of the debate rose 
significantly after 2008. It is thus possible that the clustering might change as we narrow down the 
scope. To capture the division of opinions during the most intense debate, I applied a second PCA 
on articles published between 2011 and 2014.  








Fight ethnic splittism 0.1385 0.4235* -0.0608 
Fight religious extremism 0.2071 0.5472* 0.0018 
Fight Violent terrorism 0.1996 0.5699* -0.0712 
Weaken Ethnic consciousness 0.4945* -0.0946 0.1900 
Depoliticize ethnic identity 0.4144* -0.1257 0.2706 
Adjust ethnic policies 0.4924* -0.1011 0.1784 
Protect minority language -0.2476 0.1215 0.6263* 
Respect freedom of faith -0.1845 0.1021 0.6761* 
Uphold ethnic regional autonomy -0.3521* 0.1087 -0.0135 
Enact autonomous regulation -0.1414 0.3529* -0.0234 
N=177, * if coefficient≥0.3 
 
I chose 2011 because the year before, 2010, has particular political significance. In 2010, two 
work conferences on respectively Xinjiang and Tibet were convened in Beijing, making the last 
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imprint of Hu Jintao administration on minzu policy (The Central People’s Government of the PRC 
中华人民共和国中央人民政府 2016). The succeeding four years are characterized by the 
anticipation of both a new leadership (Xi Jinping took office in 2013) and a new direction on minzu 
policy (ethnic work conference under Xi convened in 2014). Therefore, the period from 2011 to 
2014 is not only a time of intense debate but should also have been a period of concentrated policy 
lobbying in hoping to influence the incoming administration’s take on the policy. We should thus 
expect to see an even starker contrast between different groupings in this period. However, we see 
that the second PCA on articles from 2011 to 2014 produced a more or less similar result (see table 
below). This is likely due to the fact that the majority of strongly opinionated articles concentrate in 
this period, thus even a PCA on the entire timespan does not produce a very different picture.  








Fight ethnic splittism -0.0760 0.4738* -0.0259 
Fight religious extremism 0.0809 0.5535* 0.1222 
Fight Violent terrorism 0.0521 0.5898* -0.0577 
Weaken Ethnic consciousness 0.5103* 0.0678 -0.0278 
Depoliticize ethnic identity 0.4770* -0.0220 0.0961 
Adjust ethnic policies 0.5030* 0.0628 -0.0447 
Protect minority language -0.0392 -0.0413 0.6822* 
Respect freedom of faith 0.0286 0.0468 0.7034* 
Uphold ethnic regional autonomy -0.3999* 0.0103 0.0721 
Enact autonomous regulation -0.2859 0.3290* -0.0611 
N=95, * if coefficient≥0.3 
 
Because the coding used a nominal variable (0/1) for each question, where 1 is given to a 
positive answer and 0 to either a negative or a non-answer, one can also interpret this result as three 
distinct opinion clusters in the policy discourse. Each cluster, therefore, represents a group of policy 
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prescriptions with a specific focus. For the sake of simplicity and accessibility, I rename these three 
clusters as “depoliticization,” “institutionalization,” and “accommodation,” respectively.  
The first opinion cluster is the “depoliticization” camp. Members of this camp are associated 
with the opinions that the government should work to weaken the “ethnic consciousness” of the 
minorities, depoliticize their ethnic identity, and adjust the existing minzu policy. In addition, they 
either oppose the ethnic regional autonomy, or avoid endorsing it. Upon close reading, it became 
clear that the critics see “ethnic consciousness” as a transmission belt between ethnic regional 
autonomy and the rising ethnic tensions. In other words, ethnic regional autonomy causes increasing 
ethnic tensions, due to its nurturing of the “ethnic consciousness”. One can find this argument in 
the works of Zhou Ping (P. 平 Zhou 周 2010), Wang Heng (H. 恒 Wang 王 2010), Hu Angang and 
Hu Lianhe (A. 鞍钢 Hu 胡 and Hu 胡 2011), Liu Dongliang (D. 东亮 Liu 刘 2011), Luyang 
Lingbing (Luyang 卢阳 2011), Ma Rong (R. 戎 Ma 马 2013), Huang Lifu and Liufan (L. 立茀 
Huang 黄 and Liu 刘 2013), Qu Haiyang et al. (Qu 曲, Huang 黄, and Wu 吴 2013), and Yu Long 
(Yu 宇 2013). By faulting existing minzu policy for inciting inter-ethnic tension and threatening 
social stability, the critics in effect put it on trial for being against national interests. While they 
acknowledge the historical utility of this policy, they argue that new circumstance demands a new 
solution, which should focus on weakening ethnic (sub-national) identification, depoliticizing ethnic 
identities, and strengthening national identification.  
The second cluster is the “institutionalization” camp. Members of this camp emphasize the need 
to guard against ethnic splittism (Ch: minzu fenlie zhuyi), religious extremism (Ch: zongjiao jiduan shili), 
and violent terrorism (Ch: baoli kongbu shili). They also highlight the need to enact “autonomous 
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regulations”.147 Ethnic splittism can refer to wide range of activities, including but not exclusive to 
inciting ethnic hatred, engaging in ethnic violence, organizing or participating in separatist 
movement. In recent years, the term became frequently associated with “religious extremism” and 
“violent terrorism”. Together referred to as the “three evil forces” (Ch: sangu shili), they are often 
treated as the main threat to social stability and territorial integrity. The correlation between the 
emphasis on “three evil forces” and “autonomous regulation” reveals an important difference 
between this camp and the first one. Whereas “depoliticization” camp treats minority’s “ethnic 
consciousness” as the problem, here the threat comes from an “external other,” namely, the “three 
evil forces” who sabotage the country’s stability and peace. Consequently, the solution is precisely 
not to abandon existing policies, but to strengthen them against external threats. Articles such as Li 
Dajian (D. 大健 Li 李 2006), Gong Xiuping (Gong 宫 2007), Zeng Chenggui (Zeng 曾 2007), Liu 
Zaihua (Z. 在华 Liu 刘 2011), Shi Chenghu (Shi 史 2011), Hao Shiyuan (Hao 郝 2011, 2012a), and 
Lei Zhenyang & Chen Meng (Lei 雷 and Chen 陈 2013) exemplify this logic. By affirming the 
historical success of minzu policy and focusing on the “three evil forces,” they attempt to make a 
case for institutionalizing existing policy, particularly through autonomous regulations.  
The third cluster is the “accommodation” camp. Members of this camp emphasize the need to 
protect minority languages and religious freedom. Minority language and religious faith are key 
identity markers in the PRC. During the ethnic classification, language and religion were used as 
important criteria for granting official recognition to a number of ethnic groups (Mullaney 2011). 
Under the current policy, the government also should invest in the preservation and development of 
                                                      
147 The significance of ‘autonomous regulation’ (zizhi tiaoli) for an autonomous region of any level is twofold: on a 
symbolic level, it is an acknowledgement of an agreement between the central government and regional one to commit 
to the principle of ethnic regional autonomy; on a more practical level, it would specify the division of power between 
the central and regional government, according to which the “autonomy” is to be operationalized. While more than half 
of the autonomous units were established before 1960s, the process of enacting autonomous regulation did not begin 
until after the LERA came to effect in 1980s. Today a dozen of autonomous areas still does not have their own 
autonomous regulation. 
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minority languages, as well as ensuring the freedom of faith. In comparison, this camp reflects more 
affinity with the second camp than the first, with emphasis on protecting diversity. While there is no 
fundamental disagreement with the “institutionalization” camp, a lack of emphasis on autonomous 
regulations suggests they are more likely status-quoist. In other words, while they do not support 
“depoliticization,” they also avoid openly siding with more “institutionalization”. Duan Yunxue 
(Duan 段 2002), Cong Songri (Cong 丛 2009), Du Junhua (Du 杜 2011), Huang Zhu (Z. 铸 Huang 
黄 2012), Zhao Gang (Zhao 赵 2013), and Sun Yu (Yu 雨 Sun 孙 2014) are a few examples of this 
line of thinking.  
The “depoliticization” camp is the closest to the position of the pro-reform coalition. The 
“institutionalization” camp and “accommodation” camp, on the other hand, likely represent the 
anti-reform camp. While “depoliticization” stands out as a clearly prominent opinion cluster, it is far 
from being the dominant voice. Rather, opinions are polarized between those seeking to change 
policy towards repressing ethnic identities and those seeking to keep existing policy, while preserving 
ethnic identities. As the summary of principal components in the second PCA shows, the 
“depoliticization” camp account for 29.20% of the variance, whereas the combined 
“institutionalization” and “accommodation” camp account for 34.18%. Thus, the pro-reform 
opinion did not represent the majority in the intense debate from 2011 to 2014. Furthermore, when 
one compares the frequency of the ten “prescriptive references,” the most popular recommendation 
(“upholding ethnic regional autonomy”) negatively correlates with the “depoliticization” camp in the 
PCA analysis (Figure 16). The second most popular recommendation (“fighting ethnic splittism”) is 
most closely associated with the “institutionalization” camp. The signature recommendation of the 
first camp, “depoliticizing ethnic identity” is in fact the least mentioned one, appearing only 8 times 
out of 95 articles.  
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Thus, although pro-reform advocates constituted a powerful bloc within the expert community, 
anti-reform and status-quoist advocates responded with a more powerful counter campaign. The 
overwhelmingly support for the two anti-reform/status-quoist recommendations in comparison the 
rest further shows clearly the relative outnumbered position of the pro-reform camp. The above 
findings largely correspond and confirm the findings in chapter 6.  
Figure 17 – Frequency: Prescriptive Reference, 2011-2014 
 
Now to the important question concerning the “ethnicity” hypothesis: who are the ones 
supporting each of the ten policy recommendations? What could explain the academic’s behavior? 
OLS regressions on the “prescriptive references” and “ideological references” with authors’ profile 
provide us some tentative answers. As we can see from the tables below, membership in Chinese 
Marxist Ethnology (“field”) correlates strongly with a number of important indicators. Among the 
“prescriptive references”, the membership is negatively correlated with “weaken ethnic 
consciousness”, “depoliticize ethnic identity”, and “adjust minzu policy”. Among the “ideological 
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references”, it is positively correlated with “Marxism”, “Mao Zedong Thought”, “Deng Xiaoping 
Theory”, and “Three Represent”.   
In sum, experts who are members of the Chinese Marxist Ethnology are more likely to oppose 
measures that represent the reform proposal. At the same time, they are also more likely to invoke 
orthodox ideological terms than the rest of the expert community. Therefore, it appears that the 
core of the powerful anti-reform advocacy came from a group of experts with very distinct 
disciplinary and ideological backgrounds. These backgrounds, as I mentioned earlier, reflect a close 
tie to the state’s minzu policy. Given our foregoing discussion, this result suggests that the effective 
coordination of the anti-reform advocacy might have benefitted from the common background of 
these experts, which likely have provided them with extra incentives to play their part in the debate 
due to their shared membership in the field of minzu studies, which has close link with the minzu 
policy agency. Based on the above evidence, we can reasonably argue that the second alternative 
explanation, which predicts that ethnicity could have acted as a more powerful explanation for the 
behavior of academics in the debate, receives no support from the test. Rather, it is the membership 
in one’s field of studies that had the stronger influence.   
 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I tested two alternative explanations. The tests show that neither the occurrence 
of ethnic violence nor a writer’ ethnic identification has a strong influence on the character of a 
debate as I have suspected. As a result, my theory still holds, which argues that the conflict in the 
policy subsystem and the fragmentation in the knowledge community are the most important 
explanatory factors for the character of an academic policy debate. In the next chapter, I shall 
summarize the main findings of this study and discuss the implications.  
  
 291 





























































































































































Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001 
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Table 17 – Field, Ethnicity, Gender, Age, and Institutional Affiliation on Ideological Reference, 2011-2014 




Three Represents Scientific Outlook 
on Development 



























































































Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Summary of Findings 
This study asks the question: how do we account for the changes in the character of academic 
policy debate in Post-Mao China? From chapter 4 to chapter 7, I showed how changes in the policy 
subsystem and knowledge community influenced the way in which PRC academics talked about 
China’s minzu policy.  
As we have seen, scholars of ethnicity began a heated discussion about the theoretical 
foundation of minzu policy following the restoration of social sciences in the aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution (chapter 4). Under a reformist leadership and a generally collaborative policy 
system, a reconstituted knowledge community immediately plunged itself into a debate about the 
nature of interethnic relations in China at the time, with particular attention to the question whether 
there was persisting “de facto inequalities” among ethnic groups.  
Following the Tiananmen crackdown, the government gradually adjusted its minzu policy from 
an emphasis on cultural accommodation to an emphasis on development and, particularly in the case 
of Xinjiang, security (chapter 5). As the policy community became increasingly contentious due to 
this shift, a mildly diversifying research community on ethnicity was featuring increasingly political 
debate on minzu policy. Interests in politics of ethnicity began to motivate scholars outside of 
ethnology-related disciplines to join the discourse. As a result, a debate revolving around “ethnic 
consciousness” and its political ramification for the stability of the Chinese state took the center 
stage in the decade after the collapse of USSR, in which we saw the transition from theoretical 
debate to explicit policy critique.  
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The tension between development and security in China’s post-1989 minzu policy soon 
escalated (chapter 6). Starting from early 2000s, persisting ethnic tensions in the border regions 
gradually eroded the patience of hardliners in the leadership. The sudden outbreak of violence in 
two high-profile incidents in respectively 2008 and 2009 brought to the public the internal tension of 
minzu policy up until then and further aggravated the conflict between party elites with contrastingly 
different policy preferences (accommodation vs. integration). As the leadership hastily made 
adjustments in the aftermath of ethnic unrests in Tibet and Xinjiang with ad-hoc measures such as 
“ethnic solidarity education”, a pluralistic knowledge community took the lead to propose radically 
different policy alternative for the state. Scholars with background in sociology and political science, 
in particular, attacked the existing minzu policy for fostering ethno-nationalism of the minorities – 
particularly Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang – and endangering China’s political stability.  
Although the campaign did not succeed to convince the leadership for a systematic policy 
reform, the critical voice in the knowledge community on minzu managed to carve out and maintain 
a niche for continuing their policy-minded intellectual pursuit. Following the latest leadership 
transition, the party under Xi Jinping undertook a number of measures to the contain the intra-elite 
tensions through re-consolidating central control over minzu policy-making, while continuing to 
allow the securitization of in minority-concentrated border regions to go on (chapter 7). The 
knowledge community – despite increasing disciplinary diversity, research specialization, and 
professionalization – moderated the tone of overt political criticisms but continued to carry out 
critical policy discussion through studying specific policy instruments or practices.  
Taken together, the evidence presented in the preceding chapters largely supports my theory as 
it was laid out in chapter 2. From 1979 to 2017, the academic debate on minzu policy went from an 
intra-paradigm professional debate to an inter-paradigm political debate – as the conflict in the 
policy subsystem and the fragmentation in the knowledge community increased – only to become 
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somewhat moderated into an inter-paradigm professional debate following the direct intervention of 
the party leadership to unify policy discourse since 2014 on. Furthermore, as the analysis in chapter 
8 shows, the changes in the character of the debate cannot be attributed to either the occurrence of 
ethnic violence or the ethnic identification of the participating academic writers. In sum, we can 
explain a good degree of the way in which professional academics in Post-Mao China debate minzu 
policy by looking at both the changes in the level of conflict in the minzu policy subsystem and the 
level of fragmentation in the minzu knowledge community over time.  
 
9.2 Minzu Debate and Intellectual-State Relations in Post-Mao China  
9.2.1 A Threatened Yet Nonetheless Open Policy Discourse  
What do my findings tell us about the relationship between professional academics and the 
contemporary Chinese state? Although my study does not examine academic freedom, it is 
reasonable to say that by and large scholars are allowed and encouraged to pursue research on a 
variety of issues and from a variety of theoretical and methodological angles in the post-Mao era. 
Minzu policy remains a politically sensitive topic in the present period, as evident by the language 
employed in the “Depoliticization” and the “Second Generation Minzu Policy” debate (see chapter 
6, 7 and 8). Yet despite charges made in highly political terms by participants of the debate – 
especially by the critics of the reform proposals – the scholarly community carried on the debate in 
semi-public platforms, i.e. academic journals and books, without anyone suffering political 
repercussions for their opinions. Even after the 2014 Central Conference on Ethnic Work where Xi 
Jinping allegedly called off propositions advocating the abolishment of ethnic regional autonomy, 
ideas and opinions associated with such proposals continued to be circulated among scholars.  
Admittedly, there are boundaries in terms of what can be expressed in public or semi-public 
settings, e.g. academic publications, media interviews, or professional gatherings. No one would dare 
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to openly advocate, for instance, that the government should replace the existing institution of 
ethnic autonomous regions with a federalist system. However, within the parameter of permissible 
discussion, a wide range of opinions and perspectives continue to exist and clash with one another. 
This holds true even during the present time when claims are frequently made that the Chinese 
government is attacking the freedom of opinion,264 as scholars in China continued to explore and 
debate among themselves about the future of minzu policy (Gong 龚 2014; R. 戎 Ma 马 2015; Hao 
郝 2015; Xiaojun 小军 Zhang 张 2016; F. 芬 Wang 王 2017; Y. 悦 Wang 王 2017; W. 文钢 Li 李 
2017; Yan 严 2018). Therefore, it is safe to argue that the intellectual community in today’s China 
enjoy much greater freedom in pursuing research and expressing professional opinions on policy 
issues comparing with the earlier period, i.e. from 1957 (when Anti-Rightist Campaign was 
launched) to late 1970s (when the Cultural Revolution was over). It remains to be seen whether the 
current administration would make any further offense against the intellectual freedom of China’s 
domestic academic community. At the same time, what is equally interesting yet less studied is how 
scholars inside the country navigate various implicit and explicit rules about permissible speech to 
continue their critical policy discussion and what the discussion tells us about the likely trajectories of 
China’s minzu policy and ethnic politics.  
  
9.2.2 An Uneven Terrain for Critical Academic Engagement 
As we saw in chapter 7, following the 2014 Central Conference on Ethnic Work, most 
participants of the earlier minzu policy debate moderated their tone. At the same time, the debate 
                                                      
264 Tom Phillips, “China's young reporters give up on journalism: 'You can't write what you want',” The Guardian, Feb 
12th 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/china-journalism-reporters-freedom-of-speech, accessed 
October 26th, 2018; Sherisse Pham, “NYT, BBC and others barred from China's big moment,” CNN Business, October 
25, 2017, https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/25/media/china-western-media-xi-jinping-congress/index.html, accessed 
October 26th 2018.   
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left a space for critical discussions, which was sustained by a generally collaborative policy 
environment and a pluralistic knowledge community until the present day. In this discourse, we find 
a continuous and constructive dialogue about how specific policy practices and instruments could be 
adjusted, improved, or reformed, as I have argued in chapter 7 (Niu 牛 2016; Hu 虎 and Cheng 程 
2016; D. 道坤 Zhu 朱 2018). At the same time, the increasing research specialization and the 
growing division of labor within the knowledge community might have also facilitated the distancing 
of scholars from certain topics, either because they are not immediately relevant to their research or 
it would be politically unwise for them to take a position on those matters. Take Xinjiang’s “de-
extremification policy” as an example,265 after 2013 there was an evident increase in number of 
articles on the topic (see the figure below).  
Figure 18 – Number of Articles on “De-Extremification”, 1979-2016 
 
Many authors work either directly for the government or in public research units (e.g. colleges, 
universities, government think tanks) with a focus or specialization on law and enforcement, e.g. 
public security, police studies, legal studies, and counter-terrorism. Out of 140 publications on “de-
                                                      




































































































































































extremification” from 1979 to 2016266 only two were written by authors with an affiliation whose 
focus was ethnic minority or minzu policy. Yet “de-extremification policy” is clearly related to 
minzu policy. Contrasting the international outcry over the recent revelation of “re-education 
camps” in Xinjiang with the collective silence of scholars of ethnicity in China,267 one can see that 
there is a clear uneven engagement by the knowledge community. While the reasons for the absence 
of scholars of ethnicity in the “de-extremification” discussion is not clear, it is evident that this 
somewhat open space for policy discussion is not without its own bias, i.e. while it does allow critical 
voices, it might be favoring certain topics and certain directions than others.  
 
9.2.3 A More Tolerant Public Space 
In recent years, Chinese academics not only engage with one another in professional venues, but 
also publicize their opinion about minzu policy via media. During the “Depoliticization” and the 
“Second Generation Minzu Policy” debate, the state media outlet Global Times (Ch: huanqiu shibao) 
served as a regular public platform for scholars to openly debate minzu policy. Examples include 
Central Minzu University professor Wu Chuke, Xiong Kunxin, Ming Hao, Yan Qing, Zhang 
Haiyang, CASS researcher Li Sheng, Norbu Wangdan, Hao Shiyuan, PKU professor Ma Rong, 
Central Institute of Socialism professor Shen Jiaping, Xinjiang University professor Adilijiang 
Abulaiti, Zheng Liang, Xinjiang Academy of Social Science researcher Tu’erwenjiang Turxun, SEAC 
researcher Cao Jian.268  
                                                      
266 The articles are selected using automatic search on CNKI (Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure). The filtering 
criteria are: 1) subject includes “de-extremification” (Ch: qu jiduanhua), 2) published between 1979 and 2016.  
267 “China Uighurs: Xinjiang legalises ‘re-education’ camps,” October 10th, 2018, BBC, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45812419, accessed October 26th, 2018; Lily Kuo, “From denial to pride: how 
China changed its language on Xinjiang’s camps,” Oct 22nd, 2018, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/from-denial-to-pride-how-china-changed-its-language-on-xinjiangs-
camps, accessed October 26th, 2018.  
268 All articles appeared on Global Times: “Hao Shiyuan: No Need to Glorify Indian’s Ethnic Policy” (“郝时远：不必
美化印度的民族政策”), August 22nd 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-08/3056703.html; “Wu Chuke: 
Soviet Nationalities Policy Must Not be the ‘Template’” (“吴楚克: 苏联的民族政策不能是’模板’”), January 23rd 2013, 
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In addition to conventional media, a number of scholars also took advantage of the power of 
social media to publicize their policy opinions. One example is Xi Wuyi, researcher at CASS 
Institute of World Religion and director of the 2010-founded CASS Center of Science and Atheism 
Study (Ch: kexue yu wushenlun yanjiu zhongxin), who has been not only very active on Sina Blog and 
Sina Weibo269 but also highly critical about the present minzu policy.270 Xi Wuyi has been particular 
vocal about what she perceived as the growing influence of religion – particularly Islam – in the 
public life of China. Grassroot Han supremacism – including anti-ethnic minority, anti-Muslim, and 
anti-Black discourse – has existed independently from the involvement of establishment intellectuals 
for many years (Sautman 1994; Leibold 2010; Y. Cheng 2011; Carrico 2017). However, Xi Wuyi’s 
essays and comments – with her often polemical criticism of the existing policy regarding ethnicity 
and religion and her extensive use of social media platform – represent yet another form of critical 
policy engagement, where a direct communication channel is being established between intellectuals 
working for public education and research institutions and the general population. While it remains 
to be studied the social, political, and policy impact of their activities, it is certain that Xi Wuyi and 
                                                      
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-01/3572290.html; “Ming Hao: China Is Not a So-called ‘Nation-
State’” (“明浩: 中国不是所谓的’民族国家’”), April 20th 2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-
04/3852419.html;  “Experts: Improve Minzu Policy, Promote Stability in Border Regions” (“专家: 完善民族政策, 促
进边疆地区稳定”), July 11th 2013 http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-07/4115157.html; “Xiong 
Kunxin: China’s Minzu Theory Must Not Give Itself Up” (“熊坤新: 中国民族理论不能自我放弃”), October 28th 
2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-10/4495639.html; “Zheng Liang: Media Discourse on 
Counter-Terrorism Must be Delinked from Ethnicity and Religion” (“郑亮: 反恐媒介话语须与民族宗教脱钩”), 
November 1st 2013 http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-11/4516355.html; “Scholars Discussing Minzu 
Question #1: the ‘Marginalization’ of Ethnic Minorites Deserves Attention” (“学者讨论民族问题之一: 少数民族’被
边缘化’值得注意”), November 12th 2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2013-11/4557131.html; 
“Abulaiti: Slandering Bilingual Education is Doing Harm to Ethnic Minorities” (“阿布来提: 诋毁双语教育，是在害
少数民族”), June 12th 2014, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2014-06/5017749.html; “Hao Shiyuan: 
China’s Minzu Policy Is Not ‘Outmatched by Others’” (“郝时远: 中国民族政策并非’技不如人’”), April 7th 2015, 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2015-04/6107998.html; “Ma Rong: No Need to Put a Negative Label on 
Nationalism” (“马戎：不必将民族主义贴上负面标签”), April 28th 2015, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/culture/2015-
04/6290821.html, accessed October 26th 2018.  accessed October 26th, 2018.      
269 Sina Weibo (Ch: xinlang weibo) is the largest microblogging service and one of the most popular social media platforms 
in China.  
270 Xi Wuyi’s Sina Blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_55f6f0270102xqd3.html; Xu Wuyi’s Sina Weibo: 
https://www.weibo.com/u/1442246695?from=myfollow_all, accessed October 26th 2018.   
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alike represent a group of new public intellectuals willing and capable of taking advantage of new 
media to influence public opinion in today’s China.271 
 
9.3 Minzu Debate and Intellectual Innovations in Post-Mao Policy Fields 
It would not be sufficient if this conclusion does not address the big question posed at the 
beginning of this dissertation, i.e. how do intellectual innovations in policy fields occur under 
authoritarian China? The answer, as it should be clear by now, is that the changing intellectual-state 
relations during the past two decades or so had enabled a more dynamic, critical policy discussion in 
China; with regards to minzu policy in particular, the fragmentation of knowledge community has 
led to a pluralization of theoretical viewpoints of academics, who have proved to actively take 
advantage of the open space created by policy struggles among elites to push for new ideas, 
perspectives, as well as greater acceptance of their very presence and intervention in the minzu 
policy discourse. At the time of writing, the minzu discourse based on the immediate Post-Mao 
consensus faces unprecedented challenge. A new generation of scholars are actively questioning the 
conceptual and theoretical foundation of the existing minzu policy by drawing from a variety of 
disciplines, ranging from political science, anthropology, to legal studies, history, and borderland 
studies.  
It should be noted that the focus of this study is the potential of an academic policy debate in 
terms of fostering intellectual innovations in the policy fields. The evaluative standard is not based 
on what policy decision(s) comes after or out of the academic discussions. Rather, the concern is 
when one could expect a debate to be best suited to challenge conventions, promote new ideas, 
                                                      
271 For a quick, non-academic discussion of Xi Wuyi and online Han supremacism, see Yao Jinyong, “The Evil-Minded 
Xi Wuyi Who Strives to Stir Up Troubles for Ethnic Relations” (“居心叵测、 竭力挑拨民族矛盾的习五一”), 
http://www.zghzxw.com/content-168-1002-1.html; Zhang Jianmin, “The Evolution of Online Anti-Muslim Writers” 
(“网络穆黑的前世今生”), http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-100379-1000163.html, accessed October 26th 2018.   
 301 
while keeping the space for dialogue open. In contrast, a number of scholars have followed the 
minzu policy debate alongside the trajectory of ethnic politics in China in the last decade or so. 
Among them, Mark Elliot’s (2015) analysis focused more on the epistemic genealogy of the debate, 
whereas Barry Sautman (2010, 2012) and James Leibold (2013) studied more closely the policy 
implications. Both latter authors have noted the dangerous tendency of relaxing the rigid ethnicity-
based affirmation action programs while emphasizing identification with the “national” cultural and 
language, as reform proposals during the latest debate called for. Moreover, there has been a number 
of disturbing recent developments in the Chinese government’s approach to ethnic minorities that 
seem to echo the viewpoints expressed in the debate. It is not unreasonable to infer that the space 
opened up in the minzu discourse by the debate and the reform proposals that drove the debate 
were in some way connected with those regressive policy developments. A critical analysis of the 
minzu policy discourse with greater attention on the government’s justification of those regressive 
practices would help to elucidate better the social and political impact of the academic policy debate. 
The present study, however, makes no evaluation in any way the actual policies being implemented 
in light of their consequences; nor does it seek to assess the political ramification of the PRC official 
and intellectual discourse on ethnic politics and interethnic relations in China and elsewhere from a 
normative standpoint – both are extremely important topics and should receive more attention from 
political scientists. Rather, what I would like to propose is a recognition that, despite recent policy 
development, the debate that publicized those radical proposals was not merely a result of policy 
conflict, but also a product of intellectual pluralization of the knowledge community. This latter 
development should, hopefully, do more good than harm to the improvement of governance in 




Appendix A Glossary 
 
a) State Agencies and Party Organizations 
 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China 
abbr. Central Committee  
中国共产党中央委员会 zhongguo gongchandang 
zhongyang weiyuanhui 
abbr. 中共中央 zhonggong zhongyang  
Central Coordinating Small Group for Tibet 
Work 
中央西藏工作协调小组 zhongyang xizang 
gongzuo xietiao xiaozu  
Central Coordinating Small Group for Xinjiang 
Work 
中央新疆工作协调小组 zhongyang xinjiang 
gongzuo xietiao xiaozu 
Central Military Commission of the Communist 




员会 zhongguo gongchandang he zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui  
abbr. 中央军委 zhongyang junwei  
Central National Security Commission of the 
Communist Party of China  
abbr. CNSC 
中央国家安全委员会 zhongyang guojia anquan 
weiyuanhui  
abbr. 国安委 guo’anwei  
Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission 
of the Communist Party of China  
abbr. Central Poli-Legal Commission 
中共中央政法委员会 zhonggong zhongyang 
zhengfa weiyuanhui 
abbr. 中央政法委 zhongyang zhengfawei  
Central Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party of China  
abbr. Politburo  
中国共产党中央政治局 zhongguo gongchandang 
zhongyan zhengzhiju 
abbr. 政治局 zhengzhiju  
Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of 
China  
abbr. Central Secretariat  
中国共产党中央书记处 zhongguo gongchandang 
zhongyang shujichu 
abbr. 中央书记处 zhongyang shujichu 
Chinese People’s Armed Police Force  
abbr. PAP  
中国人民武装警察部队 zhongguo renmin 
wuzhuang jingcha budui 
abbr. 武警 wujing  
Chinese People’s Liberation Army  
abbr. PLA 
中国人民解放军 zhongguo renmin jiefangjun  
abbr. 解放军 jiefangjun  
Ethnic Affairs Commission of the Central 
People’s Government (1949-1954) 
abbr. EAC  
中央人民政府民族事务委员会 zhongyang 
renmin zhengfu minzu shiwu weiyuanhui (1949-1954) 
abbr. 中央民委 zhongyang minwei  
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Ethnic Affairs Committee of the National 
People's Congress  
abbr. NPC-EAC 
全国人民代表大会民族委员会 quanguo 
renmin dabiao dahui minzu weiyuanhui  
abbr. 全国人大民委 quanguo renda minwei  
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference  
abbr. CPPCC-ERAC 
中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会民族和
宗教委员会 zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang 
huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui minzu he zongjiao 
weiyuanhui  
abbr. 全国政协民宗委 quanguo zhengxie 
minzongwei  
General Office of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 
abbr. Central Office 
中国共产党中央办公厅 zhongguo gongchandang 
zhongyang bangongting  
abbr. 中办 zhongban  
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region  
abbr. GZAR 
广西壮族自治区 guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu 
abbr. 广西 guangxi 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region  
abbr. IMAR 
内蒙古自治区 neimenggu zizhiqu 
abbr. 内蒙/内蒙古 neimeng/neimenggu 
Islamic Association of China  
abbr. IAC 
中国伊斯兰教协会 zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui 
abbr. 中国伊协 zhongguo yixie 
Lanzhou Military Region of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army  
abbr. LMR 
中国人民解放军兰州军区 zhongguo renmin 
jiefangjun lanzhou junqu 
abbr. 兰州军区 lanzhou junqu 
Ministry of State Security of the People’s 
Republic of China 
abbr. MSS 
中华人民共和国国家安全部 zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guojia anquan bu  
abbr. 国安部 guoanbu, 安全部 anquanbu 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference of the 
People’s Republic of China  
abbr. CPPCC 
中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 zhongguo 
renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui 
abbr. 全国政协 quanguo zhengxie 
National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China  
abbr. NPC  
中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会 zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui 
abbr. 全国人大 quanguo renda 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region  
abbr. NHAR  
宁夏回族自治区 ningxia huizu zizhiqu 
abbr. 宁夏 ningxia 
Production and Construction Corps of the 
Xinjiang Military District of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (1954-1975) 
中国人民解放军新疆军区生产建设兵团 
zhongguo renmin jiefangjun xinjiang junqu shengchan 
jianshe bingtuan (1954-1975)  
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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(1981-present)  
abbr. XJPCC 
新疆生产建设兵团 xinjiang shengchan jianshe 
bingtuan (1981-present) 
abbr. 兵团 bingtuan 
State Administration for Religious Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China  
abbr. SARA  
中华人民共和国国家宗教事务局 zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guojia zongjiao shiwuju  
abbr. 宗教局 zongjiaoju 
State Council of the People's Republic of China 
abbr. SC  
中华人民共和国国务院 zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guowuyuan 
abbr. 国务院 guowuyuan  
State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the 
People's Republic of China (1978-present) 
abbr. SEAC 
中华人民共和国国家民族事务委员会 
zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia minzu shiwu 
weiyuanhui (1978-present)  
abbr. 国家民委 guojia minwei 
Tibet/Xizang Autonomous Region 
abbr. TAR 
西藏自治区 xizang zizhiqu 
abbr. 西藏 xizang 
United Front Work Department (of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China) 
abbr. UFWD 
中共中央统一战线工作部 zhonggong zhongyang 
tongyi zhanxian gongzuo bu 
abbr. 统战部 tongzhanbu 
Xinjiang Military District of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army  
abbr. XMD 
中国人民解放军新疆军区 zhongguo renmin 
jiefangjun xinjiang junqu 
abbr. 新疆军区 xinjiang junqu  
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region  
abbr. XUAR 
新疆维吾尔自治区 xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu 
abbr. 新疆 xinjiang 
 
b) Laws, Regulations, and Policies 
 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
(1982/1988/1993/1999/2004/2018)272 
中华人民共和国宪法 zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xianfa (1982/1988/1993/1999/2004/2018) 
Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic 
of China (2015) 
中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法 zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo fankongbuzhuyi fa (2015) 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Standard Spoken and Written Chinese 
Language (2000)  
中华人民共和国国家通用语言文字法 
zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongyong yuyan 
wenzi fa (2000) 
                                                      
272 The first date in the bracket refers to the one when the law was first enacted or approved. The date(s) following the 
first one refers to those when the laws received amendments. This applies to all the bracketed dates in this section and 
after.  
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Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy of the 
People’s Republic of China (1984/2001) 
abbr. LERA   
中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa (1984/2001)  
abbr. 民族区域自治法 minzu quyu zizhifa 
National Security Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (2015)  
中华人民共和国国家安全法 zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guojia anquan fa (2015) 
Regulation on Religious Affairs (2004/2017) 宗教事务条例 zongjiao shiwu tiaoli (2004/2017) 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
Regulation on De-extremification (2017) 
新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例 xinjiang 
weiwu’er zizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaoli (2017) 
 
c) Academic and Research Organizations 
 
Center for Chinese Borderland History and 
Geography Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (1983-2014) 
Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2014-
present)  
中国社会科学院中国边疆史地研究中心 
zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi 
yanjiu zhongxin (1983-2014) 
中国社会科学院中国边疆研究所 zhongguo 
shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang yanjiusuo 
(2014-present) 
Central Institute for Nationalities (1951-1994) 
Central University for Nationalities/Minzu 
University of China (1994-present) 
abbr. CIN (1951-1994), CUN/MUC (1994-
present)  
中央民族学院 zhongyang minzu xueyuan (1951-
1994) 
中央民族大学 zhongyang minzu daxue (1994-
present) 
abbr. 中央民院 zhongyang minyuan (1951-
1994), 中央民大 zhongyang minda (1994-
present)  
China Tibetology Research Center  中国藏学研究中心 zhongguo zangxue yanjiu 
zhongxin  
Chinese Academy of Sciences  
abbr. CAS 
中国科学院 zhongguo kexueyuan  
abbr. 中科院 zhongkeyuan  
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  
abbr. CASS  
中国社会科学院 zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 
abbr. 中国社科院 zhongguo shekeyuan 
Chinese Ethnological Research Association 
(1980-1984) 
Chinese Nationalities Study Association (1984-
1991) 
Chinese Ethnology Association (1991-present) 
中国民族学研究会 zhongguo minzuxue yanjiuhui 
(1980-1984)  
中国民族学会 zhongguo minzu xuehui (1984-
1991)  
中国民族学学会 zhongguo minzuxue xuehui 
(1991-present)  
Division of Research, Central Institute for 
Nationalities (1952-1980)  
Institute of Nationalities Research, Central 
中央民族学院研究部 zhongyang minzu xueyuan 
yanjiubu (1952-1980)  
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Institute for Nationalities (1980-1993) 
Department of Ethnology, Central Institute for 
Nationalities (1983-present) 
Faculty of Ethnological Research, Central 
University for Nationalities (1993-2000) 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, 
Central University for Nationalities (1995-
present) 
Faculty of Ethnology and Sociology, Central 
University for Nationalities (2000-present)  
 
中央民族学院民族研究所 zhongyang minzu 
xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo (1980-1995) 
中央民族学院民族学系 zhongyang minzu 
xueyuan minzuxuexi (1983-present) 
中央民族大学民族学研究院 zhongyang minzu 
daxue minzuxue yanjiuyuan (1993-2000) 
中央民族大学民族学人类学研究所 
zhongyang minzu daxue minzuxue renleixue yanjiusuo 
(1995-present) 
中央民族大学民族学与社会学学院 
zhongyang minzu daxue minzuxue yu shehuixue 
xueyuan (2000-present) 
Institute of Nationalities, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (1958-1977) 
Institute of Nationalities, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (1977-2002) 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2002-
present) 
中国科学院民族研究所 zhongguo kexueyuan 
minzu yanjiusuo (1958-1977) 
中国社会科学院民族研究所 zhongguo shehui 
kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo (1977-2002) 
中国社会科学院民族学与人类学研究所 
zhongguo shehui kexueyuan minzuxue yu renleixue 
yanjiusuo (2002-present)  
Institute of Sociology, Peking University (1985-
1992) 
Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Peking University (1992-present)  
北京大学社会学研究所 beijing daxue shehuixue 
yanjiusuo (1985-1992) 
北京大学社会学人类学研究所 beijing daxue 
shehuixue renleixue yanjiusuo (1992-present)  
Tibet Academy of Social Sciences  西藏社会科学院 xizang shehhui kexueyuan 
Tibet Think Tank 西藏智库 xizang zhiku  
Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences 新疆社会科学院 xinjiang shehui kexueyuan 
Xinjiang Think Tank 新疆智库 xinjiang zhiku 
 
d) Academic Disciplines 
 
Anthropology  人类学 renleixue 
Counter-Terrorism Studies 反恐学 fankongxue 
Cultural Anthropology 文化人类学 wenhua renleixue 
Ethno-National/Minzu History 民族史 minzushi 
Ethno-National/Minzu Policy Studies  民族政策学 minzu zhengcexue 
Ethno-National/Minzu Politics 民族政治学 minzu zhengzhixue 
Ethno-National/Minzu Question Studies  民族问题研究 minzu wenti yanjiu 
Ethno-National/Minzu Sociology  民族社会学 minzu shehuixue 
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Ethno-National/Minzu Studies  民族研究 minzu yanjiu  
Ethno-National/Minzu Theory 民族理论 minzu lilun 
Ethnology  民族学 minzuxue 
Folklore Studies  民俗学 minsuxue 
Borderland Politics  边疆政治学 bianjiang zhengzhixue 
Borderland Administration  边政学 bianzhengxue 
Marxist Ethnology  马克思主义民族学 makesi zhuyi minzuxue  
Physical Anthropology  体质人类学 tizhi renleixue 
Religious Studies  宗教学 zongjiaoxue 
Sociology  社会学 shehuixue 
Soviet Ethnography (Советская Этнография) 苏联民族学 sulian minzuxue 
Tibetology  藏学 zangxue 
 
e) Political Concepts 
 
Contact, Exchange, Integration among Ethnic 
Groups  
各民族交往交流交融 geminzu jiaowang jiaoliu 
jiaorong 
De-extremification 去极端化 qu jiduanhua 
De-politicization  去政治化 qu zhengzhihua 
Diversity in Unity 多元一体 duoyuan yiti 
Ethnic Integration  民族融合 minzu ronghe 
Ethnic Solidarity 民族团结 minzu tuanjie 
Five Keys 五把钥匙 wu ga yaoshi273 
Four Identifications  
Five Identifications 
四个认同 sige rentong274 
五个认同 wuge renting275 
                                                      
273 “Problems with mind should be worked through mind, problems with culture should be worked through with 
culture, problems with conventions should be treated with respect, problems with religion should be handled according 
to the actual conditions of the religion, problems with violent terrorism should be dealt with through the rule of law and 
strike-hard actions.” (“思想的问题用思想的方法去解决，文化的问题用文化的方式去解决，习俗的问题用尊
重的态度去对待，宗教的问题按照宗教规律去做好工作，暴恐的问题用法治和严打的方式去解决”) 
274 “Identification with the Motherland, Identification with the Chinese Nation, Identification with the Chinese Culture, 
Identification with the Socialist Path” (“对祖国的认同, 对中华民族的认同, 对中华文化的认同, 对社会主义道路
的认同”) 
275 “Identification with the Great Motherland, Identification with the Chinese Nation, Identification with the Chinese 
Culture, Identification with the Chinese Communist Party, Identification with the Socialist Path” (“对伟大祖国的认同, 




四个维护 sige weihu276 
五个维护 wuge weihu277 
Great Han-ism  
Han Chauvinism  
大汉族主义 dahanzu zhuyi 
大汉沙文主义 dahanzu shawen zhuyi 
Great Western Development  西部大开发 xibu dakaifa 
Halalification  泛清真化 fan qingzhenhua 
Harmonious Socialist Society 社会主义和谐社会 shehui zhuyi hexie shehui 
Local Nationalism 
Parochial Nationalism  
地方民族主义 difang minzu zhuyi 
狭隘民族主义 xia’ai minzu zhuyi 
Marxist Outlook on Minzu 马克思主义民族观 makesi zhuyi minzuguan  
People’s War against Terrorism 反恐人民战争 fankong renmin zhanzheng 
Scientific Outlook on Development  科学发展观 kexue fazhanguan  
Second Generation Ethno-National (Minzu) 
Policy  
第二代民族政策 di’erdai minzu zhengce 
Stability Maintenance 维稳 weiwen 
State-Nation  国族 guozu 
Stationing-in-Xinjiang Cadres (post assignment) 
Stationing-in-Xinjiang Soldiers (post 
assignment)  
留疆干部 liujiang ganbu 
留疆战士 liujiang zhanshi 
Strike-Hard Campaign  
Strike Hard and Maintain High Pressure  
严打 yanda 
严打高压 yanda gaoya 
Supporting-Tibet Cadres 
Supporting-Xinjiang Cadres  
援藏干部 yuanzang ganbu 
援疆干部 yuanjiang ganbu 
Three Evils/Three Evil Forces  三股势力 san’gu shili278 
Three Represents 三个代表 san’ge daibiao 
Two Fewers, One Leniency  两少一宽 liangshao yikuan  
                                                      
276 “Safeguard Interests of the People, Safeguard Sanctity of Law, Safeguard Ethnic Solidarity, Safeguard Unity of the 
Motherland,” (“维护人民利益, 维护法律尊严, 维护民族团结, 维护祖国统一”) 
277 “Safeguard Socialist Democracy, Safeguard Socialist Rule of Law, Safeguard Fundamental Interests of the Masses, 
Safeguard Unity of the Motherland, Safeguard Ethnic Solidarity” (“维护社会主义民主, 维护社会主义法制, 维护人
民群众根本利益, 维护祖国统一, 维护民族团结”) 
278 “Violent Terrorism, Ethnic Splittism, Religious Extremism” (“暴力恐怖势力, 民族分裂势力, 宗教极端势力”)  
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Two Inseparables  
Three Inseparables  
Three Indistinguishables  
两个离不开 liangge libukai279 
三个离不开 san’ge libukai 280 
三个分不清 san’ge fenbuqing281 




                                                      
279 “Han are inseparable from ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities are inseparable from Han” (“汉族离不开少数民族, 
少数民族离不开汉族”)  
280 “Han are inseparable from ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities are inseparable from Han, ethnic minorities are 
inseparable among each other” (“汉族离不开少数民族, 少数民族离不开汉族, 各少数民族之间也互相离不开”)  
281 “Han are indistinguishable from ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities are indistinguishable from Han, ethnic minorities 
are indistinguishable among each other” (“汉族与少数民族分不清, 少数民族与汉族分不清, 少数民族与少数民族
分不清”) 
282 “Visit (the People), Benefit (the People), Get Together (the Hearts of the People),” in Chinese: “访民情, 惠民生, 聚
民心”  
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Appendix B List of Interviews 
Numbering Date Location Interviewee Type 
20130603BJA 2013-06-03 Beijing Academic 
20130604BJA 2013-06-04 Beijing Academic 
20130616BJA 2013-06-16 Beijing Academic 
20130701BJA 2013-07-01 Beijing Academic 
20130705BJA 2013-07-05 Beijing Academic 
20130710BJA 2013-07-10 Beijing Academic 
20130716BJA 2013-07-16 Beijing Academic 
20140721BJA 2014-07-21 Beijing Academic 
20140801BJA 2014-08-01 Beijing Academic 
20140828KMA 2014-08-28 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20140829KMA 2014-08-29 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20140902KMA 2014-09-02 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20140905KMA 2014-09-05 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20140911BJA 2014-09-11 Beijing Academic 
20141013BJA 2014-10-13 Beijing Academic 
20141021BJA 2014-10-21 Beijing Academic 
20141023BJA 2014-10-23 Beijing Academic 
20141104BJA-1 2014-11-04 Beijing Academic 
20141104BJA-2 2014-11-04 Beijing Academic 
20141104BJA-3 2014-11-04 Beijing Academic 
20150319BJJ 2015-03-19 Beijing Journalist 
20150324BJA 2015-03-24 Beijing Academic 
20150330BJA 2015-03-30 Beijing Academic 
20150331BJA 2015-03-31 Beijing Academic 
20150401BJA 2015-04-01 Beijing Academic 
20150404BJA 2015-04-04 Beijing Academic 
20150413KMA 2015-04-13 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20150415KMO 2015-04-15 Kunming, Yunnan Official 
20150416KMO 2015-04-16 Kunming, Yunnan Academic 
20150513BJA 2015-05-13 Beijing Academic 
20150515BJA 2015-05-15 Beijing Academic 
20150618BJA 2015-06-18 Beijing Academic 
20150623BJA 2015-06-23 Beijing Academic 
20150625BJA 2015-06-25 Beijing Academic 
20150630BJA 2015-06-30 Beijing Academic 
20150703BJA 2015-07-03 Beijing Academic 
20150711UQA 2015-07-11 Urumqi, Xinjiang Academic 
20150713UQA 2015-07-13 Urumqi, Xinjiang Academic 
20150714UQO 2015-07-14 Urumqi, Xinjiang Official 
20150714UQA 2015-07-14 Urumqi, Xinjiang Academic 
20150715UQE 2015-07-15 Urumqi, Xinjiang Educator 
20150715UQA 2015-07-15 Urumqi, Xinjiang Academic 
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20150724YMA 2015-07-24 Yumin County, Xinjiang Academic 
20150807YJO 2015-08-07 Yanji, Jilin Official 
20150807YJA 2015-08-07 Yanji, Jilin Academic 
20150810HCO 2015-08-10 Hunchun, Jilin Official 
20150812YJA 2015-08-12 Yanji, Jilin Academic 
20150813YJA 2015-08-13 Yanji, Jilin Academic 
20160116BJA 2016-01-16 Beijing Academic 
20160117BJA 2016-01-17 Beijing Academic 
20160119BJA 2016-01-19 Beijing Academic 
20160725XNA 2016-07-25 Xining, Qinghai Academic 
20160729TRE 2016-07-29 Tongren County, Qinghai Educator 
20160730TRE 2016-07-30 Tongren County, Qinghai Educator 
20160730TRO 2016-07-30 Tongren County, Qinghai Official 
20160731TRO 2016-07-31 Tongren County, Qinghai Official 
20160802LZA-1 2016-08-02 Lanzhou, Gansu Academic 
20160802LZA-2 2016-08-02 Lanzhou, Gansu Academic 
20160802LZE 2016-08-02 Lanzhou, Gansu Educator 
20160803LZA 2016-08-03 Lanzhou, Gansu Academic 
20160810BJA 2016-08-10 Beijing Academic 
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